



MAX WEBER

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*The Protestant Ethic and  
the "Spirit" of Capitalism  
and Other Writings*

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# THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM

and Other Writings



Max Weber (1864-1920) was a German sociologist and historian who significantly influenced the development of modern social science through his attempts to develop a systematic methodology for cross-cultural studies. His best-known work, *The Protestant Ethic and the "Spirit" of Capitalism* (1905), linked the growth of modern capitalism to Protestant religious beliefs. It was followed by encyclopedic inquiries into the world religions, geopolitics, revolution, domination, class structure, bureaucracy, law, the city, the state, and science, culminating in the posthumously published *Economy and Society* (1922). For the last twenty years of his life, Weber worked as an independent scholar, accepting professorships only briefly at the Universities of Vienna (1918) and Munich (1919-20). Paralleling and informing Weber's scientific work in sociology, economics, law, and history was a serious involvement in political questions. A vocal critic of Bismarck's political legacy and of the histrionics of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Weber championed a German parliamentary democracy based on the British and American models. He participated in the committee charged with drafting the Weimar Constitution and was also a member of the German delegation at Versailles. He died in Munich of pneumonia on June 14, 1920.

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THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND  
THE "SPIRIT" OF CAPITALISM  
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by  
MAX WEBER

EDITED, TRANSLATED, AND WITH AN  
INTRODUCTION BY  
PETER BAEHR AND GORDON C. WELLS



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## THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION

*The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism* is one of those audacious and robust texts for which the term “classic” could have been invented. Ever since its publication in 1905,<sup>1</sup> the essay has provoked controversy, prompting successive generations of readers to wrestle with the paradox at its core. Many authors might have welcomed such notoriety, but not Max Weber (1864-1920), who bitterly complained that the critics had misunderstood him and that the ensuing debate was both obfuscating and sterile. To prevent further confusion, he revised the essay in 1919, modifying some of its formulations and increasing further an already massive apparatus of footnotes. But all attempts at definitive clarification were to no avail; Weber’s revision, published in 1920,<sup>2</sup> served only to generate new problems and ambiguities. And herein, ironically, lies the secret of *The Protestant Ethic’s* fame. If Weber’s “thesis” were self-evidently true, simple, or translucent, it would never have engaged a critical audience in the first place or survived to become a classic. “Mere” solutions to a problem impede a text’s ascent to greatness for the simple reason that they offer no challenges for contemporaries to embrace and successors to ponder.<sup>3</sup> Weber’s achievement was not to definitively answer a riddle but to stake out a territory fertile of new puzzles at the heart of which is the claim that religious forces, not simply economic ones, paved the way for the mentality characteristic of modern, Western capitalism. On Weber’s account, our secular and materialistic culture is partly indebted to a *spiritual* revolution: the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. That Weber’s argument raises—or begs—a hundred questions is inseparable from its eminence and renown.

## II

Although key themes of *The Protestant Ethic* were rehearsed by Weber as early as 1898,<sup>4</sup> the essay itself was written in stages between the summer of 1903<sup>5</sup> and the winter of 1905. Its composition came at a watershed moment: Weber, recovering from a prolonged nervous illness, was once more testing his creative powers. His wife, Marianne (née Schnitger, 1870-1954), was under no illusions about the essay's significance for her husband. She described it as "the first work to make Weber's star shine again" and one "connected with the deepest roots of his personality."<sup>6</sup> Perhaps this is why he defended it so vehemently and with a passionate indignation unmatched in all his other scholarly writings.

The writings on Protestantism that we present below—particularly *The Protestant Ethic* (the version of 1905) and its companion piece "*Churches*" and "*Sects*" in *North America* (1906)—condense Weber's deepest interests and commitments, and this is what makes them such intensely personal works. They also abridge a number of themes that go beyond their obvious subject matter. Not least of them is a plea for Imperial Germany to grow up: to cast off a politically authoritarian, outmoded system, dominated by the Junker landed class and embrace the modern industrial order. Weber located the origins of modern freedom not in the Enlightenment,<sup>7</sup> but in the Puritan Anglo-American tradition; the struggle to establish liberty of conscience and worship, he argued, was the cornerstone of all other human rights. The vanguard of that struggle was the Protestant sects—Baptists, Quakers, and others—whose influence in Germany had been eclipsed by the Lutheran Church and its "aura of office." Weber acknowledged that Lutheranism began life as a radical movement, but he viewed its trajectory as moving in an increasingly illiberal direction, endorsing state power against individual freedom and, allegedly like Catholicism, encouraging passive adaptation to existing conditions rather than soliciting innovation and risk. As he confessed in a much-quoted letter to the theologian Adolf von Harnack, written shortly after *The Protestant Ethic* was completed: "Luther towers above all others, but Lutheranism is—I don't deny it—in its historical articulation the most frightening of terrors for me. . . . [T]he fact that our nation never went through the school of hard asceticism, in no form whatsoever, is the source of everything that I hate about it (and about myself). I can't help it, but in religious terms the average American sect member surpasses our institutional Christians as much as Luther excels, as a religious personality, Calvin, Fox, *et*

*tutti quanti*.”<sup>8</sup> The heartlands of radical individualism, Weber claimed, were to be found in England and America, nations that created not only free institutions, effective parliaments, and responsible and dynamic leaders but also the capacity for global power politics. In contrast, Weber lamented, Germany was in danger of becoming a laughingstock. Politically rudderless and impotent, crassly dependent on Bismarck’s “Caesarist” legacy<sup>9</sup> and at the mercy of Wilhelm II’s well-publicized histrionics, Germany lacked the combination of discipline *and* freedom that the Puritan tradition had vouchsafed to the Anglophone world.<sup>10</sup>

However, Weber’s writings on Protestantism bear traces not only of the travails of Lutheranism but also of Bismarck’s disastrous struggle against German Catholics—the so-called *Kulturkampf* (1871-79)<sup>11</sup>—that, under the guise of resisting Catholic obscurantism, tore the nation apart and hastened the decline of German liberalism. It was not that Weber was any great friend of the Roman Catholic Church; on the contrary, he shared the widely held view among Protestant liberals that Catholicism was “traditionalist, hostile to progress, and culturally ‘inferior.’”<sup>12</sup> It was more that, in the aftermath of the *Kulturkampf*, German Catholics were pressing vocally for occupational quotas, designed to redress the discrimination against them in the civil service and elsewhere. Though Catholics insisted that all they wanted was basic justice, Weber, like many of his contemporaries, interpreted their platform as a demand for preferential hiring. “The Catholic drumbeat for parity was not regarded as a universalistic civil rights movement that would, for instance, have included Jews but as a partisan campaign to establish a system of patronage and spoils, an attack on the idealized neutrality of the civil service and the principle of achievement.”<sup>13</sup> This is the context of Weber’s opening observations in *The Protestant Ethic* on the relationship between religious affiliation and social stratification. For while Weber was aware of discrimination against Catholics in Germany, he was convinced, too, that their unequal distribution in the higher strata of *economic* life was principally a function of cultural orientations and antipathies, themselves a legacy of the Catholic communion. Or to put the matter in another way, that Protestants were successful not simply because of the state’s processes of selection or because of the historic preponderance of Protestants in German cities but because a community and home environment had fostered the peculiar mentality most suited to business acumen and professional advancement.<sup>14</sup> In such wise, *The Protestant Ethic* was meant as a contribution to a contemporary political debate as much as a contribution to “social economics”<sup>15</sup> and economic history.<sup>16</sup> And although received wisdom portrays

the text as essentially a reply to Marxian “materialism,” this was only one, and certainly not the most important, of Weber’s concerns.

Weber liked to describe himself as “religiously unmusical,” but he never said that he was tone-deaf. He came from a Protestant family; in particular, his mother, a lasting moral presence in his life, was an earnest and, in her own way, worldly product of a heterodox southern German Protestant milieu.<sup>17</sup> He was an active participant in the Evangelical-Social Congress (ESC)<sup>18</sup>—to which he was introduced by his cousin Otto Baumgarten—founded in 1890 to formulate social-policy questions relevant to German workers: Weber attended its conferences until 1897, sat on the ESC’s council, wrote for its house journal, *Die Christliche Welt*, directed under ESC auspices a survey in 1892-93 into the situation of rural laborers east of the Elbe river,<sup>19</sup> and delivered lectures for the ESC on the stock exchange and agrarian social relations. Weber was also a friend and critical adviser of the Protestant reformer Friedrich Naumann. To be sure, Weber’s Protestant activism was in its own peculiar way agnostic: not a matter of a faith to be espoused, but, above all, though not exclusively, a means to educate the German working class and naive bourgeois *Kultur-protestanten* in the harsh imperatives of contemporary capitalism. For Weber, the modern world was not about to witness an impending reign of reason or an abundance of Christian compassion. Instead, the future promised a ceaseless global struggle over material resources and alternative modes of life. Only the most industrially competitive, politically dynamic, and assiduously hardheaded nations had a chance of becoming—or remaining—great powers and great cultures.

Given this background, it is perhaps unsurprising that the historical connection between Protestantism and capitalism would emerge as one of Weber’s chief preoccupations. But there was even more at stake than we have so far suggested. Marianne Weber tells us that her husband, the secular ascetic par excellence, strongly identified with the Puritans of his most famous essay, whose faith and heroism produced a “new type of man . . . entirely dependent upon himself, in terrible solitude, and bereft of all magical powers of salvation. No church, no preacher, no sacrament can help him in the decisive matter of his life.”<sup>20</sup> Equally, Weber, a man whose precarious emotional condition sensitized him naturally to suffering and misfortune, was struck by the tragedy of the Puritans’ actions. Although he is often cited as a theorist of “rationality” and “rationalization,” Weber repeatedly noted that, from the standpoint of individual conduct, history is deeply *irrational*. Between action and consequence lies a chasm that no one can bridge, let alone control. The Puritans of Weber’s story

did not know, could not know, what they were doing; people can only know what they intend to do, and even then their self-knowledge is highly imperfect. More precisely, the Protestant radicals, inspired by a powerful sense of the divine, helped unwittingly to create a social and economic order its pioneers would have seen as godless, materialist, and devoid of any ultimate purpose. “Weber,” says his wife, was “profoundly moved . . . by the fact that on its earthly course an idea always and everywhere operates in opposition to its original meaning and thereby destroys itself.”<sup>21</sup> The statement is an exaggeration. Even so, it helps explain the *cri de coeur* with which *The Protestant Ethic* ends: Weber’s acidic indictment of those “specialists without spirit, hedonists without a heart”<sup>22</sup> whom he feared modern capitalism was creating in abundance.<sup>23</sup> Only for a relatively short time was capitalism animated by the moral purpose of Puritanism that it could, in any case, live “quite comfortably” without: “either, as it increasingly does today, as a fatalistically accepted inevitability or, as in the Enlightenment period, including modern style liberalism, legitimated as somehow the *relatively* optimum means of making (roughly in the sense of Leibniz’s theodicy) the *relative* best of the *relatively* best of all worlds. But capitalism *no longer* appears to the most serious-minded people as the outward expression of a style of life founded on a final, single, and comprehensible unity of the personality. And it would be a great mistake to believe that this fact will be without consequences for the position of capitalism within the total culture: firstly for capitalism’s *effects*, but also for its own inner essence and ultimately for its destiny.”<sup>24</sup>

### III

Soon after Weber completed the first part of *The Protestant Ethic* in the summer of 1904, he, Marianne, and a number of colleagues, including Ernst Troeltsch, Werner Sombart, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Paul Hensel, embarked on a trip to America. The German scholars had been invited by the Harvard psychologist Hugo Münsterberg, formerly of Freiburg University, to take part in the 1904 World Congress of Arts and Science, held in St. Louis. While the formal occasion of the American adventure was academic in a narrow sense—Weber’s own lecture for the World Congress, on comparative rural social relations, drew both on his *Protestant Ethic* research and on earlier studies of German peasant labor—<sup>25</sup> the sojourn afforded him the opportunity to visit far-flung relatives and to feel the pulse of modern capitalism, America, for himself. Unchained from his desk, the German Tocqueville was now in a position to see and engage the peoples whose history and destiny were then at the heart of his interests.

Hans Rollmann has nicely observed that “Max Weber in America reminds one of Camus’ saint without God, except that the saint is hyperactive.” <sup>26</sup> And, indeed, from the time they arrived in New York harbor on August 31 until their departure some two months later, the Webers’ whirlwind itinerary took them from the East Coast to the Midwest to the South and the West and then back again to the eastern seaboard. New York, Buffalo, Chicago, St. Louis, New Orleans, Philadelphia, Washington, Baltimore, and Boston all played host to the peripatetic couple who asked questions without respite, eagerly sought out new contacts and contributors to various scholarly projects, and who, more generally, absorbed the remarkable variety of American life. Characteristically, Weber refused to share the stiff opprobrium of those German colleagues for whom “America” was a linguistic abbreviation for vulgarity, chaos, greed, and human misery. On the contrary, as his friend Troeltsch reported, he was full of admiration for “a people of freedom, of industry and promises for the future. Everything contrary is for him only youthfulness and incompleteness, and he considers the most uncanny things to originate as a result of this plenitude of power. His love in the fight and engagement for the individual finds here entire satisfaction.”<sup>27</sup> Even Chicago, a veritable hell on earth for many continental visitors, failed to dampen Weber’s spirits. In accounts that combine wonder with detachment, Weber describes not only the city’s pollution, squalor, violent strikes, shootings, and showcased prostitutes but also its remarkable mix of



ethnic groups and cuisines. His unsqueamish, Teyloresque account of one of Chicago's legendary institutions is worth quoting at length:

Everywhere one is struck by the tremendous intensity of work—most of all in the “stockyards” with their “ocean of blood,” where several thousand cattle and pigs are slaughtered every day. From the moment when the unsuspecting bovine enters the slaughtering area, is hit by a hammer and collapses, whereupon it is immediately gripped by an iron clamp, is hoisted up, and starts on its journey, it is in constant motion—past ever-new workers who eviscerate and skin it, etc., but are always (in the rhythm of work) tied to the machine that pulls the animal past them. One sees an absolutely incredible output in this atmosphere of steam, muck, blood, and hides in which I teetered about together with a “boy” who was giving me a guided tour for fifty cents, trying to keep from being buried in the filth. There one can follow a pig from the sty to the sausage and the can.<sup>28</sup>

Weber's enthusiasm for America is not, however, to be confused with voyeurism or naïveté. Nor did he direct his questions exclusively to the established savants—like Albion Small and William James—whom he encountered on his trip.<sup>29</sup> If Weber was impressed by the New World, he was also disturbed, and his wife even more so, by the human price this experiment in nation building was exacting. In Chicago itself, the Webers visited Jane Addams's Hull House and witnessed for themselves the plight of the destitute. In Tuskegee, they sojourned to Booker T. Washington's “famous educational institution for Negroes. What they found,” Marianne Weber records, “probably moved them more than anything else on their trip. The great national problem of all American life, the showdown between the white race and the former slaves, could be grasped at its roots.”<sup>30</sup> Just how seriously Weber took that “national problem” is shown by his interactions with Northern reformers like Edwin and Caroline Seligman and his correspondence with “Negro” leaders like Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. DuBois, whose *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903) Weber was keen to see in German translation; Weber also commissioned a paper from DuBois, whom he visited in Atlanta, on “The Negro Question in the United States” for the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* (the journal he jointly edited with Werner Sombart and Edgar Jaffé), which appeared in 1906.<sup>31</sup> Assuring DuBois of his intention, never redeemed, to return to the South “as soon as possible,” Weber affirmed: “I am absolutely convinced that the ‘color-line’ problem will be the paramount problem of the time to come, here and everywhere in the world.”<sup>32</sup>

Still, for our purposes the most significant outcome of Weber's trip was the remarkable essay he penned on " 'Churches' and 'Sects' in North America." Like *The Protestant Ethic*, to which it is a scintillating counterpoint, Weber's essay on the American sects appeared in more than one incarnation. It was published first in 1906 in the German liberal newspaper the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, reworked in the same year for Martin Rade's *Die Christliche Welt* (the version translated here), and then revised once more for volume 1 of Weber's collected essays in the sociology of religion under the title "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism" (1920).<sup>33</sup> The nearest Weber ever got to an ethnography of American life, the essay is notable for its striking account of the relationship between the Protestant sects, business "sociation," and the foundations of American pluralist democracy. At this point, a contrast of the " 'Churches' and 'Sects' " article with its more famous cousin is illuminating. We begin with the latter.

In the 1905 essay on the Protestant *ethic* and in the rebuttals of H. Karl Fischer and Felix Rachfahl, also translated below, Weber seeks to document how the capitalist "spirit"—or mentality or philosophy of life (*Lebensauffassung*) or conscious way of conducting one's life (*Lebensführung*) or *Habitus* (he gave it various names)—came into being. Central to that "spirit" is a view of economic activity that is historically novel, radical, and momentous. Consider first what it negated. Traditional, precapitalist attitudes toward work, Weber suggested, tend to see it as a necessary evil, to be expedited solely in order to live and as part of the never-ending, meaningless cycle of production and consumption. Economic activity is custom bound, and money or barter is the means to sustain habitual styles of life. Since work has no intrinsic value, laborers, when they are not under the compulsion of others, cease their exertions once their needs are met; the truly important matters of life begin once work has ended. Accordingly, Weber remarks, attempts to boost the productivity of tradition-bound workers by increasing piece rates often backfire. A model of *homo economicus* might lead one to assume that the prospect of more money through higher wages would encourage laborers to work harder and be more economically efficient. But, then again, *homo economicus* is simply a convenient fiction of economic theory. In real life, economic behavior is predicated on what people believe is rational for them, and such interpretations are socially embedded and culturally mediated. As a result, workers steeped in traditional ways of life may view the increased piece rate not as an incentive to become richer by working harder and longer but simply as a means to reach their customary wage sooner; having received enough to satisfy their needs, they may

then desist from further activity. Similarly, the traditional employer tends to work at a more leisurely pace and is disposed by temperament and constrained by a complex web of social obligations to be conservative in his business methods.

In contrast to these traditional attitudes, consider next the mental and moral universe of early capitalist entrepreneurs, as Weber describes it. No longer is work deemed a meaningless chore to be finished as soon as possible. Now it is invested with moral value. For employers imbued with this new “spirit,” economic activity is an end in itself, central to their identity, a calling with rigorous implications that transgress old ways of doing business: if accustomed lifestyles and normative expectations are disrupted by the imperatives of productivity, calculated risk taking, innovation, and methodical behavior in which time is at a premium, then so be it. The enterprise is greater and more important than those it employs; the owner its resourceful steward, deferring the temptations of immediate consumption in order to make the organization more fecund and profitable. The priority of work over the worker, of the enterprise over the entrepreneur, means that there is little room here for sentimentality. In order to survive, the firm must constantly reinvest capital and adapt to an impersonal market; in order to flourish, competitors must be eliminated or at least neutralized. Steely objectivity and discipline are the orientations demanded from this godless mechanism.

Weber’s depictions of both traditional economic activity and its antithetical capitalist “spirit” are what he calls “ideal types”: analytic constructs, or models, that impute to the fluctuating actions of real people an artificial consistency that is nonetheless useful in highlighting a distinctive pattern of conduct. Ideal types are not pictures or copies of reality; they are one-sided accentuations of it, “useful fictions,” arrived at on the basis of what the investigator deems culturally significant.<sup>34</sup> That being so, both “tradition” and the “spirit” of capitalism are capable of articulations different from the ones that Weber gave them. Weber’s own characterization of the “spirit” of capitalism, which he illustrated copiously with quotations from Benjamin Franklin, sought to reconstruct attitudes and motivations toward work that he believed were uniquely modern. But where had they come from? Weber’s precise answer to this question was more evasive than he was willing to admit. But the general thrust of his argument is that the *ethos* of modern capitalism—that is, its distinctive moral attitudes toward economic activity and work, its methodical, specialized style of life—is historically indebted to (caused by, congruent with) the Protestant *ethic*: the ascetic movement that arose out of the Protestant Reformation and its aftermath. Pivotal

to that movement was a transformation in attitudes toward worldly affairs. Work gained an unprecedented dignity by being understood as a vocation or calling (*Beruf*) ordained by God. The link between Protestant ethic and capitalist ethos (spirit) is one of the most complex aspects of Weber's essay; we return to it in Section IV of this Introduction. For the moment, readers should be cautioned that the postulated relationship is between two normative constructions; more simply, between two sets of ideas common to which is the notion that work has ethical significance—that it is a duty and obligation to be expedited with maximum rigor and consistency. In Weber's responses to Fischer and Rachfahl, he irascibly reaffirms this point, insisting that the object of his essay was not to explain the origins of the capitalist system as such—a task that would have required an analysis of its political, legal, and material conditions—but only to examine Protestantism's contribution to aspects of the early capitalist frame of mind and *Lebensführung* (the way of deliberately conducting one's life).<sup>35</sup> How this squares with an assertion in *The Protestant Ethic*, reaffirmed in the first of Weber's rejoinders to H. Karl Fischer, that a distinctive economic mentality still characterized late-nineteenth-century German Protestant communities, is not altogether clear.

Among Weber's most famous claims in *The Protestant Ethic* is the contention that Calvinism constituted the supercharged motivation behind the ascetic movement and its sectarian splinters. The Calvinist doctrine of predestination, according to which all humans are irrevocably either damned or chosen to be among God's elect, posed an agonizing question to the faithful: Were they vessels of God's grace or simply worthless creatures condemned to the unending torment of hell? God's will could not be manipulated or deciphered. But could intimations of his divine purpose for humans be revealed to the faithful? Lacking any palatable answer from Calvin's own theology, Calvinist believers looked to their pastors for help. The support they received was broadly of two kinds. First, believers were counseled to assume that lack of faith in one's being chosen was tantamount to an absence of grace. The faithful were taught they "had a duty to regard themselves as [members of the] elect, and to dismiss any doubts as a temptation from the devil." Second, they were encouraged to assume that "tireless labor in a calling was . . . the best possible means of attaining this self-assurance."<sup>36</sup> This enduring crisis of "proof"—of demonstrating *to oneself* that one was among the chosen spiritual elite—fashioned a distinctive kind of individual, Weber maintained. Unable to find solace in the sacraments or in the image of a kindly God, aware that their neighbors, even their family, may be among the perpetually condemned, Calvinist believers were psychologically

isolated. Their distance from God could only be precariously bridged, and their inner tensions only partially relieved, by unstinting, purposeful labor. The result was innerworldly rational asceticism: rigorous, scrupulous, methodical work within a calling. In Gianfranco Poggi's felicitous summary: "The elect is active, not passive; his activity is directed by his intellect, not by habit or feeling; the time span of his attention and his effort is lengthy, not brief; his activity is continuous, not intermittent; he takes charge of his life, does not drift nor does he trust events to go his way; he plans his existence and takes responsibility for its temporal outcome, does not bless or curse fate; he struggles to impose order and control over the things and people surrounding him, does not allow or expect them to determine him."<sup>37</sup> The individuals who are daily reconstituted by this discipline, Weber concluded, are the vehicles of the "rationalizing" capitalist "spirit"<sup>38</sup> and the forebears of the modern capitalist *Berufsmenschen*.

We can now return to Weber's " 'Churches' and 'Sects' in North America," the fruit of his American observations. In that essay, Weber provides a novel twist to his previous argument by examining the manner in which a certain kind of *group discipline*, as distinct from an ethic (and its psychological inducements), nourishes and actively shapes the formation of the capitalist "spirit." More especially, Weber documents the mode in which American business enterprises and the voluntary organizations of American democracy have at least some of their roots in the sectarian culture of Baptist, Quaker, Pietist, Methodist, and other religious denominations.<sup>39</sup> Weber points out that although "Europeanization" and its accompanying secular attitudes are having a growing influence on American life, church affiliation remains strong. The majority of Anglophone Americans belong to a church that caters to their religious needs, yet also functions as a social club to provide a range of educative, athletic, and other services. Crucially, too, church membership is a visible demonstration of financial and commercial probity. Being a Baptist or a Quaker says more than "I am a believer"; it says, "I am honest, scrupulous, and can be relied on to charge fair prices to everyone, and to pay my debts, should I ever incur them, in a timely and expeditious fashion." Because church membership confers on its members an ethical imprimatur—a certificate of moral qualification—that is simultaneously good for business, it comes to be highly valued by those who want to get ahead. By the same token, the church community must ensure that its members maintain high ethical standards, for failure to do so will damage the credibility of the group as a whole. Penalties for miscreants must be swift and unbending. Those who belong to these churches and those who seek entry to them must *prove to their fellows* (rather than to

themselves, as in Weber's discussion of the Protestant ethic) that they are worthy of membership: they must continually and indefatigably attest by their actions that they are meticulous, hardworking, punctilious, and disciplined in their vocation. The "spirit" of capitalism is significantly shaped by these forces.

Whereas in the first part of the article, Weber uses the term "church" rather loosely, in the second part he seeks to clarify an important distinction. For, on his account, what are habitually referred to as American churches—both by commentators and by members themselves—are, analytically speaking, better comprehended as "sects." A sect, in Weber's terminology, is different from a church—for instance, Lutheran or Catholic—in a number of ways. While a church is, in principle, an institution that ministers and dispenses sacraments to all—damned and saved alike—who happen, usually by birth, to fall under its jurisdiction, a sect is "a free community of individuals" restricted to those who pass certain tests of religious purity. Churches are inclusive, ascriptive, obligatory organizations, typically characterized by a formal, hierarchically structured administration. Where they can, churches seek to have their authority bolstered by becoming the compulsory confession of state. Sects, conversely, are exclusive, voluntary communities of the religiously qualified, governed by a network of peers ("moral police," Weber calls them)<sup>40</sup> who closely inspect the conduct of fellow members and whose principal political demand is freedom from state regulation or interference. Sects are not necessarily small in the total number of believers they comprise. However, the limitations they impose on membership typically do conduce to miniaturization and promote a level of collegiality among believers and a degree of collective scrutiny, unmatched in larger, more anonymous, less discriminating church organizations.<sup>41</sup>

Weber argues that the American Baptists, Quakers, Pietists, Methodists, and other denominations with a Puritan background approximate to "sects" rather than to "churches" and that American professional and business life has been effectively modeled on a sectarian basis. Although the old religious convictions of the Puritans are replaced increasingly by the instrumental manners and attitudes typical of the "association," the sectarian emphasis on public respectability and exclusiveness survives in American business clubs and professional life. The thread that connects Puritan denominations and modern business associations is the common requirement of members that they prove their worth; in both, social acceptance by one's peers is deemed the *sine qua non* of success and advancement. Moreover, the struggle to prove oneself is of a highly personal, individual kind, albeit conducted within the context of a tightly

controlled social group. As such, Weber argues, it facilitates and promotes the antiauthoritarian thrust of Puritan societies. American democracy is the beneficiary of a movement that puts obedience to God ahead of obedience to the state, freeing the individual of deference to traditional office and encouraging personal dynamism and initiative.

## IV

Who would have guessed when *The Protestant Ethic* first appeared in 1905 that it would eventually come to be ranked as one of the great texts of the twentieth century, selling several hundred thousand copies in the process? Certainly not its English publisher, who, in 1934, doubted the translation would sell as many as two and a half thousand.<sup>42</sup> To explain why such pessimism was misplaced, it is worth briefly examining the interaction between the text and its critical reception.<sup>43</sup>

Consider first *The Protestant Ethic*'s cultural resonance. Weber's essay deals with some of the most intriguing and pressing issues of modern times: the nature of capitalism, the character of religion, the future of humanity encased in a "shell as hard as steel." Moreover, as Guenther Roth and others have argued, Weber's enthusiasm for Puritanism and British and American democracy was particularly congruent with, and flattering to, the self-image of Anglophone countries. His analysis "helped reinforce the American orthodox understanding of an inherent connection between Protestantism and liberal democracy."<sup>44</sup> At the same time, the essay's strongly counterintuitive propositions on the affinity between Protestantism (a religious movement) and capitalism (an ostensibly secular and godless economic order) offered much to chew on, inviting repudiation as much as acceptance. Indeed, without such a critical reception, the Protestant ethic "thesis" would have simply degenerated into a platitude, a social science museum piece, unread because uninteresting. Instead, it became a nodal point in a network of competing arguments about capitalism, the greatest economic and cultural force of modern times. Located in a prestigious German journal of social science, Weber's analysis was well placed to provoke criticism and thus attention.

And so it did. From the beginning, *The Protestant Ethic* was attacked as theoretically confused, imaginatively fanciful, and historically wrong; furthermore, the dissent aired in Weber's lifetime—notably, by Fischer, Rachfahl, Sombart, and Brentano<sup>45</sup>—dilated on themes that have haunted the essay ever since.<sup>46</sup> The essay was criticized for overestimating the importance of religious motives and of the Protestant petite bourgeoisie in the emergence of capitalism; conversely, for underestimating the significance of Catholic, pre-Reformation merchants and bankers as vehicles of capitalism; relatedly, for



failing to see that the matrix of attitudes, habits, and motivations that Weber labeled the “spirit” of capitalism, and hence of a modern capitalist calling, preceded the likes of Benjamin Franklin by four centuries—for instance, in the shape of the Catholic Florentine merchant Leon Battista Alberti. Further objections concerned Weber’s one-sided etymology and interpretation of *Beruf* (calling, vocation) and the theoretical weight he accorded it; his failure to reconcile convincingly the strongly antimammonistic attitudes of the Puritans with what he claimed to be their role as an unwitting capitalist vanguard; and his inability to see the striking parallels between Jewish and Puritan asceticism and to acknowledge more generally that it is the status of being socially and politically marginal, more than the existence of peculiar religious or ethical beliefs, that explains why some groups are bearers of innovation while others cling to tradition.

Weber contested vigorously all these objections, asserting either that they represented a caricature of his position<sup>47</sup> or attested to the critics’ own incompetence as historians; often he claimed both simultaneously. Since his answers appear at length in this volume, readers can make up their own minds as to their plausibility or otherwise. As they do so, it will immediately become apparent that the Weber ritually evoked in textbooks of social science has experienced a remarkable metamorphosis. Gone is the apostle of restraint, sobriety, and value freedom. In his place glowers an entirely different being: a pugnacious literary street fighter who seems to have flourished in an epoch before the social contract was signed. Weber’s polemical replies—nasty, brutish, though none too short—take no hostages. Felix Rachfahl is not simply mistaken, in Weber’s view; he is benighted, pathetic, dishonest, and wrong in every way, a charlatan egregiously seeking to misrepresent Weber’s analysis. Granted, Weber’s interlocutor has a fine line in sarcasm himself, relishing the fact that the “bubble on the Neckar has burst.”<sup>48</sup> Even so, a perusal of Rachfahl’s own essays shows that Weber’s damning indictment of his scholarship is absurd and unfair. Weber’s scathing responses raised considerably the temperature of the debate, and his subsequent replies to Sombart and Brentano, though more civil, are just as apodictic. Henceforth, authors who wanted to propose their own distinctive theories of the origins of modern capitalism could do no better than to confront the Weber “thesis” and, by so doing, locate themselves in a major intellectual controversy. Weber’s argument became both a totem to which scholars paid deference every time they attacked it, thereby acknowledging its stature, and a medium through which they could argue against each other, helping to promote a value-added spiral of information, theory, and nuance. The same applies to

Weber's later claims about the unique genesis of Western institutions, which have provoked both dissent and qualified support from those concerned to debate "Orientalism" and Asian values.<sup>49</sup>

Disputes over a text, then, are vital for its discursive longevity. Simple endorsement would place *The Protestant Ethic* in the mausoleum of social science, not at its commanding heights. So long as it is argued over, particularly by some of the best minds in contemporary social science, the essay emerges perennially revitalized. Reports of its death are seriously exaggerated.<sup>50</sup> Still, cultural resonance will only take a text so far. To join the pantheon of literary works that are commonly called classics, Weber's essay also had to possess qualities of fruitful ambiguity, or textual suppleness, which allow multiple readings and adoptions. And such creative engagement was greatly facilitated in the case of *The Protestant Ethic*,<sup>51</sup> both by the fact that the essay exists in two versions, interspersed by the polemical rejoinders to Fischer and Rachfahl, and by its complex relationship to the totality of Weber's mature writings on capitalism and religion. In addition, the work contains an intriguing metaphor—*stahlhartes Gehäuse* (or "shell as hard as steel")—that Talcott Parsons rendered as "the iron cage." The translation is questionable; its impact undeniable. For the "iron cage" has become one of the key *topoi* of the human sciences, versatile enough to animate investigations ranging from scientific management<sup>52</sup> to the men's movement<sup>53</sup> or to invite literary pun (as in Michael Roth's *The Ironist's Cage*) and oxymoron (as in Ian Gamble's *Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty*).

More generally, such tropes, and the complex arguments in which they are embedded, allow commentators to interpret *The Protestant Ethic* from radically different perspectives. For instance, is the essay primarily a contribution to a universal history of rationality<sup>54</sup> or a study of the genesis of modern Western humanity and the specialized modes of life peculiar to it?<sup>55</sup> Is it advancing a strong thesis in which Calvinist ideas were a necessary, though not sufficient, condition of the outlook of modern capitalism or a weak thesis in which Calvinism was simply consistent with the capitalist spirit and did nothing to impede it?<sup>56</sup> Is the text less about the origins of the capitalist mentality than about the manner in which strata that were *already* capitalist adopted ideas and attitudes that lent their activity a spectacular dynamism?<sup>57</sup>

Questions and arguments like these are not arbitrary impositions on Weber's texts but rather derive from properties central to them. Consider, for instance,

Weber's much debated description of the link between the Protestant ethic and the capitalist "spirit" (or at least of one of its "components"). Sometimes that connection appears causal (a relationship between an independent and dependent variable); at other times, logical; while on still other occasions, Weber describes the relationship as one of adequacy, elective affinity, meaningful congruence, or correspondence. Then again, it is difficult to know what historical weight Weber actually accords the Protestant ethic in the development of capitalism. When critics point to ambiguities in one text, Weber claims indignantly that he has clarified those problems in another. When the same critics charge him with philosophical "idealism," Weber reminds them of his distinction between the "spirit" of capitalism (its moral attitudes and motivations) and the capitalist institutional "form" or "system" that encompasses economic, political, juridical, and scientific conditions. Such causal pluralism may be admirable as a methodological postulate, but, rhetorically, it allows Weber to constantly elude refutation.<sup>58</sup> Little wonder that critics have charged him with evasion and considered his use of ideal types to be a kind of "mental alchemy."<sup>59</sup>

What we have been calling the textual suppleness of *The Protestant Ethic* directs an audience toward questions about the narrative itself. Attention is focused on what the text "really" means, how it is related to other works of Weber's oeuvre, what its author was seeking to do in composing them. But for Weber's writings on Protestantism to have become seminal, they needed to do more than raise her menueutical questions; they needed also to invite creative application to a host of issues beyond their immediate purview. We have already noted an example of such reader appropriation: the tendency of writers on themes such as the "iron cage" or Orientalism and Asian values to pick up, even if polemically, Weber's arguments. In addition, Weber's writings on Protestantism and capitalism have been employed to examine such diverse phenomena as the nature of social action, the character of trust relationships, the clash of civilizations, and the dangers of mass consumption; and to explain why some nations became wealthy while others remained poor.<sup>60</sup> Such applications, engagements, and creative misreadings of Weber's essay testify to its continuing hold over the scholarly imagination.

This is not the place for an extended analysis of *The Protestant Ethic's* national reception—its trajectory in Britain, for instance, was very different from that in Japan<sup>61</sup>—but one understudied case is particularly instructive. We have seen how Weber sought to understand the United States during his sojourn of 1904. How has the United States sought to understand him?<sup>62</sup> To some degree,

the reception of *The Protestant Ethic* in America parallels that in other Anglophone countries. Historians and economists have in general been the least sympathetic to its argument; sociologists, the most enthusiastic. But the American case is especially interesting because of its pioneering character and the diversity of its interlocutors. To be sure, *The Protestant Ethic* was already a topic of discussion of British historians in the interwar years (as it was among French luminaries, such as Maurice Halbwachs, Henri Pirenne, and Henri Sée). In 1926, R. H. Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* criticized Weber's argument, among other things, for conflating Calvinism and Puritanism; while in 1933, H. M. Robertson's *Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism: A Criticism of Max Weber and His School* taxed Weber for misunderstanding Reformed attitudes toward economic activity and for failing to see that Catholicism, particularly its Jesuit inflection, was more conducive to the capitalist spirit than Calvinism was. Yet the "American" contribution was distinctive in a number of important ways.

To begin with, it was two Americans—the University of Chicago economist Frank H. Knight and Talcott Parsons<sup>63</sup> (an economics instructor at Amherst College and at Harvard University before assuming the persona of a sociologist)—who first translated Weber's work on Protestantism and capitalism, thereby making it accessible to a growing Anglophone public.<sup>64</sup> Of particular significance was Parsons's translation of *The Protestant Ethic*, published in 1930,<sup>65</sup> which, until 2001,<sup>66</sup> was the only version available for English-language readers to peruse. In consequence, Weber was refracted through a peculiarly Parsonian lens. Parsons, it is true, was the very opposite of a parochial thinker. As an undergraduate at Amherst College, he majored in biology and philosophy before proceeding in the mid-1920s to study economics and sociology, first at the London School of Economics, then in Weber's home city, Heidelberg, where he became personally acquainted with Karl Mannheim, Alfred Weber (Max Weber's brother), Marianne Weber, and Karl Jaspers. Of all American sociologists of the twentieth century, few have known European Continental traditions better than Parsons. At the same time, his translation of *The Protestant Ethic* entailed a domestication of Max Weber's ideas with far-reaching outcomes. Gisela Hinkle has remarked on the "Americanization of Max Weber" to which Parsons contributed, by which she means "an interpretive transformation of Weber's writings through the process of translation. Translation from one language to another," she adds, "and more specifically from one intellectual and linguistic context to another, entails not merely a substitution of words but a transformation of ideas, styles of thinking, modes of

expression, indeed a whole context of mental imagery and assumptions.”<sup>67</sup> Her concern is that a clash of philosophical perspectives between translators and authors can have major consequences for the latter, pulling a work into an interpretive orbit that disturbs the original constellation of themes, idioms, and emphases. A salient example occurs in *The Protestant Ethic*, where Parsons’s hostility to behaviorist psychology and his determination to enlist Weber in the pantheon of thinkers similarly averse to it lead him to downplay Weber’s emphasis on psychological *Antriebe* (drives, impulses), rendering this term as “sanctions.” Similarly, Parsons translates “elective affinities” (*Wahlverwandschaften*) as “correlations,” a social-scientific idiom that extinguishes the compressed imagery of eroticism, attraction, and alchemy that pervade the Goethean evocation. Another instance occurs toward the end of *The Protestant Ethic*, where Parsons substitutes “last stage” (of cultural development) for “last men” (*die “letzten Menschen”*), thereby obliterating the Nietz-schean resonance of the original.

But Parsons did more than translate Weber’s key text on Protestantism. In *The Structure of Social Action* (1937),<sup>68</sup> Weber, together with Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, and Emile Durkheim, is employed in an ambitious project to reconstruct what Parsons claimed to be “a *single* body of systematic theoretical reasoning” on “social action.” Transcending “utilitarianism” and idealism alike, Parsons’s “voluntaristic theory of action” became the first stage of his evolution toward structural functionalism, the school of thought that dominated American sociology in the 1950s. As Parsons rose to fame in American sociology, so did Weber, a coupling reinforced by Parsons’s cotranslation of part one of Weber’s *Economy and Society*, first published in 1947 and again evincing a distinctly Parsonian theoretical bent.<sup>69</sup> More significantly for our purposes, *The Structure of Social Action* represented Parsons’s attempt, only partially successful in the longer term, to reorganize, simplify, and distill the great diversity of sociological thought into a fundamental common core. In the process, Weber was elevated to one of sociology’s few canonical thinkers; *The Protestant Ethic*, to one of the discipline’s jewels.<sup>70</sup>

A contrast of Parsons’s approach with that of Pitirim A. Sorokin<sup>71</sup> is telling. Sorokin, Parsons’s older rival at Harvard,<sup>72</sup> not only divided sociological theory into a plethora of “schools” that scattered dozens of thinkers across a broad and heterogeneous horizon; the place afforded to Weber was respectful but comparatively small. In Sorokin’s *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928), Weber appears as a representative of “psychosociologicistic theories of religion,”

along with, for instance, the largely forgotten Benjamin Kidd. By contrast, Parsons's stratagem was to raise Weber head and shoulders above the multitudes discussed by Sorokin by treating him as part of a "major revolution in the scientific analysis of social phenomena." Parsons was not interested in an intellectual history of sociology that would explore its many precursors and branches. His approach was to move toward synthesis, omitting thinkers whose work was peripheral and integrating the insights of those who were taking the social sciences forward. "There is an elevated range" of thinkers, Parsons acknowledged in his preface to the second edition of *Structure*, "not just three peaks [Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber], but these peaks loom far higher than the lesser ones."<sup>73</sup> For Durkheim and Weber, at least, that judgment has been fully vindicated by the passing of time, and in some interpretations of twentieth-century thought, Parsons has replaced Pareto as one of sociology's "classic" thinkers.<sup>74</sup>

Moreover, various cohorts of Parsons's students played a major role in the American transmission of the *Protestant Ethic* "thesis": Robert K. Merton pushed it further to examine the relationship between Puritanism and modern science; Robert Bellah used it to reevaluate the extent to which traditional Japanese institutions and religions were favorable to economic efficiency and development; Randall Collins sought to relocate it in Weber's multicausal theory of capitalism and, more generally, placed Weber in the same "conflict tradition" as Marx.<sup>75</sup> In all these cases, the authors did not seek to defend Weber's original argument so much as to creatively adapt or extrapolate aspects of it to related problems. As such, whatever other problems their work raised, they were free of the anathema often attached to writers who, vaguely or otherwise, sought to apply Weber's analysis to *contemporary* American society.<sup>76</sup> Surveying a number of these attempts in a paper first delivered to the American Catholic Sociological Society in August 1963, Andrew Greeley claimed that all the evidence available offered not "the slightest confirmation for the theory that Protestants are more achievement-oriented than Catholics in American society."<sup>77</sup>

Historians, too, have been overwhelmingly skeptical. Had *The Protestant Ethic* been read mainly by historians, its influence on American thought would have been marginal. Most have found the "thesis" unconvincing or outdated, decisively surpassed by later Reformation research and largely irrelevant to the history of industrialization.<sup>78</sup> Economists—congenitally ill disposed toward cultural accounts of economic phenomena—have typically granted Weber's

thesis a certain inventiveness but deemed it peripheral to disciplinary paradigms. Even those among their number, like Joseph Schumpeter, who took a generous view of the mutually fecund relations between economics and sociology (and most of his colleagues emphatically did not) gave the impression that *The Protestant Ethic* was a road unwisely taken. Schumpeter called it an example of “spurious problems,” that is to say, “problems that the analyst himself creates by his own method of procedure”—in this case, the formulation of an ideal type of the “New Spirit of Capitalism.” Alas, Schumpeter contended, there was no such entity, “in the sense that people would have had to acquire a new way of thinking in order to be able to transform a feudal economic world into a wholly different capitalist one. So soon as we realize that pure Feudalism and pure Capitalism are equally unrealistic creations of our own mind, the problem of what it was that turned the one into the other vanishes completely. The society of the feudal ages contained all the germs of the society of the capitalist age. These germs developed by slow degrees, each step teaching its lesson and producing another increment of capitalist methods and of capitalist ‘spirit.’ Similarly, there was no such thing as a New Spirit of Free Enquiry whose emergence would call for explanation. The scholastic science of the Middle Ages contained all the germs of the laical science of the Renaissance.”<sup>79</sup> The point of quoting Schumpeter at length is not to endorse uncritically his depiction of Weber’s procedure or his conclusions but only to show that even a potentially tolerant observer from economics expressly disowned the “thesis.”

Sociology, we saw previously, has been much more favorable to *The Protestant Ethic* and not only because of the discipline’s bias toward cultural types of explanation. One reason is a tendency toward highly ritualized citation and summary, reinforced by the fact that sociologists are in the main professionally unequipped to make historically discriminating judgments. Another is the disciplinary firewall erected by specialization and “compartmentalization” shielding sociologists from the criticisms of colleagues in history and economics. But that is only part of the picture. *The Protestant Ethic* has perennially survived in American sociology, and in other national traditions, too, not because of its ostensible veracity<sup>80</sup> but because of its utility: its protean aptitude, sketched above, to act as a catalyst of hypotheses or vehicle of multiple projects that have little to do with the impulse that originally animated it. Weber is found, for instance, wherever theories of “modernization”<sup>81</sup> are debated or wherever Marx’s flag is hoisted; in the latter case, Weber can be counted on to lead the retaliatory assault on the Marxian citadel, notwithstanding the fact that in many respects he found fruitful an

economic interpretation of history. Or to put the matter differently: sociology continues to accord *The Protestant Ethic* a singular standing not because of its putative historical accuracy but because of what it permits sociologists to do and project.<sup>82</sup> It is the essay's suggestiveness, not its ultimate verisimilitude, its pliability, not its irrefutability, that keeps it alive.

It was observed previously that the first two major translations of Weber's work came from American hands. In fact, practically *all* the book-length translations of Weber's studies of sociology, law, economics, method, politics, and religion up to 1990 were likewise produced under American auspices.<sup>83</sup> So, too, was the first major Anglophone commentary: *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (1959)<sup>84</sup> penned by Reinhard Bendix, a Berliner who had immigrated to the United States in 1938 and who, until his death in 1991, remained America's foremost Weberian sociologist. Bendix's base at Berkeley from 1947 onward (first in the Department of Sociology and later in the Department of Political Science) and Parsons's at Harvard nicely epitomizes what became known as "coastal" sociology, the dominant centers of the East and the West. Still, undoubtedly the most influential text, after *The Protestant Ethic*, for the American reception of Weber came not from California or Massachusetts but from the University of Wisconsin at Madison and the University of Maryland: the collaboration between Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills that produced *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. That anthology, which contained Weber's companion piece to *The Protestant Ethic*—"The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism"—helped launch the career of Mills, and with it an alternative reading of Weber. For Mills, Weber was quintessentially the theorist of modern history and of power relations, a pulverizing battering ram against Parsonian "grand theory" and a vital contributor to "the sociological imagination": an imagination that "enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals."<sup>85</sup>

Gerth and Mills's tormented partnership in producing what has become the most widely read compendium of Weber's works is one of the more fascinating stories of scholarly collaboration.<sup>86</sup> For our purposes here, however, it is sufficient to recall that Gerth was among a group of talented scholars—it included Leo Strauss, Emil Lederer, Hans Speier, Adolph Löwe, Arnold Brecht, Hans Morgenthau, and Erich Fromm—who brought Weber to America as a consequence of the great German cultural emigration of the 1930s and 1940s. In the process, Weber was adapted, filtered, applied, and reshaped to make him



intelligible to American pragmatic and religious sensibilities. Albert Salomon, from his base at the New School of Social Research in New York City, was an early cultural mediator.<sup>87</sup> Hannah Arendt, robustly anti-Weberian on most dimensions, nonetheless paid tribute to the “greatness” of *The Protestant Ethic*.<sup>88</sup> Addressing himself to an American audience on the parlous state of German academic social sciences during the first third of the twentieth century, Franz Neumann—the legal scholar, advocate, and “critical theorist” who had made America his home in 1936—noted one sterling exception: “Max Weber, whose name is known and honored wherever social and political science is taught. Weber’s greatness consists in a unique combination of a theoretical frame (although for me of doubtful validity), a mastery of a tremendous number of data, and a full awareness of the political responsibility of the scholar.” Neumann, writing in 1953, went on to say that while “Weber’s influence in Germany was very limited,” it “is here, in the United States, that Weber really came to life.”<sup>89</sup> To which one is compelled to add: much to the chagrin of some Americans. Almost thirty-five years after Neumann’s encomium, Allan Bloom indicted Weber as one of the principal miscreants responsible for “the closing of the American mind.” Weber’s sin, Bloom thundered, was to be a chief purveyor of cultural relativism and decisionism, a siren voice proclaiming the age of disenchantment and rationalization. Substituting a concern for reason and good and evil with a hodgepodge of warring, incommensurable, freely chosen values, Weber reaffirmed the legacy of Nietzsche. Indeed, the “transfusion of this . . . mythmaking or value-positing interpretation of social and political experience into the American bloodstream was in large measure effected by Max Weber’s language. His success here is, I am tempted to say, miraculous. A good example is his invention, the Protestant Ethic.” Weber’s treatment of the Calvinists, Bloom claimed, was symptomatic of a more general nihilism. Denying the essential rationality of human values, Weber saw the Calvinists’ convictions as no more than “worldviews” or “world interpretations” imposed “on a chaotic world by powerful personalities.” For Bloom, probably Strauss’s<sup>90</sup> most famous disciple, such an interpretation was a travesty, a denial of reason as well as God. Yet in spite of it, “the Weberian language and the interpretation of the world it brings with it have caught on like wildfire.”<sup>91</sup> There are no signs that the flames are yet extinguished.

*The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism* has been described by the sociologist Daniel Bell as “probably the most important sociological work of the

twentieth century,”<sup>92</sup> while the American intellectual historian H. Stuart Hughes has called it “one of the great works of the social thought of our time—an almost unique combination of imaginative boldness in its central hypothesis and meticulous scholarship in its documentation.”<sup>93</sup> Few essays of social science are more daring, stimulating, and interesting. Modern scholarship has subjected the text to a constant barrage of critical attack, yet it has survived to be read and reread. The matrix of problems with which it deals retains an interest and pathos that are likely to endure. And behind the essay stands a man of remarkable qualities and paradoxes. The last encyclopedic genius of the twentieth century still awaits a biography that can do justice to his prodigious versatility. The problem is not only that we moderns lack Weber’s range, it is also that a culture of “specialists without spirit, hedonists without a heart” is ill equipped to understand a man who was in most respects its antithesis.

## ADDENDUM ON THE 1905 AND 1920 VERSIONS OF *THE PROTESTANT ETHIC*

We noted that *The Protestant Ethic* exists in both an original (1905) and a revised (1920) form. The latter version, completed shortly before Weber's death, was the one that Talcott Parsons drew on in his English translation of 1930. Until recently,<sup>94</sup> it has been the only complete translation of *The Protestant Ethic* available for Anglophone readers. Our translation offers an alternative to Parsons, not only because it seeks to be more faithful to Weber's concepts and phrasing<sup>95</sup> but also because it goes back to the version of 1905. The decision to translate the 1905 text rather than to retranslate its 1920 successor was guided by a number of considerations.

To begin with, the 1905 version of *The Protestant Ethic* is foundational, the baseline that enables us to understand the text as Weber first conceived it and to calibrate the modifications that appeared in its 1920 counterpart. Those modifications were themselves prompted by the controversy that began shortly after the essay's original publication. (Since Weber died in the same year that the 1920 version was published, he had no further opportunities to engage his critics.) His countercritiques appear in the four cannonades to Fischer and Rachfahl—translated into English in their entirety in this Penguin Classic—and in the feisty but more measured footnotes of the 1920 edition where Weber duels with Lujo Brentano and Werner Sombart.<sup>96</sup> We have incorporated the most relevant of these footnotes in Appendix I so that readers have a virtually complete record of Weber's replies to critics. In short, a return to the original, 1905 version of *The Protestant Ethic* and the associated rebuttals provides readers with the narrative context and trajectory of the debate during Weber's own lifetime.

Our claim, let us be clear, is not that the first edition of *The Protestant Ethic* is somehow "better" than the second—in the way that some commentators believe Goethe's so-called *Urfaust* (the earliest, 1775, version of *Faust* Part 1)<sup>97</sup> to be more aesthetically remarkable than its successors of 1790 or 1808; or Mary Shelley's 1818 version of *Frankenstein* superior to the much more famous text of 1831.<sup>98</sup> It is rather that both the 1905 and 1920 versions of *The Protestant Ethic* are *sui generis*, interesting in their own unique ways and invite somewhat

different kinds of consideration. (For this reason, the German *Gesamtausgabe*—the critical edition of Weber’s complete works—will publish both versions separately.<sup>99</sup>) Second, the early text has distinctive qualities—a more tentative tone than its 1920 counterpart and a peculiar social-scientific orientation—that reveal a Weber who is still largely unknown. “In the first version of the text,” Hartmut Lehmann observes, Weber “sounds as if he is presenting an interesting argument: He proceeds as if conducting an experiment. By contrast, in the second version, Weber appears to speak with an authoritative voice: He writes as if [he is] presenting the final results of a study that allow no objection.”<sup>100</sup>

When Weber reedited *The Protestant Ethic* in the summer of 1919, he inserted it into a massive research program that had in good measure already been accomplished: a sociology of the world religions with a specific, comparative focus on their economic ethics and their distinct modes of rationality.<sup>101</sup> That project, together with the sociological perspective that informed it, simply did not exist for him in 1903-04 when *The Protestant Ethic* was in the process of gestation. On the contrary, Weber had a very different plan in mind. As the conclusion to the original essay makes plain, Weber’s initial predisposition was to examine the impact of ascetic rationalism on a host of institutions, “from the conventicle to the state,” and to situate the specific form of ascetic Protestantism in the history of Occidental ascetic rationalism more generally from “the Middle Ages to its dissolution into pure utilitarianism.” Deflected by more urgent tasks—most immediately, his feverish attempt to document the Russian Revolution of 1905-06<sup>102</sup>—and also by the growing conviction that further work on the nuances of Protestantism was best left to theological specialists such as Ernst Troeltsch,<sup>103</sup> Weber never substantively pursued his original agenda.<sup>104</sup> Evidently, as ambitious as that earlier project may have been, it proved too confining for Weber’s expanding theoretical interests, clear from 1909 onward,<sup>105</sup> in the singularity of Western culture and the peculiar kinds of rationalism he claimed were at its heart.<sup>106</sup> Indeed, according to Marianne Weber, the “cognition of the uniqueness of Occidental *rationalism* and the role assigned to it in Western culture was for Weber one of his most important discoveries. As a result, his original guiding question, on the relationship of religion and economy, was expanded into a more comprehensive one, concerning *the unique nature of the entire Occidental culture.*”<sup>107</sup> To expedite and inform a convincing response to that new research question, Weber needed to do more than study the Western experience; he required contrasting case studies that might shed light on the West’s putative uniqueness. Accordingly, he

turned to an investigation of Asian cultures, and more especially Asian religions, to establish why their economic development differed so fundamentally from Occidental paths; or, to put it another way, Weber employed his Asian case studies in an attempt to prove the unparalleled genesis of Occidental capitalism and rationalism. In contrast, the uniqueness of the West, or a comparative, cross-cultural theory of rationalism, are not part of the *Problemstellung* or *Fragestellung* (“problematic”) of the text of 1905, the focus of which is much more circumscribed: an inquiry into the impact of Protestant rational asceticism on the rise of modern capitalism.<sup>108</sup>

But it is not only that Weber’s focus was markedly different in 1905; so, too, was the standpoint from which he conducted his research. By 1919, Weber had been developing his own kind of sociology—conceived by him as a perspective on “social action” rather than as a substantive area<sup>109</sup>—for almost a decade. In 1903-04, by contrast, when Weber began to write *The Protestant Ethic*, he was proceeding primarily from the vantage of what he called “social economics” (*Sozialökonomik*), a term that emerged originally in France in the early 1800s (it is typically associated with Jean-Baptiste Say) but to which Weber gave his own idiosyncratic inflection. On Weber’s account, social economics combines elements of both analytic and historical economics (rival German schools at the time Weber was writing) and addresses the relationship of economics to noneconomic phenomena, notably, religion, law, and politics.<sup>110</sup> The manifesto of this approach can be found in Weber’s essay “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy” (1904)<sup>111</sup> in which he distinguishes between various modes of conceiving social economic “phenomena,” that is, phenomena characterized by “the scarcity of means” through which human needs can be satisfied.<sup>112</sup> Note that, for Weber, the quality of a phenomenon that falls under the rubric of “social economics” is “not something which it possesses ‘objectively.’ It is rather conditioned by the orientation of our cognitive interest, as it arises from the specific cultural significance which we attribute to the particular event in a given case.”<sup>113</sup> Thus, social-economic phenomena will differ according to the interest researchers bring to their investigation. Be that as it may, Weber suggests that there are three theoretically productive ways in which “social economics” can be considered as culturally significant. We can study economic “events” or, more especially, “institutions,” such as the stock exchange, that mediate, regulate, or seek to control the struggle over material resources. We can study “economically conditioned phenomena,” such as the artistic taste of a period, that may be influenced by economic events or institutions. Or we can study “economically

*relevant*” phenomena, to wit, phenomena that are not economic in any orthodox sense of the term but that may be pertinent for our understanding of economic forces: Weber gives as an example the impact of religion. And what this suggests, to return to our major theme, is that *The Protestant Ethic* of 1905 is not a contribution to the sociology of religion (sociology is never mentioned in the text) but rather, at least in part, a study in social economics, concerned to document a culturally significant, “economically relevant”<sup>114</sup> phenomenon: Protestant asceticism’s significance for modern capitalism.<sup>115</sup>

Social economics never entirely lost its interest for Weber; he continued to see it as an omnibus science that could accommodate economic theory, economic history, and economic sociology. Moreover, what we know as *Economy and Society* is but part of the wider multivolume project that Weber called *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, on which he worked, on and off, from 1908 until his death in 1920. However, he never returned to a systematic theoretical analysis of social economics; the tripartite distinction among economic phenomena, economically conditioned phenomena, and economically relevant phenomena is not pursued again; and even the title of the *Grundriss* appears to have become largely a flag of convenience adopted to avoid a lawsuit against the publisher.<sup>116</sup> Instead, from 1909, Weber was drawn ever more deeply into sociology, and particularly the sociology of religion, law, domination, as well as economics. Of increasing importance to him was the complex relationship between “material” interests (struggles over physical resources) and “ideal” interests (conflicts driven by such things as status, nationalism, ethnic prestige, and the desire for salvation). Neither type of interest was reducible to the other, and Weber had a keen eye for situations in which material and ideal interests collided or when the latter impeded the former. Moreover, by 1919, Weber had at his disposal a sophisticated sociological theory of “social action” and of “rationalization” to develop these ideas for which the earlier “social economic” formulations were plainly insufficient. The sociological importance he attributed to rationality in the history and structure of Western institutions is shown to powerful effect in the “Prefatory Remarks” to volume 1 of the sociology of religion, which we translate in Appendix II.

Yet if Weber’s intellectual framework had shifted by 1919, what are we to make of his insistence in the 1920 edition of *The Protestant Ethic* that “if anyone should be sufficiently interested to do so (an unlikely eventuality), they are welcome to compare the two editions of these essays and satisfy themselves that *not one single sentence* that contains any materially essential statement has been

cut, reinterpreted, or moderated”?<sup>117</sup> It is certainly true that, some additional illustrations<sup>118</sup> and an expanded bibliographical apparatus notwithstanding, Weber left most of the essay intact and continued to defend its main argument with aggressive intransigence. To that extent, no essential point was changed. Readers of the 1905 version can thus rest assured that they are perusing a substantive essay, not a rough draft of something that only became “definitive” fifteen years later. At the same time, Weber’s revised essay does witness a sharpening of language and some conceptual developments that arose precisely from earlier critical encounters—an evolution that is only possible to trace if one knows the text of 1905 and the responses to Fischer and Rachfahl (their names have all but disappeared from the 1920 text) as well as to Sombart and Brentano that it triggered. Since Weber’s principal ripostes and “clarifications” to all these authors are included in our translation, we shall restrict our comments to some additions to—and one omission from—the 1920 text that are not so obvious.

Among the more subtle changes evident in the 1920 revision is a reformulation of language, as Weber attempts to employ a terminology that is more historically persuasive and more rigorously attuned to his argument. Accordingly, as Klaus Lichtblau and Johannes Weiß point out, previous references to “capitalism,” the “capitalist spirit,” and the “capitalist enterprise” now witness the insertion of the prefix “modern” to establish Weber’s limited purview. Similarly, Weber replaces the expression “*bürgerliche Klassen*” with “*bürgerliche Mittelklassen*” to signal the “estate” or “status” location of the early social carriers of the modern capitalist spirit;<sup>119</sup> he draws a sharper distinction between the Reformed Church and its sectarian offshoots; and, seeking decisively to distance himself from all Hegelian-like formulations, prefers to write of the “ethic” of the calling rather than its “idea.”<sup>120</sup>

Another characteristic of the 1920 revision is a conceptual development: Weber’s attempt to specify more clearly the psychological mechanism through which a religious faith is transmuted into actual, quotidian conduct. One of the more striking features of Weber’s writings on religion—and this includes *The Protestant Ethic* in both its narrative manifestations—is the importance they accord to psychological forces. Weber not only takes it for granted that human beings have psychological drives, or “impulses,” with social consequences; he also believes that the need to justify one’s standing in life—as privileged or dispossessed—is among the most basic psychological requirements of the human situation.<sup>121</sup> Chaos, indeterminacy, and uncertainty are existential conditions too promiscuously senseless for most people to entertain willingly.

As a result, humans seek reassurance that their fate in life is not arbitrary but meaningful; that salvation and redemption are not distant possibilities beyond their influence but states of being that can, at least in part, be achieved in the here and now by active intervention or mediation. “One must,” Weber insisted, “constantly put the psychological question . . . : How, through what medium, does the individual become *certain* of his relationship to the eternal?”<sup>122</sup> It is erroneous, Weber says, to imagine that a deep attachment to the sacred is tantamount to immersion in a transcendental realm completely aloof from the world. Even those religious virtuosi who live, as it were, in and for the “beyond” and who eschew “such solid goods of this world, as health, wealth, and long life”<sup>123</sup> are still seeking psychological compensation and gratification in their everyday lives. Indeed “[p]sychologically considered, man in quest of salvation has been primarily preoccupied by attitudes of the here and now. The Puritan *certitudo salutis*, the state of grace that rests in the feeling of ‘having proved oneself,’ was psychologically the only concrete object among the sacred values of this ascetic religion.”<sup>124</sup> And, as Weber argued, it had important consequences for the formation of capitalist attitudes to work.

Yet in order for Weber to demonstrate a causal link between Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism (or, if one prefers, an affinity or congruence between them), he had to show that the Puritan lay following was sufficiently energized to confront traditional attitudes to everyday life and become the bearers of a radically different, ascetically inclined vocational culture. He also needed, relatedly, to show how the psychic dread that accompanied the doctrine of predestination could be sublimated into asceticism in the first place. In the 1905 version of *The Protestant Ethic*, Weber handles this knot of difficulties by invoking the somewhat amorphous concept of “psychological drives” or “impulses” (*psychologische Antriebe*) but, doubtless realizing that this was too blunt an instrument to do the theoretical work he required of it, he later adapted his terms accordingly. While retaining the notion of psychological *Antriebe* and asserting that religious ethics, however much subject to political and economic influences, derive “primarily from religious sources,”<sup>125</sup> Weber’s work on religion in general, and Christianity in particular, increasingly emphasizes how various types of faith hold out to believers differing kinds of “psychological rewards” or “premiums” (*Prämien*);<sup>126</sup> and it is these premiums that the faithful are typically seeking, and are motivated by, in their devotional and worldly conduct. Psychological premiums or rewards, or what Weber describes as “premiums of salvation” (*Heilsprämien*),<sup>127</sup> are thus the key mechanism in



moving the believer from faith to consistent action.

Of course, as Weber acknowledges, the theology of Calvinism provided little, if any, justification for the belief that human beings could affect their own destiny; on the contrary, the weight of the doctrine pulled overwhelmingly against such a heretical notion, championing a God so transcendent as to have little interest in his creatures and so all-powerful as to confound any notion of significant human agency. Against this, however, Weber argues that the real issue for his “problematic” is not Calvinism as an abstract theological system but whether, how, and in what respects Calvinist doctrine furnished “*practical, psychological*” motives for real ethical conduct.<sup>128</sup> Weber’s conclusion was that Calvinism promoted, despite itself, an emotional inducement in the faithful to look for “proof” of “election;” and that methodical, systematic work in a calling was the social product of this religious quest. The psychological premiums offered by Lutheranism and Catholicism were utterly different, Weber argued, rewarding in their own peculiar ways an adaptation to the world and providing pressure valves (e.g., through the confessional) to release the pent-up, agitated anxiety typical in Calvinism or among the Puritan sects. An early expression of Weber’s analysis of religious “premiums” can be found in the last of his polemics with Rachfahl—polemics that, ironically, he described as “unfruitful.” But perhaps the clearest formulation of what Weber means comes toward the end of his essay on “The Protestant Sects.” As he puts it, “it is not the ethical *doctrine* of a religion, but that form of ethical conduct upon which *premiums* are placed that matters. Such premiums operate through the form and the condition of the respective goods of salvation. . . . For Puritanism, that conduct was a certain methodical, rational way of life which—given certain conditions—paved the way for the ‘spirit’ of modern capitalism. The premiums were placed upon ‘proving’ oneself before God in the sense of attaining salvation—which is found in *all* Puritan denominations—and ‘proving’ oneself before men in the sense of socially holding one’s own within the Puritan sects. Both aspects were mutually supplementary and operated in the same direction: they helped to deliver the ‘spirit’ of modern capitalism, its specific *ethos*: the ethos of the modern *bourgeois middle classes*.”<sup>129</sup>

The previous discussion has focused principally on additions that Weber made to the 1920 text. Others include Weber’s reference to the “disenchantment” of the world that rationalization brings in its train. To describe refinements such as these as “clarifications” is tempting but somewhat tendentious: it assumes that Weber’s position was already thoroughly worked out in his own mind by 1905

and that it was only his critics' incompetence and perversity that prompted the explications we sketched above. To avoid that impression, it is preferable to describe the additions as developments of a core position, adjustments that emerged from Weber's tempestuous dialogue with the unpersuaded. A comparison of the 1905 and 1920 texts and the responses to Fischer and Rachfahl that punctuate them illuminates that intellectual trajectory. By the same token, the earlier document provides a clue, expunged from the revised version, to the stimulus that led Weber to turn his attention to Puritanism once again.<sup>130</sup> Georg Jellinek's *Erklärung der Menschen und Bürgerrechte* (1895).<sup>131</sup>

Weber was particularly impressed by Jellinek's argument that the "idea of legally establishing inalienable, inherent, and sacred rights of the individual is not of political but religious origin. What has been held to be a work of the Revolution was in reality a fruit of the Reformation and its struggles. Its first apostle was not Lafayette but Roger Williams."<sup>132</sup> According to Jellinek, the template for the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, promulgated by the French Constituent Assembly of August 26, 1789, was not to be traced to Rousseau's *Contrat Social* (1762)<sup>133</sup> but to the various Bills of Rights that issued from Virginia and elsewhere in the 1770s and early 1780s. In turn, those documents bore the impress of the uncompromising struggles for freedom of conscience that characterized the northern European Puritan movement whose seeds had fallen on American shores.

For Jellinek, as for Weber, the Puritan sects were radical not only in their unconditional affirmation of freedom of conscience but also in asserting that such freedom applied to everyone irrespective of the denomination to which they belonged; the Quaker and Baptist sects helped establish a *universal*, as distinct from a local or contingent, concept of right. "Such freedom of conscience," Weber remarked in *Economy and Society*, "may be the oldest Right of Man—as Jellinek has argued convincingly; at any rate, it is the most basic Right of Man because it comprises all ethically conditioned action and guarantees freedom from compulsion, especially from the power of the state. In this sense the concept was as unknown to Antiquity and the Middle Ages as it was to Rousseau's social contract, with its power of religious compulsion. The other Rights of Man or civil rights were joined to this basic right,<sup>134</sup> especially the right to pursue one's own economic interests, which includes the inviolability of individual property, the freedom of contract, and vocational choice. . . . The basic Rights of Man made it possible for the capitalist to use things and men freely, just as this worldly asceticism—adopted with some dogmatic variations

—and the specific discipline of the sects bred the capitalist spirit and the rational ‘professional’ (*Berufsmensch*) who was needed by capitalism.”<sup>135</sup>

In sum: both versions of *The Protestant Ethic* are valuable in their own right and need to be read historically.<sup>136</sup> Each of them was saying something slightly different, and knowing this helps us not only to differentiate the texts themselves but also to trace the path from one to the other. For instance, as David Beetham observes, in the 1905 version of *The Protestant Ethic*, “it is the origins of capitalism that is central; in his anticritique of 1910 [the responses to Rachfahl], Weber insists that it is the effect of the *Berufsethik* on the character of modern man that is most important; in the revised edition of 1919, the argument is set firmly within the broader rationalization theme.”<sup>137</sup> Conversely, a major flaw in many accounts of Weber’s mature oeuvre is the unreal assumption that it is an integrated whole, seamless and guided by a central problem: “rationalization,” “the heteronomy of purposes,” the refutation of Marx.<sup>138</sup> Aside from the oddity of believing that a thinker of Weber’s range and sophistication was preoccupied by *one* overriding question or located within one “problematic,” it is psychologically bizarre to imagine that he did not have changes of heart—and of direction. Continuities in Weber’s thinking are evident and undeniable. But just as important are the departures and innovations. *The Protestant Ethic* of 1905 and the replies to critics that followed its publication help us to retrieve the Weber of history rather than of myth, the Weber whose ideas evolved through dialogue and argument rather than as the emanation of some primordial master plan.

## NOTES

(Note: dates in square brackets denote original year of publication)

1. The two-part essay appeared as “Die protestantische Ethik und der ‘Geist’ des Kapitalismus,” in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 20 (1905), pp. 1-54, and 21 (1905), pp. 1-110. Early copies of part 1 were distributed by the publisher Siebeck in late 1904. This explains why some accounts of the full essay refer to 1904-05 as its date of publication. For the sake of simplicity, we follow the precedent of the *Archiv*, volume 20, whose title page gives the date of 1905.

2. Published as “Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus,” in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion)* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1920), vol. 1, pp. 17-206. Cited hereafter as *Religionssoziologie*. Note that in the transition from the 1905 to the 1920 version, the cautionary quotation marks around “Geist” (Spirit) have disappeared. Many other small changes were made to the 1920 edition, some of which we will discuss below. For a full concordance, see *Die Protestantische Ethik und der ‘Geist’ des Kapitalismus*, edited by Klaus Lichtblau and Johannes Weiß (Bodenheim: Athenäum Hain Hanstein, 1993), pp. 158-202. Cited hereafter as Lichtblau and Weiß.

3. See Randall Collins, *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 32.

4. In the first of his responses to Felix Rachfahl, Weber says that he lectured on the topic “twelve years ago,” see this volume, p. 247. This is worth emphasizing since it is common in the secondary literature to assume that *The Protestant Ethic* was conceived as a response to Werner Sombart’s *Der Moderne Kapitalismus* (2 vols.) (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1902). For an early claim that “the most radical political innovators have been profoundly influenced by the Calvinist theory of predestination,” see Max Weber, “Roscher’s ‘His torical Method,’ ” in *Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics* (New York: Free Press, 1975 [1903]), translated by Guy Oakes, p. 223, note 54. For a useful collection of articles debating the relationship between Calvinism and democracy, see Robert M. Kingdom and Robert D. Linder (eds.), *Calvin and Calvinism: Sources of Democracy?* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1970),

especially the contributions of Emile Doumergue (Weber's contemporary, and a sharp critic of Troeltsch) and Hans Baron.

5. Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: A Biography* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988 [1975]), translated and edited by Harry Zohn, with a new introduction by Guenther Roth, pp. 325-26. Cited hereafter as *Biography*. For the German edition, see Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: Ein Lebensbild* (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1950 [1926]), p. 371. Cited hereafter as *Lebensbild*.

6. Marianne Weber, *Biography*, p. 335.

7. Weber's contention is elaborated on in note 146 of *The Protestant Ethic*. The relevant section was expunged from the 1920 version of the essay and replaced by a passage on toleration that echoes Weber's two critiques of Felix Rachfahl. The contribution of Puritanism to the freedom of women is explored in note 238.

8. Letter to Adolf von Harnack, February 5, 1906, in *Briefe 1906-1908, Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* II/5 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1990), pp. 32-33. The sentiment is echoed in note 28 of Weber's first rebuttal of Felix Rachfahl, p. 273-76, below. See also Roth's comment that the "hatred [Weber] felt for his Lutheran heritage and the German authoritarian realities was so great that he modeled his notion of ethical personality and innerworldly asceticism to a considerable extent after an idealized image of English history, especially of Puritanism." "Weber the Would-Be Englishman: Anglophilia and Family History," in Hartmut Lehmann and Guenther Roth (eds.), *Weber's Protestant Ethic. Origins, Evidence, Contexts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 [1987]), pp. 83-121, p. 83; compare pp. 84-97.

9. For Weber's analysis of Bismarck's "Caesarism," see Peter Baehr, *Caesar and the Fading of the Roman World: A Study in Republicanism and Caesarism* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1998), pp. 165-221.

10. The two outstanding studies of Weber's political views and ideas are Wolfgang J. Mommsen's *Max Weber and German Politics 1890-1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984 [1959]), translated by Michael S. Steinberg; and David Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985 [1974]).

11. The term was coined in 1872 by the scientist and left-liberal parliamentarian Rudolf Virchow. Bismarck's real target was the Catholic Center Party, whose confessional orientation "seemed to stand for allegiance to an authority [the *Curia*] other than the national state." More generally, antipapal feeling was strong among the middle classes and the

German liberal parties. See Gordon A. Craig, *Germany: 1866-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981 [1978]), pp. 69-78; the quote comes from p. 71. On the importance of the *Kulturkampf* for understanding Weber's Protestant ethic thesis, and on Weber's anti-Catholic bias, see George Becker, "Educational 'Preference' of German Protestants and Catholics: The Politics Behind Educational Specialization," *Review of Religious Research* 41:3 (2000), pp. 311-27, at pp. 315-22.

12. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, "The German Theological Sources and Protestant Church Politics," in Lehmann and Roth, pp. 27-49, at p. 45. In this respect, as Graf points out, Weber echoed the views of Albrecht Ritschl, the Göttingen-based Protestant theologian whose ideas are in other respects frequently attacked in *The Protestant Ethic*.

13. Thomas Nipperdey, "Max Weber, Protestantism, and the Context of the Debate around 1900," in Lehmann and Roth, pp. 73-81, at p. 74.

14. The tendentious statistical analysis on which Weber based his argument—Martin Offenbacher's *Konfession und soziale Schichtung: Eine Studie über die wirtschaftliche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden* (Tübingen and Leipzig: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1900)—the extrapolations he drew from it, and the curiously limited sample on which the whole edifice is based (data on the relationship between religion and schooling in Baden) are subject to a damning critique by Richard F. Hamilton in *The Social Misconstruction of Reality: Validity and Verification in the Scholarly Community* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 33-50. In turn, Hamilton refers to, but also corrects, Kurt Samuelsson's statistical dissection of Offenbacher in *Religion and Economic Action* (London: William Heinemann, 1961 [1957]), translated by E. Geoffrey French, edited and with an introduction by D. C. Coleman, pp. 138-46). Samuelsson assumed that a "typographical or arithmetical error . . . put the proportion of Protestants in the *Realgymnasien* at 69 percent" (Weber actually italicizes the figure for emphasis) when it should have been 59 percent (Samuelsson, p. 140). However, even this lower figure is incorrect. Reassessing the raw Baden data on which Offenbacher drew, George Becker has recalculated the figure of *Realgymnasien* students (i.e., those attending a kind of school that was more "modern" and practically oriented than the humanistically inclined *Gymnasien*) at 52 percent. (It is important to note that for both Protestants and Catholics, the *Gymnasium* was typically the school of first choice because of its prestige and the career privileges it afforded; conversely, graduates of the more modern schools "were legally excluded, until the end

of the century, from the faculties of law, theology, and medicine, and had only limited access to the faculty of arts and sciences”), George Becker, “Replication and Reanalysis of Offenbacher’s School Enrolment Study: Implications for the Weber and Merton Thesis,” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36 (4) 1997, pp. 483-96, at 488-89.) Further, even this numerical discrepancy may well be explained by the structure of opportunities obtaining in Wilhelmine Germany, post *Kulturkampf*, rather than by religious value orientations. See Becker, “Educational ‘Preference’ of German Protestants and Catholics,” cited in note 11 above.

Weber’s own calculations can be found in part 1 of *The Protestant Ethic*, note 7, p. 44, below.

15. This concept is explained in Section IV below.

16. Weber’s invidious contrast between Lutheranism and Calvinism, and his analysis of asceticism and “religious psychologies,” was shaped by the framework of German theological discussion, in particular the work of Matthias Schneckenburger: see especially Graf, “The German Theological Sources and Protestant Church Politics,” in Lehmann and Roth. Weber’s guide to the theological literature of the day was his friend and colleague Ernst Troeltsch whose major writings on Protestantism preceded Weber’s by fourteen years: See Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, “Friendship between Experts: Notes on Weber and Troeltsch,” in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Max Weber and His Contemporaries* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), pp. 215-33, especially at pp. 221-22. Cited hereafter as Mommsen and Osterhammel.

17. Marianne Weber, *Biography*, p. 19.

18. See Rita Aldenhoff, “Max Weber and the Evangelical-Social Congress,” in Mommsen and Osterhammel, pp. 193-202.

19. An important interlocutor for Weber on this project was the theologian Paul Göhre. On their relationship, see Rita Aldenhoff, in Mommsen and Osterhammel, pp. 197-98. Weber’s study of the situation of rural workers was a continuation of work he had pursued for the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* (Association for Social Policy). For a brief discussion of Weber’s conflicted position within the Verein, see Dieter Krüger, “Max Weber and the Younger Generation of the Verein für Sozialpolitik,” in Mommsen and Osterhammel, pp. 71-87.

20. Marianne Weber, *Biography*, p. 339.

21. Marianne Weber, *Biography*, p. 337.

22. See this volume, 121.

23. We have concentrated above on the proximate relationships between *The Protestant Ethic* and Weber's biography, but any detailed account would have to include many other aspects, both methodological and substantive. For instance, in Weber's studies, in the early to mid-1890s, of German rural workers east of the Elbe, he had already dilated on the importance of cultural and psychological factors for economic development, particularly the desire for freedom and its consequences. See, for instance, Weber's Freiburg Inaugural Address, "The Nation State and Economic Policy" (1895), in Weber: *Political Writings*, edited and translated by Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1-28, at pp. 8-10.

For a helpful description of the wider context from which the *Protestant Ethic* essay sprang, see Gordon Marshall, *In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: An Essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis* (London: Hutchinson, 1982), pp. 17-40.

24. These remarks appear in the second of Weber's counter critiques of the historian Felix Rachfahl, below pp. 244-338, at pp. 294-95.

25. The lecture, originally entitled "German Agrarian Conditions, Past and Present," can be most conveniently read in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970 [1948], edited and with an introduction by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, pp. 363-85. Gerth and Mills redubbed the essay "Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany," changing the earlier English title ("The Relations of the Rural Community to Other Branches of Social Science"), and reworking the translation that appeared in the official proceedings of the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science. See *Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis* (Boston and New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1906), vol. 7, pp. 725-46, translated by C. W. Seidenadel. The German manuscript of Weber's lecture has never been recovered.

26. Hans Rollmann, " 'Meet Me in St. Louis': Troeltsch and Weber in America," in Lehmann and Roth, pp. 357-83, at p. 373.

27. Letter to Marta Troeltsch, September 14-16, 1904. Quoted in Rollman, " 'Meet Me in St. Louis,' " p. 372.

28. Marianne Weber, *Biography*, p. 287.

29. That he conversed with William James, probably in German, is clear from a comment Weber makes in "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," [German edition, 1920] in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber*, pp. 302-22, at p. 308. On the meeting with Albion Small



in Chicago, see Rollmann, “ ‘Meet Me in St. Louis,’ ” pp. 375-76.

30. Marianne Weber, *Biography*, p. 295.

31. We are drawing on the fascinating paper by Lawrence A. Scaff, “The ‘cool objectivity of sociation’: Max Weber and Marianne Weber in America,” *History of the Human Sciences* 11:2 (1998), pp. 61-82. Scaff’s article not only examines the Weber-DuBois correspondence—DuBois, a student of Humboldt University between 1892 and 1894, had attended Weber’s lectures “probably on commercial law” (p. 71)—but also contains much of interest on Marianne Weber’s communications with such “women activists, reformers, and educators” as Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, Florence Kelley, M. Carey Thomas, Yamei Kin, Helen Francis Garrison Villard, Caroline Beer Seligman, Ethel Puffer Howes, and Margaret Washington (p. 74). Because Marianne was writing her husband’s biography, she underplayed her own activities in America.

DuBois’s article appeared as “Die Negerfrage in den Vereinigten Staaten,” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 22 ( January 1906), pp. 31-79. It is reprinted in Herbert Aptheker, *Writings of W. E. B. DuBois in Periodicals Edited by Others* (New York: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1982), vol. 1, pp. 277-312.

32. Letter to DuBois, November 17, 1904. Quoted in Scaff, “The ‘cool objectivity of sociation,’ ” p. 72.

33. “Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist des Kapitalismus,” in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion)* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1920), vol. 1, pp. 207-36, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills as “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism,” in *From Max Weber*, pp. 302-22.

34. Weber reminds Felix Rachfahl that ideal types are roughly of two kinds. In the first case, an ideal type is constructed to show the abstract similarities between one social phenomenon and another; in the second case, the point is to distinguish sharply between social phenomena, thereby drawing attention to the peculiarities of the object under investigation. Weber’s analysis of “the Protestant ethic” and the “spirit of capitalism” seeks to delineate the uniqueness of *both* concepts and the social qualities they purport to convey. See Weber’s first response to Rachfahl, pp. 262-64, below.

The locus classicus of Weber’s discussion of “ideal types” is “ ‘Ob

jectivity' in social science and social policy," in Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949), pp. 49-112, "Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozial-politischer Erkenntnis," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 19:1 (1904), pp. 22-87

35. Toward the end of the first part of *The Protestant Ethic*, Weber had said ". . . we have no intention of defending any such foolishly doctrinaire thesis as that the 'capitalist spirit' (as always in the provisional sense of the word in which we are using it) let alone capitalism itself, *could only* arise as a product of certain influences of the Reformation. The very fact that certain important *forms* of capitalist business are considerably *older* than the Reformation would invalidate such a thesis. We intend, rather, to establish whether and to what extent religious influences *have in fact* been *partially* responsible for the qualitative shaping and the quantitative expansion of that 'spirit' across the world, and what concrete aspects of capitalist culture originate from them," p. 36, below.

36. This volume, 77-78, emphases omitted.

37. Gianfranco Poggi, *Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit: Max Weber's "Protestant Ethic"* (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 69.

38. The "spirit" of capitalism, Weber affirms in the second of his critiques of Rachfahl, comprises "the 'objectivity' [*Sachlichkeit*] that is cool and lacking in humanity [*menschlichkeitsfremde*], the 'calculation,' the rational consistency, the serious approach to work with no trace of any naive attitude to life, and the specialist narrowness [that] have always provoked emotional antichrematist sentiments when viewed from the artistic, the ethical, and particularly the purely human angle," pp. 294, below.

39. Lawrence Scaff documents the "series of visitations to sectarian services (Methodist, Baptist, Black Baptist, Presbyterian, Quaker, Christian Scientist, and the Ethical Culture Society)" that took place "during the last month of [the Webers'] travels." See "The 'cool objectivity of sociation,' " p. 66.

40. This suggestive expression is actually used in part 2 of *The Protestant Ethic*, composed shortly after Weber returned from his American trip. See p. 104, below.

41. To be sure, the relationship between church and sect is more fluid than we have so far suggested. The Geneva experiment of 1541-64, under John Calvin's leadership, was to all intents and purposes the imposition of a church, in Weber's sense, the duty of which was to ensure that all city

members served the glory of God, by coercion if need be. Even so, Calvinism had an important impact on many Puritan movements that constituted “sects.” See Weber’s contribution to the first meeting of the German Sociological Society (1910): “Max Weber on Church, Sect, and Mysticism,” *Sociological Analysis* 34:2 (summer 1973 [1924, 1910]), translated by Jerome L. Gittleman, pp. 140-49.

42. Details in Guenther Roth, “Max Weber at Home and in Japan: On the Troubled Genesis and Successful Reception of His Work,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 12:3 (1999), pp. 515-25, at p. 521.

43. The following model of reception processes draws on Peter Baehr, *Founders, Classics, Canons: Modern Disputes over the Origins and Appraisal of Sociology’s Heritage* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2002).

44. Guenther Roth, “Introduction,” in Lehmann and Roth, pp. 1-24, at p. 3.

45. H. Karl Fischer, “Kritische Beiträge zu Prof. M. Webers Abhandlung: ‘Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus,’” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 25 (1907), pp. 232-42; H. Karl Fischer, “Protestantische Ethik und ‘Geist des Kapitalismus.’ Replik auf Herrn Prof. Max Webers Gegenkritik,” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 26 (1908), pp. 270-74; Felix Rachfahl, “Kalvinismus und Kapitalismus,” *Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik* 3 (1909), columns 1217-38, 1249-68, 1287-1300, 1319-34, 1347-66; Felix Rachfahl, “Nochmals Kalvinismus und Kapitalismus,” *Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik* 4 (1910), columns 689-702, 717-34, 755-68, 775-94. Lujo Brentano, *Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus* (Munich: J. Roth, 1916); Werner Sombart, *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1911), translated by M. Epstein as *The Jews and Modern Capitalism* (New York: Collier Books, 1962 [1914]), with an introduction by Bert F. Hoselitz; Werner Sombart, *Der Bourgeois: Zur Geistesgeschichte des modernen Wirtschaftsmenschen* (Munich and Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1913), translated by M. Epstein as *The Quintessence of Capitalism: A Study of the History and Psychology of the Modern Business Man* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967 [1915]).

46. For a brief but useful evaluation of some of Weber’s later critics—including H. M. Robertson, R. H. Tawney, Henri Pirenne, Kurt Samuelsson, and Hugh Trevor-Roper—see Malcolm H. MacKinnon, “The Longevity of the Thesis: A Critique of the Critics,” in Lehmann and Roth, pp. 211-43. The best overall appraisal of Weber’s argument is Gordon

Marshall's, *In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism*.

47. Weber's qualifications to his thesis are lucidly summarized in Jacob Viner, *Religious Thought and Economic Society: Four Chapters of an Unfinished Work by Jacob Viner* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978), edited by Jacques Melitz and Donald Winch, pp. 154-59. On Weber's analysis of the Jews, see Hans Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild von Hegel bis Max Weber* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1999 [1967]). For a discussion in English, see Gary A. Abraham, *Max Weber and the Jewish Question* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992).

48. Weber's home, and intellectual base camp, was Heidelberg, a city cradled in the Neckar river valley.

49. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985 [1978]), p. 289; Mohammed Nafissi, "Reframing Orientalism: Weber and Islam," in Ralph Schroeder (editor), *Max Weber, Democracy and Modernization* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 182-201; Wolfgang Schwentker, "Western Impact and Asian Values in Japan's Modernization: A Weberian Critique," in Schroeder (editor), pp. 166-81.

50. The critical literature on Weber's essay is enormous. Major root and branch critiques include Samuelsson, *Religion and Economic Action*; MacKinnon, "The Longevity of the Thesis: A Critique of the Critics" (MacKinnon's own critique focuses on Weber's misinterpretation of Calvinism and the putative "crisis of proof"); Hamilton, *The Social Misconstruction of Reality*, pp. 32-106 (which empirically assesses the twelve key claims of Weber's argument); Luciano Pellicani, *The Genesis of Capitalism and the Origins of Modernity* (New York: Telos Press, 1994), translated by James G. Colbert, pp. 27-61. The best of the more qualified and sympathetic appraisals is Marshall, *In the Spirit of Capitalism*. See also, David Zaret, *The Heavenly Contract: Ideology and Organization in Pre-Revolutionary Puritanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); and Zaret, "The Use and Abuse of Textual Data" in Lehmann and Roth, pp. 245-72.

A common criticism of Weber's argument is that it adduced no substantial evidence to show, let alone prove, that the Puritans entertained the motives that it imputed to them; neither did it demonstrate that Puritans who believed in predestination "went on to become capitalist businessmen," Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 306.

Conversely, Weber's essay is defended on both empirical and theoretical grounds by David S. Landes in *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999 [1998]), pp. 174-81.

51. A "didactic catastrophe," is Wilhelm Hennis's judgment of Weber's Protestant ethic writings. Hennis adds, "this is perhaps the basis of their indestructible attraction," *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction*, translated by Keith Tribe (London: Allen and Unwin, 1988 [1982]), p. 31.

52. Ed Andrew, *Closing the Iron Cage: The Scientific Management of Work and Leisure* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1981).

53. Michael Schwalbe, *Unlocking the Iron Cage: The Men's Movement, Gender Politics, and American Culture* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

54. Friedrich H. Tenbruck, "The Problem of Thematic Unity in the Works of Max Weber," in Keith Tribe (ed.), *Reading Weber* (London: Routledge, 1989 [1975]), translated by Sam Whimster.

55. Hennis, *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction*, pp. 21-61.

56. Frank Parkin argues that both theses can be found in *The Protestant Ethic*. See Parkin's *Max Weber* (London: Tavistock, 1982), pp. 40-70. See also Pellicani, *The Genesis of Capitalism and the Origins of Modernity*, p. 34.

57. "Thus Weber demonstrates only that Calvinism was an *accelerator* of capitalist development, not its *generator*," Pellicani, *The Genesis of Capitalism and the Origins of Modernity*, p. 32. Compare Poggi, *Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit: Max Weber's "Protestant Ethic,"* pp. 56, 93ff.

58. Weber's rhetorical strategy is well analyzed by MacKinnon ("The Longevity of the Thesis: A Critique of the Critics"), in Lehmann and Roth, pp. 211-43.

59. Viner, *Religious Thought and Economic Society*, p. 158. For a more sympathetic treatment of the ideal types (Troeltsch's use of them, rather than Weber's), see A. G. Dickens, *The German Nation and Martin Luther* (Glasgow: Fontana, 1976 [1974]), pp. 209-10.

60. Respectively, James S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 6-10; Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1996 [1995]), pp. 43-57; Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pearson, *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press,

1998), p. 59; George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization Thesis: Explorations and Extensions* (London: Sage, 1998), pp. 4, 77-78, 164; and David S. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999 [1998]), pp. 174-79.

61. Aspects of the British reception are examined in Gordon Marshall, *In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: An Essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis* (London: Hutchinson, 1982), and Larry Ray, "The Protestant Ethic Debate," in R. J. Anderson, J. A. Hughes, and W. W. Sharrock (eds.), *Classic Disputes in Sociology*, pp. 97-125. On the Japanese reception, see Hayashi Makoto and Yamanaka Hiroshi, "The Adaptation of Max Weber's Theories of Religion in Japan," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* (1993) 20/2-3, pp. 207-28, and Wolfgang Schwentker, *Max Weber in Japan: Eine Untersuchung zur Wirkungsgeschichte 1905-1995* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998).

62. For a sketch, see Hans H. Gerth, "The Reception of Max Weber's Work in American Sociology" [originally published in Japanese in 1963], in Joseph Bensman, Arthur J. Vidich, and Nobuko Gerth (eds.), *Politics, Character, and Culture: Perspectives from Hans Gerth* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 208-17.

63. On their relationship, see Richard Swedberg, *Economics and Sociology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 14-15.

64. Weber's *General Economic History* (New York: Collier Books, 1961), translated by Frank H. Knight and first published in 1927, concludes with an overview of the place of Protestantism in the formation of the capitalist spirit. (The book is based on lectures that Weber delivered to students in Munich in 1919-20.) Talcott Parsons's translation of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* appeared in 1930. Both authors published articles on Weber at around the same time and communicated with each other about their Weber translations. See Frank H. Knight, "Historical and Theoretical Issues in the Problem of Modern Capitalism," *Journal of Economic and Business History* (1928), vol. 1, pp. 119-36; and Talcott Parsons, "Capitalism in Recent German Literature: Sombart and Weber," *Journal of Political Economy* 36 (1928), pp. 641-54, and 37 (1929), pp. 31-51.

65. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Unwin University Books, 1930), translated by Talcott Parsons, with a foreword by R. H. Tawney.

66. A new translation by Stephen Kalberg of the 1920 version is now available from Roxbury Press (Los Angeles, 2001). On the need for a new

translation, see Kalberg's remarks in *Perspectives: The American Sociological Association Theory Section Newsletter* 23:1 (January 2001), pp. 1-4.

67. Gisela J. Hinkle, "The Americanization of Max Weber," *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* 7 (1986), p. 89.

68. Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: Free Press, 1968 [1937]); the reference in the previous sentence to a "single body etc." comes from p. xxi, emphasis in the original.

69. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons.

70. Marshall and Pareto are, today, marginal figures in sociology. Durkheim and Weber, the two thinkers accorded the most space in *The Structure of Social Action*, have remained pivotal. We might note that Weber receives a longer treatment in *Structure* than Durkheim and that Parsons begins his exposition of the former with a treatment of Protestantism and capitalism, pp. 500-686, at pp. 500-38.

71. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories through the First Quarter of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper and Row, 1928).

72. On the conflict between them, see Barry V. Johnston, *Pitirim A. Sorokin: An Intellectual Biography* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 84-102.

73. Parsons, *Structure*, p. xvi.

74. The following major treatments can suffice: Raymond Aron, *Main Currents in Sociological Thought* (2 vols.) (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971 [1967]), translated by Richard Howard and Helen Weaver (Aron expands the canon to seven thinkers: Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Comte, Marx, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber); Anthony Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Jeffrey C. Alexander, *Theoretical Logic in Sociology* (4 vols.) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980-1983), where Parsons joins the ranks of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber; and Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (2 vols.) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987 [1981]), translated by Thomas McCarthy, in which George Herbert Mead, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons assume pride of place as "classics, that is, as theorists of society who still have something to say to us," vol. 1, p. xl.

75. Robert K. Merton, *Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth*

*Century England* (New York: Howard Fertig, 2001 [1938]); Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion: The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan* (New York: Free Press, 1985 [1957]); Randall Collins, *Weberian Sociological Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), especially pp. 19-44.

76. For instance, Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (New York: Doubleday, 1961).

77. Andrew Greeley, "The Protestant Ethic: Time for a Moratorium," *Sociological Analysis* 25 (1964), pp. 20-33, at p. 23.

78. For a review of the historical literature, see Philip Benedict, "The Historiography of Continental Calvinism," in Lehmann and Roth, pp. 305-25, and Richard F. Hamilton's bracing, *The Social Misconstruction of Reality: Validity and Verification in the Scholarly Community* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 88-97. The only country, Benedict points out, in which Weber's thesis has significantly affected "mainstream" historical research is Britain on account of R. H. Tawney's influence and that of his pupils, notably, Christopher Hill.

79. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967 [1954]), edited from manuscript by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter, pp. 80-81. A much more sympathetic appraisal of *The Protestant Ethic's* enduring value, from the standpoint of economic culture, can be found in the majority of essays included in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2001).

80. We are not saying that all sociologists have been indifferent to the accuracy of Weber's argument about Protestantism. It is rather that they have rarely returned to the sources that could sustain, qualify, or refute that argument and, in any case, employ selectively Weber's ideas and hypotheses as a springboard to other related projects. Fine exceptions to sociological ahistoricity include Gordon Marshall's *Presbyteries and Profits: Calvinism and the Development of Capitalism in Scotland, 1560-1707* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), and David Zaret, *The Heavenly Contract: Ideology and Organization in Pre-Revolutionary Puritanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

81. See the essays collected in S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization: A Comparative View* (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

82. See the research agenda that Benjamin Nelson extrapolates from *The Protestant Ethic* in "Weber's Protestant Ethic: Its Origins, Wanderings, and Foreseeable Futures" in Charles Y. Glock and Phillip E. Hammond, *Beyond*



*the Classics? Essays in the Scientific Study of Religion* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 71-130, at pp. 106-11.

83. Major landmarks, aside from texts already mentioned, were *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949), translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch; *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), edited and annotated by Max Rheinstein; translated by Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein; *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth; *Ancient Judaism* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale; *The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958), translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale; *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1968) edited [with some new translations and revisions of older ones] by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich; *Max Weber on Universities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 [1973]), translated, edited, and with an introductory note by Edward Shils; *Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), translated with an introduction by Guy Oakes; *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations* (London: New Left Books, 1976), translated by R. I. Frank; *Critique of Stammler* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), translated with an introductory essay by Guy Oakes. Marianne Weber's *Max Weber: A Biography*, translated by Harry Zohn, became available in 1975. For a new edition of the text that includes an introduction by Guenther Roth, see the New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction imprint of 1988.

84. *Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait* (London: Methuen & Co, 1966 [1959]). Almost half the book is devoted to Weber's studies of religion and their relationship to economic phenomena.

85. C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 5.

86. It is richly documented in Guy Oakes and Arthur J. Vidich, *Collaboration, Reputation, and Ethics in American Academic Life: Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999).

87. Albert Salomon, "Max Weber's Methodology," *Social Research* 1:3 (1934), pp. 147-68; "Max Weber's Sociology," *Social Research* 2:1 (1935), pp. 60-73; "Max Weber's Political Ideas," *Social Research* 2:3 (1935), pp. 368-84. The second of these articles is framed by a discussion of Weber's

sociology of religion.

88. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 254. In common with her husband, Heinrich Blücher, Arendt deplored Weber's "ideal-type" methodology, particularly as adumbrated by Salomon. See *Within Four Walls: The Correspondence between Hannah Arendt and Heinrich Blücher 1936-1968* (New York: Harcourt, 2000), pp. 62-64, 69.

89. Franz L. Neumann, "The Intelligentsia in Exile" [1953] in Paul Connerton, *Critical Sociology: Selected Readings* (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 423-41, at p. 438.

90. Among many engagements, see Leo Strauss, "The Social Science of Max Weber," *Measure: A Critical Journal* 2:2 (1951), pp. 204-30, and *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), especially chapter 2. We should note that while Strauss opposed Weber's theoretical legacy, he had no hesitation in calling him "the greatest social scientist of our century," p. 36.

91. Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 208-09.

92. Daniel Bell, "Afterword: 1996" to *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism: Twentieth Anniversary Edition* (New York, Basic Books, 1996 [1976]), p. 287.

93. H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought 1890-1930* (London: Paladin, 1974 [1958]), p. 319.

94. See note 66 above.

95. We have no wish to join the ranks of Parsons's detractors. Let us say simply that the problems encountered in translating Weber have, since Parsons's time, received growing scholarly attention from which we have been fortunate to benefit. For some helpful reflections, see Keith Tribe, "Translator's Appendix," in Wilhelm Hennis, *Max Weber's Science of Man* (Newbury: Threshold Press, 2000) pp. 205-16; Peter Ghosh, "Some Problems with Talcott Parsons' Translation of 'The Protestant Ethic,'" *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 35 (1994), pp. 104-23; Guenther Roth, "Interpreting and Translating Max Weber," 7:4 (1992), pp. 449-59.

96. From the 1920 edition of *The Protestant Ethic* alone, it would be impossible to discern the amount of pages that Weber devoted to his critiques of H. Karl Fischer and Felix Rachfahl, or the gratuitously insulting manner in which they were conducted. Fischer is not so much as mentioned, while Rachfahl is simply "a scholar whom I otherwise respect,

[but who has] ventured on to a field with which he [is] not really familiar.” Weber now considers the polemics against Rachfahl to have been “rather fruitless” (p. 343, below). Weber’s counterarguments with Brentano and Sombart, tucked away in the footnotes of the 1920 revision, are robust but generally much more respectful in tone. Weber had close but troubled collegial relationships with both Brentano, whose chair at the University of Munich he assumed in 1919, and Sombart, his fellow editor at the *Archiv*. In particular, Weber’s relationship with Sombart became increasingly strained over the years and his famous description of Sombart’s *Der Bourgeois* (1913) as “a book with a definite ‘thesis,’ in the bad sense of the word” remains one of the more memorable academic putdowns of the period (Weber, this volume, p. 352). On the “reserve and distance, even the barely concealed *ressentiment*, that crept into the Weber-Sombart relationship,” that led Weber to emphasize “the very different ‘spirit’ in which you [Sombart] and I engage in ‘science,’ ” see Lawrence A. Scaff, *Fleeing the Iron Cage: Culture, Politics and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1989), p. 204.

97. For Walter Kaufmann, “Nothing in previous German literature equals the bold conception and the concentrated power of that draft [the *Urfaust* ], and the final scene may well be the high point of German drama, not barring the later version which the poet deliberately made less stark,” “Introduction” to *Goethe’s Faust*, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 3-56, at p. 4.

98. For arguments in favor of the 1818 version, see the introductory remarks of Paddy Lyons in Mary Shelley, *Frankenstein* (London: J. M. Dent, 1992), pp. xv-xxviii.

99. Both will be edited by Hartmut Lehmann. Because the *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* is a multivolume project that will take years, if not decades to complete, its progress is best monitored by consulting the regularly updated publisher’s Web site: <http://www.mohr.de/mw/mwg.htm>.

100. Hartmut Lehmann, “The Rise of Capitalism: Weber versus Sombart,” in Lehmann and Roth, pp. 195-208, at p. 204.

101. The three volumes of the *Religionssoziologie* (edited by Marianne Weber), which appeared in 1920 (vol. 1) and 1921 (vols. 2 and 3), largely reproduce, in revised form, articles that had previously been published in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. Besides the essays on the Protestant ethic and the Protestant sects, and three important theoretical statements, they contain studies of the economic ethics of Confucianism

and Taoism (vol. 1), Hinduism and Buddhism (vol. 2), and ancient Judaism (vol. 3). Although a fourth volume was to be devoted to Talmudic Judaism, early Christianity, Oriental Christianity, and Islam, Weber died before he could make any extensive progress on it. For an outline of Weber's own plan for the *Religionssoziologie*, see Wolfgang Schluchter's *Rationalism, Religion, and Domination: A Weberian Perspective* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1989), translated by Neil Solomon, pp. 469-71.

102. "Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Rußland" (1906) and "Rußlands Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus" (1906), in *Max Weber: Zur Russischen Revolution von 1905* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1989), edited by Wolfgang J. Mommsen, in collaboration with Dittmar Dahmann, pp. 86-684. For an abridged English edition of this work, see Max Weber, *The Russian Revolutions* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), translated and edited by Gordon C. Wells and Peter Baehr.

103. Ernst Troeltsch's master work on Protestantism, *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen* (1912) was translated by Olive Wyon as *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, vols. 1 and 2 (Louisville, KY.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992 [1931]), with a foreword by James Luther Adams. (Only volume 2 is directly concerned with Protestantism.) Most of it had previously appeared in twelve articles published in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* between 1908 and 1910. Although Troeltsch praises Weber's *The Protestant Ethic* as "a brilliantly acute piece of analysis and observation," he is equally keen to assert that his "researches do not start from those of Weber." On the intellectual relationship of Weber and Troeltsch, and their division of labor, see Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, "Friendship between Experts: Notes on Weber and Troeltsch," in Mommsen and Osterhammel (eds.), pp. 215-33.

104. Though traces of it are to be found everywhere in his work, for instance, in his study of the Protestant sects as a mode of business sociation. While Weber never carried out the research project sketched in the 1905 version of *The Protestant Ethic*, neither did he delete the sketch from the text of 1920. He did, however, modify its wording; more on this below.

105. The date is given by Wolfgang Schluchter in his reconstruction of the trajectory of Weber's sociology of religion. See *Rationalism, Religion, and Domination*, pp. 411-32, at p. 414; also pp. 425, 430.

106. For a critique of Weber's position, see, inter alia, Jack Goody, *The East in the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), especially pp. 11-81.

107. We have used Solomon's translation of this passage (in Schluchter, *Rationalism, Religion, and Domination*, p. 414) in preference to Harry Zohn's, which, accidentally, substitutes "Eastern rationalism" for "Occidental rationalism," thus garbling the meaning of this sentence. Compare Marianne Weber, *Biography*, p. 333, with *Lebensbild*, p. 381.

108. And even in the 1920 revision for the *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion*, volume 1, Weber was careful in the contents page to indicate the distinct status, and limited purview, of his studies of Protestantism; accordingly, they are not included under the rubric of "The Economic Ethic of the World Religions"—the series of studies of Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and ancient Judaism that Weber had composed from 1913 onward. On this, see Schluchter, *Rationalism, Religion, and Domination*, pp. 429-30.

As Weber conceptualized matters in 1920, *The Protestant Ethic* sought to demonstrate "the extent to which the emergence of an 'economic disposition,' the 'ethos' of an economic form, was determined (*bedingt*) by certain religious beliefs" ("Prefatory Remarks," p. 366, below). Here, then, Weber was interested in the impact of a religious faith—or, more specifically, of the practical impulses toward certain kinds of economic action that a particular religious faith psychologically induced—on the modern, bourgeois capitalist mentality (and life conduct). In contrast, the studies of "The Economic Ethic of the World Religions" had a more ambitious goal: to examine both sides of the causal relationship between religious beliefs, on the one hand, and economic disposition and structure, on the other. In these studies, Weber examines the relationships among world religions, the social strata that were their characteristic bearers, and the kind of attitudes toward economic conduct the latter display. Second, he investigates not only the economic ethics of religion but also the economic ethics of the larger societies in which religious faiths are practiced. The economic ethic of a society embraces attitudes to such things as work, wealth, charity, and economic innovation; from this perspective, religion is one determinant of the society's economic ethic (others include political and geographic factors and, not least, economic ones). On the distinction between the economic ethic of a *religion* and of a *society*, see Richard Swedberg's discussion in *Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 132-45.

109. See Wilhelm Hennis, "The Spiritualist Foundation of Max Weber's 'Interpretive Sociology': Ernst Troeltsch, Max Weber and William James'

*Varieties of Religious Experience*,” *History of the Human Sciences* 11:2 (1998), pp. 83-106, at p. 106, note 73.

110. For a superb discussion of Weber’s conception of social economics, to which we are indebted, see Swedberg, *Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology*, especially pp. 173-206.

111. Max Weber, “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” in Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: Free Press, 1949), translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, pp. 49-112 ; “Die ‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozial-politischer Erkenntnis,” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 19:1 (1904), pp. 22-87.

112. For Weber, the purview of social economics concerns those phenomena the basic element of which “is constituted by the fact that our physical existence and the satisfaction of our most ideal needs are everywhere confronted with the quantitative limits and the qualitative inadequacy of the necessary external means, so that their satisfaction requires planful provision and work, struggle with nature and the association of human beings,” “ ‘Objectivity’ in social science,” pp. 63-64. Or, as Weber explained to students attending his course in economics at the University of Heidelberg (1897-98), “The standpoint of man is decisive. Economics is not a science of nature and its properties, but rather of man and his needs,” quoted in Keith Tribe, “Historical Economics, the Methodenstreit, and the Economics of Max Weber,” in Tribe’s *Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse, 1750-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 66-94, at p. 92.

113. “ ‘Objectivity’ in social science,” p. 64.

114. In the second of his replies to Fischer, Weber reiterates the point that his concern was with the “economically relevant components of the modern style of life,” see below, p. 234. Note, however, that Weber refers to himself in this essay as a historian and as economist (“we *Nationalökonom*en”), p. 236. And in the second of the Rachfahl rebuttals, he reemphasizes his interest in “religious psychology.” This serves to remind us that Weber’s scholarly identity was always mercurial and multifaceted.

115. This is also Swedberg’s conclusion in *Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology*, pp. 119, 192. When Weber revised *The Protestant Ethic* in 1919, he substituted a reference to a “social-economic ethic” with the expression “social-political ethic.” Although this seems to lend support to our argument, it probably does not. Weber may have simply thought that

“social political” described more accurately the examples he actually provided in both versions (the conventicle and the state). Compare “Die protestantische Ethik und der ‘Geist’ des Kapitalismus,” in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 21 (1905), p. 109, with *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, vol. 1, p. 205.

116. See Swedberg, *Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology*, p. 200.

117. This volume, p. 343.

118. One of his most famous “new” illustrations—Weber’s enlistment of William Petty to support his argument—was actually first cited in his polemics with Felix Rachfahl; see this volume, pp. 254-55, 329.

119. To a large degree, this linguistic refinement was already evident in the replies to Rachfahl, where Weber writes of “rising middle classes” (*bürgerlicher aufsteigender Mittelstände*) and the “capitalist middle classes” (*bürgerlich-kapitalistischen Mittelklassen*).

In the first of the Rachfahl *Antikritiken* (notes 32 and 34), Weber says that confusion about the focus of his essay might have been minimized if he had indicated, particularly in the title of *The Protestant Ethic*, that he was concerned with the “spirit” of modern capitalism. The reason he failed to adopt that nomenclature, Weber continues, was because he considered “capitalism” to be a concept that was only applicable to modern times. “Modern capitalism” was thus a redundant expression. Later, however, he had changed his mind and now granted that “capitalism” could take many historical forms. That being the case, it was all the more necessary to insist that it was modern capitalism that was his primary concern. See pp. 278, below.

120. We are citing Lichtblau and Weiß, pp. xv-xvi, almost verbatim.

121. See Max Weber, “The Social Psychology of the World Religions,” (1915) in Gerth and Mills, pp. 267-301, especially the repetition of the word “need” on pp. 270-71, 275. This essay is the “Introduction” (*Einleitung*) to Weber’s series of studies on the economic ethic of the world religions (*Religionssoziologie*, vol. 1, pp. 237-75). The English title is a plausible invention of Gerth and Mills.

122. Max Weber, “Max Weber on Church, Sect, and Mysticism,” pp. 148-49.

123. Weber, “Social Psychology,” p. 277.

124. Weber, “Social Psychology,” p. 278.

125. Weber, “Social Psychology,” p. 270; compare p. 287. Also, *Economy*

*and Society*, p. 1197. Or, as Weber put it in the second rejoinder to Rachfahl, “Out of their own religious life, out of their religiously determined family tradition, out of the religiously influenced style of life of their environment, there grew within people [imbued by ascetic Protestantism] a disposition (*Habitus*) that suited them in a quite specific way to meet the specific demands of early modern capitalism,” p. 312.

126. Parsons translated this term as “sanction.”

127. *Religionssoziologie*, vol. 1, p. 40 (continuation of footnote 1). In *Economy and Society*, p. 56 (*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 40) and in “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism,” in Gerth and Mills, pp. 302-22, at p. 321 (*Religionssoziologie*, vol. 1, pp. 207-36, at pp. 234-35), Weber appears to define faith, sociologically, as an orientation toward *Heilsgüter* (that is, goods of salvation or religious benefits).

128. Weber’s second rebuttal of Rachfahl, p. 302, below.

129. Weber, “The Protestant Sects,” p. 321.

130. This volume, note 146, p. 157. Weber expressed a similar indebtedness to Jellinek in a memorial tribute he paid to his deceased friend in 1911: see Marianne Weber, *Biography*, p. 472, and the remarks of Roth in the “Introduction” to Lehmann and Roth, pp. 20-24.

131. Translated by Max Farrand as *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens: A Contribution to Modern Constitutional History* (New York: Henry Holt, 1901).

132. Jellinek, *Declaration*, p. 77. (Roger Williams and a small band of compatriots founded Providence, Rhode Island, in 1636. Williams “preached complete separation of Church and State, and demanded absolute religious liberty, not only for all Christians but also for Jews, Turks, and heathen,” *Declaration*, p. 65). Weber may well have found congenial Jellinek’s contention that although the religious origins of human rights are ancient, their first “practical” application came in the seventeenth century (*Declaration*, p. 62).

133. All Jellinek will concede is that Rousseau’s essay exercised “a certain influence upon the style of some clauses of the Declaration,” *Declaration*, p. 12. A critique of Jellinek’s thesis, and a reconstruction of the extraordinarily complex processes that created the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, can be found in Keith Baker’s “The Idea of a Declaration of Rights,” [1994], in Gary Kates (ed.), *The French Revolution: Recent Debates and New Controversies* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 91-140. Baker argues, contra Jellinek, that Rousseau’s political language had a major impact on the Declaration.



Compare with Marcel Gauchet, "Rights of Man," in François Furet and Mona Ozouf (eds.), *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989), translated by Arthur Goldhammer, pp. 818-28.

134. Jellinek makes a similar point in *Declaration*, p. 80.

135. *Economy and Society* (1910-14), pp. 1209-10. Compare Weber, "The Protestant Sects," p. 321: "The ascetic conventicles and sects formed one of the most important historical foundations of modern 'individualism.' Their radical break away from patriarchal and authoritarian bondage, as well as *their* way of interpreting the statement that one owes more obedience to God than to man, was especially important."

136. This desideratum is not aided by Marianne Weber's biography that, however admirable in other respects, is often anachronistic. For our purposes it suffices to note her depiction of *The Protestant Ethic* (1905) as "Weber's first study on the sociology of religion," *Biography*, p. 335. As Scaff remarks: "Writing in the shadow of the Versailles Treaty, after the bitter disappointments of a fratricidal war, and in the aftermath of the break-up of the international women's movement, Marianne framed her memory and rewrote history in line with the moment of national collapse and the perceived need for liberal heroes and founders of Weimar. But the gain in national mythmaking was at the expense of an important intellectual record and a social and political experience," Lawrence A. Scaff, "The 'cool objectivity of sociation,' " p. 62.

137. David Beetham, "Mosca, Pareto and Weber: A Historical Comparison," in Mommsen and Osterhammel, pp. 139-58, at p. 146.

138. To employ Gordon Marshall's terminology, we find a "genealogical" approach to Weber's work much more plausible than a "teleological" one that ignores chronology and "ruthlessly systematize[s]" Weber's intellectual development. See Marshall, *In Search of the Spirit*, pp. 21, 157-64.

## SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

The expository and critical literature on *The Protestant Ethic* is vast, prompting at least one call (in vain!) for a moratorium. The suggestions below mostly embrace texts that deal with the thesis in the round, as opposed to those that focus on one particular aspect of it. With a few exceptions, they are all available in English or English translation. More bibliographical information can be found in the endnotes of the Introduction. At the time this manuscript goes to press, the German critical edition (the *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*) of *The Protestant Ethic* essays, edited by Hartmut Lehmann, is not available. For information on its eagerly awaited publication, readers are advised to consult the regularly updated publisher's Web site: <http://www.mohr.de/mw/mwg.htm>.

### A) MAX WEBER'S PRINCIPAL WRITINGS ON PROTESTANTISM AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM AVAILABLE IN ENGLISH

*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Unwin University Books, 1930), translated by Talcott Parsons, with a foreword by R. H. Tawney. Parsons translated the 1920 version of the essay. Stephen Kalberg has also translated this version, which is available from Roxbury Press (Los Angeles, 2001).

"The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge, 1970), pp. 302-22.

"Max Weber on Church, Sect, and Mysticism," *Sociological Analysis* 34:2 (summer 1973) translated by Jerome L. Gittleman, pp. 140-49.

*General Economic History* (New York: Collier Books, 1961), translated by Frank H. Knight. This book, composed of students' notes from a course on "Outlines of Universal Social and Economic History" that Weber delivered at the University of Munich in 1919-20, is invaluable. Weber analyzes Protestantism and the spirit it helped shape in the context of a far-reaching economic, political, and legal examination of the origins of modern capitalism.

*Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978; various translators), especially pp. 611-23 (on Judaism and Puritanism), and pp. 1196-1211 (on the Reformation's impact on economic life, Judaism and capitalism, and church, sect, and democracy).

*The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism* (New York: Free Press, 1951), translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth, with an introduction by C. K. Yang, pp. 226-49 (an influential contrast between Confucianism and Puritanism).

#### A) GERMAN EDITIONS OF WEBER'S *PROTESTANT ETHIC*

Klaus Lichtblau and Johannes Weiß (eds.), *Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus* (Bodenheim: Athenäum Hain Hanstein, 1993). This volume republishes the 1905 version of the essay and, together with a helpful Introduction by the editors, also contains a concordance of the changes Weber made to its 1920 counterpart.

Johannes Winckelmann, *Die protestantische Ethik I: Eine Aufsatzsammlung*. Herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann (Gütersloh: Verlagshaus Mohn, 1984). (This contains the 1920 version of the essay, together with some other of Weber's Protestant ethic related pieces.) *Die protestantische Ethik II: Kritiken und Antikritiken*. Herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann (Gütersloh: Verlagshaus Mohn, 1982). (This volume contains the Fischer and Rachfahl critiques, Weber's rebuttals, and pertinent essays by Ernst Troeltsch, Ephraim Fischhoff, and Reinhard Bendix.)

For more bibliographical information on German editions, see footnotes 1 and 2 of the Introduction.

#### B) *SECONDARY LITERATURE*

Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: A Biography* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1988), translated by Harry Zohn, with an Introduction by Guenther Roth.

Marianne Weber discusses the background to *The Protestant Ethic*, its main arguments, and the Webers' American trip on pp. 279-304, 325-42.

Gordon Marshall, *In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: An Essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis* (London: Hutchinson, 1982). A comprehensive analysis of Weber's thesis and its critics.

Gianfranco Poggi, *Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit: Max Weber's "Protestant Ethic"* (London: Macmillan, 1983). Like Marshall's book, Poggi's is lucid, sympathetic but critical.

Two books that helpfully put *The Protestant Ethic* in the wider context of Weber's sociology of religion as a whole are:

Wolfgang Schluchter, *Rationalism, Religion, and Domination: A Weberian Perspective* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1989), translated by Neil Solomon.

Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (London: Methuen, 1966).

Sophisticated attempts to refute Weber's thesis can be found in:

Richard F. Hamilton, *The Social Misconstruction of Reality: Validity and Verification in the Scholarly Community* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), chap. 3; and Luciano Pellicani, *The Genesis of Capitalism and the Origins of Modernity* (New York: Telos Press, 1994), translated by James G. Colbert, chap. 2. Also noteworthy is the reanalysis by George Becker of the statistical data Weber used to support his argument. See Becker's "Replication and Reanalysis of Offenbacher's School Enrollment Study: Implications for the Weber and Merton Thesis," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36 (4) 1997, pp. 483-96.

Three useful anthologies of writings devoted to the Weber "thesis" are:

Hartmut Lehmann and Guenther Roth (eds.), *Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Philippe Besnard (ed.), *Protestantisme et capitalisme: La controverse post-*

*weberienne* (Paris: Colin, 1970).

Robert W. Green (ed.), *Protestantism, Capitalism, and Social Science: The Weber Thesis Controversy* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1973; 2nd ed. (Contains extracts from the critiques of H. M. Robertson, R. H. Tawney, and Kurt Samuelsson, among others)).

An excellent exposition of the relationship between Weber's sociology of religion and economic sociology can be found in Richard Swedberg's *Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), especially chapter 5.

A useful, up-to-date source on all matters Weberian is the journal *Max Weber Studies*, edited by David Chalcraft, Austin Harrington, and Sam Whimster, and published by Sheffield Academic Press.

## NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION

Any attempt to translate Weber's *Protestant Ethic* must acknowledge a debt to Talcott Parsons, whose pioneering work first made the text available to an English-speaking readership. Despite some errors and omissions, Parsons achieved an admirable level of readability. After seventy years, however, the time has come for alternative versions to be offered to the reading public. Additionally, while Parsons translated the 1920 version of the text, we have gone back to its 1905 predecessor. We have also included in our edition Weber's lengthy rebuttals of H. Karl Fischer and Felix Rachfahl. The initial translation from the German was done by Gordon Wells; the role of Peter Baehr was to scrutinize the draft versions. Conversely, the Introduction and the editorial prefaces were written by Peter Baehr, with Gordon Wells contributing advice and suggestions. Editors' footnotes were the work of both Baehr and Wells.

Weber is renowned for his dense and convoluted prose, and although *The Protestant Ethic* cannot be described as one of his most difficult writings, it presents the translator with many challenges. In our experience, the two main problems facing the translator of Weber are (1) terminology and (2) syntax.

(1) Regarding terminology, we have had to make decisions on how to render certain key words and expressions. We have not thought it appropriate to aim for 100 percent consistency regardless of context. To assist the reader in recognizing Weber's key concepts, however, we have frequently added the German term in square brackets.

The following notes in no way claim to represent a glossary but are intended to give a flavor of the way we attempted to tackle the terminology problem.

For *Beruf* we have preferred "calling," with its solidly biblical and Puritan connotations. The word implies the purpose of God yet can still be understood in the sense of a mundane occupation. Occasionally, where the emphasis is strongly on the secular meaning, we have rendered it by using "occupation" or "profession."

Weber constantly uses the word *Lebensführung* to denote actively conducting one's life in the way that rational asceticism entails. We have therefore normally translated the term as "conduct of life" or "way of conducting one's life."

For *innerweltliche* (as in *innerweltliche Askese*), we decided to stick with a literal rendering (“innerworldly”) as no other solution seemed adequate. The expression, curious for English readers, denotes a form of conduct that is both self-searching *and* oriented toward world-shaping activity. It is to be contrasted with forms of asceticism that are focused on contemplation and monastic life.

We have normally translated *Bewährung* as “proof” but occasionally also as “putting to the test.” The German word can have the legal meaning of “probation,” and a *Bewährungsprobe* is a severe *test* that, if passed, furnishes *proof* of an individual’s qualities. Compare the New English Bible version of the Lord’s Prayer: “Do not bring us to the *test*.” In the Christian context, *Bewährung* is the test or trial to which believers are subjected, and which, if they come through it unscathed, shows them to be in a state of grace.

The adjectival compound *stahlhartes Gehäuse* was famously rendered by Parsons as “iron cage.” We pay tribute to the resonance of Parsons’s phrase and acknowledge its canonical place in the social sciences but felt it departed too far from Weber’s original meaning to be acceptable for our version. (Had Weber wished to invoke the iron cage, he could have used the German *eisener Käfig* to do so.) We might begin by noting that Weber wrote not of iron but of steel. Iron is a metal that is ancient and elemental. Like steel, it evokes hardness and unbending resolution: Bismarck was known as the “Iron Chancellor”; Mrs. Thatcher, the “Iron Lady.” But steel has more complex and more modern connotations than its metallic counterpart. Steel, unlike iron, is an invention rather than an “element”; although pre-modern in origins, the breakthrough in steel came with its mass industrial production during the 1850s, a result of the pneumatic Bessemer process. As such, steel is the product of *human fabrication*. It is also capable of being extremely hard (enabling high-speed drills) *and* flexible (consider steel sheets and wire). Hence, as a metal that is associated in the European context with modernity, fabrication, and malleability, steel appears to have much more in common with rational bourgeois capitalism than the iron of which it is a refinement.

Further, we translated *Gehäuse* as “shell,” which is one possible meaning of the word (“casing” is another), ending up with “shell as hard as steel.” We were guided in this choice by the thought that a shell has an organic quality and symbolizes something that has not just been externally imposed but that has become integral to human existence. Whereas a cage confines human agents but leaves their powers otherwise intact, a shell suggests that modern capitalism has created a new kind of being.

On this complex expression, readers are referred to Peter Baehr, “The ‘Iron Cage’ and the ‘Shell as Hard as Steel’: Parsons, Weber, and the stahlhartes Gehäuse Metaphor in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*,” *History and Theory* 40 (May 2001), pp. 153-69, and the excellent article by David Chalcraft, “Bringing the Text Back In: On Ways of Reading the Iron Cage Metaphor in the Two Editions of ‘The Protestant Ethic,’ ” in *Organizing Modernity: New Weberian Perspectives on Work, Organization and Society*, edited by Larry J. Ray and Michael Reed (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 16-45.

(2) The second major area of difficulty is that of syntax, or sentence structure. Even by the standards of German academic writing, Weber’s sentences are inordinately long, with one subordinate clause being embedded in another like Russian *matryoshka* dolls. No doubt this is a result of the fecundity of Weber’s thought processes, whereby he constantly sought to further qualify and refine his statements. However, at times this almost seems to have become a mannerism, so that (to give a simple example) he can rarely bear to simply state “most,” without adding, in parenthesis, “but by no means all.” He also seems to have a predilection for phrases meaning “in particular.” And his use of italics for emphasis seems somewhat idiosyncratic. Some of these stylistic features seem more pronounced in the polemical writings and voluminous footnotes, when Weber paid even less attention to stylistic niceties. Sometimes we have broken down particularly indigestible passages into more manageable chunks. More often, however, despite the possible awkwardness that can result, we have thought it best to retain as much as possible Weber’s constructions and mannerisms. We have done this both in order to convey to the reader the flavor of the original and to ensure that the flow of the argument is reproduced as faithfully as possible.

Having expressed these caveats about Weber’s style of prose, it must be emphasized that the texts we have been privileged to translate contain many magnificent passages of eloquent and persuasive writing. If we have succeeded in coming close to conveying some of the force of the original, our labors will not have been in vain.

Editors’ comments and cross references are denoted by square brackets [ ].



# *The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism*<sup>1</sup>

## *Part I. The Problem*<sup>2</sup>

Contents: 1. Denomination and social stratification. 2. The “spirit” of capitalism.  
3. Luther’s concept of the calling. Scope of the investigation.

## 1. [DENOMINATION AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION]<sup>3</sup>

With relatively few variations and exceptions [1], the occupational statistics of a denominationally mixed region reveals a phenomenon which in recent years has frequently been the subject of lively debate in the Catholic press, in Catholic literature [2], and at Catholic conventions: business leaders and owners of capital, as well as the skilled higher strata of the labor force, and especially the higher technical or commercially trained staff of modern enterprises [3] tend to be predominantly *Protestant*. This undoubtedly applies where the religious difference coincides with a difference of nationality and thus with a difference in the degree of cultural development, such as exists in eastern Germany between Germans and Poles; but the same phenomenon is confirmed by statistics of denominational allegiance almost everywhere where capitalist development has had a free hand to transform social stratification and to structure the population according to occupation in order to meet its own requirements. The greater the freedom enjoyed by capitalism, the more evident this has been.

Now, it is true that there may be *historical* reasons [4] for the relatively much greater proportion of Protestants (far exceeding the percentage of Protestants in the total population) represented among owners of capital [5], management and the higher grades of labor in the large modern business and trade enterprises. [6] Such reasons go back to the distant past and appear to indicate that religious allegiance is not a *cause* but to a certain degree a *consequence* of economic phenomena. Having a share in these economic functions presupposes either ownership of capital or an expensive education, and usually both, and is thus linked to the ownership of inherited wealth or at least to a certain level of prosperity. A large number of the wealthiest regions of the empire, which were favored by geography or natural resources and most economically developed, and in particular the majority of the wealthy *cities*, embraced Protestantism in the sixteenth century; and *even today* Protestants are still feeling the benefit in the economic struggle for existence.

A *historical* question then arises however as to the *reason* for this particularly strong predisposition of the economically most developed regions toward a

revolution in the Church. And here the answer is *by no means* as simple as one might at first believe. Certainly, the casting aside of economic traditionalism seems to be one phenomenon that was bound to lend strong support to the tendency to call into question religious traditions and to rebel against traditional authorities. But what is often forgotten is that the Reformation meant less the entire *removal* of ecclesiastical authority over life than the replacement of the previous form of authority by a *different* one. It meant, in fact, the replacement of an extremely relaxed, practically imperceptible, and scarcely more than formal authority by an infinitely burdensome and earnest regimentation of the conduct of life [*Lebensführung*], which penetrated every sphere of domestic and public life to the greatest degree imaginable. Today, even peoples of thoroughly modern economic character can tolerate the rule of the Catholic Church —“punishing heretics, but treating sinners gently,” a principle that applied even more strongly in the sixteenth century than it does today; but the rule of Calvinism, as exercised in the sixteenth century in Geneva and Scotland, at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in large parts of the Netherlands, in the seventeenth century in New England, and at times even in England, would be for us simply the most unbearable form of ecclesiastical control over the individual that it would be possible to imagine.

What the reformers in the countries with the *highest* economic development disapproved of was not that there was *too much* but rather that there was *too little* ecclesiastical and religious control of life. How is it that it was precisely these economically most developed countries, and, as we shall see, within them precisely the economically rising “bourgeois”<sup>4</sup> [*bürgerlich*] classes, which not only tolerated that Puritan tyranny but defended it with the sort of heroism that *bourgeois* classes *as such* have rarely before and never since exhibited—with what Carlyle, not without reason, calls “the last of our heroisms”?

As we have said, the fact that the majority of owners of capital and people in managerial positions in business today are Protestants may be understood in part simply as a consequence of the greater average amount of wealth passed on to them. It is important to emphasize, however, that there are phenomena for which *no* such causal relationship exists. These include, among others, the following. Firstly, the universally demonstrable difference, in Baden as well as in Bavaria and, for example, in Hungary, in the type of secondary education that Catholic,

as opposed to Protestant, parents generally provide for their children. The fact that the percentage of Catholics among the pupils and candidates for the “*abitur*” in “secondary” educational institutions on the whole falls considerably below the proportion of Catholics in the general population [7] can, it is true, be attributed to a considerable degree to the differences in inherited wealth previously mentioned. But among those Catholics who *do* attend secondary school, the percentage of those educated in the modern institutions designed to prepare pupils for *technical* studies and *commercial and business* careers, or indeed for any middle-class [*bürgerlich*] occupation, again falls *well* short of that of Protestants. [8] Examples of such institutions are technical grammar school, technical school, city technical school, *etc.* [*Realgymnasium, Realschule, Höhere Bürgerschulen*]. Catholics prefer the education offered by the classics-based grammar schools [*humanistische Gymnasien*]. This is a phenomenon that *cannot* be explained by differences in inherited wealth. However, it may help to explain the low participation rate of Catholics in capitalist business life.

Even more striking, however, is an observation that helps us to understand the lower proportion of Catholics among skilled *workers* in modern industry. It is well known that the factories to a large extent take their skilled workers from the younger generation of *craft workers*, thus leaving the preliminary training of their workers to the trades themselves and only taking them on after this preliminary training is complete. But this practice is far more common among Protestant than among Catholic journeymen. In other words, among journeymen the Catholics show the greater inclination to *remain* in craft work and thus more often tend to become *master* craftsmen, while the Protestants to a greater degree tend to flock to the factories, where they form the upper echelons of skilled workers and management. [9] In these cases the choice of occupation [*Berufswahl*] and future career [*berufliche Schicksale*] has undoubtedly been determined by the *distinct mental characteristics* which have been instilled into them and indeed by the influence on them of the religious atmosphere of their locality and home background.

The lower proportion of Catholics in modern business life in Germany is particularly striking since it belies the usual experience of national or religious minorities today. When excluded from politically influential positions by the dominant group (or when choosing to exclude themselves), these minority

groups generally come under *particular* pressure to pursue a business career; in this way their most talented members seek to achieve the ambition that can find no fulfillment within the service of the state. This is unmistakably how things stand *today* with regard to the Poles in Russia and Prussia, where they are undoubtedly doing well economically—in contrast to the situation in Galicia, where the Poles have political influence. It was the same with the Huguenots in France under Louis XIV and the Nonconformists and Quakers in England. Last but not least, it has been the same with the Jews for the last two thousand years. But in the case of the Catholics in Germany, we see no obvious sign of any such effect. Even in the past they never achieved very much *economically*, either in Holland or in England, during the periods when they were either persecuted or merely tolerated. It follows that the reason for these differences in attitude must be sought principally in their distinct internal characteristics [*Eigenart*] and *not* in the external historical and political situation of different denominations. [10]

It would therefore be important to discover *which* elements of the internal characteristics of the denominations have had (and continue to have) the effect described above. Looking at it from a modern and rather superficial point of view, one might be tempted to express the contrast by saying that the greater “*unworldliness*” of Catholicism and the ascetic features which express its highest ideals must necessarily induce in its followers a greater indifference toward worldly goods. Indeed, this reasoning does correspond to the view of the two denominations widely held today. This view leads Protestants to criticize those (real or alleged) ascetic ideals of the Catholic conduct of life [*Lebensführung*], while Catholics respond with the accusation of “materialism,” which they believe to be the consequence of the way Protestantism has secularized every aspect of life. One modern writer has formulated the contrasting attitudes of the two denominations toward business life in this way: “The Catholic . . . is more calm; his acquisitive drive is lower, he places more value on a life which is as secure as possible, even if this should be on a smaller income, than on a perilous, exciting life, which could bring honors and riches. As the popular saying jokingly has it, ‘either eat well or sleep soundly.’ In the above case, the Protestant likes to eat well, while the Catholic wants to sleep soundly.” [11] In fact, “wanting to eat well” may be an accurate, if incomplete, description of the motivation of the religiously indifferent section of Protestants in *Germany at present*.

In the past, things were very different. It is a well-known fact that the very opposite of enjoyment of life characterized the English, Dutch, and American Puritans. Indeed, as we shall see, this represented one of their most *significant* features in terms of our investigation. Moreover, French Protestantism has to a great extent preserved to this day the character which was impressed upon the Calvinist Churches in general and especially those “under the cross” in the period of religious conflict. Despite this—or perhaps, as we shall have to consider, precisely because of it—French Protestantism is known to have been one of the most significant agents of commercial and capitalist development in France and has remained so, in the small measure that persecution has permitted. If one wishes to use the term “unworldliness” [*Weltfremdheit*] to describe this seriousness and the powerful dominance of religious interests in determining their conduct of life [*Lebensführung*], then French Calvinists were and remain just as unworldly as (in general) the German (or at least the North German) Catholics, to whom Catholicism undoubtedly means more than it does to any other nation on earth. Both differ in similar ways from the predominant religious party: the lower social strata of the French Catholics have a great love of life and their upper strata are quite hostile to religion. In the same way, the Protestants of Germany are to day preoccupied with secular commercial life, while their upper strata are largely indifferent to religious matters. [12] Scarcely anything demonstrates as clearly as this parallel that vague ideas, such as the (alleged!) “unworldliness” of Catholicism and of the (alleged!) “worldliness” of Protestantism and many other similar ones, are too general to explain anything, as they are wide of the mark to some extent today, and certainly in relation to the past. If one *should* wish to apply these concepts, however, then apart from the observations already made, a number of others, which readily present themselves, could even suggest that the supposed antithesis between unworldliness,” “asceticism,” and religious piety, on the one hand, and participation in capitalist commerce, on the other hand, might in fact amount to an inner *affinity*.

Indeed it is striking—to begin with a few purely outward factors—how great is the number of representatives of the most introspective forms of Christian piety who come from commercial circles. In particular, Pietism owes a strikingly large number of its most serious adherents to this background. One might detect here a kind of contrastive effect of “mammonism” on introspective personalities which are unsuited to business careers, and, undoubtedly, as with Francis of Assisi, so with many of those Pietists, the origin of the “conversion” has often presented

itself to the converted themselves in this way. And, similarly, one could attempt to explain the strikingly common phenomenon of capitalist entrepreneurs on the grandest scale emerging from parsonages (Cecil Rhodes is an example of this) as a reaction to their ascetic upbringing. However, this explanation ceases to convince when in the same persons and groups of people a virtuoso capitalist commercial sense *coincides* with the most intense forms of a piety which permeates and regulates the whole of life. Such cases are by no means isolated but are a characteristic feature of whole groups of the historically most important Protestant churches and sects. Calvinism in particular, *wherever it has existed*, has exhibited this combination. Although in the period of the spread of the Reformation, Calvinism, in common with other Protestant denominations, was not confined to one particular *single class*, yet it is characteristic and in a sense “typical” that in the French Huguenot churches, for example, *monks* and *industrial workers* (merchants and craftsmen) were particularly strongly represented among the proselytes. This continued to be the case, especially in times of persecution. [13] Even the Spanish knew that “heresy” (i.e., the Calvinism of the Dutch) “encouraged the spirit of trade,” and Gothein [14] rightly terms the Calvinist diaspora the “seedbed of the capitalist economy.”<sup>5</sup> [15] Here, the decisive factor might appear to be the superiority of the French and Dutch economic culture, from which this diaspora overwhelmingly originated, or perhaps also the powerful influence of exile and of being wrenched from traditional surroundings. [16] But in France itself, as we know from Colbert’s<sup>6</sup> struggles, the situation was exactly the same in the seventeenth century. Even Austria—not to mention other countries—occasionally brought in Protestant manufacturers direct from abroad.

Even more striking, let us not forget, is the combination of religious control of life and an extremely well developed business sense which existed within a number of those sects renowned equally for their detachment from the world and their prosperity: especially the *Quakers* and the *Mennonites*. The part played by the former in England and North America was similar to that played by the latter in the Netherlands and Germany. The fact that even Frederick William I, recognizing that the Mennonites in East Prussia were indispensable pillars of industry, left them alone despite their absolute refusal to do military service is just one of many well-known facts that illustrate this. Given the character of this king, however, it is perhaps the most telling. The fact, finally, that the *Pietists*, too, were able to combine intense piety with business acumen in equal measure

[17] is well enough known; one only needs think of Calw.

There is therefore no need to multiply examples in what are, after all, only provisional remarks. These few examples suffice to demonstrate one thing: the “spirit of labor,” “the spirit of progress,” or whatever one likes to call it, the awakening of which is customarily attributed to Protestantism, must not, as tends to happen today, be understood in an “Enlightenment” sense. The old Protestantism of such men as Luther,<sup>7</sup> Calvin,<sup>8</sup> Knox,<sup>9</sup> or Voët<sup>10</sup> had little to do with what is today called “progress.” It was directly hostile to whole aspects of modern life which today even the most extreme sectarian would not wish to do away with. So if an inner affinity between the old Protestant spirit and modern capitalist culture is to be found, we must try, for good or ill, to seek it *not* in its more or less materialistic or at least antiascetic enjoyment of life (as it is called), but rather in its purely *religious* features. Montesquieu (*Esprit des lois*, bk. 20, chap. 7) said of the English: “This is the people in the world who have best known how to take advantage of each of these three great things at the same time: religion, commerce, and liberty.”<sup>11</sup> Could it be that their superiority in the field of commerce and, as we shall discuss later in a different context, their aptitude for free political institutions perhaps have some connection with that unrivaled degree of piety that Montesquieu attributed to them?

When we pose the question in this way, a whole variety of possible relationships, dimly discerned, immediately arise before us. Our task must be to *formulate* as clearly as possible what we are vaguely aware of, given the inexhaustible complexity of all historical phenomena. In order to be able to do this, however, we must leave the sphere of vague general ideas with which we have hitherto been concerned and grapple with the characteristic nature and variety of those great religious thought worlds which have come down to us in the various historic branches of the Christian religion.

Beforehand, however, some remarks are necessary, first regarding the particular character of the object for which we are seeking a historical explanation, then regarding the sense in which such an explanation is possible at all in the framework of these investigations.



## 2. [THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM]

In the title of this study, the somewhat pretentious sounding expression “Spirit of Capitalism” has been used. What are we to understand by this?

If any object can be found for which the use of this term can have any meaning, then it can only be a “*historical individual*,” that is, a complex of configurations [*Zusammenhänge*] in historical reality which we group together conceptually from the point of view of their *cultural significance* to form a single whole.

A historical concept like this, however, as it relates to a phenomenon which is significant in terms of its *individual characteristics*, cannot be defined or demarcated according to the schema: “genus proximum, differentia specifica.”<sup>12</sup> It must be composed from its individual elements, taken from historical reality. It will not be possible to arrive at the ultimate *definition* of the concept at the outset but only at the *conclusion* of the investigation. To put it another way, only in the course of the discussion and as the essential outcome will it be shown how that which we understand as the “spirit” of capitalism should best—that is, most satisfactorily for the points of view *which interest us here*—be formulated. These “points of view” (to which we shall come in due course) are, in turn, not at all the only ones possible with which to analyze the historical phenomena we are considering. For a study of *different* points of view, *other* features would be the “essential” ones, as for *any* historical phenomenon. It follows that what we understand by the “spirit” of capitalism in terms of what we deem “*essential*” from our point of view, is by no means the *only* possible way of understanding it. This is in the nature of “historical concept-formation,” which for its methodological purposes does not seek to embody historical reality in abstract generic concepts but endeavors to integrate them in concrete configurations [*Zusammenhänge*], which are always and inevitably *individual* in character.

If, then, we are to determine the object with which our analysis and historical explanations are concerned—as we must—then we cannot do this by means of a conceptual “definition” but only by a provisional *illustration* of what is here

meant by the “spirit” of capitalism. Such an illustration is indeed indispensable for the purpose of understanding the object of the investigation, and we therefore propose, to this end, to focus our attention on a document of that “spirit” which encapsulates the essence of the matter in almost classical purity:

“Remember, that *time is money*.<sup>13</sup> He that can earn ten shillings a day by his labor, and goes abroad, or sits idle, one half of that day, though he spends but sixpence during his diversion or idleness, ought not to reckon *that* the only expense; he has really spent, or rather thrown away, five shillings besides.

Remember, that *credit is money*. If a man lets his money lie in my hands after it is due, he gives me the interest, or so much as I can make of it during that time. This amounts to a considerable sum where a man has good and large credit, and makes good use of it.

Remember, that money is of the *prolific, generating nature*. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more, and so on. Five shillings turned is six, turned again it is seven and threepence, and so on, till it becomes a hundred pounds. The more there is of it, the more it produces every turning, so that the profits rise quicker and quicker. He that kills a breeding sow, destroys all her offspring to the thousandth generation. He that murders a crown, destroys all that it might have produced, even scores of pounds.

Remember this saying, *The good paymaster* is lord of another man’s purse. He that is known to pay punctually and exactly to the time he promises, may at any time, and on any occasion, raise all the money his friends can spare. This is sometimes of great use. After industry and frugality, nothing contributes more to the raising of a young man in the world than punctuality and justice in all his dealings; therefore, never keep borrowed money an hour beyond the time you promised, lest a disappointment shut up your friend’s purse for ever.

The most trifling actions that affect a man’s credit are to be regarded. The sound of your hammer at five in the morning, or eight at night, heard by a creditor, makes him easy six months longer; but if he sees you at a billiard table, or hears your voice at a tavern, when you should be at work, he sends for his money the next day; demands it, before he can receive it, in a lump.

It shows, besides, that you are mindful of what you owe; it makes you appear a careful as well as an *honest* man, and that still increases your *credit*.

Beware of thinking all your own that you possess, and of living accordingly. It is a mistake that many people who have credit fall into. To prevent this, keep an

exact account for some time both of your expenses and your income. If you take the pains at first to mention particulars, it will have this good effect: you will discover how wonderfully small, trifling expenses mount up to large sums, and will discern what might have been, and may for the future be saved, without occasioning any great inconvenience.

For six pounds a year you may have the use of one hundred pounds, provided you are a man of known prudence and honesty.

He that spends a groat a day idly, spends idly above six pounds a year, which is the price for the use of one hundred pounds.

He that wastes idly a groat's worth of his time per day, one day with another, wastes the privilege of using one hundred pounds each day.

He that idly loses five shillings' worth of time, loses five shillings, and might as prudently throw five shillings into the sea.

He that loses five shillings not only loses that sum, but all the advantage that might be made by turning it in dealing, which, by the time that a young man becomes old, will amount to a considerable sum of money."

The author of this little sermon is *Benjamin Franklin*.<sup>14</sup> [18] The passage is held up to ridicule as the profession of faith of the Yankee by Ferdinand Kürnberger in his corrosively witty *Portrait of American Culture*. [19] No one can doubt that this is the characteristic voice of the "spirit of capitalism," although clearly it does not contain everything that may be understood by the term. Let us pause a little longer to consider this passage. Kürnberger, in his book *The Man Tired of America*, sums up its philosophy of life thus: "They turn cattle into tallow, and people into money." The essence of this "philosophy of avarice" is the idea of the *duty* of the individual to work toward the increase of his wealth, which is assumed to be an end in itself.

When Jakob Fugger<sup>15</sup> was approached by a business colleague who had retired and was trying to persuade him to do the same, as he had "spent enough time making money and should now give others a chance," Fugger dismissed this suggestion as "pusillanimous," responding that: "he [Fugger] took a completely different view, and intended to go on making money as long as he could."<sup>16</sup> [20] The "spirit" of this response differs in obvious ways from that of Franklin: what

in the case of Fugger expresses commercial daring and a personal inclination, ethically neutral [see Appendix I], has for Franklin the character of an *ethically* slanted maxim for the conduct of life [*Lebensführung*]. *This is the specific sense in which we propose to use the concept of the “spirit of capitalism.”* [21] [See Appendix I, c.]

All Franklin’s moral precepts, however, have a utilitarian slant. Honesty is *useful* because it brings credit. So are punctuality, hard work, moderation, etc., and they are only virtues *for this reason*—from which it would follow that where, for example, the *appearance* of honesty serves the same purpose, then this would suffice, and any unnecessary surplus of this virtue would inevitably seem, in Franklin’s eyes, like unproductive and reprehensible profligacy. And indeed: anyone reading his autobiography must inevitably come to the same conclusion. It contains an account of his “conversion” to those virtues [22] and, in particular, describes how, by strictly preserving the *appearance* of modesty, or officiously belittling one’s own merits, it is possible to enhance one’s standing in the community. [23] According to Franklin, these virtues, like all others, are only virtues at all to the extent that they are “useful” to the individual in concrete situations; the mere appearance of virtue is an adequate substitute wherever it serves the same purpose. This is indeed an inescapable conclusion for the strict utilitarian. That which Germans tend to find “hypocritical” in the virtues of Americanism is here exposed for all to see.

In truth, though, matters are not as simple as that. We are here dealing with something quite other than a case of purely egocentric maxims being dressed up as moral precepts. This is clear both from the character of Benjamin Franklin himself, as revealed in the rare honesty of his autobiography, and *the fact that* he saw his discovery of the “usefulness” of virtue as a revelation from God, who wished to direct him toward virtue *by this means*. Instead, the “summum bonum” of this “ethic” is the *making of money* and yet more money, coupled with a strict avoidance of all uninhibited enjoyment. Indeed, it is so completely devoid of all eudaemonistic,<sup>17</sup> let alone hedonist, motives, so much purely thought of as an end *in itself*<sup>18</sup> that it appears as something wholly transcendent and irrational, beyond the “happiness” or the “benefit” of the *individual*. [See Appendix Id.]

The aim of a man's life is indeed moneymaking, but this is no longer merely the means to the end of satisfying the material needs of life. This reversal (incomprehensible to the superficial observer) of what we might call the "natural" state of affairs is a definite leitmotiv of capitalism, although it will always be alien to anyone who is untouched by capitalism's aura. At the same time it contains a line of thought that comes very close to certain *religious* ideas. For if one asks the question why "money should be made out of people," Benjamin Franklin, though a dispassionate and nonsectarian Deist, replies in his autobiography with a Bible text which, he says, his strict Calvinist father constantly drummed into him in his youth: "Seest thou a man active *in his calling* [*Beruf* ], he shall stand before kings." [24] Moneymaking—provided it is done legally—is, within the modern economic order, the result and the expression of diligence *in one's calling* and *this diligence* is, it is not difficult to recognize, the real alpha and omega of Franklin's morality, as we find it in the passage quoted and throughout his writings.<sup>19</sup>

The idea, so familiar to us today and yet in reality far from obvious, that *one's duty consists in pursuing one's calling* [*Berufspflicht*], and that the individual should have a commitment to his "professional" [*beruflichen*] activity, whatever it may consist of, irrespective of whether it appears to the detached observer as nothing but utilization of his labor or even of his property (as "capital"), this idea is a characteristic feature of the "social ethic" of capitalist culture. Indeed, in a certain sense it constitutes an essential element of it.

It is not as if it had grown up *only* in the soil of capitalism: later we shall attempt to follow it further back into the past. Even less, of course, would we maintain that the continued existence of *today's* capitalism is conditional on the subjective acquisition of these ethical maxims by its individual bearers, that is, the entrepreneurs or the workers in modern capitalist businesses. *Today's* capitalist economic order is a monstrous cosmos, into which the individual is born and which in practice is for him, at least as an individual, simply a given, an immutable shell [*Gehäuse*], in which he is obliged to live. It forces on the individual, to the extent that he is caught up in the relationships of the "market," the norms of its economic activity. The manufacturer who consistently defies these norms will just as surely be forced out of business as the worker who cannot or will not conform will be thrown out of work. [25]

Today's capitalism, then, which has come to dominance in economic life, creates and trains, by means of "economic *selection*," the economic subjects—entrepreneurs and workers—that it needs. But here is precisely where the limits of the concept of "selection" as a means of explaining historical phenomena are reached. In order that this kind of conduct of life and attitude to one's "profession" [*Berufs*]-*Auffassung* ], "adapted" as it is to the peculiar requirements of capitalism, could be "selected" and emerge victorious over others, it obviously had first to come into being, and not just in individuals, but as an attitude held in common by groups of people. The origin of this attitude is therefore what needs to be explained. We shall speak later in greater depth about the view of naive historical materialism, according to which such "ideas" come about as a "reflection" or "superstructure" of the economic base.

At this point it is perhaps sufficient for our purpose to indicate that in Benjamin Franklin's birthplace (Massachusetts) at least, the "capitalist spirit" (in the sense in which we are using it) was undoubtedly present before any "capitalist development" had taken place. It is also true, for example, that in the neighboring colonies—which were to become the Southern States of the Union—it remained far less developed, and this in spite of the fact that these colonies had been founded by great capitalists for *business* purposes, whereas the New England colonies had been founded by preachers and "graduates," with the help of the lower middle class [*Kleinbürger*], craftsmen and yeomen, for *religious* reasons. In this case, then, the causal relationship is the reverse of that which would be postulated from the "materialist" standpoint.

The early progress of such new "ideas" is, however, beset by many more obstacles than the theoreticians of the "superstructure" assume; they do not blossom like a flower. The capitalist spirit in the sense in which we have hitherto understood it has had to prove itself in a hard struggle against a world of hostile forces. A way of thinking like that expressed by Benjamin Franklin was applauded by an entire nation. But in ancient or medieval times<sup>20</sup> it would have been denounced as an expression of the most filthy avarice and of an absolutely contemptible attitude. Even today this still regularly happens in all those social groups that are least involved in the distinctively modern capitalist economy or are least adapted to it. This is *not* because the "acquisitive instinct"

[*Erwerbstrieb*] was unknown or undeveloped in “precapitalist” eras—as is often said—nor because there was *less* of the “auri sacra fames,”<sup>21</sup> outside the sphere of bourgeois capitalism [*bürgerlichen Kapitalismus*] in those days than within the specifically capitalist sphere, as modern romantics fondly imagine. In this respect, things have not changed. It is not at *this* point that the difference between the capitalist and the precapitalist “spirit” lies. When it comes to *greed*, there is nothing to choose between the Chinese mandarin, the aristocrat of ancient Rome, or the small farmer in modern times. And the “auri sacra fames” of the Neapolitan coachman or “barcaiuolo,” the Asian representative of similar trades, or the *craftsman* from southern Europe or Asia, expresses itself, as anyone can experience for himself, far more *aggressively* and certainly more unscrupulously than, for instance, that of the Englishman in a similar situation.<sup>22</sup>

The *absolutely* unscrupulous way they assert their own interests is a typical characteristic of such countries, whose bourgeois capitalist [*bürgerlich-kapitalistisch*] development has remained “*backward*.” As every manufacturer knows, the lack of “*coscienziosità*” of the workers [26] in these countries (Italy, for example, in contrast to Germany) has been one of the *main obstacles* to their capitalist development and to a certain extent remains so today. Capitalism has as little use for the undisciplined “*liberum arbitrium*” type of worker, as it has for the businessman who is simply unscrupulous in his outward conduct. This we can learn from Franklin. The difference does not therefore lie in the varying strengths of any “*drive*” to pursue money. The “auri sacra fames” is as old as the story of humanity itself, but we shall see that those who unreservedly surrender to this drive—like the Dutch sea captain who “was ready to go through hell for the sake of profit, even if it meant getting his sails singed”—were *by no means* the representatives of the attitude from which the capitalist “spirit” emerged as a *mass phenomenon*—and that is what we are talking about.

Above all, the “spirit” of capitalism had to wrestle with the kind of feeling and conduct that is customarily termed “*traditionalism*.” Here, too, any attempt at a conclusive “definition” must be deferred; we shall merely—here too, of course, only provisionally—make clear by reference to some special cases what is meant by the term, beginning “at the bottom,” with the workers.

One of the technical devices used by the modern entrepreneur to get the maximum performance out of “his” workers, and to increase the “work rate,” is piecework. In agriculture, for example, one occasion that generally demands the greatest possible increase in the intensity of work is the bringing in of the *harvest*. The weather may be changeable, and extraordinarily high levels of profit or loss depend on carrying out the work as rapidly as possible. Accordingly, the piecework system of payment is normally used here. With increasing yields and a more intensive operation, the interest of the entrepreneur in speeding up the harvest tends to become ever greater. It is therefore natural that attempts have again and again been made to interest the workers in improving their performance by *raising* the rates of pay for piecework, thus offering the workers the opportunity to achieve what are for them extraordinarily high earnings in a short space of time.

But here characteristic problems have arisen. With remarkable frequency, the raising of the piecework rate did not result in *more*, but in *less*, work being done in the same period of time, because the workers responded to the raising of the piecework rate not by *increasing* but by *reducing* the amount they worked in a day. The man who, for example, had hitherto reaped 2½ acres of corn at 1 mark per acre and had thus earned 2.50 marks a day, did *not*, as had been hoped, after the raising of the piecework rate by 25 pfennigs per acre, take the opportunity of higher rewards and reap, say, 3 acres—as he might well have done—thus making 3.75 marks, *but* instead only reaped 2 acres a day, because in this way he could continue to earn 2.50 marks as before and, in the words of the Bible, “therewith be content.” The extra money appealed to him less than the reduction in work; he did not ask: How much can I earn in a day if I do the maximum possible amount of work in a day? but: How much must I work in order to earn the same amount—2.50 marks—that I used to earn and which covers my *traditional* needs? This is the behavior which—following the normal usage—we shall term “traditionalism”: a person does not “by nature” want to make more and more money, but simply to live—to live in the manner in which he is accustomed to live, and to earn as much as is necessary for this. Wherever capitalism has begun its work of increasing the “productivity” of human labor by increasing its intensity, it has run up against the infinitely persistent resistance of this leitmotiv of precapitalist economic labor. Even today, the greater the “backwardness” (from the capitalist point of view) of the workforce on which it relies, the more it continues to meet this resistance.



To return to our example. When the appeal to the “acquisitive sense” [*Erwerbssinn*] by the offer of *higher* wages failed, it only remained to try the diametrically opposite method: to force the worker by the *reduction* of the rate of pay to work *harder* than before in order to maintain his previous income. Even today, to the superficial observer, low wages and high profits seem (as they always did) to be in correlation to each other; any *additional* wages paid have always seemed to mean a corresponding reduction in profits. Time and again, from its very beginnings, capitalism has trodden this path, and for centuries it was regarded as an article of faith that low wages were “productive,” that is, that they increased work performance, and that, in the words of Pieter de la Court—whose thinking in this matter was, as we shall see, truly in the spirit of old Calvinism—the common people will only work because they are poor and only as long as they remain so.

However, the effectiveness of this apparently reliable method has its limitations. [27] Certainly, capitalism demands for its growth the presence of a surplus population that it can hire cheaply on the “labor market.” However, while an excessively large “reserve army” may, under some circumstances, favor quantitative expansion, it can inhibit improvements in *quality*. In particular, it gets in the way of the transition to forms of operation that make intensive use of labor. Low pay is by no means identical with cheap labor. Even from the purely quantitative point of view, performance declines whenever wages are inadequate *to maintain physical health*. In the long run, such levels of pay often mean virtually the “selection of the unfittest.” Today’s Silesian reaper, working at full stretch, can cover, on average, little more than two-thirds of the area that the better paid and better fed Pomeranian or Mecklenburger can cover in the same time, while the Pole achieves less than the German. And the further east he comes from, the less he achieves. From a purely business point of view, too, low wages fail as a principle of capitalist development whenever the manufacturing process demands *qualified* (skilled) labor or perhaps the operation of expensive and easily damaged machines, or indeed any reasonable level of close attention and initiative. Here low wages do not pay; in fact, they have the opposite effect. Here a well-developed sense of responsibility is absolutely indispensable, along with a general attitude which, at least *during* working time, does not continually seek ways of earning the usual wage with the maximum ease and the minimum effort, but performs the work as though it were an absolute *end in itself*—a

“calling.” An attitude like this is not, however, something which occurs naturally. It cannot be directly produced either by high wages or by low wages, but has to be the product of a long, slow “process of education.”

*Today*, once established, capitalism is able to recruit the workers it needs relatively easily in all industrialized countries, and in every industrial region within individual countries. In the past it was an extremely difficult problem in each single case. [28] And even today it cannot always achieve its aim without powerful assistance, such as that which, as we shall see in due course, it received in its early days. An example will again best illustrate what is meant. Today, the traditionalist form of labor is often best exemplified by *female* workers, especially unmarried ones. Almost without exception, those who employ girls, especially *German* girls, complain of their absolute inability, or at least reluctance, to give up the traditional ways of working which they have been taught, in favor of others which are more practical. They will not adapt to new working methods. They are unwilling to learn, to concentrate, or to think for themselves. Attempts to discuss ways of rendering the work easier, above all more profitable, generally meet with complete incomprehension on their part. Raising the piecework rates does not have the desired effect either, simply bouncing off a solid wall of habit.

The only case which regularly *differs*—and this is a not unimportant point for our investigation—is that of girls who have had a specifically religious education, especially girls from a *Pietist* background. It is often said, and recently this was confirmed to me with regard to the linen industry by a relative, that far and away the best opportunities for economic education are to be found in *this* category of female workers. Within this group, the ability to concentrate the mind, as well as the absolutely vital ability to feel a sense of *commitment to the work*, is commonly found. These qualities are very often combined with strict economy that is *mindful* of the level of earnings, and with a spirit of sober self-control and moderation that enhances performance enormously. Here is the most fertile ground for the growth of that attitude to work as an end in itself, as a “*calling*,” that capitalism demands. Here, *as a result of* a religious upbringing, the chances of rising above the familiar old traditional ways are greatest. This observation from present-day capitalism [29] should be enough in itself to show us again that it is worth *posing the question* as to what form, in the early days of

capitalism, such links between capitalist adaptability and religious factors might have taken. For it is evident from many individual phenomena that these links already existed in those days. For example, when Methodist workers in the eighteenth century were the object of hatred and persecution from their fellow workers, this was not due at all, or at least not primarily, to their religious eccentricities—England had seen plenty of these, some of which were more conspicuous. In fact, the frequent destruction of their *tools*, of which we read in reports of the time, suggests that they were targeted because they were excessively “keen to work,” as we might put it today.

Let us, however, first turn again to the present, to the entrepreneurs in fact, in order to clarify the meaning of “traditionalism” here as well.

In his discussion of the genesis of capitalism [30], Sombart distinguishes between “subsistence” and “acquisition” [*Erwerb*] as the two great “leitmotivs” between which economic history has oscillated, depending on the degree to which personal *needs* or the striving for *gain* and the *opportunities* for making profits (beyond what was needed for personal needs) became the driving force behind the type and direction of economic activity. What he terms a “system of subsistence economy” seems at first sight to be identical with what we have here defined as “economic traditionalism.” This is indeed true if the term “needs” is taken to mean “traditional needs.” If it is not understood in this sense, however, large number of economies which in terms of the *form* of their organization may be regarded as “capitalist” according to Sombart’s definition (given elsewhere in his writings) [31] cease to belong to the sphere of “profit-based” economies and must be classed as “subsistence economies.” Some economies are run by private entrepreneurs in the form of trade in capital (either money or goods with money value) for the purpose of profit, gained by purchase of the means of production and the sale of the products (which makes them undoubtedly “capitalist enterprises”). Such economies can still be *traditionalist* in character. In the course of recent economic history, too, this has been the case not just exceptionally but *regularly*—though with constantly recurring interruptions by new and ever more violent manifestations of the “capitalist spirit.” The “capitalist” form of an economy and the spirit in which it is run do indeed stand in a generally *adequate* relationship to each other, but not in a relationship of mutual dependency governed by any law. We shall nevertheless provisionally

use the expression “spirit of capitalism” for that attitude which, *in the pursuit of a calling* [*berufsmäßig*], strives systematically for profit for its own sake in the manner exemplified by Benjamin Franklin. We do this for the *historical* reason that this attitude has found its most adequate expression in the capitalist enterprise, and conversely the capitalist enterprise has found in this attitude its most adequate *spiritual motivation*.

However, the two [i.e., form and motivation] may very easily become separated. Benjamin Franklin was filled with the “capitalist spirit” at a period when, in terms of its *form*, his printing business in no way differed from any craft business. And we shall see that, in general, at the threshold of the modern period, the bearers of that attitude which we have here designated “spirit of capitalism” [32] were by no means only, or even predominantly, “capitalist” entrepreneurs from among the patricians of trade, but were drawn chiefly from the rising strata of the middle class [*Mittelstand*]. In the nineteenth century, too, the classical representatives of this attitude were not the refined gentlemen of Liverpool and Hamburg with their inherited commercial wealth, but ambitious “nouveaux riches” from often quite humble backgrounds in Manchester or Rhineland-Westphalia.

Of course, the capitalist enterprise is the only possible form in which to operate a business such as a bank, a wholesale export business, a sizable retail store, or, finally, the large-scale putting out<sup>23</sup> of goods manufactured in home industries. Nevertheless, they can all be run in a strictly traditionalist spirit. Indeed, it is not *possible* for the business of the big banks of issue to be run in any other way. Overseas trade has for whole periods of history been organized on the strictly traditionalist basis of monopolies and quotas. In the retail trade—and we are not talking about those small-time spongers without capital who are today always appealing for state aid—the revolutionary process which is putting an end to old traditionalism is still in full flow. This is the same upheaval that has shattered the old forms of the putting-out system—a system to which modern outwork bears no more than a formal relationship. Familiar though these things may be, we propose once again to illustrate how this revolutionary process operates and what it means, and we shall do this by reference to a particular case.

Up until the middle of the last century, the life of a putter-out in at least some of the branches of the continental textile industry [33] was a fairly easygoing one by today's standards. It went something like this. The peasants came with their fabrics—often (in the case of linen) still mainly or entirely made of raw materials manufactured by themselves—into the town where the putters-out lived, and, after careful—often official—scrutiny of the quality, received the usual payment for them. For more distant markets, the clients of the putter-out were middlemen who also traveled to see him, bought either according to samples or from stock on the basis of traditional quality, or placed an order well in advance—whereupon a new order would be placed with the peasants. Visits to the clients, if they occurred at all, were infrequent—usually correspondence and the sending of samples was sufficient. Office hours were relatively short—perhaps five or six per day, occasionally considerably fewer. Working hours were longer when sales representatives went on their travels, although this did not always happen. Income was modest, but sufficient for a decent standard of living [*Lebensführung*] and enough to put a little by in the good times to build up a small nest egg. On the whole, relations between competitors were amicable, and there was a large measure of agreement on the “principles of business.” Prolonged daily visits to the club, as well as perhaps a glass of wine in the evening with a circle of friends, made for an unhurried lifestyle.

It was in every respect a “capitalist” *form* of organization: the entrepreneurs were engaged purely in commerce; the use of capital stocks in the conduct of business was essential; viewed objectively, the economic process was capitalist in form. But it was traditionalist economy if one looks at the *spirit* which inspired the entrepreneurs: the traditional way of life, level of profit, and amount of work; the traditional style of running the business and of relations with workers; the essentially traditional clientele; the traditional manner of obtaining clients and sales. These things dominated the operation of the business and underlay the “ethic” of this circle of entrepreneurs.

At some point this easygoing state of affairs was suddenly disturbed, often without there being any fundamental change in the *form* of the organization—such as conversion to a unified business,<sup>24</sup> machine operation, or the like. What happened was often simply this. A young man from one of the putter-out families from the town moved to the country, carefully selected the weavers he

needed, tightened up control over them and made them more dependent, thus turning peasants into workers. He also took personal charge of sales, approaching the ultimate buyers, the retail stores, as directly as possible; he gained customers personally, traveled to see them every year on a regular basis; most important, he was able to adapt the quality of the products exclusively to their needs and wishes, and to “personalize” the products. At the same time he began to carry out the principle of “low price, high turnover.” There was then a repetition of what invariably follows a “rationalization” process of this kind: you either prospered or went under. Under the impact of the bitter struggle for survival that was beginning, the idyll collapsed. Considerable fortunes were made and not invested at interest but reinvested in the business. The old, comfortable, and easygoing way of life gave way to harsh realities. Those who became involved got on; they had *no wish* to consume but only to make profits. Those who carried on in the same old way were *compelled* to tighten their belts.

In such cases (and this is the main point), it was *not* normally an influx of new *money* that brought about this revolution—in a number of cases known to me the entire “revolutionizing process” was set in motion with a few thousand marks capital borrowed from relatives: it was the new *spirit* at work—the “spirit of capitalism.” The question of the motive forces behind the development of capitalism is not primarily a question of the origin of the *money* reserves to be used, but a question of the development of the capitalist spirit. Wherever it emerges and is able to make its influence felt, it creates the money as the means of achieving its effects, although the reverse is not true. However, its entry on to the scene is not normally a peaceful one. Suspicion, occasionally hatred, most of all moral indignation, can threaten to overwhelm the pioneer. Often—several cases are known to me—myths begin to circulate regarding his supposedly murky past. Few people are sufficiently clear-sighted to be aware of the unusual strength of character that is required from this “new type” of entrepreneur if he is not to lose his sober self-control and face moral and economic shipwreck. As well as energy and clarity of vision, he will need certain outstanding “*ethical*” qualities to win the absolutely indispensable confidence of the clients and of the workers when introducing these innovations and to maintain the vigor necessary to overcome the innumerable obstacles he will meet. It is these qualities above all which have made possible the infinitely more intensive work rate that is now demanded of the entrepreneur. There is no longer any place for the comfortable lifestyle. These ethical qualities are quite different in kind from those that were adequate for the traditionalism of the past.

Now one may be inclined to observe that these *personal* moral qualities, in themselves, have nothing whatever to do with any ethical maxims, let alone religious ideas, but rather that the negative ability to *relinquish* old traditions (by a kind of liberal enlightenment) is an adequate basis for this conduct of life. And, in fact, today this is, in general, certainly true. Not only is there normally no correlation between the conduct of life and religious principles, but where a correlation does exist it tends to be, at least in Germany, negative in character. The kind of people who are inspired by the “capitalist spirit” today tend to be, if not exactly hostile to the Church, then at least indifferent. The prospect of the “holy tedium” of paradise holds few attractions for their active nature; for them, religion is simply something that stops people from working here on earth. If one were to ask them what is the *purpose* of their restless chase and why they are never satisfied with what they have acquired (something which must seem inexplicable to those who are entirely oriented to *this world*), they would answer, if they had an answer at all, “to provide for children and grandchildren.” More frequently, however—and this motive is obviously not peculiar to them but applies to “traditionalist people”—they would answer, with greater justification, that business, with its ceaseless work, had quite simply become “indispensable to their life.” That is in fact their only true motivation, and it expresses at the same time the *irrational* element of this way of conducting one’s life, whereby a man exists for his business, not vice versa.

Of course, the sense of power and the prestige that the mere fact of wealth bestows play their part. When the imagination of an entire nation has become focused on sheer size, as in the United States, the mystique of figures may work its irresistible magic on the “poets” among businessmen. But it holds few attractions for leading entrepreneurs, especially those that are consistently successful. And certainly, the behavior of typical German capitalist parvenu families who enter the safe haven of inherited property and ennoblement [*Fideikom mißbesitzes und Briefadels*], and whose sons try to hide their social origins by the way they conduct themselves at the university and in the officers’ corps, is an example of the decadence of epigones. The “ideal type” of the capitalist entrepreneur [34], exemplified in our country by certain outstanding examples, is worlds away from such pretentiousness, whether crude or more refined. He shuns ostentation and unnecessary show, spurns the conscious enjoyment of his power, and is embarrassed by the outward signs of the social

esteem in which he is held. His conduct of life, in other words, is often characterized to a certain degree by a form of *asceticism* like that which emerges clearly in the “sermon” of Franklin which we previously quoted. We shall have to pursue the historical significance of this phenomenon, which is not unimportant for our purpose. In particular, it is by no means unusual, in fact it is quite common, to find in him a degree of modesty that is significantly more honest than the reserve that Benjamin Franklin so judiciously recommends. He “gets nothing out of” his wealth for his own person—other than the irrational sense of “fulfilling his vocation” [*Berufserfüllung*]. [35]

It is precisely this however that seems so incomprehensible and puzzling, so sordid and contemptible, to precapitalist man. For anyone to make the purpose of his life’s work exclusively the idea of eventually going to one’s grave laden with a heavy weight of money and goods seems to him the product of perverse instinct, of the “*auri sacra fames*.”

At present, under our political, legal, and trading institutions, with the business structure characteristic of our economy, this “spirit” of capitalism could, as we have said, be understood purely as a product that has *adapted* to its environment. The capitalist economic order *needs* this uncompromising devotion to the “vocation” [*Beruf* ] of moneymaking. It is an attitude to outward possessions which is so appropriate [*adäquat*] to the economic structure, and is so very closely linked with the prerequisites for success in the economic struggle for existence, that there can no longer be any question today of a *necessary* connection between that chrematistic<sup>25</sup> *conduct of life* and any one uniform philosophy of life. Indeed, those who take this attitude no longer find it necessary to rely on the approval of any religious powers and regard the influence exerted on economic life by the norms of the Church, to the extent that this influence still makes itself felt, to be just as much of a hindrance as regulation by the state. The interests represented by the politics of trade and social affairs then tend to determine the “philosophy of life.” But these are phenomena of a period in which capitalism, having emerged victorious, has liberated itself from the old supports. Just as once it could only break the mold of medieval economic regulation in alliance with the emerging modern state power, so—let us say provisionally—the same *could* be true of its relationship with the religious powers. Whether and in what sense this actually was the case is



precisely what we propose to investigate here.

Scarcely any proof is needed that this attitude toward moneymaking as an *end in itself*, a “vocation” [*Beruf* ], which one has a duty to pursue, runs counter to the moral feeling of entire eras. The phrase “Deo placere non potest” was used in relation to the activity of the merchant.<sup>26</sup> But, when compared to widely held radical antichrematistic views,<sup>27</sup> this represented a considerable *accommodation* of Catholic doctrine to the interests of the financial powers of the Italian cities that were politically so closely allied with the Church. And even when the doctrine was softened even more, as in the case of Antoninus of Florence, the feeling still lingered that gain as an activity pursued as an end in itself was basically a “*pudendum*,”<sup>28</sup> which was tolerated solely because it had become an established institution. A “moral” view like that of Benjamin Franklin would have been simply unthinkable. This was also the position of those directly concerned. Their life’s work was, at best, something morally neutral—tolerated, but, on account of the constant danger of clashing with the Church’s ban on usury, spiritually dubious. The sources reveal that upon the death of wealthy people, considerable sums of money flowed into the coffers of Church institutions as “conscience money,” some of it even going back to former debtors as “*usura*” wrongfully taken from them. Even skeptical persons not in sympathy with the Church tended to play safe and pay these sums in order to be reconciled with the Church just in case the worst came to the worst. It was an insurance against the uncertainties concerning the afterlife and because, after all (at least this rather lax view was widely held), outward conformity to the laws of the Church was sufficient for salvation. [36] It is here that the *amoral* and in part *immoral* character of their actions becomes clear, as those concerned themselves saw it.

How, then, did what was, at best, behavior which was morally no more than tolerated, become a “calling” as understood by Benjamin Franklin? This behavior was regarded as the epitome of a morally laudable conduct of life—and was even enjoined as a duty—in the primitive, petit bourgeois environment of eighteenth-century Pennsylvania, where the economy was in constant danger of collapsing into barter, where there was scarcely a trace of the larger commercial [*gewerblichen*] enterprises, and only the antediluvian beginnings of banks could be detected. And yet, in the Florence of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,

the money and capital market for every political great power, the center of the “capitalist” world at that time, it was regarded as morally dubious. How is this historically explicable? To speak of a “reflection” of the “material” conditions in the “superstructure of ideas” would be sheer nonsense here. What, then, is the philosophy according to which an activity that is outwardly directed solely toward *profit* is characterized as a “calling”—one to which the individual feels an obligation? For it is this philosophy that, here too, guarantees the ethical foundation and support for the conduct of life of the “new style” entrepreneur.

As Sombart has said in his highly felicitous and effective writings, the basic motive of economic life can be termed “economic rationalism.” And this is undoubtedly true, if one understands by this the increase in the productivity of labor, which by structuring the production process along *scientific* lines has eliminated labor’s links with the naturally existing “organic” limitations of the human being. This rationalization process in the field of technology and economics undoubtedly also determines a significant proportion of the “ideals” of modern civil [*bürgerlich*] society: in the minds of the representatives of the “spirit of capitalism,” labor in the service of a *rational* structuring of the provision of the material needs of humanity has always been one of the guiding purposes of their life’s work. To grasp this self-evident truth, one only needs to read, for example, Franklin’s description of the efforts he made to bring about municipal improvements in Philadelphia. Creating employment for numerous people and contributing to the economic prosperity (in the capitalist sense of demography and trade) of one’s hometown is a source of pleasure and pride to the modern entrepreneur and helps to give him an “enjoyment of life” which is undoubtedly founded on “idealism.” Similarly, it is, of course, one of the fundamental characteristics of the private capitalist economy that, rationalized on the basis of strict *arithmetical* calculation—or as Sombart puts it: shaped “by calculation”—it aims at the economic success desired and planned for, in contrast to the hand-to-mouth existence of the peasant or the privileged routine of the guild craft worker.

It might appear, then, that the development of the “capitalist spirit” can most easily be understood as a part of the total development of rationalism and must be derived from the latter’s fundamental attitude to the ultimate problems of life. Thus Protestantism could only be considered historically to the extent that it had

played a part as “harbinger” of a purely rationalist philosophy of life. But as soon as one begins the task in earnest, it becomes evident that such a simple way of approaching the problem will not do, if only because the history of rationalism *by no means* shows *parallel* advances being made in different individual areas of life.

The rationalization of civil law, for example, if by this we mean a *conceptual* simplification and ordering of the contents of the law, reached its highest form yet in the Roman law of late antiquity. But it is at its most backward in some of the economically most highly rationalized countries, notably in England, where a renaissance of Roman law was thwarted by the power of the great legal associations; by contrast, the dominance of the Roman law in the Catholic regions of southern Europe has continued uninterrupted. The purely secular rational philosophy of the eighteenth century became established not solely or even primarily in the countries with the highest capitalist development. Even today, the philosophy of Voltaire is commonly subscribed to by broad swathes of upper and—what is in practice more important—middle social strata, particularly in the Catholic Latin countries. Most of all, if we understand by practical “rationalism” that conduct of life which deliberately relates the world to the secular interests of the individual and judges from that perspective, then (it must be said that) this style of life was and today remains a quite “typical” feature of the nations of the “*liberum arbitrium*,”<sup>29</sup> a feature which is deeply ingrained in the Italians and the French. And we have already found convincing proof that this is by no means the soil in which that relationship of man to his “calling,” viewed as a task given to him, which is what capitalism demands, best flourishes. It is possible to “rationalize” life from extremely varied ultimate standpoints and in very different directions; “rationalism” is a historical concept which embraces a world of opposites, and we shall have to investigate the intellectual origin of that concrete form of “rational” thinking and living from which arose the idea of the “calling” and that devotion to the work of the calling—so *irrational* from the point of view of eudaemonistic self-interest—which was and still is one of the most characteristic components of our capitalist culture. What interests us here is the origin of that irrational element which is contained in the concept of the “calling.”

### 3. [LUTHER'S CONCEPTION OF THE CALLING]

Now it is unmistakable that the German *word* “Beruf,” and even more clearly the English word “calling,” carry at least *some* religious connotations—namely, those of a *task* set by *God*—and the more strongly we emphasize the word in a particular case, the more strongly felt these connotations become. And if we trace the word back through history in the civilized languages, it becomes evident that the Latin, Catholic peoples, like those of classical antiquity [37], have no expression which quite corresponds to our word “Beruf,” in the sense of one’s station in life or defined area of work. By contrast, *all* Protestant peoples have such an expression. And it is further evident that what we are concerned with is not some ethnically determined characteristic of the Germanic languages, or the expression of a “Germanic spirit of the people,” but the fact that the word in its present meaning derives from the *translations of the Bible*, in fact, from the spirit of the translators, not from the spirit of the original. [38] In Luther’s translation the word seems to have been used for the first time in the book of Ecclesiasticus [Jesus Sirach] (11, 20-21) in precisely our modern sense. [39] Very soon after that it took on today’s meaning in the secular [*profan*] language of all Protestant peoples. Previously, no suggestion of such a meaning had been observable in the secular literature of *any* of them. Even in published sermons it has, as far as one can tell, only appeared in the work of one German mystic, whose influence on Luther is well known.

The new meaning of the word corresponded to a new *idea*—a product of the Reformation. This is generally recognized. True, as early as the Middle Ages, there were already certain indications of the high estimation of secular everyday labor which is implicit in this concept of the calling—we shall have more to say about this later. But what was definitely new was the estimation of fulfillment of duty within secular callings as being of the absolutely *highest* level possible for moral activity. It was this that led, inevitably, to the idea of the *religious* significance of secular everyday labor and gave rise to the concept of the calling. So, in the concept of “calling” is expressed that central dogma of all Protestant denominations which rejects the Catholic division of Christian moral commands into “praecepta” and “consilia,” and recognizes, as the *only* means of living a life pleasing to God, not the surpassing of innerworldly [*innerweltlich*] morality

through the pursuit of monastic asceticism, but exclusively the fulfillment of innerworldly duties which arise from the individual's station in life. This then becomes one's "calling."

Luther [40] develops this idea in the course of the first decade of his reforming activity. At first, in line with the predominant medieval tradition as represented by men like Thomas Aquinas [41], he believes secular work, although willed by God, to be creaturely in character; it is the indispensable *basis in nature* for the life of faith [42], as morally neutral as eating and drinking. But as he develops the "sola fide" idea more clearly in its logical consistency, and becomes increasingly antagonistic toward the Catholic "evangelical counsels" of monasticism, which he sees as "dictated by the Devil," the calling begins to grow in importance. The monastic style of life is now not only completely worthless as a means of justification before God (that much is self-evident), he also sees it as a manifestation of *unloving* egoism and an abdication from secular duties. In contrast, labor in a secular calling appears as the outward expression of Christian charity. This view is based in particular on the argument that division of labor forces each individual to work for *others*, an extremely otherworldly argument which is almost grotesquely at variance with Adam Smith's well-known dictum. [43] Little more is heard of this essentially scholastic justification, however, and Luther returns, with increasing emphasis, to the point that the fulfillment of innerworldly duties is absolutely the *only* way to please God, that this and *only* this is God's will, and that therefore every legitimate occupation [*Beruf*] is quite simply of equal value. [44] It is indeed beyond doubt and may be regarded as a truism that this moral quality ascribed to life in a secular calling [*Berufsleben*] was one of the most momentous achievements of the Reformation, and was Luther's own contribution. However, the practical significance of this achievement is in general more dimly felt than clearly recognized.

First of all, it is scarcely necessary to state that Luther cannot really be regarded as having an inner affinity with the "capitalist spirit" in the sense in which we have hitherto understood this word. Even those within the Church who are keenest to praise what the Reformation "achieved" are today in no way sympathetic to capitalism in any sense whatever. Even more certainly, Luther himself would without any doubt have rejected any affinity with a philosophy

such as that espoused by Franklin. We should not, however, cite his accusations against the great merchants, the Fuggers [45] and their like, as a sign of this. The struggle against the (de jure or de facto) *privileged* position of certain of the great trading companies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can best be compared to the modern campaign against the trusts. In itself, it is no more the expression of a traditionalist attitude than is the latter.

Cromwell, too, wrote after the Battle of Dunbar (September 1650) to the Long Parliament: “Be pleased to reform the abuses of all professions: and if there be any one that makes many poor to make a few rich, that suits not a Commonwealth.” And yet elsewhere we find him animated by a quite specific “capitalist” way of thinking. [46]

On the other hand, in his numerous attacks on usury and the taking of interest, Luther expresses unambiguous views on the nature of capitalism which, compared with late scholasticism, are, from the capitalist point of view, quite “backward.” [47] In this category belongs in particular, of course, the argument concerning the unproductive nature of *money*, an argument that had already been dealt with by Antoninus of Florence. But there is no need for us to go into detail here. The main point is: the idea of the “*calling*” in the *religious* sense was capable of producing very different results for the innerworldly conduct of life. The authority of the Bible, where Luther believed he found this idea, was, on the whole, more favorable toward a *traditionalist* interpretation. In particular the Old Testament, which enjoins the *exceeding* of innerworldly morality only in a few individual instances, expressed a similar religious idea in a strictly traditionalist manner: everyone should “earn their own living” and leave the godless to run after profit: that is the sense of all the passages which deal directly with the affairs of the world. Only the Talmud adopts, in part—though not in principle—a different standpoint. The personal attitude of Jesus is summed up in classical purity by the words “Give us *this day* our daily bread,” and the element of radical rejection of the world implied by his use of the phrase “μαμωνάος τῆς αἰσχροσύνης,”<sup>30</sup> ruled out any *direct* linkage of the modern idea of the calling [*Berufs gedanken*] with him personally. [48] Thanks to the eschatological expectations of the first generations of Christians, it is true to say that the “apostolic age” of Christianity, as recorded in the New Testament, especially in the words of Paul himself, was either indifferent to secular working life

[*Berufsleben*] or, like the Old Testament, essentially traditionalist. Since everyone was awaiting the coming of the Lord, then let everyone remain in the estate [*Stand*] and the secular occupation [*Hantierung*] in which the “call” of the Lord has found him, and continue to labor as before: thus he will not be a burden to the brethren, and in any case it will only be for a short while. Luther’s reading of the Bible was colored by his outlook at any given time, and in the course of his development between about 1518 and about 1530, this not only remained traditionalist, but also *became* more and more traditionalist. [49]

In the early years of his reforming activity, his view, resulting from his essentially creaturely estimation of the calling, was one of Pauline eschatological *indifference* toward the *nature* of innerworldly activity, such as that expressed in 1 Corinthians 7. [50] One could attain salvation in any station of life [*Stand*], and on life’s brief pilgrimage it was futile to set any store by the nature of one’s occupation. And the striving after material gain which exceeded one’s own needs, and thus only seemed possible at the expense of others, must therefore necessarily be regarded as reprehensible. [51] As he became increasingly involved in the affairs of the world, he came to value labor in a calling more highly. At the same time, the concrete occupation of the individual became increasingly a special *command* of God to him to discharge the duties of *this* concrete situation, into which divine providence had directed him. After his struggles with the “zealots” and the peasant riots, the *objective* historical order into which the individual had been placed by God became for him more and more the direct outflow of the divine will. [52] This ever-stronger emphasis on the role of providence, in individual events of life as well [as public affairs], led him increasingly to a traditionalist stance, one that corresponded to the idea of “destiny.” The individual should on principle *remain* in the calling and station in which God has placed him, and should keep his earthly striving within the limits of his allotted station in life. If economic traditionalism was at first a result of Pauline indifference, it later came to flow from an evermore intense belief in providence [53] that identifies unconditional obedience to God [54] with unconditional submission to the situation in which one has been placed. Thus Luther never arrived at a connection resting on a fundamentally new basis in principle between work in a calling and *religious* principles. [55] Purity of *doctrine* as the sole infallible criterion of the Church, to which increasingly he held fast after the battles of the 1520s, was enough in itself to frustrate the development of new perspectives in the area of ethics.

Thus the concept of the calling remained, for Luther, bound to tradition. [56] The calling was something which man had to *accept* as divine decree; it was something to which he had to “submit”—this connotation *took precedence* over the other idea present, namely, that work in a calling was a (or rather the) divinely appointed *task*. [57] And orthodox Lutheranism, as it developed, stressed this feature even more. The only ethical advance was a negative one: the ending of the need to surpass innerworldly duties by ascetic ones. At the same time, however, obedience toward the authorities and submission to one’s station in life was preached. [58] As we shall discuss in greater detail later [59], the German mystics did a great deal of preparatory work on the idea of the calling in the Lutheran sense. Thus Tauler emphasized the fundamentally *equal* value of spiritual and secular callings and accorded less value to the traditional forms of gaining merit from ascetic works. [60] This was due to the overriding importance of the ecstatic and contemplative reception of the divine spirit by the soul. In a certain sense, Lutheranism even represented a step backward from the mystics, insofar as in the case of Luther—and more so in the case of his Church—the *psychological* bases of a rational ethic of the calling had become rather insecure in comparison with the mystics, whose views on this point have something in common with both the Pietist and to some extent the Quaker psychology of faith. [61] Furthermore—as we propose to demonstrate—Luther was suspicious of the element of *ascetic self-discipline* [in the mystics]. This smacked of sanctification by works<sup>31</sup> [*Werkheiligkeit*] and as such was increasingly discouraged in his Church.

The mere notion of the “calling” as Luther understood it, then—this much has surely been established by now—was, as far as we can tell so far, of no more than dubious relevance to what we are seeking. This does not mean at all that the Lutheran form of new ordering of religious life has no practical significance for the subjects under our consideration. Clearly, though, it cannot be *directly* derived from *Luther’s* position and that of his Church with regard to the calling in the world, and is by no means as easy to grasp as may be the case with other manifestations of Protestantism. Our best course of action, then, will be to proceed to consider those forms of Protestantism in which a connection between practical life and the religious starting point can be more readily discerned than for Lutheranism.



The outstanding part played by *Calvinism* and of the Protestant *sects* in the history of capitalist development has already been mentioned. Just as Luther found a “different spirit” from his own alive in Zwingli,<sup>32</sup> so also did his spiritual descendants in Calvinism. Certainly Catholicism has always, right up to the present, regarded Calvinism as the real enemy. No doubt there are *political* reasons for this, for although the Reformation would have been inconceivable without Luther’s personal religious development and has always borne the stamp of his personality, his work would never have achieved outward permanence without Calvinism. The reason for the revulsion felt by Catholics and Lutherans *alike* lies in the *ethical* peculiarity of Calvinism. Even the most cursory glance reveals that a completely different kind of relationship has here been created between religious life and earthly action than in either Catholicism or Lutheranism. This is apparent even in literature that employs specifically religious *motifs*. Consider, for example, the conclusion of the *Divine Comedy*, where the poet in Paradise is struck dumb as, all desires fulfilled, he contemplates the divine mysteries. Then compare this with the conclusion of the poem that has become known as the “Divine Comedy of Puritanism.” Milton concludes the final canto of “Paradise Lost” after the description of the expulsion from Paradise as follows:

They, looking back, all th’ eastern side beheld  
Of Paradise, so late their happy seat,  
Waved over by that flaming brand; the gate  
With dreadful faces thronged and fiery arms.  
Some natural tears they dropped, but wiped them soon;  
The world was all before them, where to choose  
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide.  
They, hand in hand, with wandering steps and slow,  
Through Eden took their solitary way.

And shortly before, Michael had said to Adam:

. . . Only add  
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable; add faith,  
Add virtue, patience, temperance; add love,  
By name to come called charity, the soul  
Of all the rest: then wilt thou not be loath  
To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess

A Paradise within thee, happier far.<sup>33</sup>

Anyone can sense immediately that this mightiest expression of earnest Puritan worldliness, that is, valuing life as a task to be accomplished, would have been impossible in the mouth of a medieval writer. But neither is it in accord with Lutheranism, as expressed, for example, in Luther's and Paul Gerhard's chorales. We propose at this point to replace this indefinite feeling with a rather more precise *formulation* and to inquire concerning the inner reasons for these differences. Appeals to the "national character" are not only a mere confession of *ignorance*, but are in this instance completely inappropriate. To attribute a single "national character" to seventeenth-century Englishmen would be simply historically wrong. "Cavaliers" and "Roundheads" felt themselves to be radically different kinds of people, not simply two different parties, and anyone who studies the subject closely would be compelled to agree with them. [62] Conversely, no distinction can be found between the character of the English merchant adventurers and that of the old Hanseatic traders, nor indeed is there any discernible difference between the English and the German character in the late Middle Ages which cannot be immediately explained by their differing political destinies. It is only the power of *religious* movements—not they alone, but primarily—that has created those differences of which we are aware today.

If, accordingly, while investigating the relationships between the old Protestant ethic and the development of the capitalist spirit, we take as our starting point what was created by Calvin, Calvinism, and the Puritan sects, this should not be taken to mean that we expect to find that one of the founders or representatives of these religious communities in any sense saw as the aim of their life's work the awakening of what we are here calling the "capitalist spirit." We can hardly imagine that any of them would have considered the striving for worldly goods, as an *end in itself*, as an *ethical value*. There is, however, one thing that we must once and for all hold on to. *Ethical* programs of reform have never been of *central* concern to any of the "Reformers"—among whom for our purposes we have to include men such as Menno [Simons], George Fox,<sup>34</sup> and Wesley.<sup>35</sup> They are not the founders of societies of "ethical culture" or representatives of humanitarian programs of social reform or of cultural ideals. The *salvation of souls* and this alone is at the heart of their life and work. Their ethical goals and the practical effects of their teaching are all anchored firmly here and are the *consequences* of purely religious motives. And we shall therefore have to be prepared for the cultural effects of the Reformation to be in large measure—

perhaps even, from our particular point of view, predominantly—unforeseen and indeed *unwished for* consequences of the work of the Reformers, often far removed from, or even in virtual opposition to, everything that they themselves had in mind.

The following studies could, then, perhaps play a modest part in illustrating the manner in which “ideas” become effective in history. This purpose is the source of the justification for including them in this journal, which does *not* itself normally engage in purely historical work. In order, however, that no misunderstandings arise concerning the sense in which, it is claimed, purely nonmaterial [*ideell*] motives become effective, we propose to conclude this lengthy investigation with a few further thoughts.

It must be stressed that these studies are not in any way intended as an attempt to evaluate Reformation thought, whether in terms of social politics or religion. We are constantly dealing, for our purposes, with aspects of the Reformation that must appear peripheral and indeed external to the *religious* consciousness. For we are merely attempting some clarification of the nature of that element which religious motives have contributed to the fabric of the development of our modern *material* culture, which has grown up out of innumerable individual historical themes. We are merely asking which of certain characteristic elements of this culture might be *attributable* to the influence of the Reformation as historical cause. In doing this we must of course reject any notion that economic changes could have led to the Reformation as a “historically necessary development.” Innumerable historical constellations, especially purely political processes, which not only do not fit into any economic “law,” but fit into no economic scheme of any kind, had to come together in order for the newly created churches to be able to continue to exist at all. On the other hand, however, we have no intention of defending any such foolishly doctrinaire thesis as that the “capitalist spirit” (as always in the provisional sense of the word in which we are using it), let alone capitalism itself, *could only* arise as a result of certain influences of the Reformation. The very fact that certain important *forms* of capitalist business are considerably *older* than the Reformation would invalidate such a thesis. We intend, rather, to establish whether and to what extent religious influences *have in fact* been *partially* responsible for the qualitative shaping and the quantitative expansion of that “spirit” across the

world, and what concrete aspects of capitalist culture originate from them. In view of the tremendous confusion of reciprocal influences emanating from the material base, the social and political forms of organization, and the spiritual content of the cultural epochs of the Reformation, the only possible way to proceed is to first investigate whether and in what points particular *elective affinities* between *certain* forms of religious belief and the ethic of the calling can be identified. At the same time, the manner and general *direction* in which, as a result of such elective affinities, the religious movement influenced the development of material culture will be clarified as far as possible. Only *then* can the attempt be made to estimate the degree to which the historical origins of elements of modern culture should be attributed to those religious motives and to what extent to others.

#### EDITORS' NOTES

[1](#) See Appendix I, a).

[2](#) Weber's essay, published in two parts, appeared originally as "Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus," in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 20 (1905), pp. 1-54; and 21 (1905), pp. 1-110. "The Problem" (= Part 1) was written before his American sojourn (see Introduction, pp. xiii ff., for details of the trip).

[3](#) This subheading and later similar ones are not shown in the 1905 edition. They are included here to assist the reader.

[4](#) For want of a better word, we have here used "bourgeois" to approximate to *bürgerlich*, but it should be noted that there is no real equivalent in English to the German word, as Lassman and Speirs have explained in their glossary to *Weber: Political Writings* (Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 373). *Bürgerlich* (and the associated noun *Bürgertum*) is more positive and wide ranging; it implies civic virtues rather than the smugness suggested by "bourgeois" in English. (*Bürger* is German for "citizen").

[5](#) See Appendix I, b).

[6](#) Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), son of a merchant, rose to become one of the most powerful men of seventeenth-century France. Under the tutelage of Louis XIV, Colbert, as controller general of finance and secretary of state for the navy, proved to be an indefatigable and effective reformer of French industry, commerce, and taxation.

[7](#) Martin Luther (1483-1546) was a theologian and religious reformer who

initiated the Protestant Reformation. As an Augustinian monk, he first came to public notice in 1517 when he nailed his 95 theses to the door of the church at Wittenberg, opposing the Church's practice of selling indulgences (offering reduction in time spent in purgatory) and using the money to build Saint Peter's Basilica in Rome. In 1521 Luther was summoned to appear before the emperor Charles V at the Diet of Worms where he was called upon to recant from his writings. He defiantly refused with the words, "Here I stand. I can do no other. So help me God." He had to flee for his life but was given protection by the elector Frederick the Wise of Saxony, who gave him shelter in Wart-burg Castle, in Eisenach. Here he began his translation of the New Testament from the original Greek into German. This work was to be one of the foundations of the modern German language.

At the heart of Luther's theology was his belief in justification by faith *alone*. He even added the word *allein* ("alone") to his translation of Romans 3.28, although it was not present in the original. By making the Bible available to the people in their own tongue, he gave them immediate access to God's word, so that they no longer needed to rely on the mediation of the priesthood. He also taught that all legitimate callings are of equal worth in the sight of God. Luther was, however, a conservative in political matters and preached the duty of obedience to the *Obrigkeit*, the "authorities." His influence was greatly assisted by the invention of the printing press, which enabled his writings and his Bible translation to be widely circulated.

8 John Calvin (1509-1564) was the leading figure of the second stage of the Protestant Reformation and gave the movement begun by Luther a new direction.

He first began to train for the priesthood in Paris but became attracted to the humanist and reforming movements. However, the authorities became less tolerant of the movement for reform, and when in 1535 the rector of the University of Paris came out in support of Martin Luther, both he and Calvin, who had been closely associated with the rector, were forced to flee the country. He settled in Geneva, where, apart from a brief spell of exile in Strasbourg, he spent most of his life. While there, he gradually attained a dominant position on the Council and succeeded in organizing the government of the city as a theocracy, where the civil authorities were subject to the Church. Strict rules of behavior and religious observance were enforced.

While he agreed with Luther on many central issues of the faith, Calvin was more of a logical thinker and systematizer. His great doctrinal study (with

versions in both Latin and French) was the *Christianae Religionis Institutio* (Institutes of the Christian Religion). The first edition, which appeared in 1536, was a fluent and succinct doctrinal statement, whereas the final revised and greatly extended edition of 1559 included copious footnotes in which he vigorously defended his position against his critics. His most characteristic doctrine is that of the absolute sovereignty of God and the consequent denial of free will in man. Since nothing can happen unless God wills it, the doctrine of predestination is a natural corollary. God elects some people to eternal salvation, while the rest, by implication, are assigned to eternal damnation. All people in their natural state are deserving only of death, and it is solely by the grace of God that some are chosen for eternal life. The doctrine is discussed extensively in Weber's *Protestant Ethic*; indeed, his whole thesis is built around it.

Calvin's theology was extremely influential and formed the doctrinal basis for various branches of Protestantism, notably, Puritanism in sixteenth century England, and several nonconformist churches.

[9](#) John Knox (1514 -1572) led the Scottish Reformation. Trained to be a priest, Knox abandoned Catholicism to take up the cause of the Reformed Church. Knox served under the Protestant English government of Edward VI (Scotland was in Roman Catholic hands) but was forced to flee on the accession of Mary Tudor, a Catholic, in 1553. He went to Frankfurt am Main, and thence to Geneva. His final return to Scotland came in 1559. Knox's *First Book of Discipline* and *Book of Common Order* played a vital role in shaping the constitution and liturgy of the Reformed Church of Scotland.

[10](#) Gisbert (or Gijsbert) Vöet (1589-1676), also known as Gisbertus Voetius, was a theologian who participated vigorously in the Synod of Dort (1618-19), pushing for firm action against the Arminian "Remonstrants." From 1634, he was an influential Protestant theologian at the University of Utrecht, constructing a kind of reformed scholasticism. In the 1640s, he clashed with Descartes, claiming him to be atheist.

[11](#) *The Spirit of the Laws*, translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 [1748]), p. 343.

[12](#) Weber is here applying the theoretical principles that he had recently expressed in the article "Die "Objektivität" sozialwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis," published in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 19 (1904), pp. 22-87.

[13](#) The following emphases are Weber's.

[14](#) Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) was a remarkable American of astonishing versatility, whose accomplishments include those of printer, author, diplomat, and scientist. Born in Boston, the tenth son of a tallow chandler, he learned the printing trade from his brother James, with whom he jointly published a liberal weekly, the *New England Courant*. The years 1723 to 1726 were spent in London, where he worked as a printer. Back in Philadelphia, he soon achieved prosperity through a number of printing and publishing ventures, including the printing of Philadelphia's paper currency, which he had first advocated in a pamphlet. His *Poor Richard's* almanacs, printed annually from 1732 to 1757, with their homespun philosophy, had wide appeal. The extracts from Franklin's writings quoted by Weber are written in the same vein. Weber's nephew, Eduard Baumgarten, has expressed the view that his uncle took Franklin too seriously, failing to detect the element of humor in these writings. [See Guenther Roth's introduction to Lehmann and Roth (eds.), *Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts* (Cambridge, 1993)]. Certainly, Franklin himself was involved in a number of risky ventures that were hardly in the spirit of his own advice.

Franklin advocated such community projects as the foundation of a police force and a volunteer fire company. In science, he conducted experiments in electricity and introduced lightning conductors. He also invented a more efficient type of stove that was widely adopted. He played a leading role in diplomatic negotiations with France and England before and during the American War of Independence. In his last years he helped to frame the U.S. Constitution. He enjoyed tremendous popularity, particularly in France, where he was recognized as a precursor of the French Revolution.

Franklin's most important literary legacy is his autobiography, begun in 1771 and left unfinished at the time of his death, which encapsulates his philosophy of life.

[15](#) Jakob Fugger (1459-1525), also known as Jakob II the Rich, was a major figure in the renowned Catholic Fugger family, whose activities as bankers and merchants brought fame and notoriety. Jakob's interests in silver and copper mines and precious stones gave him enormous wealth and influence—he alone raised 544,000 guilders to finance the election of Charles V as emperor—but also attracted the anathema of Martin Luther among others who decried his policy of charging interest on loans and his support of the sale of indulgences.

[16](#) See Appendix I, c).

[17](#) That is, concerned with the pursuit of happiness.

[18](#) See Appendix I, d).

[19](#) See Appendix I, e).

[20](#) See Appendix I, f ).

[21](#) “The accursed hunger for gold,” Virgil, *Aeneid*, iii.57.

[22](#) See Appendix I, g).

[23](#) “Putting out” refers to the giving out, for example, to cottage weavers, by merchants of raw materials (such as raw wool, flax, cotton), which, as a finished product, is then collected by the merchants and sold. The putting-out system conflicted with, and undermined, the traditional market monopoly of the guilds. See David S. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (New York: Norton, 1999), pp. 43-44, 208-09.

[24](#) *Geschlossener Betrieb* is a reference to the transition from a decentralized domestic economy to a centralized industrial operation.

[25](#) That is, money oriented.

[26](#) See Appendix I, h).

[27](#) That is, radically opposed to moneymaking.

[28](#) That is, something to be ashamed of.

[29](#) This is an allusion to the humanism of Erasmus, as contrasted with Lutheranism.

[30](#) This phrase translates to “mammon of unrighteousness” (Luke 16.9).

[31](#) Weber elaborates on the significance of the concept of *Werkheiligkeit* in Part II of his *Protestant Ethic* essay on pages 79-80 of this volume.

[32](#) A contemporary of Luther, Huldrych Zwingli (1484-1531) was a leader of the Swiss Protestant Reformation. A Swiss patriot and classical scholar who was much influenced by the humanism of Erasmus, Zwingli was appointed “people’s priest” at Grossmünster at Zurich in 1518, a position he used to preach openly for church reform. Zwingli was involved in a number of prominent disputations, and the reform movement he initiated spread from Zurich to the cantons Basel and Bern, prompting the formation of a Protestant Christian Civil League. The



five Roman Catholic forest cantons of Lucerne, Zug, Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden were attacked by the League in 1529 in the first Kappel War. During the second Kappel War (1531), in which he served as an army chaplain, Zwingli was slain in battle. Zwingli and Luther disagreed, among other things, on the interpretation of the Eucharist, but shared much in common including a belief in the primacy of Scripture and in justification by faith alone, a commitment to a vernacular liturgy, and opposition to clerical celibacy and monasticism.

[33](#) This excerpt is quoted from *Norton Anthology of English Literature*, 3rd ed., 1974.

[34](#) George Fox (1624-1691) was the founder of the Society of Friends (Quakers). At the age of nineteen, he experienced a divine call that led him to break off associations with his own friends and wander the country in solitude. In 1648, he began his public ministry. Much persecuted and often imprisoned, Fox vehemently opposed formalism, pomp, and convention, and refused to take off his hat in court and submit himself to oath. Against rigid sacerdotalism, he emphasized simplicity and the overriding importance of experiencing the “inner light” of Christian devotion.

[35](#) John Wesley (1703-1791) was an evangelist and founder of Methodism. In 1728, he was ordained a priest. While a fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford, he joined the Holy Club, a religious study group derisively known as the Methodists. Voyaging to America in 1735 to preach to the Indians, he met some Moravian emigrants who were to have a great spiritual influence on him. Back in London in 1738, Wesley underwent a conversion experience at an evangelical meeting on Aldersgate Street, where he “felt his heart strangely warmed.” From then on, he devoted his life to preaching the gospel, mainly at open-air meetings, since the pulpits of the Church of England were closed to him. He traveled extensively throughout the country, delivering several sermons a day. He organized his followers into societies and class groups for mutual encouragement and admonition. Thanks to their frugal and disciplined habits, many Methodists eventually became prosperous. Wesley did not intend to found a new church, but separation did, nevertheless, eventually occur. Wesley was also concerned with social questions, and it is commonly said that the British Labour Party owes more to Methodism than to Marxism.

# *The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism*

# Part I: The Problem

## *Weber's Notes*

1) Most of these, though not all, can be explained by the fact that, of course, the denominational allegiance of the workforce of an industry depends primarily on the religious denomination prevalent where that industry is located, or on that of the catchment area from which its workers are drawn. At first sight, this might appear to distort the picture presented by many denominational statistics—for example, those of the Rhine Province. In addition, of course, the figures can only be conclusive where the individual specialized occupations [*Berufe*] have, as far as possible, been considered separately. If this is not done, it could happen that, for instance, really big entrepreneurs are lumped together with self-employed “masters” under the heading of “works managers.”

2) Compare, for example, Schell, *Der Katholizismus als Prinzip des Fortschrittes*, Würzburg, 1897, p. 31, and Georg von Hertling, *Das Prinzip des Katholizismus und die Wissenschaft*, Freiburg, 1899, p. 58.

3) A few years ago, one of my students made a study of the most detailed body of statistics we possess on these matters, the denominational statistics of Baden. Cf. Martin Offenbacher, *Konfession und soziale Schichtung: Eine Studie über die wirtschaftliche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden*. Tübingen and Leipzig, 1901, vol. 4, no. 5 of the *Volkswirtschaftlichen Abhandlungen der badischen Hochschulen* [Vol. 4, no. 5 of the *Economics Transactions of the Universities of Baden*]. The facts and figures to be presented by way of illustration all derive from this research.

4) Here, too, further details for Baden can be found in Offenbacher's first two chapters.

5) For example, in 1895 in Baden:

For every 1,000 Protestants, the average taxable income was 954,060 marks.

For every 1,000 Catholics, the average taxable capital income was 589,000 marks.

True, at over 4 million marks, the Jews are way out in front.

(Figures from Offenbacher, op. cit., p. 21)

6) On this matter, see the entire results of Offenbacher's work.

7) Of the population of Baden in 1895, 37 percent were Protestants, 61.3 percent were Catholics, and 1.5 percent were Jews. However, in 1885-91, the denominational allegiance of students attending non-compulsory schools beyond elementary level was as follows (according to Offenbacher, op. cit., pp. 16f.)<sup>1</sup>:

	Protestants	Catholics	Jews
<i>Gymnasien</i> <sup>1</sup>	43%	46%	9.5%
<i>Realgymnasien</i>	69%	31%	9%
<i>Oberrealschulen</i>	52%	41%	7%
<i>Realschulen</i>	49%	40%	11%
<i>Höhere</i>	51%	37%	12%
<i>Bürgerschulen</i>	—	—	—
Average	48%	42%	10%

Similar results in Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, the Reich lands (that is, Alsace-Lorraine), and Hungary (see Offenbacher, op. cit., pp. 18f.)<sup>2</sup>

8) See the figures in the preceding note, according to which it is *only* at the *Gymnasien* that the total attendance of Catholics (which is one-third below the

norm for their proportion of the population) at secondary [*mittleren*] schools exceeds that of Protestants—and that by only a few percent. No doubt this is because these schools provide the foundation for the study of theology. The study goes on to show that in Hungary the proportion of those of the *Reformed* faith attending secondary schools is even greater than that typical of Protestants (Offenbacher, op. cit., p. 19 note).

9) Figures in Offenbacher, op. cit., p. 54; tables at the end of his study.

10) This is not to say, of course, that the latter has not also had extremely important consequences. Neither is it any contradiction that, as we shall go on to show, it was of decisive importance in the development of the whole atmosphere of life of many Protestant sects (with an effect on their economic life as well) that they represented *small* and therefore homogeneous *minorities*. This was in fact the case for the *strict* Calvinists outside of Geneva and New England, for example, wherever they were politically in control.

[Editors' note: The remainder of this note appears only in the 1920 edition. We include it here on account of its reference to Brentano. See Appendix I, pp. 341-55.]

That emigrants of every religious persuasion from all over the world (Indian, Arabic, Chinese, Syrian, Phoenician, Greek, Lombard, or *Cawertschen*<sup>3</sup>), having received a *training in commerce* in highly developed countries, moved to other countries, was a universal phenomenon, and has nothing to do with our problem. In his essay—from which we shall frequently be quoting—*Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus*—Brentano makes reference to his own family. But *bankers* of foreign origin who enjoyed the privilege of commercial experience and connections have existed at all times and in every country. They are not specific to *modern* capitalism and *were* regarded—see later—with ethical suspicion by the Protestants. It was a different matter for the Protestant families of Muralt, Pestalozzi, etc., from Locarno, who emigrated to Zurich, where they very soon became numbered among the bearers of a specifically *modern* capitalist (*industrial*) development.

11) Offenbacher, op. cit., p. 68.

12) An exceptionally perceptive commentary on the character of the denominations in Germany and France, and the intermingling of these differences with the other cultural elements in the conflict between the nationalities in Alsace, may be found in the superb article by W. Wittich, "Deutsche und französische Kultur im Elsaß," (*Illustrierte Elsaß. Rundschau*, 1900), also obtainable as an offprint.

13) See Dupin de St. André, *L'ancienne église réformée de Tours: Les membres de l'église* (*Bulletin de la société de l'histoire du protestantisme*, vol. 4, p. 10). Here one could regard as the driving motive force the yearning for *emancipation* from monastic control, or indeed from any ecclesiastical control. Catholics might particularly incline to this view. Against this, however, is the opposing judgment of contemporaries (including Rebelais). Moral qualms were also felt by, for example, the first National Synods of the Huguenots (e.g., 1st Synod, C. Partic., qu. 10 in Aymon, *Synodes nationaux de l'Eglise réformée de France*, p. 10), as to whether a banker should be permitted to become a church elder. Furthermore, arising from questions raised by anxious church members, the debate constantly recurred in the National Synods (in spite of Calvin's clearly stated position) as to the permissibility of taking interest. All this shows the deep concern felt by those affected, but *at the same time* it surely also shows that the desire to be able to exercise "usuraria pravitas" without having to go to confession cannot have been the decisive factor.

14) Eberhard Gothein, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Schwarzwaldes*, vol. 1, p. 67.

15) In relation to this, see the brief remarks of Sombart in *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, vol. 1, p. 280. [See also Appendix Ib), p. 344 in this volume.]

16) It has been well established that where work is concerned the mere fact of a

change in location is one of the most powerful means of intensifying production. The same Polish girl, who, in her homeland, cannot be induced by even the most favorable wage rates to overcome her traditional inertia, appears transformed when she works abroad as a migratory farm laborer, and there seems no limit to the amount of work she is capable of. The same phenomenon may be observed in the case of Italian migratory laborers. That this is not *solely* due to the educative experience of a higher “cultural milieu”— although, of course, this plays a part—is shown by the fact that the same phenomenon occurs even where—as in agriculture—the *nature* of the occupation is exactly the same as in the homeland, and the accommodation in barracks for migratory laborers, etc., may even involve a temporary *drop* in their standard of living to a level which they would *never tolerate* in their homeland. The mere fact of working in quite different circumstances from those to which they had been accustomed breaks down the traditionalism and is the “educative factor.” It scarcely needs mentioning how much the American economic development depends on such influences. With regard to antiquity, the Babylonian exile had a very similar significance for the Jews. This is almost physically evident in the inscriptions. But for the Calvinists, the influence exercised by the characteristic form of their religious beliefs undoubtedly played its part as an independent factor. This is evident from the unmistakable difference in the economic character of the Puritan New England colonies, compared with Catholic Maryland, the Episcopalian South, and the multi-denominational Rhode Island.

17) This is not, of course, to deny that Pietism, in common with other religious movements, later opposed certain “progressive” features of the capitalist economic order—for example, the transition to the factory system—for reasons of patriarchal sentiment. A clear distinction must be made between the ideal at which a religious movement aimed and the degree to which it was actually able to influence the conduct of life of its supporters, as we shall see.

18) The final passage comes from *Necessary Hints to Those That Would Be Rich* (1736), the remainder from *Advice to a Young Trades-man* (1748), (The Works of Benjamin Franklin, 1836, vol. 2, pp. 80f and pp. 87ff).

19) *Der Amerikamüde* (Frankfurt, 1855), a literary paraphrase of *Lenau's*

impressions of America. As a work of art the book would be somewhat indigestible today, but it is simply unsurpassed as a document of the differences (which have long since faded) between German and American feeling. One might say it is a document contrasting, on the one hand, the inner life, which, in spite of everything, has, ever since the time of medieval German mysticism, remained *common* to the Catholics (Kürnberger was a liberal Catholic) and Protestants of Germany, with, on the other hand, the vigorous activity of Puritan capitalism.

20) Sombart used this quotation from a memorandum from Fugger as the motto for the section on the “Genesis of Capitalism” in *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, vol. 1, p. 193, compare *ibid.*, p. 290.

21) It is on this that our somewhat different approach to the problematic [*Problemstellung*] rests. The very considerable practical significance of the distinction will become clear later. By the way, it should be noted that Sombart has by no means disregarded this ethical aspect of capitalist enterprise. However, in his scheme of ideas this ethical aspect appears as a product of capitalism, whereas we propose to consider the opposite hypothesis for the purposes of our argument. Final conclusions can only be drawn when our investigation is complete. For Sombart’s view, see *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 357, 380, *etc.* His argument follows on from the brilliant concepts in Simmel’s *Philosophie des Geldes* (final chapter). We cannot pursue this matter any further at this point.

22) “I grew convinced that *truth, sincerity, and integrity* in dealings between man and man were of the utmost importance *to the felicity of life*; and I *formed written resolutions, which still remain in my journal book*, to practice them ever while I lived. Revelation had indeed no weight with me as such; but I entertained an opinion that, though certain actions might not be bad *because* they were forbidden by it, or good *because* it commanded them, yet probably these actions might be forbidden *because* they were bad for us, or commanded because they were beneficial to us in their own nature, all the circumstances of things considered.”



23) “I therefore put myself as much as I could out of sight and started it”—that is, the creation of a library that he had suggested—“as a scheme of a ‘number of friends,’ who had requested me to go about and propose it to such as they thought lovers of reading. In this way my affair went on smoothly, and I ever after practiced it on such occasions; and from my frequent successes, can heartily recommend it. The present little sacrifice of your vanity will afterward be amply repaid. If it remains awhile uncertain to whom the merit belongs, someone more vain than yourself will be encouraged to claim it, and then even envy will be disposed to do you justice by plucking those assumed feathers and restoring them to their right owner.” Ibid., p. 140.

24) Proverbs chapter 22, verse 29. Luther translates “in seinem Geschäft,” and the older English Bible translations have “business.” See below for further discussion.

25) To describe the phrase “Anyone who doesn’t toe the line will be kicked out” (heard at Social Democratic Party Conferences) as “barrack-room style” would be a grievous misunderstanding. The rebel is never kicked “out” of the barracks, but “into” the detention cell. Rather, it is the economic destiny of the modern working man, as he experiences it every day, which he finds and must endure in the party. Party discipline is the reflection of factory discipline.

26) cf. Sombart’s comments in *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, p. 123, above. Although some aspects of my subsequent argument refer to much older works, I hardly need to stress how much it owes to the very existence of Sombart’s great writings, with their penetrating formulations. This is true even—indeed *especially*—where we part company. Even someone who feels constantly provoked to dissent most strongly from Sombart’s formulations, and rejects some of his theses outright, still has a duty to take account of his work. The attitude of German economic [*nationalökonomisch*] critics toward his work can only be described as *truly embarrassing*. [Editors’ note: The remainder of this note was omitted from the 1920 edition. We have included it because of its reference to Sombart. See also Appendix I of this volume, pp. 341-55.] The first, and for a long time the only, man to engage in a detailed and *objective* manner with some of Sombart’s *historical* theses was a historian (von Below in

the *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1903). The term “uninspired” would be too polite an adjective to describe the quality of the “criticism” produced so far of the sections of Sombart’s work that are genuinely economic [*nationalökonomisch*] in character.

27) At this stage we cannot tackle the question of *where* these limits lie. Neither can we take a position on the well-known theory of the links between high wages and high performance. The theory was first propounded by Brassey, then formulated and defended, theoretically by Brentano, and historically and at the same time constructively by Schulze-Gävernitz. The discussion has been reopened by Hasbach’s perspicacious studies (*Schmollers Jahrbuch*, 1903, pp. 385-91 and 417f.). It must suffice here to state the fact, which no one doubts and is indeed beyond question, that low wages *cannot* simply be *equated* with high profits or with favorable opportunities for industrial development—and that, in general, “education” in capitalist culture and with it the possibility of a capitalist economy are not achieved simply by means of mechanical financial operations. All the examples chosen are purely *illustrative*.

28) The introduction of *capitalist business* has therefore often not been possible without extensive movements of immigration from more old established cultural regions. *Sombart* has rightly commented on the distinction between individual “skills” and the tricks of the trade, compared with the scientific objectivity of modern technology. But at the time of the first beginnings of capitalism, the distinction scarcely existed—indeed, the (so to speak) *ethical* qualities of the capitalist worker (and to a certain degree of the entrepreneur as well) often had a higher “scarcity value” than the skills of the craftsman which had ossified in centuries-old traditionalism. Even today, in the choice of its locations, industry is by no means independent of such qualities in the population—qualities which have been acquired through long tradition and training in intensive labor. Where this dependence is observed, prevailing scientific opinion tends to attribute it to inherited racial qualities, rather than to tradition and training—a very dubious assumption, in my view. Later, we shall have more to say about this too.

29) The foregoing remarks are open to misunderstanding. We all know the type of modern businessman who likes to make use of the old saying “The people

must have religion,” and large numbers of the Lutheran clergy in particular, acting out of a general sympathy with “the authorities,” are only too keen to place themselves at the disposal of these businessmen as “clerical police” when it comes to branding strikes as sinful and accusing the trades unions of encouraging “covetousness,” *etc.* These are matters which have nothing to do with the phenomena we are speaking of. What we are concerned with in the text are not isolated cases, but are very common, and, as we shall see, typically recurring features.

30) *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, vol. 1, p. 62.

31) *Op. cit.*, p. 195.

32) We must just stress at this point that we are not justified in making the *a priori* assumption that the *technique* of the capitalist enterprise and the spirit of “labor in a calling,” which normally provides capitalism with the energy it needs to expand, have their *original* source in the same social strata. Much the same may be said of the social origins of religious consciousness. Historically, Calvinism was undoubtedly one of the providers of training in the “capitalist spirit.” But the great wealth, in the Netherlands, for example, was not predominantly in the hands of strict Calvinists, but, for reasons that will be discussed later, of Arminians. It was the rising *petite bourgeoisie*, here and elsewhere, who were the “typical” bearers of capitalist ethics and Calvinist church polity.

33) The following portrait has been composed out of elements of various individual branches of industry in different locations, on the principle of the “ideal type.” For our purely illustrative purposes, it is, of course, immaterial that in none of the examples referred to were events played out in every detail precisely in the manner here depicted.

34) By this we simply mean the type of entrepreneur whom we are making the object of our consideration, not some empirical average. On the concept “ideal type,” see my article in this journal, “*Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis.*” In *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und*

*Sozialpolitik* 19:1 (1904) pp. 22-87.<sup>4</sup>

35) Only further investigation can reveal how this “ascetic” streak was not merely peripheral in the development of capitalism, but was of outstanding significance. This further investigation alone can demonstrate that it is not a question of arbitrarily selected features.

36) We can learn exactly how they used to come to terms with the ban on the taking of interest in, for example, Book I, chapter 65 of the statute of the *Arte di Calimala* (at the moment I only have at my disposal the Italian edition by Emiliani-Giudici, *Storia dei Comuni Italiani*, vol. 3, p. 246): “Procurino i consoli con *quelli frati che parrà loro*, che perdono si faccia e come fare si possa il meglio per l’amore di ciascuno, del dono, merito or guiderdono, ovvero interesse per l’anno presente e secondo che altra volta fatto fue.” [The consuls must ensure that they make confession to those brethren whom they judge most likely to pardon them, and that they do it in the manner most appropriate to the gift, service, or reward received, in terms of the interest exacted for the past year, according to custom.] In other words, the guild obtains indulgence for its members through official channels and through submission to the Church. The instructions that follow are also highly typical of the amoral character of capital gains, as well as, for example, the immediately preceding injunction (chap. 63) to record all interest and profits as “gifts.” Today’s stock exchange blacklisting of those who take profits from differential rates can be compared to the vilifying of those who came before the court of the Church pleading *exceptio usurariae pravitatis*.

37) Greek has no word corresponding to the ethical tone of the German word. Where Luther translates Ecclesiasticus [Jesus Sirach] 11, 20-21 as “bleibe in deinem Beruf,” quite in accordance with today’s usage (see below), the Septuagint translates it, on one occasion, as *ovov*, and on the other, “*πόνοϋς*.” Elsewhere in ancient times, “*τα π οσόκοντα*” is employed in the general sense of “duties.” In the language of the Stoics, “*καόματαϋ*” occasionally carries a similar connotation (as my colleague Herr Dieterich has pointed out to me) although the *linguistic* origin is doubtful.

What we express by the word “Beruf,” namely, the continuous activity of man on the basis of the division of labor, which is normally his source of income and thus a permanent economic living, is expressed in Latin either by the colorless “opus,” or by “officium,” which carries a connotation that is at least related to the ethical content of the German word. (It derives from “opificium,” which was originally ethically neutral, and later, especially in Seneca, *de beneficiis*, IV, 18, is equivalent to “Beruf”). Latin also has “munus”—derived from the feudal dues of the ancient civic community—or finally “professio.” The latter word, when used in this sense, appears to derive from the idea of *public* duties, especially the ancient *tax* declarations of the citizens. Later, it is used in the modern sense of “liberal professions” (as in “professio bene dicendi”), and within this limited field takes on a general meaning which is quite similar in every sense to our word “Beruf” (even in the more inward sense of the word; as when in Cicero it is said of someone “non intelligit quid profiteatur,” in the sense of “he does not recognize his own ‘Beruf’ ”)—except that the idea is entirely secular, with no *religious* connotation whatever. This, of course, applies a fortiori to the word “ars,” which is used in Imperial times in the sense of “craft.”

The Vulgate translates the above passages in Ecclesiasticus [Jesus Sirach] in the first instance by “opus,” and in the second (v. 21) by “locus,” which in this case would mean, roughly, “social position.”

In the Romance languages, only Spanish has anything which even partially corresponds to the German sense, namely, “vocacion,” which has the sense of *inner* “calling” to something, as to a spiritual office. However, the word is never used in a secular, external sense like “Beruf.” In the translations of the Bible into the Romance languages, the Spanish “vocacion” and the Italian “vocazione” and “chiamamento” are *only* used in a sense at all similar to the (soon to be discussed) Lutheran and Calvinist usage when translating the New Testament term “κλήσις,” that is, the gospel calling to eternal salvation, for which the Vulgate has “vocatio.” The fifteenth-century Italian Bible translation, for example, printed in the *Collezione die opere inedite e rare*, Bologna, 1887, uses “chiamamento” in this way, alongside “vocazione,” the word preferred by the modern Italian translations of the Bible. The words used in the Romance languages for “Beruf” in the *external* sense of regular business activity, however, carry no religious connotations in themselves. This is evident from the

lexical material and from a detailed exposition kindly supplied to me by my esteemed friend Professor Baist (Freiburg). Admittedly, some of these words, like those derived from “ministerium” or “officium,” may have originally had a certain ethical connotation, while others, like those derived from “ars,” “professio,” and “implicare (impiego),” have never had one. The passages from Ecclesiasticus [Jesus Sirach] quoted earlier, where Luther used “Beruf,” are translated as follows. French, verse 20, “office”; verse 21 “labeur” (Calvinist translation); Spanish, verse 20, “obra”; verse 21, “lugar” (following the Vulgate); Italian: older translations, “luogo” (following the Vulgate), recent translations, “posto” (Protestant).

38) On the other hand, the *Augsburg Confession* only includes the concept in a partially developed form and only implicitly. Article XVI (see the edition by Kolde, p. 43) teaches: “For the Gospel . . . does not seek to overturn the secular government, police, and matrimony, but desires that all such things are kept as God’s order, and in such estates demonstrate Christian charity and right good works, each one *according to his calling* [*nach seinem Beruf*] (in Latin: *et in talibus ordinationibus exercere caritatem*, *ibid.*, p. 42). This leads to the consequence that one must obey the authorities [*Obrigkeit*], showing that here “Beruf” is used to refer, at least *primarily*, to an *objective* order in the sense of “κλῆσις,” 1 Corinthians 7.20. And Article XXVII (in Kolde, p. 83) speaks of “Beruf” (Latin: *in vocatione sua*) only in connection with estates ordained by God: priest, authorities [*Obrigkeit*], princes, lords, etc., and even this only exists in German in the *Konkordienbuch*, while in the German *princeps* edition the phrase is missing.

Only in Article XXVI (Kolde, p. 81) is the word used with our modern meaning, or at least in a sense which embraces this meaning: “that mortification of the flesh shall not serve to earn grace, but to keep the body in a condition such that it does not hinder one from doing what one has been commanded to do, according to one’s calling (Latin: *juxta vocationem suam*).”

39) As the dictionaries show, and my colleagues Professors Braune and Hoops have most kindly confirmed, the word “Beruf” (Dutch: “beroep,” English: “calling,” Danish: “kald,” Swedish: “kallelse”) is not used in *any* of these languages in its modern secular sense prior to Luther’s translation. The Middle High German, Middle Low German, and Middle Dutch words with the same

sound as “Beruf” all mean “Ruf” (call) in its modern German meaning. This meaning also includes in particular—in the late medieval period—the “Berufung” (*Vokation*), that is, the calling of a candidate to a *spiritual benefice* [*Pfründe*] by the one authorized to make the appointment—a special case which tends to be emphasized in the dictionaries of Scandinavian languages too. Luther also occasionally uses the word in this latter meaning. However, even though this special use of the word may have assisted in its change of meaning, the creation of the modern concept of “Beruf” derives linguistically from the translations of the Bible, and indeed the *Protestant* translations. It is only in *Tauler* (died 1361) that we find hints of the later sense, as we propose to mention later.

Luther translates two apparently quite distinct concepts as “Beruf.” *Firstly*, the Pauline “κλήσις,” in the sense of the calling of God to eternal salvation. In this category belong: 1 Corinthians 1.26; Ephesians 1.18, 4.1, and 4.4; 2 Thessalonians 1.11; Hebrews 3.1; 2 Peter 1.10. All these cases relate to the *purely* religious concept of the calling [*Berufung*] which comes from God by means of the gospel preached by the apostle. The term “κλήσις,” has nothing whatever to do with secular “callings” in the present-day sense. The German Bibles before Luther have “ruffunge” for this term (this is found in all the incunabula in the Heidelberg Library); these Bibles also use “von Gott gefordert” rather than “von Gott geruffet.”

Secondly, he translates—as previously mentioned—the words of Ecclesiasticus : “ν τωñ γω σον παλαιωόñιτι” and “και μμν τωñ πονω σου” as “beharre in deinem Beruf” (persevere in your calling) and “bleibe in deinem *Beruf*” (remain in your calling), instead of “bleibe bei deiner *Arbeit*” (remain in your work). The later (authorized) Catholic Bible translations (e.g., the one by Fleischütz, Fulda, 1781) have simply followed him in this (as in the New Testament passages). As far as I can see, Luther’s translation of this passage is the *first* case when the word “Beruf” has been used in today’s *purely* secular sense. As already mentioned, as far as I am aware, the word did not exist previously in the German language in this sense and was not even used by the older Bible translators or preachers. The German Bibles before Luther use the word “Werk” in the passage from Ecclesiasticus. In his sermons, Berthold von Regensburg uses the word “Arbeit” where we speak of “Beruf.” Linguistic usage is therefore the same here

as in the ancient languages. The first passage known to me where “*Ruf*” (admittedly not “*Beruf*”), as the translation of “κλήσις,” is applied to purely secular work, is found in Tauler’s fine sermon on Ephesians 4 (works, Basel edition, f. 117 v.): Of peasants who “muck out”: they often conduct themselves better “if they follow their calling in a simple way, than clerical men who have no concern for their calling” [*so sie folgen einfeltiglich irem Ruff denn die geistlichen Menschen, die auf ihren ruf nicht Acht haben*]. The word “*Ruf*” in this sense has not entered the secular language. And although Luther’s linguistic usage (see *Werke*, Erlangen edition, vol. 51, p. 51) varies between “*Ruf*” and “*Beruf*,” direct influence by Tauler is by no means certain, although there is much in, for example, “*Die Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*” that is reminiscent of this very sermon of Tauler. For Luther did *not* at first use the word in the purely *secular* sense in which Tauler used it (compare against Denifle, *Luther*, p. 163).

Evidently, the advice in Ecclesiasticus, apart from the general admonition to trust in God, makes not the slightest reference to a specifically religious evaluation of labor in the “calling,” and the expression “πovoc,” (toil) rather the opposite. What Jesus Sirach says (in Ecclesiasticus) simply corresponds to the exhortation of the psalmist (Psalm 37.3): “Settle in the land and find safe pasture” [New English Bible]. This is also very clear from the connection with the exhortation (Ecclesiasticus 11.20) not to follow the example of the godless who strive after wealth. The translation of a passage in the First Letter to the Corinthians forms a bridge between those two seemingly quite distinct uses of the word “*Beruf*” by Luther.

In Luther (in the usual modern editions), the context in which this passage is located is as follows: 1 Corinthians 7.17: “. . . ein jeglicher, wie ihn der Herr berufen hat, also wandle er . . . (18) Ist jemand beschnitten berufen, der zeuge keine Vorhaut. Ist jemand berufen in der Vorhaut, der lasse sich nicht beschneiden. (19) Die Beschneidung ist nichts und die Vorhaut ist nichts; sondern Gottes Gebot halten. (20) Ein jeglicher bleibe in dem Beruf, in dem er berufen ist (vv τ κλσι κλθ—as Professor [Geheimrat] A. Merx tells me, this is unquestionably a Hebraism—Vulgate: in qua vocatione vocatus est). (21) Bist du ein Knecht berufen, Sorge des nicht; doch kannst du frei werden, so brauche des viel lieber. (22) Denn wer ein Knecht berufen ist, der ist ein Gefreiter des



Herrn; desgleichen wer ein Freier berufen ist, der ist ein Knecht Christi. (23) Ihr seid teuer erkauft; werdet nicht der Menschen Knechte. (24) Ein jeglicher, lieben Brüder, worinnen er berufen ist, darinnen bleibe er bei Gott.” In verse 29, there then follows the reminder that “time is short,” which is followed by the familiar instructions arising from eschatological expectations (v. 31), to have wives as though one did not have them, to buy but not to count on possessing what has been bought, and so on. In his exegesis of this chapter, Luther, even in 1523, had followed the older German versions by translating “κλσις” in verse 20 as “Ruf” (Erlangen edition, vol. 51, p. 51), and had at that time interpreted this as “Stand” (estate or condition).

In fact it is evident that the word “κλσις” in this—and *only* this—passage corresponds at least approximately to the Latin “status” and our “Stand” (in German), i.e., state, estate, or condition, as in married state, the condition of servant, *etc.* Only one instance can be found in Greek literature, as far as one can tell from the available lexical material, of this word—the root is related to “κκλησια” “a gathering called together.” That one instance is a reference in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where the word corresponds to the Latin “classis”—a Greek loan word meaning a citizens’ division that has been “called up.” Theophylactos (eleventh-twelfth century) interprets 1 Corinthians 7.20 to mean “ν οιοω βιοω και ν οιοω τ αό γ μ α τ ι καοί πολιτωόματι ωό ν πιστυσν”<sup>5</sup> (my colleague Professor Deißmann drew my attention to this passage). Certainly, “κλσις” does not correspond to our modern “Beruf” in the passage with which we are concerned. But Luther, who had translated “κλσις” as “Beruf” in the eschatologically motivated exhortation that everyone should remain in his present condition, subsequently (presumably because of the objective similarity *of the advice*), when he translated the Apocrypha, also rendered “πονος” with “Beruf” in the traditionalist and antichrematistically motivated advice of Jesus Sirach (in Ecclesiasticus) that everyone should remain in his occupation [*Hantierung*].

In the meantime (or about the same time), in the Augsburg Confession of 1530, the Protestant dogma of the uselessness of the exceeding of innerworldly standards of morality (as taught by Catholic doctrine), was laid down, using the words “einem jeglichen nach seinem Beruf” [to each according to his calling] (see note 38 above). Luther’s translation clearly reflects both this and his respect

(which was increasing considerably in the early 1530s) for the sanctity of the order in which the individual has been placed, a product of his evermore sharply defined belief in the very special divine decrees operating right down to the details of life, together with his increasing tendency to accept the secular order as immutably willed by God. For whereas he now translates “πονοϝ” and “όργον” in Ecclesiasticus [Jesus Sirach] as “Beruf,” a few years previously he had translated (in Proverbs 22.29) as “*Geschäft*,” the Hebrew [ ל נ ] which was undoubtedly the basis for “πονοϝ” and “ργον” in the Greek text of Ecclesiasticus [Jesus Sirach] and is derived from the root לנγ = “to send,” and thus from “mission.” Like the German “Beruf” and the Nordic “kallelse,” this Hebrew word refers especially to the *spiritual* “Beruf,” or calling (Septuagint: ργον, Vulgate: “opus,” English Bibles: “business,” and similarly the Nordic and all other translations). Admittedly, as Professor Merx informs me, even in ancient times the Hebrew word לנ had completely lost any link with the original concept, just as, for example, our word “Berufsstatistik” (occupational statistics) has lost its links with the meaning of “Beruf” as “calling.”

As early as the sixteenth century, the term “Beruf” became established in its present meaning in secular literature. The Bible translators before Luther had used the term “Berufung” for “κλσις” (thus, for example, in the Heidelberg incunabula of 1462/66 and 1485), and Eck’s Ingolstadt translation of 1537 has “in dem Ruf, worin er beruft ist.” The later Catholic translations usually follow Luther directly. In England, the Wyclif Bible translation (1382) used “cleping” (the Old English word which was later replaced by the loan word “calling”), and Tyndale, in 1534, expresses the idea in a secular sense: “in the same state wherein he was called,” as does the Geneva Bible of 1557. Cranmer’s official translation of 1539 replaced “state” with “calling,” while the (Catholic) Rheims Bible of 1582, like the Anglican Court Bibles of the Elizabethan Age, reverted, in typical fashion, to “vocation,” following the Vulgate. Murray (see his entry under “calling” has already correctly established that the Cranmer translation is the source of the Puritan concept of the “calling” in the sense of “Beruf” to mean “trade.” As early as the mid-sixteenth century, “calling” is used in this sense: by 1588, we read of “unlawful callings,” and in 1603, “greater callings” in the sense of “higher professions—Berufe,” etc. (See Murray, op. cit.)

40) Compare the following with the instructive study by K. Eger, *Die Anschauung Luthers vom Beruf* (Giessen, 1900). His only possible weakness is that, like almost all other theological writers, Eger fails to analyze with sufficient

clarity the concept of the “*lex naturae*” (see, on this subject, Ernst Troeltsch in his review of Seeberg’s *Dogmengeschichte*, Gött. Gel. Anz., 1902).

41) For when Thomas Aquinas represents the classification of people according to estate [*ständisch*] and occupation [*beruflich*] as the work of divine providence, he means by this the objective kosmos of society. But the reason why the individual turns to a particular concrete “calling” (as we should say, Aquinas says “*ministerium*” or “*officium*”), is to be found in “*causae naturales*.” Quaest. Quodlibetal. VII, article 17c: “*Haec autem diversificatio hominum in diversis officiiis contingit primo ex divina providentia, quae ita hominum status distribuit, . . . secundo etiam ex causis naturalibus, ex quibus contingit, quod in diversis hominibus sunt diversae inclinationes ad diversa officia. . . .*” The contrast with the Protestant concept of the calling (and also the Lutheran concept—which, especially in its emphasis on providence, is so closely related to it in other ways) is so clear that this quotation is sufficient to make the point at this juncture, especially as we shall be returning to an assessment of the Catholic attitude at a later stage. Regarding Aquinas, see Maurenbrecher, *Thomas von Aquinas Stellung zum Wirtschaftsleben seiner Zeit*, 1898. Incidentally, where Luther appears to agree with Aquinas in details, it is probably the general doctrine of scholasticism rather than Aquinas in particular that has influenced him. For he seems, as Denifle has shown, in fact to have had only a rather inadequate knowledge of Aquinas (see Denifle, *Luther und Luthertum*, 1903, p. 501, and also Köhler, *Ein Wort zu Denifles Luther*, 1904, p. 25f.).

42) In “Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen” (On the Freedom of a Christian Man), (1) the “double nature” of man is employed as the basis for innerworldly duties within the *lex naturae* (here, the natural order of the world) which results from the fact that (Erlangen edition, vol. 27, p. 188) man is de facto tied both to his body and to the social community. (2) In this situation he will (p. 196)—and this is a second reason linked to the first point—if he is a believing Christian, resolve to *repay* God’s mercy by loving his neighbor. This very loose connection between “faith” and “love” is related to (3) (p. 190) the ancient ascetic justification of labor as a means of giving the “inward” man control over his body. (4) Labor is therefore a special instinct [*Trieb*] implanted in Adam by God before the fall, which he has followed “solely to please God.” Thus the idea of the “*lex naturae*” (here, natural morality) comes into play in a

different way. Finally, (5) (pp. 161 and 199) in Matthew (7.18f.) the idea is expressed that good work in one's calling is, and can only be, a result of the new life resulting from faith. This idea was not, however, developed into the Calvinist idea of "proving oneself" [*Bewährung*]. The employment of so many diverse conceptual elements can be explained by the powerful tide of emotion on which the writing is carried along.

43) "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love; and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages." (*Wealth of Nations*, Book 1, chap. 2).

44) "Omnia enim per te operabitur (Deus), mulgebit per te vaccam et servilissima quaeque opera faciet, ac maxima pariter et minima ipsi grata erunt" (exegesis of Genesis, *Opera Latina Exegetica*, ed. Elsperger, article VII, p. 213). Before Luther, the idea is found in Tauler, who, in principle, equates in value the spiritual and the secular "Ruf" (call). Opposition to Thomism is common to both German mysticism and Luther. This opposition finds its expression in the fact that Aquinas felt compelled to interpret the Pauline principle "If any would not work, neither should he eat," (2 Thess. 3.10, AV) in such a manner that the duty of work, which after all is obligatory, *lege naturae*, was laid upon mankind in general, but not upon every individual. This was because he needed to maintain the moral value of contemplation, but also give due weight to the mendicant orders. The gradation in the *value* placed upon work, starting from the "opera servilia" of the *peasants*, has to do with the specific character of the mendicant orders, which, for material reasons, were inevitably domiciled in the *towns*. Such gradation was foreign to both the German mystics and Luther, who was from a peasant family. To them, all occupations were *equal* in value. They stressed, however, the divinely willed ordering according to estate.

The relevant passages of Thomas Aquinas can be found in Maurenbrecher, *Thomas von Aquinos Stellung zum Wirtschaftsleben seiner Zeit* (Leipzig, 1898, p. 65f.).

45) With regard to the Fuggers, Luther says: “It cannot be right or godly for so much great and royal wealth to be accumulated in the life of one man.” This is essentially an expression of the suspicion of the peasant toward capital. Similarly (*Großer Sermon vom Wucher*, Erlangen edition, vol. 20, p. 109), he finds the purchase of annuities morally questionable, because it is “a new, hastily invented thing” [*ein neues behendes erfunden Ding*]*—*that is, because it is economically *obscure*, just as something like a forward transaction [*Terminhandel*] might seem obscure to the modern clergyman.

46) What we mean by this may be illustrated by the example of the Manifesto to the Irish, with which in January 1650 Cromwell commenced his war of extermination against them. It was his reply to the manifestos of the Irish (Catholic) clergy of Clonmacnoise, dated December 4 and 13, 1649. The most significant passages read as follows:

Englishmen had good inheritances (i.e., in Ireland) which many of them *purchased with their money* . . . they had good leases from Irishmen for long time to come, *great stocks thereupon*, houses and plantations erected *at their cost and charge*. . . . You broke the union . . . at a time when Ireland was in perfect peace and when through the *example of English industry, through commerce and traffic*, that which was in the nations’ hands was better to them than if all Ireland had been in their possession. . . . *Is God, will God be with you?* I am confident he will not.

What is significant about this manifesto, which is reminiscent of leading articles in the English press at the time of the Boer War, is not that the capitalist “interest” of the English is presented as the legal justification for the war—this could no doubt equally well have been used as an argument in negotiations between, let us say, Venice and Genoa on the extent of their spheres of influence in the Far East. No, what is special about this document is that Cromwell, addressing the Irish themselves, and calling God to witness, bases the *moral* justification for their subjugation on the fact that English capital has educated the Irish in the habit of work. Anyone who knows his character will be aware of the profound subjective conviction with which he does this. (The manifesto can be found in Carlyle, and extracts are published and analyzed in Gardiner’s *History of the Commonwealth*, vol. 1, p. 163f.)

47) This is not the place to go into more detail. Compare the writers cited in note 49.

48) See the remarks in the fine book by Jülicher on the “Gleichnisse des Jesu” [The Parables of Jesus], vol. 2, p. 636 and pp. 108f.

49) Regarding the following, see again Eger, op. cit. Worthy of mention, too, is Schneckenburger’s fine book, which even today has not been superseded: *Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformierten Lehrbegriffes* (Stuttgart: Güder, 1855). Luthardt’s *Ethik Luthers* [Luther’s ethic], p. 84 of the first edition, the only one available to me, fails to give a true picture of the development [of these ideas]. Compare also Seeberg’s *Dogmengeschichte* [Dogmatic History], vol. 2, p. 262, below. Of no value at all is the article on “Beruf” in the *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, which instead of a scholarly analysis of the concept and its origin contains all kinds of rather shallow remarks on everything under the sun, including women’s rights and similar topics. Of the economic [*nationalökonomisch*] literature on Luther, I should like to mention just the works of Schmoller (*Geschichte der nationalökonomischen Ansichten in Deutschland während der Reformationszeit*, *Zeitschrift für Staatswissenschaft*, vol. 16, 1860), Wiskemann’s prizewinning dissertation (1861) and the study by Frank G. Ward (*Darstellung und Würdigung von Luthers Ansichten vom Staat und seinen wirtschaftlichen Aufgaben*, *Conrads Abhandlungen*, vol. 21, Jena, 1898).

50) *Interpretation of the seventh chapter of the First Letter to the Corinthians*, 1523, Erlanger Ausgabe, vol. 51, pp. 1f. Here, in the light of this passage, Luther interprets the idea of the “freedom of all callings” before God in the following way:

1) Certain human institutions must be rejected (monastic oath, the ban on mixed marriages, etc). 2) The fulfilment (in itself a matter of *indifference* in the sight of God) of secular duties toward one’s neighbor is commanded as the duty of *charity*. In truth, we are here dealing with a typical debate (see, for example, pp. 55 and 56) on the dualism of the *lex naturae* compared with justification before God.

51) Compare the passage from *Von Kaufhandlung und Wucher* [On Trade and

Usury], 1524 (which Sombart justifiably used as a motto for his work on *Handwerksgeist* [the spirit of craft work], that is, traditionalism): “Darum muß du dir fürsetzen, nichts denn deine ziemliche Nahrung zu suchen in solchem Handel, danach Kost, Mühe, Arbeit und Gefahr rechnen und überschlagen und also dann die Ware selbst setzen, steigern oder niedern, daß du solcher Arbeit und Mühe Lohn davon habst.”

[Therefore you must endeavor to seek nothing but the food that is due to you in such trade, and thereafter calculate provisions, trouble, labor, and danger. Add this together and then add the goods themselves, and raise or reduce the figure so that you have the reward for such labor and toil.]

The principle is here formulated very much in the spirit of Aquinas.

52) As early as the letter to H. V. Sternberg of 1530, in which he dedicates to him his exegesis of the 117th Psalm, he declares the “estate” of the (lower) nobility to be instituted by God, in spite of its moral depravity (Erlangen edition, vol. 40, p. 282, bottom). The decisive significance of the Münzer riots for the development of this view is very clear from the letter (p. 282, top). Compare also Eger, op. cit., p. 150.

53) Luther also commences his interpretation (1530) of the 111th Psalm, verses 5 and 6 (Erlangen edition, vol. 40, pp. 215-16) with a polemic against the surpassing of the secular order by monasteries, etc. Now, however (in contrast to positive law such as that created by emperor and lawyers), *lex naturae* is “directly *identical* with God’s justice: it is God’s institution and embraces in particular the division of people according to estates” (p. 215, par. 2). However, he emphasizes strongly that it is only before *God* that the estates are equal.

54) This faith in providence is taught in particular in “Von Konzilien und Kirchen” (1539) and “Kurzes Bekenntnis vom heiligen Sakrament” (1545).

The extent to which the idea of the *testing* [*Bewährung*] of the Christian in his daily work [*Berufsarbeit*] and conduct of life—an idea that dominated Calvinism and is so important for us—remained in the background for Luther is shown by the passage in “Von Konzilien und Kirchen” (1539, Erlangen edition, vol. 25, p. 376, bottom): “In addition to these seven principal features” (by which the true Church may be recognized) “there are also *more external signs*” (by which the holy Christian Church may be recognized) . . . if we are not fornicators and drunkards, proud, arrogant, extravagant; but chaste, self-controlled sober. . . .” According to Luther, these signs are not as certain as those which are “more elevated” (pure doctrine, prayer, etc.) “because in the practice of such works some of the heathen appear to be as proficient as the Christians, and by these standards can sometimes even seem more holy than they.”

As we shall shortly mention, Calvin’s personal position was not essentially different, although that of Protestantism certainly was. Certainly, in Luther’s thinking the Christian serves God only “*in vocatione*,” not “*per vocationem*” (Eger, pp. 117ff.).

However, among the German mystics there are at least certain approaches along these lines with regard to the idea of *proof* [*Bewährungsgedanken*] (admittedly more in its Pietist than in its Calvinist interpretation, and understood in a purely psychological sense). See, for example, Seeberg, *Dogmengeschichte*, p. 195 (the passage quoted above from Suso), as well as the previously quoted passage from Tauler).

56) His final point of view is then set down in certain sections of his exegesis of Genesis (in the *Opera Latina Exegetica*. Elsparger edition):

Volume 4, page 109: “Neque haec fuit levis *tentatio*, intentum esse suae vocationi et de aliis non esse curiosum. . . . Paucissimi sunt, qui sua sorte vivant contenti . . .” (ibid., p. 111). Nostrum autem est, ut vocanti *Deo pareamus* . . .” (p. 112). “Regula igitur haec servanda est, ut unusquisque *maneant in sua vocatione et suo dono contentus vivat*, de aliis autem non sit curiosus.” This essentially corresponds very closely to Thomas Aquinas’s traditionalist position



(Summa Theologica, IIa, IIac, q. 118 art. I.) “Unde necesse est, quod bonum hominis circa ea consistat in quadam mensura, dum scilicet homo . . . quaerit habere exteriores divitias, prout sunt *necessariae ad vitam eius secundum suam conditionem*. Et ideo in excessu huius mensurae consistit *peccatum*, dum scilicet aliquis supra debitum modum vult eas vel acquirere vel retinere, quod pertinet ad avaritiam.” Aquinas derives the sinful character of an excessive acquisitive drive [*Erwerbstrieb*] (beyond what is required for one’s condition in life) from the *lex naturae* as expressed in the *purpose* (ratio) of external possessions, whereas Luther derives it from God’s providence. On the relationship between faith and calling in Luther, see also volume 7, p. 225: “. . . quando es fidelis, tum placent Deo etiam physica, carnalia, animalia officia, sive edas, sive bibas, sive vigiles, sive dormias, quae mere corporalia et animalia sunt. *Tanta res est fides* . . . Verum est quidem, placere Dei *etiam in impiis sedulitatem et industriam in officio*” (this *activity* in working life is a virtue of *lex naturae*). “Sed obstat in credulitas et vana gloria, ne possint opera sua referre ad gloriam Dei” (reminiscent of Calvinist phraseology). “. . . *Merentur* igitur etiam impiorum bona opera in hac quidem vita praemia sua” (contrast Augustine’s “vitia specie virtutum palliata”) “sed non numerantur, non colliguntur in altro.”

57) In the *Kirchenpostille* [Church Devotions] (Erlanger ed., vol. 10, pp. 233, 235-36, we read: “*Everyone* is called to some calling.” He should await *this* calling (on page 236 it is even called a “command”) and in so doing serve God. It is not the performance but the *obedience* shown that is pleasing to God.

58) Despite what was said above about the effect of Pietism on the efficiency of female workers, such teaching accords with the assertion by modern entrepreneurs that, for example, strict Lutheran domestic workers today commonly, for example in Westphalia, are strongly inclined to think in a traditionalist way, and are unhappy with changes to methods of work (even when these do not involve a transition to the factory system) in spite of the increased earnings on offer, giving as their reason that in the afterlife everything will be evened out. We see that the mere fact of church allegiance and faith are not yet of any essential significance for the conduct of life as a whole. Certain far more concrete religious elements of life played their part in the early days of capitalism and—to a limited degree—still do.

59) “Later” throughout this section means: when we trace the historical origins of the Puritan concept of the calling after having described it.

60) Compare Tauler, Basel edition, Folio pp. 161f.

61) Compare Tauler’s remarkably moving [*stimmungsvoll*] sermon, op. cit. and folio 17-18, v. 20.

62) Anyone who shared the Levellers’ view of history [*Geschichtskonstruktion*] would be in the happy position of reducing this, too, to racial differences. As representatives of the Anglo-Saxons, they believed they were defending their “birthright” against the descendants of William the Conqueror and the Normans.

#### *EDITORS’ NOTES*

1 German school types are defined in the main text.

2 The numbers of *Gymnasien* and *Realgymnasien* students do not add up to 100 percent, an error that Weber carried over into the 1920 version of *The Protestant Ethic*. Given the importance Weber attributes to these findings, and the weighty inferences he draws from them, this is not a trivial mistake. George Becker, working on the raw Baden data, has recalculated the number of Protestant students attending the *Realgymnasien* at 52 percent, and even this figure may have more to do with the opportunity structure of the time rather than with distinctive religious value orientations. Note also that while Weber’s posits a time frame of 1885-91, the time frame of his source, Martin Offenbacher, is 1885/86-1894/95. For a more extended discussion of Weber’s statistics, and for critiques of them (together with references to Becker’s articles), see Editors’ Introduction, note 14.

3 In the Middle Ages, Cahors, in southwest France, was a well-known financial center. Merchants from Cahors (Cawertschen) brought their knowledge of Italian trade and banking practice to their German counterparts (see *Brockhaus Enzyklopädie*, 19th ed. vol. 11, Mannheim, 1990).

4 Translated as “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” in Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949), pp. 49-112.

5 “[Let every man abide] in whatever life and in whatever *citizenship* he was in

when he became a believer.”

# *The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism*

## *II. The Idea of the Calling in Ascetic Protestantism*

Contents: 1. The religious foundations of innerworldly asceticism. 2. Asceticism and Capitalism

## 1. [THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS OF INNERWORLDLY ASCETICISM]<sup>1</sup>

The historical bearers of ascetic Protestantism (in the sense of the expression used here) are principally four in number: 1. Calvinism *in the form* which it assumed in the chief areas of its dominance in the course, especially, of the seventeenth century; 2. Pietism; 3. Methodism; 4. The sects that grew out of the Baptist movement. [63] None of these movements was completely separate from the others, and even the separation from the nonascetic churches of the Reformation was not strictly enforced. Methodism only arose in the middle of the eighteenth century within the English state Church; it was not the intention of its founder that it should be a new church as much as a revival of the ascetic spirit within the old one, and it was only in the course of its development, in particular when it spread to America, that it became separated from the Anglican Church. Pietism grew out of Calvinism in England and especially Holland but remained connected with orthodoxy by imperceptible links. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, it joined Lutheranism thanks to the work of Spener, though the dogmatic basis for this was rather slender. On the whole, it remained a movement *within* the church. Only Zinzendorf's Moravian, or "Herrnhut," Brotherhood [*Brüdergemeinde*],<sup>2</sup> which had been subject to already waning Hussite and Calvinist influences, reluctantly felt the need to form a sect of its own, as Methodism had done.

At the outset of their development, Calvinism and the Baptist movement were sharply opposed, but the Baptist movement of the later seventeenth century came close to Calvinism, and indeed in the Independent sects of England and Holland at the beginning of the seventeenth century the distinction between them had become blurred. There was also a gradual transition between Pietism and Lutheranism, and the same can be said of Calvinism and the Anglican Church, which in its outward character and the spirit of its most loyal members was close to Catholicism. The ascetic movement which, in the broadest sense of this highly ambiguous word, was known as "Puritanism" [64], did, it is true, in the persons of its supporters and especially of its most devoted defenders, attack the foundations of Anglicanism, but here too the antitheses only gradually became acute in the course of conflict. And even if we completely leave aside the

question of constitution and organization—indeed, especially then—the facts of the matter remain the same.

Dogmatic differences, even the most important, like those regarding the doctrines of predestination and justification, intermingled and combined in a variety of ways, and even at the beginning of the seventeenth century frequently (though not without exception) proved an obstacle to the maintenance of a distinct church community.

In particular, the examples of *moral* conduct which are important for our purposes can be found equally among the followers of the most varied denominations, whether they emerged from one of the four sources listed above or from a combination of several of them. We shall see that similar ethical maxims could be linked with different dogmatic principles. Also, the ethical compendia of the various denominations influenced each other mutually, and one finds in them great similarities, in spite of the well-known fact that the conduct of life they advocate is very different. It would almost seem as though the best way forward would be to ignore the doctrinal documentation as well as the ethical theory, and to restrict ourselves to the practical moral behavior, as far as this can be established.

This, however, would be a mistake. The dogmatic roots of ascetic morality died (admittedly only after terrible struggles). But the original attachment to those dogmas left clear traces in later “undogmatic” ethics, and *only* a knowledge of the original thinking can enable us to understand how that morality was connected to the idea of the beyond, an idea which absolutely dominated the minds of the most thoughtful people of that time. Without the power of this idea, which towered above all else, *no* moral renewal seriously affecting practical life could have been put into effect. For we are not primarily concerned with what was taught in ethical compendia of the period—however much practical importance this too had through the influence of Church discipline, pastoral care and preaching; the main thing is to discover the psychological *drives* [*Antriebe*] which led people to behave in a certain way and held them firmly in this path. These drives usually originated from purely religious ideas. In that era, people pondered apparently abstract dogmas in a manner that only becomes

comprehensible if we understand the connection of these dogmas with practical religious interests. It is inevitable that we must pursue a path through certain dogmatic considerations [65] that must seem as tedious to the nontheological reader as they must seem hasty and superficial to the theological scholar. At the same time, we can, of course, only proceed in such a way that we present the religious ideas in a logically consistent form, compiled as an “ideal type,” which rarely existed in historical reality. For precisely *because of* the impossibility of drawing clear boundaries in historical reality, we can only hope to arrive at the specific effects of these ideas by examining their *most logically consistent* form.

## [CALVINISM]

*Calvinism* [66] was the faith [67] in the name of which the great political and cultural battles were fought in the countries in which capitalism was most highly developed (the Netherlands, England, and sixteenth-and seventeenth-century France). What was regarded then and in general is still regarded today as its most characteristic dogma is the doctrine of *election by grace*.<sup>3</sup> It has been debated whether this is “the most essential” dogma of the Reformed Church or an “adjunct.” Judgments about whether a historical phenomenon is “essential” may, *on* the one hand, be judgments of value or faith. This is the case if what concerns us is what is “interesting” or what is of permanent “value” about it. Alternatively, we may be concerned with the causal significance of a phenomenon, arising from its influence on other historical processes: in this case it is a question of judgments of historical imputation that are at stake.

If we take the latter position as our starting point, as we must do, and ask what significance should be attributed to this dogma in terms of its *effects* on cultural history, then the answer is that it must undoubtedly be rated very highly. [68] The cultural struggle [*Kulturkampf*] fought by Oldenbarnevelt<sup>4</sup> was defeated by it, the division within the English Church became irreparable under James I owing to differences between the Crown and Puritanism over this very doctrine, and indeed it was primarily *this* aspect of Calvinism which was felt to be a danger to the state and was attacked by the authorities. The great synods of the seventeenth century, especially those of Dordrecht<sup>5</sup> and Westminster,<sup>6</sup> as well as numerous other smaller ones, put the elevation of this doctrine to canonical status at the center of their work; it has served as a rock to hold fast to for innumerable heroes of the “Church Militant.” We cannot ignore it, and, since it can no longer be assumed that every educated person is familiar with it, we must first acquaint ourselves with its authentic contents from the articles of the “Westminster Confession” of 1647. Both the Independent and the Baptist confessions of faith follow it closely on this point. [69]



## ***CHAPTER IX (OF FREE WILL)***

No. 3. Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a natural man, being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto.

### ***CHAPTER III (OF GOD'S ETERNAL DECREE)***

No. 3. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His glory, some men . . . are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death.

No. 5. Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to His eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of His will, hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory, out of His mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions, or causes moving Him thereunto; and all to the praise of His glorious grace.

No. 7. The rest of mankind, God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of His own will, whereby He extendeth or withholdeth mercy as He pleaseth, for the glory of His sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of His glorious justice.

## ***CHAPTER X (OF EFFECTUAL CALLING)***

No. 1. All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, He is pleased, in His appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by His word and Spirit, . . . Taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by His almighty power determining them to that which is good. . . .

## *CHAPTER V (OF PROVIDENCE)*

No. 6. As for those wicked and ungodly men, whom God as a righteous judge, for former sins, doth blind and harden, from them He not only withholdeth His grace, whereby they might have been enlightened in their understandings, and wrought upon in their hearts; but sometimes also withdraweth the gifts which they had, and ex poseth them to such objects as their corruption makes occasion of sin; and withal, gives them over to their own lusts, the temptations of the world, and the power of Satan: whereby it comes to pass, that they harden themselves, even under those means which God useth for the softening of others.

“May I go to hell, but such a God will never compel my respect” was Milton’s famous judgment on the doctrine. [70] But we are not concerned with a value judgment, but with the historical position of the dogma. We can only briefly pause to consider the question of how this doctrine arose and what place it occupied in the patterns of thought within Calvinist theology. Two separate paths led to it. For the most active and passionate of those great men of prayer, such as have been known at many times in the history of Christianity since Augustine, the phenomenon of the feeling of religious redemption was linked with the conviction that they owed everything to the exclusive efficacy of an objective power, and nothing whatsoever to their own merit. The powerful feeling of joyful assurance that followed the tremendous tension of the sense of sin seemed to break over them totally unexpectedly and destroy any idea that this unimaginable gift of grace could be due to any of their own efforts or have anything to do with the qualities of their own faith and will.

That time of Luther’s greatest religious genius, when he was able to write “Die Freiheit eines Christenmenschen,” was the time when he held most firmly to the “secret decree” of God, which was to him the absolutely sole and fathomless source of his religious state of grace. [71] Later, he did not formally give this up—but the idea not only did not attain a central position in his thinking, it also increasingly faded into the background, the more he came under pressure from “re alpolitik” as a responsible church politician. Melancthon deliberately avoided including the “dangerous and obscure” doctrine in the Augsburg

Confession, and the church fathers of Lutheranism held it as firm dogma that grace can be lost (*amissibilis*) but can then be won back by humble repentance and believing trust in God's word and the sacraments.

In the case of Calvin [72], the process was precisely the contrary. The significance of the doctrine grew markedly in the course of his polemical arguments with doctrinal opponents. Not until the third edition of his "Institutio" was it fully developed, and it was only in the great *Kulturkämpfe*, which the synods of Dordrecht and Westminster attempted to bring to a conclusion, that it gained centrality. For Calvin the "decretum horrible" was *not* something *experienced*, as for Luther, but *conceptualized* [*erdacht*]; it therefore attained progressively greater significance with every further twist of the logic of his arguments, which related solely to God, not to man. [73] God was not there for the sake of men, but men were there for the sake of God, and the exclusive purpose of all that happened—thus also the fact (about which Calvin was in no doubt) that only a small proportion of humanity was called to salvation—was to glorify the majesty of God. To apply the yardstick of earthly "justice" to his sovereign decrees was pointless and an affront to his majesty [74], since he, and he alone, was *free*, that is, subject to no law, and his decrees could only be understood or known in any way to the extent that he had seen fit to reveal them to us. These fragments of the eternal truth were all we had to hold on to; everything else—the *purpose* of our individual fate—was surrounded by dark mysteries which it would be impossible and presumptuous to inquire into.

For the reprobate, for example, to complain about their fate as undeserved would be like the animals complaining because they were not born as men. For every creature was separated from God by an unbridgeable gulf and deserved only eternal death except in so far as he, for the greater glory of his majesty, had willed differently. All we could know was that one section of humanity would be saved, and the rest damned. To assume that human merit or fault had any influence on one's fate would be to regard God's absolutely free decisions, which had stood for all eternity, as capable of being changed by human influence—an impossible idea. The humanly comprehensible "Father in Heaven" of the New Testament, who rejoiced at the return of the sinner like a woman who had found a lost coin, had here become a transcendent being remote from any human understanding, a being who had allotted to each individual his destiny according

to his entirely unfathomable decrees, and who controlled the tiniest detail of the cosmos [75]. Since his decrees were immutably fixed, those on whom he bestowed his grace could never lose it, just as those to whom he denied it could never attain it.

This doctrine, with all the pathos of its inhumanity, had one principal consequence for the mood of a generation which yielded to its magnificent logic: it engendered, *for each individual*, a feeling of tremendous inner *loneliness*. [76] In what was for the people of the Reformation age the most crucial concern of life, their eternal salvation, man was obliged to tread his path alone, toward a destiny which had been decreed from all eternity. No one and nothing could help him. Not the preacher—for only the elect could spiritually understand the word of God. Not the sacraments—for although the sacraments were decreed by God for his greater glory and were therefore to be steadfastly observed, they were not a means of attaining the grace of God but were only subjective “*externa subsidia*” of faith. Not the Church—for although the principle “*extra ecclesiam nulla salus*”<sup>7</sup> still applied, in the sense that anyone who remained apart from the true Church could never be among the elect of God [77], the reprobate also belonged to the (outward) Church, indeed they *must* belong to it and be subject to its discipline, not in order to attain salvation through it—that was impossible—but because they too must be compelled to abide by God’s commandments for his glory. Finally—not even God, for Christ had died for the elect alone; God had determined from all eternity that Christ’s sacrificial death should be for their benefit alone.

Linked with the harsh doctrine of the absolute worthlessness and remoteness from God of all mere creatures, this inner isolation of man contained, on the one hand, the basis for the absolutely negative attitude of Puritanism toward all sensual and *emotional* elements in culture and subjective religiosity—because they were of no use for salvation and they fostered sentimental illusions and superstitious idolatry. It thus formed the basis for a fundamental rejection of every kind of culture of the senses. [78] On the other hand, however, it formed one of the roots of that *disillusioned* and *pessimistically* tinted *individualism* [79] which is still discernible in the “national character” and the institutions of the peoples with a Puritan past—in such striking contrast to the quite different viewpoint from which the “Enlightenment” later regarded men. In the period

with which we are concerned, we find clear traces of the influence of the doctrine of election by grace on fundamental elements of the conduct [*Lebensführung*] and philosophy of life [*Lebensanschauung*], even where the dogma itself was losing its hold. It was, quite simply, only the *most extreme* form of that *exclusive* trust in *God* that we are here concerned to analyze. An example is the striking frequency of the warnings, especially in English Puritan literature, against placing any trust in the help and friendship of men. Even the gentle Baxter<sup>8</sup> advises profound suspicion even of one's closest friend, and Bailey goes so far as to recommend trusting no one and saying nothing compromising to anyone: God alone should have our confidence. [80] In striking contrast to Lutheranism, private confession, which worried Calvin himself only on account of its possible sacramental interpretation, was quietly dropped in the areas where fully developed Calvinism held sway.

The Calvinist's relationship with his God was carried on in profound inner isolation, despite the need to belong to the true Church for salvation. [81] An impression of the specific effects of this peculiar atmosphere can be gained from reading, in Bunyan's<sup>9</sup> *Pilgrim's Progress* [82], by far the most widely read book in the whole of Puritan literature, the account of Christian's behavior when he becomes aware that he is dwelling in the City of Destruction, and he hears the call to commence his pilgrimage to the Celestial City forthwith. Wife and children cling to him—but, running across the fields with his fingers in his ears, crying "Life, eternal life," he rushes away. No polished writing could depict better than the naive sentiments of the imprisoned tinker, soon to earn worldwide acclaim, the mood of the Puritan believer who was basically concerned only with himself, and had thoughts only for his own salvation. Thus we see him engaged in unctuous discourse as he journeys with his traveling companions who are treading the same path, in scenes uncomfortably reminiscent of Gottfried Keller's "Gerechte Kammacher."<sup>10</sup> Not until he himself is safe does it occur to him that it would be nice to have his family with him. It is the same tormenting fear of death and the afterlife as that experienced constantly and overpoweringly by Alfons von Liguori, as described by Döllinger. [83] All this is worlds away from the spirit of pride in this world, to which Machiavelli gives expression in his praise of those Florentine burghers for whom—in the struggle against pope and interdict—"patriotism was stronger than fear for the salvation of their souls."<sup>11</sup>

It seems at first a mystery as to how this tendency to inwardly release the individual from the very close ties with which the world held him in its embrace could be linked with the undoubted superiority of the social organization of Calvinism. [84] But this is precisely what follows, strange though it may seem, from the particular characteristics which Christian “charity” was forced to assume under pressure from the inner isolation of the individual resulting from the Calvinist conception of God. The world was destined to serve the self-glorification of *God*, and the Christian existed to do his part to increase the praise of God in the world by obeying his commands. God willed the social achievement of the Christian, *because* it was his will that the social structure of life should accord with his commands and be organized in such a way as to achieve this purpose. The *social* [85] work of the Calvinist in the world was merely work “in majorem gloriam *Dei*.” Labor in a *calling*, in the service of the secular life of the community, also shared *this* character. Luther himself spoke of specialized work in a particular calling [*arbeitsteiligen Berufsarbeit*] deriving from “Christian charity.” But what had been for him a tentative suggestion became for the Calvinists a characteristic part of their ethical system. “Christian charity” [*Nächstenliebe*]*—*since, after all, it was to serve only the glory of *God*, not that of the *creature* [86]*—*expressed itself *principally* in the fulfillment of the duties of the *calling* given through the *lex naturae*, and in this it took on a peculiarly neutral and *impersonal* character—one which served the *rational* structuring of the surrounding social *cosmos*. The wonderfully purposeful structuring and organization of this *cosmos*, which, according to the biblical revelation and equally according to natural insight, is evidently designed to be of “*use*” to the human race, shows that labor in the service of this social usefulness furthers the divine glory and is willed by God. Later, we shall be analyzing the significance of these points for the light they shed on the political and economic rationalism of Calvinism: the source of the *utilitarian* character of Calvinistic ethics lies here; important peculiarities of the Calvinist concept of the *calling* also originate from it. Now, however, we return once again to a particular consideration of the doctrine of predestination.

The decisive question for us is how this doctrine was *endured* [87] during a period in which the next life was not only more important but in many respects was also more certain than all earthly concerns. [88] One question inevitably very soon arose for every single believer, and forced all other interests into the



background: “Am I one of the elect? And how can I be certain of my election?” [89] For Calvin himself, this posed no problem. He felt himself to be an “instrument” [*Rüstzeug*] and was certain of his state of grace. Accordingly, his only answer to the question of how the individual could be sure of his election was basically that we should be satisfied with the knowledge of God’s decree and with the trust in Christ which comes through true faith. He fundamentally rejects the assumption that one can tell from the behavior of others whether they are elect or reprobate, calling it a presumptuous attempt to penetrate the mysteries of God. In this life the elect are indistinguishable from the reprobate [90], and even the subjective experiences of the elect—as “*ludibria spiritus sancti*”<sup>12</sup>—are possible for the reprobate too, with the sole exception of that persevering, faithful trust, *finaliter*. So the elect are and remain God’s *invisible* church.

It was quite different for the epigones—this was already true of Beza<sup>13</sup>—and especially for the broad category of ordinary people. For these the “*certitudo salutis*,” in the sense of the possibility of *recognizing* one’s state of grace, necessarily became elevated to absolutely overriding importance, and so it is that wherever the doctrine of predestination was established, the question continued to be asked as to whether there were definite distinguishing features by which membership of the “*electi*” could be recognized. In the development of Pietism (which grew out of the Reformed Church), this question continued to be of central importance, indeed in a certain sense was part of its constitution. And outside Pietism as well as within it, when we come to consider the (politically and socially so far-reaching) significance of the reformed doctrine and practice of the Communion, we shall also be discussing the importance, throughout the seventeenth century, of establishing an individual’s state of grace. This was necessary, for example, when deciding whether someone should be admitted to Communion, that is, to the central ritual of the church, a matter which was crucial for the social standing of the participants.

As far as the question of one’s *own* state of grace was concerned, at least, it was impossible to rest content with Calvin’s reliance [91] on the witness of persevering faith effected by grace working in men, a reliance never formally abandoned by orthodox doctrine. [92] In particular, the practice of pastoral care, which had to deal with the torments created by the doctrine at every stage, could

not be satisfied with it. It came to terms with these difficulties in various ways. [93] In cases where the doctrine of election by grace was not reinterpreted, moderated, or simply dropped [94], two related types of pastoral counseling emerged as typical. On the one hand, people were taught that they simply had a duty to *regard* themselves as elect, and to dismiss any doubts as a temptation from the devil [95], since lack of assurance was a result of inadequate faith, in other words, of the inadequate working of grace. The exhortation of the apostle to “make one’s own calling sure” was interpreted as a duty to strive for the subjective certainty of one’s election and justification in daily struggle. Instead of humble sinners, to whom Luther promised grace if they entrusted themselves to God in penitent faith, those self-assured “saints” were bred who were embodied in the steely [*stahlhart*] Puritan merchants of that heroic age of capitalism and are occasionally found right up to the present day. And, on the other hand, *tireless labor in a calling* was urged as the best possible means of *attaining* this self-assurance. [96] This and this alone would drive away religious doubt and give assurance of one’s state of grace.

The idea that secular labor in a calling was capable of achieving this derived from deep-seated peculiarities of the religious feelings cultivated in the Reformed Church; the differences from Lutheranism were most clearly manifested in the doctrine concerning the nature of justifying faith. These differences are so subtly and objectively analyzed in Schneckenburger’s fine series of lectures [97], with such absence of value judgments, that the following brief observations can essentially simply base themselves on his account.

The goal of Lutheran piety, as it developed in the course of the seventeenth century, was the supreme religious experience of the “*unio mystica*” with the deity. [98] As indicated by the term itself, which was unknown in this version of the Reformed doctrine, we are talking about a powerful [*substantiell*] divine sensation, the feeling of the divine really entering into the believing soul, an experience similar in quality to the effects of contemplation in the German mystics; it is *passive* in character, is directed toward the fulfillment of the desire for *rest* in God, and is marked by a pure inwardness of spirit. In Lutheranism it is combined with that profound feeling of sinful unworthiness, which is intended carefully to preserve the “*poenitentia quotidiana*” of the Lutheran believer; this in turn is directed toward the preservation of the humility and simplicity

essential for the forgiveness of sins. The piety specific to the Reformed Church is not, and never has been, of the purely inwardly directed, emotional kind. Any real entering of the divine into the human soul is excluded by the absolute transcendence of God in relation to all his creatures: “*fini tum non est capax infiniti.*” The communion of God with the recipients of his grace can only take place and be consciously experienced by God’s *working* in them (“*operator*”) and by their becoming conscious of this—in other words, when their *actions* arise out of the faith which comes from God’s grace, and when the quality of those actions legitimates this faith as truly coming from God. The Reformed Christian, too, wants to be saved “*sola fide,*” but since in Calvin’s view all one’s feelings and moods, however sublime they may appear, are deceptive, [99] faith must prove itself in its objective *effects*, if it is to serve as a reliable guarantee of *certitudo salutis*: it must be a “*fides efficax.*” [100]

If one poses the further question, by what *fruits* the Reformed Christian may indubitably recognize true faith, the answer is again: by a Christian manner of conducting one’s life [*Lebensführung*] which serves the greater *glory of God*. What this is can be deduced from his will, which is either directly revealed in the Bible or is indirectly discernible in the purposeful ordering of the divinely created world (*lex naturae*). [101] In particular, by a comparison of one’s own spiritual state with that which according to the Bible is appropriate to the elect, for example, the patriarchs, it is possible to check one’s own state of grace. [102] Only one of the elect really has the *fides efficax*; only he is capable, thanks to regeneration (*regeneratio*) and the sanctification (*sanctificatio*) of his whole life which follows from this, to increase God’s glory by works that are really, not merely apparently, good. And by being conscious of the fact that his conduct—at least as far as his basic character and constant firm resolution (*propositum oboedientiae*) are concerned—is based on a strength [103] dwelling within him which is capable of increasing the glory of God, and is therefore willed by God and above all *effected* by God [104], he attains that supreme prize which has been the goal of all his religious striving—the certainty of grace. [105] The second Letter to Corinthians 13.5 provides further evidence that this certainty is attainable. [106] Totally unsuited though good works are to serve as a means of attaining salvation—for even the elect remain creatures, and everything they do falls infinitely far short of God’s demands—they are indispensable as *signs* of election. [107] In this sense they are occasionally described quite simply as “indispensable for salvation,” [108] or linked with the “*possessio salutis.*” [109] This means, however, fundamentally, that God helps those who help themselves [110], in other words, the Calvinist “*creates*” [111] his salvation *himself* (as it is

sometimes expressed)—more correctly: creates the *certainty* of salvation. It further means that what he creates *cannot* consist, as in Catholicism, in a gradual storing up of meritorious individual achievements; instead, it consists in a form of *systematic self-examination* which is *constantly* faced with the question: elect or reprobate? This brings us to a very important point in our discussion.

Again and again, as we know, the accusation of “sanctification by works” [*Werkheiligkeit*] [112] was made by Lutherans against the thinking which developed with ever greater clarity [113] in the Reformed churches and sects. And—although the accused rightly rejected the identification of their *dogmatic* position with Catholic teaching—the accusation was not unreasonable as far as the *practical consequences* for the everyday life of the average Reformed Christian were concerned [114]: there has perhaps never been a more intensive form of religious appraisal of moral *action* than that which Calvinism engendered in its followers. But crucial for the practical importance of this kind of “sanctification by works” [*Werkheiligkeit*] is the recognition of the *qualities* which characterize the conduct of life corresponding to it and distinguish it from the everyday life of an average Christian in the Middle Ages. We may perhaps attempt to formulate it as follows. From the ethical point of view, the medieval Catholic [115] lived to a certain extent “from hand to mouth.” Firstly, he carried out the traditional duties conscientiously. The “good works” he performed over and above these, however, were normally an unsystematic series of *individual* actions that he carried out to make up for particular sins or as advised by the priest, or, toward the end of his life, as a kind of insurance policy. The God of Calvinism, on the other hand, demanded of his own, and effected in them, not individual “good works,” but “sanctification by works” raised to the level of a system. [116] The ethical practice of ordinary people was divested of its random and unsystematic nature and built up into a consistent *method* for the whole conduct of one’s life. It is no accident that the name “Methodists” stuck with the bearers of the last great revival of Puritan thought in the eighteenth century, just as the term “Precisians”<sup>14</sup> (which is similar in meaning) was applied to their spiritual forebears in the seventeenth century. [117] For only in a fundamental transformation of the meaning of the whole of life in every hour and every action [118] could the working of grace be effective in lifting man out of the *status naturae* into the *status gratiae*.

The life of the “saint” was exclusively directed toward the transcendental goal of salvation, but *precisely for this reason* it was *rationalized* and exclusively dominated by the necessity of increasing the glory of God on earth; and never has the principle of “omnia in majorem dei gloriam” been taken with such deadly seriousness. [119] Only a life governed by *constant reflection*, however, could be regarded as overcoming the status naturalis: Descartes’s “cogito ergo sum” was taken over by contemporary Puritans *in this ethical* rein terpretation. [120] This rationalization now gave Reformed piety its specifically *ascetic* character and was also the basis for its inner affinity (as well is its specific antithesis) to Catholicism.

Christian asceticism in its highest manifestations exhibited this rational character as early as the Middle Ages. It is also the fundamental reason for the importance in world history of Western monastic life [*Lebensführung*], in contrast to Eastern monasticism. In the rule of Saint Benedict, even more strongly in the Cluniacs and Cistercians, and, finally, most markedly in the Jesuits, it is free of arbitrary withdrawal from the world and virtuoso self-torment. It has become a systematically formed method of rational living, its aim being to overcome the *status naturae*, to release man from the power of irrational impulses [*Triebe*] and from dependency on the world and nature, to subject him to the supremacy of the purposeful will [121], and to subordinate his actions to his own continual control and to the consideration of their ethical consequences. The aim was thus to train the monk—objectively speaking—to be a worker in the service of the kingdom of God, and so also—subjectively speaking—to ensure the salvation of his soul. This absolute self-control, like the aim of the *exercitia* of Saint Ignatius and the highest forms of all rational monastic virtues, was also the decisive practical ideal of Puritanism.

In the profound contempt with which the cool, reserved calm of its devotees [122] is contrasted, in the reports of the interrogation of its martyrs, with the frenzied bluster of the noble prelates and officials, one can already see the clear emergence of that high regard for reserved self-control which is found in the best kinds of English and Anglo-American “gentleman” today. [123] Putting this into language familiar to us [124], we might say the following. Puritan asceticism—like any “rational” asceticism—worked to enable man to demonstrate and assert his “constant motives”—in particular, those which asceticism instilled into him

—against the “emotions”—in other words, to *train* him to become a “personality” in *this* strictly psychological sense of the word. The *goal* of asceticism was, in contrast to many widely held notions, to be able to lead a watchful, aware, alert life. The most urgent *task* was the eradication of *uninhibited* indulgence in instinctive pleasure. The most important *means* employed by asceticism was to bring *order* into the conduct of life of those who practiced it. All of these vital points are found equally clearly [125] both in the rules of Catholic monasticism and in the principles of conduct of the Calvinists. [126] It is to this methodical control over the whole man that both owe their tremendous world-conquering power. In particular, it has enabled Calvinism, rather than Lutheranism, to ensure the continued existence of Protestantism as “*ecclesia militans*.”

On the other hand, it is quite obvious where the *difference* between Calvinist and medieval asceticism lies: it is in the omission of the “*consilia evangelica*” and thus the transformation of asceticism to a purely *innerworldly* variety. It is not as though within Catholicism the “methodical” life had been confined to the cells of the monasteries. That was neither the case in theory nor in practice. In fact, it must be freely admitted that in spite of the more modest aims of Catholic morality, an ethically unsystematic life does *not* attain the highest ideals that Catholicism has set itself—even for innerworldly life. The tertiary order of Saint Francis made major advances toward the ascetic penetration of everyday life and was by no means alone in this. Of course, works like the “Imitation of Christ” show, precisely *because of* the powerful influence they exercise, how the conduct of life commended in them was felt to be on a higher plane than the everyday morality which merely satisfied minimum requirements. They show, too, that everyday morality was in no way judged by the standards of Puritanism. And the practice of certain ecclesiastical institutions, especially that of indulgences, which was seen in the Reformation period not as a minor abuse but as *the* fundamental evil, inevitably constantly ran counter to the beginnings of systematic innerworldly asceticism [*innerweltliche Askese*]. The decisive point was, however, that the model of how to lead a methodical life par excellence, was, as ever, the *monk, and he alone*, that therefore the more firmly asceticism took hold of the individual, the more it forced him *out* of everyday life, because the truly holy life consisted in *exceeding* innerworldly morality. [127]

Luther was the first to do away with this—not as some kind of agent of a “developmental tendency,” but first as a result of his own personal experience, and then after being pressed further by the political system—and Calvinism simply followed on from him. [128] A dam was thus built to prevent asceticism flowing out of secular everyday life, and the way was open for those passionately serious, reflective types of men, who had hitherto provided the finest representatives of monasticism, to pursue ascetic ideals *within* secular occupations.

In the course of its development, Calvinism made a positive addition: the idea of the necessity of *putting one’s faith to the test* [*Bewährung des Glaubens*] in secular working life. [129] It thus provided the *positive* motivation [*Antrieb*] for asceticism, and with the firm establishment of its ethics in the doctrine of predestination, the spiritual aristocracy of the monks, who stood outside and above the world, was replaced by the spiritual aristocracy [130] of the saints *in* the world, predestined by God from eternity, an aristocracy which with its *character indelebilis* was separated from the rest of reprobate humanity by a gulf that was fundamentally more unbridgeable and in its invisibility was more awe-inspiring [131] than that which outwardly cut off the medieval monk from the world. This new gulf cut unsparingly into *all* social feelings. For in view of their neighbors’ sinfulness, the appropriate sentiment for these elect by God’s grace, and therefore saints, is not forbearing helpfulness in the consciousness of their own weakness, but hatred and contempt for them as enemies of God, who bear the mark of eternal damnation upon them. [132] This way of thinking was capable of intensifying to the point where in certain circumstances it could end in the formation of *sects*. This was the case when—as in certain “Independent” groups of the seventeenth century—the authentic Calvinist belief that God’s glory demanded that the reprobate be compelled to submit to the law of the Church was outweighed by the conviction that it would be dishonoring to God if an unregenerate person were in his flock and partook of the sacraments, let alone presided over their administration as an appointed preacher. [133] And even where they did not proceed to the logical consequence of forming sects, the most varied forms of church constitution did (as we shall see) emerge from the attempt to separate regenerate Christians from the unregenerate, who were not ready for the Communion, and to admit only regenerate preachers.

The norm on which this ascetic conduct of life consistently based itself, and which it evidently needed, came, of course, from the Bible, and the important point for us concerning the often talked-about “bibliocracy” of Calvinism is that the moral precepts of the *Old Testament*—since the Old Testament was as much inspired as the New Testament—were of *equal* worth with those of the New Testament, provided, that is, they were neither obviously meant to apply only to the historical circumstances of Judaism, nor had been expressly abrogated by Christ. For the *believers* in particular, the law was provided as an ideal norm, never quite attainable, but still binding [134], whereas Luther, by contrast, (originally) extolled the *freedom* from the servitude of the law as the divine privilege of believers. [135] The influence of the plain Hebrew wisdom laid down in the books most commonly read by the Puritans, the Book of Proverbs and many of the Psalms, can be sensed in these people’s whole attitude to life. In particular, the *rational* character of religion and the suppression of its *emotional* side have been rightly attributed by Sanford [136] to the influence of the Old Testament. This Old Testament rationalism is essentially petit bourgeois and traditionalist in character; it is flanked by the emotional power of the prophets and many of the Psalms, as well as elements which had already influenced the development of a specifically emotional religion in the Middle Ages. [137] So ultimately it was, after all, its own fundamental ascetic character which led Calvinism to select those elements of the Old Testament that it found congenial, and to assimilate them.

That systematization of the ethical conduct of life that ascetic Reformed Protestants shared with rational Catholic religious orders is visible in the manner in which the scrupulous [*präzise*] Reformed Christian continually *monitored* his state of grace [138]. The religious journal, in which sins, temptations, and progress made in grace were continuously recorded, was a feature common to both modern Catholic piety (chiefly in France), largely created by the Jesuits, and the most devout circles of the Reformed Church [139]. But whereas in Catholicism it was complementary to the confession, or provided the “directeur de l’âme” with the basis for his authoritarian guidance of the believer (who was usually female) under his charge, the Reformed Christian used the journal to “feel his *own* pulse.” It is mentioned by all the important moral theologians, and a classic example of it is provided by Benjamin Franklin’s tabular and statistical bookkeeping of his progress in the individual virtues. On the other hand, Bunyan takes the image of God as bookkeeper (which goes back to the Middle Ages and even to antiquity) to typically tasteless extremes, whereby the relationship of the



sinner with God is compared to that of a customer to the shopkeeper.<sup>15</sup> Anyone who goes into the red may just be able to pay off the accumulated interest with the proceeds of his own merits, but will never be able to pay off the principal. Just as he scrutinized his own conduct, so also the later Puritan examined that of God and saw the finger of God in all the vicissitudes of life. And, in contrast to Calvin's authentic teaching, he therefore knew why God disposed in this or that way. Thus the sanctification of life could almost assume the character of a business arrangement [140]. The consequence of this *systematization* of the ethical conduct of life, which was enforced by Calvinism (unlike Lutheranism), is the permeation of the whole of existence by Christianity.

So far we have restricted ourselves to Calvinist religion and accordingly have assumed the doctrine of predestination to be the dogmatic background to Puritan morality as expressed in a methodically rationalized ethical conduct of life. This was mostly because that doctrine was adhered to as a cornerstone of Reformed doctrine far beyond the circle of that religious party, namely, the "Presbyterians," which was firmly grounded in Calvin's teaching in every respect. Both the Independent Savoy Declaration of 1658 and the 1689 Baptist Confession of Hanserd Knolly contain it, and even within Methodism (although John Wesley, the great organizing talent of his movement, was a believer in the universality of grace) the great agitator of the first generation of Methodists and its most rigorous thinker, Whitefield,<sup>16</sup> as well as the group (who were quite influential for a time) surrounding Lady Huntingdon,<sup>17</sup> were adherents of the "Particularism of Grace." With its magnificent consistency, it was this doctrine which, in the most fateful era of the seventeenth century, kept alive in the militant representatives of the "holy life" the idea of being an instrument of God and the executor of his providential decrees [141], and prevented an early collapse into a purely utilitarian pursuit of justification by works [*Werkheiligkeit*] here on earth, an attitude which would never have been capable of inspiring such immense sacrifices for the sake of irrational and ideal goals.

The link that this doctrine established between belief in absolutely binding norms, on the one hand, and absolute determinism and the complete transcendence of the divinity on the other, was, in its way, an idea of genius. It was at the same time—in principle—to an extraordinary degree more "*modern*" than the gentler doctrine (appealing more to the emotions) that subordinated God

as well as man to the moral law. Above all, however, the idea of *being put to the test* [*Bewährung*] (which is of fundamental importance for our discussion) constantly recurs. Since it is the psychological starting point for methodical morality, it will have to be studied “in its purest form,” by considering it in the context of a discussion of the doctrine of election by grace and the significance of this doctrine for everyday life. The most logically consistent form of this doctrine had to be our starting point because the idea of being put to the test as a schema of the link between faith and morality regularly appears in the denominations still to be discussed. Within Protestantism the consequences for the ascetic ordering of the conduct of their lives that the doctrine inevitably had for its serious followers are the *fundamental* antithesis of the (relative) moral feebleness of Lutheranism. The Lutheran “*gratia amissibilis*,” which can be won back at any time by penitence and contrition, evidently contains *in itself* no drive to adopt that which is important for us as a product of ascetic Protestantism, namely, a systematic, rational approach to the whole of the moral life. [142]

Lutheran piety was more inclined to leave the unrestrained vitality of instinctive action and uncomplicated emotional life undiminished; that pressure [*Antrieb*] for constant self-examination and thus for *systematic* regimentation of one’s own life, like that which the awe-inspiring doctrine of Calvinism contained, was lacking. A religious genius like Luther lived without constraint in the freedom of this openness to the world and—as long as his strength did not desert him!—was in no danger of falling back into the “*status naturalis*.” And that simple, fine, and typically emotional type of piety that has adorned some of the best kinds of Lutheranism, together with its nonlegalistic morality, finds few parallels with authentic Puritanism. It is much closer to the gentle Anglicanism of men like Hooker<sup>18</sup> or Chillingworth.<sup>19</sup> But for the ordinary, even the zealous, Lutheran, nothing was more certain than that he would only be raised temporarily—for as long as the influence of the individual confession or sermon lasted—out of the *status naturalis*.

Contemporaries were well aware of the difference between the ethical standard of the Reformed royal courts and that of the Lutheran ones [143], which were so often places of drunkenness and brutality. They were aware, too, that the Lutheran clergy were quite incapable of combating the ascetic Baptist movement by their preaching of the doctrine of “faith alone.” The qualities of

“Gemütlichkeit” and “naturalness” that people notice about the Germans are quite unlike the Anglo-American atmosphere, which still today suffers under the lingering impression of that thorough crushing of the uninhibitedness of the “status naturalis”—this is even noticeable in people’s faces. And Germans are frequently disconcerted by the “narrowness,” “unfree dom,” and inner constraint that they find. These are opposing ways of conducting one’s life, arising from the *lesser* degree of ascetic permeation of life by Lutheranism in contrast to Calvinism. The antipathy felt by the uninhibited “child of the world” toward the ascetic life is expressed in these sentiments. Lutheranism, as a result of its doctrine of grace, simply failed to provide the psychological drive to be systematic in the conduct of life, and thus to enforce the methodical rationalization of life. This drive, which determined the ascetic character of piety, was *capable* of being engendered by various kinds of religious motives, as we shall soon see: Calvinism’s doctrine of predestination was only *one* of a number of possibilities. We have found convincing evidence, however, that it was not only quite unique in its logical consistency, but was also of the utmost psychological efficacy. In comparison, the *non-Calvinist* ascetic movements appear, purely from the viewpoint of the religious motivation of their asceticism, to be *dilutions* of the logical consistency of the Calvinist doctrine.

In the course of historical development, it was usually, though not always, the case that the Reformed type of asceticism was either imitated by the other ascetic movements or used as a point of reference in the development of their own principles (which may have deviated from it or gone beyond it) in order to compare and complement them.

## [PIETISM]

*Historically*, at least, the idea of election by grace is the starting point for the ascetic movement usually known as “*Pietism*.” To the extent that this movement has remained within the Reformed Church, it is almost impossible to distinguish between Pietist and non-Pietist Calvinists. [144] Almost all the firm adherents of Puritanism have occasionally been numbered among the Pietists, and there is a quite tenable view that all the links between predestination and the idea of proof (or of being put to the test) [*Bewährung*], together with the interest in gaining the subjective “*certitudo salutis*” as set out above, are a Pietist development of the authentic doctrine of Calvin. [145]

With regard to England, therefore, one tends not to use the term “Pietism” at all. But even the continental Reformed Pietism (of the Netherlands and the Lower Rhine) is largely just a developed form of Reformed asceticism, like the religiosity of Bailey. The decisive emphasis had moved so strongly on to the “*praxis pietas*” that it seems to put dogmatic orthodoxy in the shade and even sometimes make it seem insignificant. The predestined can on occasion be guilty of errors of dogma as much as other sins, and experience teaches that many Christians without any formal training in theology can bring forth the most evident fruits of faith, while on the other hand it is clear that mere theological knowledge does not necessarily lead to conduct that gives proof of faith. [146] Election can therefore not be proved at all by theological knowledge. [147]

Deeply suspicious of the Church of the theologians, of which however—this is one of its characteristic features—it nevertheless officially remains a member, Pietism begins to gather the followers of the “*praxis pietatis*” in “conventicles” to be separate from the world. The movement aims to draw the invisible church of the “saints” visibly together on earth and, safe in this community, without going as far as to form sects, to lead a life which is dead to the influences of the world and based on the will of God in every detail, so that the daily outward signs manifest in their conduct may make them sure of their regenerate state. By leading more ascetic lives, the “*ecclesiola*” of the truly converted—and this is also a common feature of all true Pietism—hope to taste communion with God

in all its bliss in *this* life.

*This latter* striving has an inner affinity with the Lutheran “*unio mystica*” and often leads to a stronger cultivation of the *emotional* side of religion than is normal for the average Reformed Christian. *This* then, from *our* point of view, must be regarded as the most important feature of “Pietism” within the Reformed Church. For the emotional element, which on the whole is quite foreign to the original form of Calvinist piety, while having an inner affinity with certain forms of medieval religion, directs the practice of religion toward *the enjoyment of bliss in this world* instead of the ascetic struggle to secure a *future* in the next. And emotion *can* experience such a heightening that religious feeling can take on a truly hysterical character and then achieve precisely the opposite *effect* of that sober and austere discipline into which the systematic “holy life” of the Puritan takes a man, namely, a weakening of those “inhibitions” which support the rational personality of the Calvinist against “emotional states”. This emotional heightening occurs through that alternation (known from countless instances and with a psychophysical basis) between semi-sensuous states of religious exaltation and periods of nervous exhaustion, when God seems “remote”. [148] Similarly, the Calvinist idea of the depravity of the creature, if taken in an *emotional* way—for example, “feeling like a worm”—*can* lead to a deadening of the energies in working life. [149] Even the idea of predestination *can* lead to fatalism if—in contrast to the authentic tendencies of Calvinist rational religion—it becomes something to be *emotionally* appropriated. [150] And finally, the drive toward the seclusion of the saints from the world *can*, given a strong degree of increase in emotional involvement, lead to a kind of monastic community organization of a semicomunist character, like those which Pietism has frequently produced in the Reformed Church. [151]

But as long as this extreme effect, brought about by that cultivation of *emotion*, is not produced, and Reformed Pietism continues to strive to ensure salvation within secular *working* life, the practical effect of Pietist principles is merely an even *stricter* ascetic control of conduct in the calling and an even firmer religious foundation to morality in the calling than that which is provided by the mere worldly “respectability” of the normal Reformed Christian (seen by the “superior” Pietists as second-class Christianity). The religious aristocracy of the

saints, which, in the course of the development of all Reformed asceticism, is the more certain to emerge, the more seriously it is taken, is then—as in Holland—organized within the church on a voluntarist basis by the formation of conventicles. In English Puritanism, on the other hand, as we shall see later, the religious aristocracy aimed for either a formal distinction between active and passive Christians in the *constitution* of the church, or—as previously mentioned—in the creation of sects.

The development of *German Pietism* (associated with the names of Spener,<sup>20</sup> Francke,<sup>21</sup> and Zinzendorf<sup>22</sup>) from within Lutheranism leads us away from the area of predestination. It does not, however, necessarily lead us away from the area of those ideas of which predestination was the ultimate conclusion. This is clear from the case of Spener, who, as he himself testifies, was influenced by English and Dutch Pietism, and, for example, from the fact that Bailey's writings were read in the first Pietist conventicles. [152]

For our subject, at least, Pietism means merely the penetration of methodically cultivated and controlled, that is, *ascetic*, living [*Lebensführung*] into areas of non-Calvinist religious observance. [153] Lutheranism, however, inevitably found this rational asceticism to be an alien element, and the lack of consistency of German Pietist doctrine is a result of the difficulties arising from this. In the case of Spener, the dogmatic foundation of systematic religious conduct is based on a combination of Luther's ideas and the specifically Reformed component of good works performed “with the goal of *honoring God*” [154] and with the equally Reformed sounding faith in the possibility for the regenerate to achieve a relative degree of Christian perfection. [155] What is lacking is the consistency of the theory. With his strong mystical leanings [156], Spener attempts, in a rather vague, but essentially Lutheran, manner, to describe, rather than to give reasons for, the systematic character of Christian living which is essential to his Pietism also. The *certitudo salutis* is not derived from sanctification, and the latter concept, as previously mentioned, is linked in the loose Lutheran manner with faith, rather than with the idea of proof. [157]

But again and again, whenever the rational, ascetic element in Pietism gained the upper hand over the emotional side, the ideas that are so significant for our thesis

came into their own. These were (1) that the methodical development of one's own holiness to ever higher levels of firm assurance and perfection as measured against the *law* was a *sign* of a state of grace [158], and (2) that the providence of God *worked* in those so perfected, by giving them signs to which they would be receptive if they waited patiently and engaged in methodical reflection. [159] For A. H. Francke, too, labor in a calling is the ascetic means par excellence [160]; he is every bit as convinced as the Puritans that it is God himself who blesses his own with success in their labors. And as a substitute for the "double decree," Pietism created ideas which, very much like that doctrine (though less strongly), established an aristocracy of the regenerate [161], with all the psychological consequences that we have already described for Calvinism. One of these is the doctrine known as "Terminism" [162], which was (falsely) attributed to Pietism *in general* <sup>23</sup> by its opponents. This is the assumption that although grace is universally offered, it is only offered to any one individual once at one particular moment in his life, or at least on some occasion for the last time. [163] Anyone who misses this moment is beyond even the help of the universalism of grace—that person is in the situation of someone who has been passed over by God in Calvinist doctrine. In effect, this theory is quite close to the assumption, which Francke, for example, derived from personal experience and which was widely believed within Pietism—indeed, it could even be said to be predominant—that grace can only achieve a "breakthrough" under specific unique and un-repeatable circumstances, namely, after a "repentance experience" [*Bußkampf*].<sup>24</sup> [164] Since, in the view of the Pietists, not everyone is disposed to have that experience, the person who, in spite of employing the ascetic method indicated by the Pietists to help to bring it about, does not experience it, remains in the eyes of the regenerate a kind of passive Christian. On the other hand, by the creation of a *method* for bringing about the "repentance experience," the achievement of divine grace becomes in effect the object of *rational* human arrangement.

This notion of the "aristocracy of grace" was also responsible for many Pietists (though not all, for instance, not Francke) and especially, as the constantly recurring questions raised in Spener's writing show, many Pietist *pastors*, having reservations about private confession. These reservations contributed to the undermining of private confession in Lutheranism, too, since the *effect* of grace visible in a holy *life*, achieved through repentance, determined whether absolution could be granted. It was therefore impossible to be satisfied with the

mere “attritio” to justify granting it. [165]

Zinzendorf’s religious *self*-appraisal, even if it does waver in the face of attacks by the orthodox, constantly leads to the notion of the “instrument” [*Rüstzeug*]. Otherwise, though, the attitude of this remarkable “religious dilettante” (as Ritschl calls him) regarding the points which are important for us, is difficult to define unambiguously. [166] He referred to himself repeatedly as a representative of the “Pauline-Lutheran Trope”<sup>25</sup> *as against* the “Pietist-Jacobean Trope” which adhered closely to the *law*.<sup>26</sup> However, it is clear from the notary’s minutes of August 12, 1729, that the doctrinal standpoint of the brotherhood itself and its practice, which, in spite of his constantly stressed Lutheranism, [167] he permitted and encouraged, corresponds in many respects to the Calvinist aristocracy of saints. [168] The much discussed transferring of the office of elder to Christ (on November 12, 1741) expressed something similar for all to see. Of the three “tropes” of the brotherhood, moreover, the Calvinist and the Moravian ones were essentially based on the Reformed ethic of the calling. Zinzendorf, too, speaking to John Wesley, expressed the Puritan view that *other people* could *recognize* the justified person by the manner of his life even if the person himself could not always do so. [169]

On the other hand, however, there is in the specific kind of piety characteristic of the Herrnhut Brotherhood a strong element of the emotional, and on more than one occasion Zinzendorf personally endeavored to thwart [170] the tendency toward the Puritan type of ascetic sanctification in his community and to reinterpret the idea of justification by works [*Werkheiligkeit*] in a Lutheran sense. [171] Also, as a consequence of the rejection of the conventicles and the retention of the practice of confession, an essentially Lutheran type of reliance on sacramental transmission of salvation was developed. Then Zinzendorf’s specific principle that the *childlikeness* of religious feeling was a feature of its genuineness, as well as, for example, the use of *the drawing of lots* as a means of discovering God’s will, operated so strongly against rationalism in the conduct of life that, on the whole, wherever the influence of the Count extended [172], the anti-rational, *emotional* elements in the piety of the Herrnhut community predominated to a far greater extent than elsewhere within Pietism. [173] The linking of morality and the forgiveness of sins in Spangenberg’s “*Idea fidei fratrum*” is just as loose [174] as it generally is in Lutheranism. Zinzendorf’s



rejection of the Methodist striving for perfection corresponds—as elsewhere in his writings—to his basically eudaemonistic ideal of letting people experience bliss [175] (he used the word “*Glückseligkeit*”) in the *present*, and to experience it *emotionally*, instead of instructing them to be sure of enjoying it in the *hereafter* through rational work. [176]

The idea did, however, continue to prevail that the particular value of the brotherhood, compared to other churches, lay in its Christian activities, in missionary work, and—something which was seen to be linked with this—in labor in a calling. [177] In addition, the practical rationalization of life from the viewpoint of *utility* was a vital part of Zinzendorf’s philosophy of life. [178] For him—as for other representatives of Pietism—rationalization was prompted, on the one hand, by a decided distaste for philosophical speculation, which was seen as endangering faith, and by a corresponding preference for specialized empirical knowledge [179], and, on the other hand, by the practical experience of the professional [*Berufs*] missionary. As a center of mission, the brotherhood was at the same time a business enterprise, and so introduced its members into the ways of innerworldly asceticism, which, in any sphere of life, first asks about “tasks” and then tackles these in a calm and methodical way. An obstacle to achieving this was the glorification of the charisma of apostolic *poverty* in the “disciples” [180] (derived from the example of the missionary life of the apostles), who were chosen through the “election of grace.” This was in effect a partial revival of the “*consilia evangelica*.” The creation of a rational ethic of the Calvinist type was held back by this, even if—as the example of the transformation of the Baptist movement shows—it was not excluded.

All in all, when we consider German Pietism from *our* point of view, we shall have to note a certain shakiness and insecurity in the religious basis of its asceticism, which falls well short of the iron consistency of Calvinism. This may be ascribed partly to Lutheran influences and partly to the *emotional* character of its religiosity. True, it is very one-sided to represent this emotional element as the feature which distinguishes Pietism from *Lutheranism* [181]. But, in comparison with *Calvinism*, the intensity of the rationalization of life was necessarily less. Thinking about having to repeatedly prove one’s state of grace, the guarantee of one’s eternal *future*, was the inner driving force for the Calvinist, and drew his attention emotionally to the *present*, in which the

predestined Christian must constantly endeavor to gain self-confidence afresh in restless and successful labor in his calling. In the Pietist this self-confidence was replaced by that humility and brokenness [182] of character which was partly a result of emotional agitation (directed purely to inward experiences), and partly the result of the Lutheran institution of confession, which was admittedly often viewed with serious misgivings by Pietism, but was usually tolerated. [183] But in all this is manifested that specific Lutheran manner of seeking salvation, for which the “forgiveness of sins,” not practical “sanctification” is crucial. In place of the methodical rational striving to gain and keep the certain *knowledge* of future bliss (in the hereafter), here the need is to *feel* reconciliation and communion with God here and now in this life. However, just as in external “material” life, the inclination to seek enjoyment in the present conflicts with the rational structuring of the “economy,” which is, after all, based on the need to make provision for the future, so it is, in a sense, in the sphere of religious life.

Quite obviously, compared with the need of the Reformed “saints” to prove themselves with a view to the life hereafter, the directing of religious need to an inward emotional *feeling* in the present involved a diminution of the drive [*Antrieb*] toward the rationalization of innerworldly *action*. Admittedly, the Pietist was able to develop an extra degree of *methodical* religious penetration of the conduct of life compared with the orthodox Lutheran, with his traditionalist adherence to the word and sacraments. On the whole, though, Pietism from Francke and Spener to Zinzendorf moved in the direction of an *increasing* emphasis on the emotional. This is not, however, just the expression of some “developmental tendency” immanent within it. The differences follow from the contrasting religious and social backgrounds of their leading representatives. We shall have more to say about this in another context. Later on, we shall also speak about how the particular nature of German Pietism is expressed in its social and geographic *distribution*. [184] Here we must once again remind ourselves that, of course, the differences between this emotional Pietism and the religious conduct of life of the Puritan saints are a matter of subtle nuance. If we had to make a provisional assessment of the practical effect of these differences, we might say that the virtues cultivated by Pietism tend to be those which might be developed by, on the one hand, the “faithful” [*berufstreu*] employee, laborer, and home worker, and, on the other hand, in the manner of Zinzendorf, rather patriarchally minded employers displaying pious *condescension*. Compared to this, Calvinism seems to have a closer affinity with the tough, upstanding, and active mind of the middle-class [*bürgerlich*] capitalist entrepreneur. [185]

Finally, *pure* emotional Pietism—as Ritschl [186] has stressed—is a religious pastime for “leisure classes.”<sup>27</sup> Inadequate though this description is—as will be shown—it does tally with certain differences in the economic character of the peoples who have been under the influence of one or other of the two ascetic traditions.

## [METHODISM]

A combination of emotional and yet ascetic religious practice and increasing indifference or even rejection of the dogmatic foundation of Calvinist asceticism is a distinguishing mark of the Anglo-American equivalent of continental Pietism, namely, *Methodism*. [187] The very name illustrates what struck its contemporaries about it: the “methodical” and systematic conduct of life with the purpose of achieving *certitudo salutis*—for this was crucial here, too, and it remained at the center of the religious strivings of the Methodists. The affinity which, despite all differences, it undoubtedly had with German Pietism [188] is evident in particular from the fact that this methodical approach was especially applied to the bringing about of the emotional act of “conversion.” And here—since Methodism was conceived as a mission for the masses from the very start—the emphasis on *feeling* that had been aroused in John Wesley by the influence of the Lutherans and the Herrnhut Brotherhood (Moravians) took on a strongly *emotional* character, especially on American soil. Repentance, which at times was only achieved after a frenzied struggle [*Bußkampf*] of terrifying proportions, and in America was preferably performed on the “penitent form” [*Angstbank*],<sup>28</sup> led to faith in God’s unmerited grace and at the same time to an immediate consciousness of justification and reconciliation.

With a fair amount of difficulty, this emotional religiosity now combined with the ethic which had once and for all been given a *rational* stamp by Puritanism. First of all, in contrast to Calvinism, which suspected everything purely emotional of being a delusion, absolute certainty of the saved person—the day and hour of whose conversion would normally be known—was regarded as the only indubitable foundation of *certitudo salutis*. Such certainty rested entirely on the *feelings* and flowed from the direct witness of the spirit. According to Wesley’s doctrine, which represents a logical development of the doctrine of sanctification, but is a decided departure from the orthodox version, a person reborn in this way can now, in *this* life, through the working of grace, come to the consciousness of *perfection*, or sinless-ness. This comes about through a second, separate, and equally sudden inner process known as “sanctification.” However difficult it may be to achieve this goal—and it is usually only only achieved toward the end of one’s life—it is vital to strive toward it—because it

provides the final guarantee of *certitudo salutis* and gives joyful assurance in place of the “morose” anxiety of the Calvinists [189]—and in any case the truly converted person must distinguish himself as such to himself and others by at least showing that sin “has no more power over him.”

Despite the crucial importance of the witness of *emotion*, the importance of the holy life, based upon the *law* [of God], is, of course, upheld. Where Wesley takes issue with the idea of “holiness through works” [*Werkgerechtigkeit*] commonly accepted in his time, he is doing no more than reviving the old Puritan idea that works are not the real grounds for the state of grace but only the grounds for recognizing it, and even this only when they are done exclusively for God’s glory. A good life [*der korrekte Wandel*] *alone* is not sufficient—as he experienced for himself—the *emotion* of the state of grace must be present as well. He himself occasionally describes works as a “condition” of grace, and in the Declaration of August 9, 1771 [190], he stresses that anyone who does no good works is no true believer.

In spite of all that, there were difficulties. [191] Since the certainty of “perseverantia” was linked to the *once only* act of repentance, *certitudo salutis* was no longer located in the consciousness of grace which flowed from constant testing in the ascetic life, but in the direct *emotion* of grace and perfection. This could mean one of two things for Methodists who were adherents of the doctrine of predestination. [192] Either, in the case of weak characters, there was a danger of adopting an antinomian<sup>29</sup> interpretation of “Christian freedom,” which meant the breakdown of the methodical conduct of life, or, if this logical extreme was resisted, the experience could lead to a degree of self-assurance in the saint which could reach dizzying heights [193]—an *emotional* intensification of the Puritan type. In the light of attacks from their opponents, the Methodists attempted to counter these problems in two ways. Firstly, by an increased emphasis on the normative validity of the Bible and the indispensability of proof. [194] Secondly, by a strengthening of Wesley’s anti-Calvinist tendency within the movement, which taught that grace could be lost. The strong Lutheran influences to which, through the mediation of the Moravian Brotherhood, Wesley had been exposed [195], strengthened this development and increased the *undefined* nature of the religious orientation of Methodist morality. [196] The result was that finally, in essence, the only concepts firmly held on to were

those of “regeneration”<sup>30</sup>—an emotional assurance of being saved which came as a direct fruit of *faith*, as indispensable foundation, and sanctification with its consequence of (at least virtual) freedom from the power of sin, as a demonstration of the state of grace. The importance of external means of grace, especially the sacraments, was correspondingly devalued.

Methodism therefore seems to us to be an edifice resting on ethical foundations as insecure as those of Pietism. However, the striving for the “higher life,”<sup>31</sup> and the “second blessing,” served as a kind of substitute for the doctrine of predestination, and, growing up on English soil, the practice of its ethics was certainly based on that of Reformed Christianity, of which it claimed to be a “revival.”<sup>32</sup>

The emotional act of conversion was brought about *methodically*, but its achievement was not followed by a pious *enjoyment* of communion with God in the style of the emotional Pietism of Zinzendorf; instead, the emotion thereby awakened was immediately directed into the path of the *rational striving* for perfection. The emotional character of the religious experience did not therefore lead to an inward type of emotional Christianity in the manner of German Pietism. Schneckenburger has already demonstrated that this feature is connected with a *less* developed sense of *sin* (due in part to the very fact of the emotional nature of the conversion experience). This has been a regular focus of criticism of Methodism ever since. Here the basic *Reformed* character of the religious feeling remained dominant. The emotional arousal took on the character of an enthusiasm which is occasionally whipped up “to a frenzy,” but which otherwise did not detract at all from the rational character of the conduct of life. [197] Methodist “regeneration”<sup>33</sup> thus merely created an *extension* of pure holiness through works: a religious grounding for the ascetic life [*Lebensführung*] when predestination had been abandoned. The distinguishing features of the conduct of life that were indispensable as a check on (or “condition of,” as Wesley would sometimes say) the genuineness of conversion are materially the same as for Calvinism. We can more or less disregard Methodism in relation to the idea of the calling, as it is a latecomer on the scene [198] and contributed nothing new to it. It only becomes important for our concerns when we come to a consideration of social ethics and thus to the regulation of working life [*Berufsleben*] by the ecclesiastical authorities. For it is

in the manner of its *organization* that its effectiveness particularly lies.

## [THE BAPTIST MOVEMENT]

From the point of view of their thought content as well as their historical development, the Pietism of the European continent and the Methodism of the Anglo-Saxon people are merely secondary phenomena. A second *autonomous* bearer of Protestant asceticism, alongside Calvinism, is the *Baptist* movement [*Täuferum*] and the sects [199] which, in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, directly or through acceptance of its religious modes of thought, emerged from it, namely, the *Baptists*, the *Mennonites*, and, above all, the *Quakers*. [200] With these we arrive at religious communities whose ethic rests on a basis which is different in principle from the Reformed doctrine. The following sketch, which only selects what is for the moment important for *us*, cannot convey any conception of the variety within this movement. Again we shall place the main emphasis on developments in the old capitalist countries.

From the historical point of view, the most important idea of all these communities (its significance for cultural development can only be made clear in a different context) is already familiar to us in outline, namely, the “believers’ church.”<sup>34</sup> [201] That is, the religious community, the “visible church,” to use the language of the Reformation churches [202], is no longer regarded as a kind of charitable foundation [*Fideikommissstiftung*] for celestial purposes, an *institution* which necessarily comprised the righteous and the unrighteous—whether it be for the increase of the glory of God (Calvinist), or for the mediation of salvation [*Heilsgüter*] to men (Catholic and Lutheran),—but exclusively as a community of *personal believers and born-again Christians* and only these: in other words, not as a “church,” but as a “sect”.<sup>35</sup> [203] This is what is intended to be symbolized by the (in itself) purely external principle of baptizing exclusively adults who have personally come to faith and confessed it. [204] For the Baptists [*Täufer*], as they have consistently stressed in all religious debates, “justification” through this faith is radically different from the idea of a “forensic” imputation of the merits of Christ, which dominates the orthodox dogma of old Protestantism. [205] It consists in the *inward appropriation* of his redeeming work. But this appropriation is the result of individual *revelation*, the working of the divine spirit in the individual, and *only* in this way. It is offered to everyone and the only requirement is to wait on the spirit and not to resist its



coming by sinful attachment to the world. The significance of faith in the sense of knowledge of the Church's doctrine, or in the sense of taking hold of God's grace in penitence, was quite muted in comparison, and there was a renaissance of early Christian pneumatic religious ideas, although these were very much remodeled. The sect for which Menno Simons, in his *Fondamentboek* (1539), first created a tolerably unified doctrine, claimed, as did the other Baptist sects, to be *the* true spotless Church of Christ, consisting, like the primitive Church, exclusively of those who had been *personally* awakened and called by God. The regenerate and they alone are the brethren of Christ, because, like him, they have been directly spiritually begotten by God. [206] The outcome for the first communities of Baptists was a strict *shunning* of the "world," that is, of all nonessential dealings with worldly people, linked with the strictest bibliocracy, which looked to the first generation of Christians as models to be emulated, and this principle of shunning the world never quite disappeared as long as the old spirit remained alive. [207]

From these motives, which dominated their early period, the Baptist sects appropriated that principle with which we are already familiar in Calvinism (though there it is justified in a slightly different way), and whose fundamental importance is a continuing theme, namely, the absolute *condemnation of all "idolatry"* as a devaluation of the reverence due to God alone. [208] For the first Swiss and Upper German generation of Baptists, the biblical way of conducting one's life was as radical as it originally was for Saint Francis: an abrupt break with all the pleasures of the world, and a life led strictly according to the example set by the apostles. And in truth the life of many of their first representatives recalls that of Saint Aegidius.<sup>36</sup> But this extremely strict biblical observance [209] was not very firmly based, when viewed in light of the pneumatic character of their religiosity. What God has revealed to the prophets and apostles is not the sum total of what he can reveal and wants to reveal. On the contrary, the continuation of the word, not as a written document, but as a force of the Holy Spirit working in the daily lives of the faithful, who speaks directly to the individual if he is willing to listen, is, as the early Christian communities testify, the sole mark of the true Church. This was the teaching of Schwenckfeld<sup>37</sup> *contra* Luther, and later of Fox *contra* the Presbyterians. Out of this idea of the continuing revelation has come the well-known doctrine, which was later developed consistently by the Quakers, of the significance of the inner witness of the spirit in reason and *conscience*.

In this way the principle of the *sole* authority (though not the validity) of the Bible was done away with, and at the same time a development was introduced which swept away all external and magical remnants of the Church's doctrine of salvation, including even, in the case of the Quakers, Baptism and the Holy Communion. [210] Only the "inner light" makes possible a true understanding even of the biblical revelation of God. [211] Its effect can, on the other hand, at least according to the Quakers, who took the doctrine to its logical conclusion, extend to people who have never known the biblical form of the revelation. The principle: "extra ecclesiam nulla salus" applies only to this *invisible* church of those illuminated by the spirit. *Without* the inner light, the natural man, even if guided by natural reason [212], remains a purely creaturely being, whose complete remoteness from God the Baptists, and the Quakers too, sensed more acutely than the Calvinists. On the other hand, the regeneration which the spirit brings about, if we *wait patiently* for it, and inwardly devote ourselves to it, *can*, since it is the work of God, lead to a condition of such complete victory over the power of sin [213] that relapses or indeed the loss of the state of grace become a practical impossibility. It remains true, however, as in the case of Methodism later, that the achievement of that state is not regarded as the norm; the degree of perfection of the individual is seen as subject to development.

Nevertheless *all* Baptist communities aim to be "*pure*" congregations in terms of the blameless lives led by their members. An inner separation from the world and its interests, and the absolute subordination to the authority of God, who speaks to us in our consciences, is also the sole unmistakable mark of true regeneration; the corresponding manner of life [*Wandel*] is thus a condition of salvation. It cannot be earned, but is the gracious gift of God. However, only the person who lives according to his conscience can regard himself as born again. In this sense, "good works" are a "causa sine qua non." As we can see, these latter thoughts of Barclay,<sup>38</sup> on which we have based this account, are again practically identical to the Reformed doctrine, and were undoubtedly developed under the influence of the Calvinist asceticism which the Baptist sects found in England and the Netherlands; George Fox devoted the whole of the early part his missionary activity to preaching the necessity of earnestly and inwardly appropriating this message.

Psychologically, however—since predestination is rejected—the specifically *methodical* character of Baptist morality rests above all on the idea of “*waiting*” upon the working of the spirit, which even to day characterizes the Quaker “meeting”<sup>39</sup> and is finely analyzed by Barclay: the purpose of this silent waiting is the overcoming of the instinctive and irrational, the passions and subjectivity of the “natural” man, who should be silent, in order to create that quietness in his soul in which alone God can speak. Admittedly, the effect of this “waiting” *can* result in hysterical states,<sup>40</sup> prophecy, and, where eschatological hopes are cherished, even to an outbreak of fanatical reforming zeal, as occurred in the Münster movement, which was crushed. But as Baptist ideas began to infiltrate normal secular life, the belief that God only speaks when the creature is silent evidently led to the calm *consideration* of actions and to the basing of these on careful individual searching of the conscience [214]. The practical lives of the later Baptist communities, particularly the Quakers, took on this calm, sober, and supremely *conscientious* character. Hand in hand with this went an accommodation to work in a calling. The leaders of the oldest movement of Baptists had been ruthlessly radical in their rejection of the world. However, even the first generation of Baptists had some prosperous, middle-class [*bürgerlich*] members, so the strictly apostolic conduct of life was clearly *not* held to be essential as evidence of rebirth for *all*. The earnest moral rigor of the Baptists had, in practice, followed the path trodden by Reformed ethics [215]—this was even before Menno, who firmly believed in the virtue of the innerworldly calling and private ownership of property. Ever since the time of Luther, whom Baptists followed in this matter, the development toward the otherworldly, monastic form of asceticism was ruled out as unscriptural and suggestive of justification by works.

Nevertheless, quite apart from the early semicomunist communities, which we shall not be dealing with, one Baptist sect—the “Tunker” (*Dompelaers* or *Dunckards*)—clung to the rejection of education and any possessions beyond what was essential to sustain life. Barclay, too, did not look upon loyalty to one’s calling [*Berufstreue*] with the eyes of a Calvinist, or even a Lutheran, seeing it rather in a Thomist sense as an inevitable *consequence*, “*naturali ratione*,” of the involvement of the believer in the world. [216]

While these views (like those of Spener and the German Pietists) implied a

weakening of the Calvinist idea of the calling, for the Baptist sects the intensity of their interest in the economic aspects of the calling was considerably *increased* by various factors. One of these was the refusal to accept state office, which was originally regarded as a religious duty deriving from rejection of the world. Even after it had been abandoned as a principle, it continued to exist in practice among Mennonites and Quakers at least, because the strict refusal to bear arms and to swear on oath disqualified them for public office. Hand in hand with this went an implacable opposition to every kind of aristocratic lifestyle, partly, as in the case of the Calvinists, as a result of the prohibition of (the idolatrous) glorification of the creature, and partly also as a consequence of their *unpolitical* or indeed *antipolitical* principles. The entire sober, conscientious, and methodical conduct of life of the Baptists was thus diverted into the path of the *unpolitical* life in a calling.

At the same time, the tremendous importance that the Baptist doctrine of salvation placed upon control by the conscience, which was seen as the way God reveals himself to the individual, marked out the question of conduct in business life [*Berufsleben*] as highly significant for the development of major aspects of the capitalist spirit, as we shall see when we come to look at the social ethics of Protestant asceticism. If we may anticipate in this matter at least, we shall see that, as early as the seventeenth century, the specific form taken by that innerworldly asceticism of the Baptists, and especially the Quakers [217], was expressed by putting into practice that important principle of capitalist “ethics” contained in the saying “honesty is the best policy” <sup>41</sup> [218]—of which Franklin’s tract is the “locus classicus.” On the other hand, we shall expect to find the effects of Calvinism more in the direction of the unleashing of the individual’s economic energy in the pursuit of private gain [*Erwerb*]. For despite all the formal legality of the “saint,” often enough Goethe’s maxim applied to the Calvinist as much as to others, namely, “When a man acts, he ignores his conscience; only the contemplative man has a conscience.” [219]

A further important element that contributed to the intensity of the innerworldly asceticism of the Baptist denominations can similarly only be considered later in a different context. Nevertheless, a few remarks may be permitted at this stage to justify our proposed procedure. We propose to take as our starting point *not* the objective social institutions of the old Protestant churches and their ethical

influences, and especially not *Church discipline*, which is, admittedly, very important, but the effects of the *subjective* appropriation of ascetic religiosity on the conduct of the *individual*. This is not only because this aspect of the matter is the one to which by far the least attention has been paid. It is also because the effect of Church discipline was by no means always uniform. Ecclesiastical policing of the life of the individual, which in the Calvinist state churches was taken almost to the level of the Inquisition, was quite *capable* of working *against* that release of the individual powers that resulted from ascetic striving for methodical appropriation of salvation. Indeed, it sometimes did *in fact* work against it.

Mercantilist regulation by the state was able to bring industries into being, but, at least on its own, could not produce the capitalist “spirit”—indeed, where this regulation took on a character like that of authoritarian police, the spirit might actually be paralyzed by it. Ecclesiastical regulation of asceticism could have the same effect, if it became too overbearingly intrusive. In this instance, it would compel a certain outward behavior but might paralyze the subjective motives for a methodical conduct of life. On this point, too, we shall have something to say when we come to consider the social policy of ascetic Protestantism. We shall then have to take account of the great difference that existed between the effect of the authoritarian moral police of the state *churches*, and the moral police of the *sects*, which depended on people subjecting themselves to it voluntarily. The fact that all the denominations of the Baptist movement always created “sects,” not “churches,” certainly increased the intensity of its asceticism as much—though in varying degrees—as it did in those Calvinist, Pietist, and Methodist communities which were *de facto* pushed into forming voluntarist communities.

Our task is now to follow the Puritan idea of the calling in its effect on *business* life [*Erwerbsleben*], having tried, in the preceding outline, to show the development of its religious foundation. However many deviations there may have been among the different ascetic religious communities as regards details, and however varied may have been the emphasis placed on those aspects which are significant for our purpose, these aspects were present and active in all of them. To recapitulate, what has been crucial for our consideration was always the view (which recurs in all denominations) of the religious “state of grace” as a status<sup>42</sup> that separates man from the depravity of the creaturely and from the

“world” [220]. Possession of this status, however—no matter how the dogmas of the different denominations might teach their followers to acquire it—could only be guaranteed by *proving oneself* [*Bewährung*] in a specific form of conduct unambiguously distinct from the style of life of the “natural” man. The consequence for the individual was the drive to *keep a methodical check* on his state of grace as shown in how he conducted his life and thus to ensure that his life was imbued with *asceticism*. This ascetic style of life, however, as we have seen, meant a *rational* shaping of one’s whole existence in obedience to God’s will. And this asceticism was no longer an *opus supererogationis*, but could be expected of everyone wanting to be sure of salvation. This *rationalization* of the conduct of life in the world with a view to the beyond is the *idea of the calling* characteristic of ascetic Protestantism.

Christian asceticism, which was originally a flight from the world into solitude, had already once dominated the world on behalf of the Church from the monastery, by renouncing the world. In doing this, however, it had, on the whole, left the natural, spontaneous character of secular everyday life unaffected. Now it would enter the market place of life, slamming the doors of the monastery behind it, and set about permeating precisely this secular everyday life with its methodical approach, turning it toward a rational life *in* the world, but neither *of* this world nor *for* it. Our remaining chapters will attempt to show to what extent it succeeded. [Editors’ note: In fact, there is only one more chapter.]

## 2. [ASCETICISM AND THE CAPITALIST SPIRIT]

In order to grasp the links between the fundamental religious ideas of ascetic Protestantism and the maxims of everyday economic life, it is necessary to turn, in particular, to those theological writings which clearly belong within the sphere of practical pastoral care. In an age in which the afterlife was everything, and the Christian's social standing depended on admission to the Holy Communion, the Christian minister exercised an influence through pastoral care, church discipline, and preaching, *beyond anything the modern mind can imagine*. This much is clear from a glance at the collections of "consilia," "casus conscientiae," etc. In such an age, the religious forces at work in *this* practical sphere are the decisive formative influences on the "national character."

In our discussions in *this* section, in contrast to later discussions, we can treat ascetic Protestantism as a *single* phenomenon. Since, however, English Puritanism, which grew out of Calvinism, is the most consistent foundation of the idea of the calling, we shall, in accordance with our principles, concentrate on one of its representatives. Richard *Baxter* stands out from many other literary representatives of the Puritan ethic by his eminently practical and irenic<sup>43</sup> position, and at the same time by the universal recognition of his works, which have been reprinted many times and translated into various languages. A Presbyterian and apologist for the Westminster Synod, and yet—like so many of the finest minds of his time—gradually growing away from the dogmas of High Calvinism, he was inwardly an opponent of Cromwell's usurping of power, because he was averse to all revolution, to sects, and especially to the fanatical zeal of the "saints." At the same time, he was very generous in his attitude toward external peculiarities and was objective toward his opponents. He sought out his field of activity essentially in the area of practical furtherance of church life and the moral life, and—as one of the most successful pastors in history—in this service he placed himself at the disposal of the parliamentary government, as well as of Cromwell and of the Restoration [221], and it was in this latter period that he eventually—before the "days of Saint Bartholomew"—left office. His "Christian Directory" is the most comprehensive compendium of Puritan moral theology in existence, while at the same time being based on his practical experience of pastoral care. For comparison we shall also, in rather cursory

fashion, due to shortage of space, consider Spener's "Theologische Bedenken," representing German Pietism, Barclay's "Apology," representing Quakerism, and other representatives of ascetic ethics [222, 223].

If we take Baxter's "The Saints' Everlasting Rest" and his "Christian Directory" or similar works of other writers, what first strikes us in the judgments on wealth and its acquisition [*Erwerb*] is the stress on the "ebionitic"<sup>44</sup> elements of the New Testament message. [224] Wealth as such is a serious danger, its temptations never cease, and the striving for it is not only pointless in the face of the overwhelming importance of the kingdom of God, but is also morally questionable. Calvin, far from seeing the wealth of the clergy as a hindrance to their effectiveness, saw it as giving them a thoroughly desirable increase in their prestige, and permitted them to invest their wealth for profit, although without giving offense. Baxter's kind of asceticism, by contrast, seems directed *against* all striving toward the procurement [*Erwerb*] of temporal goods. This disapproval is strongly felt—however, we need to look more closely to appreciate its crucial ethical meaning and context. What is really reprehensible is *resting* on one's possessions [225], *enjoyment* of wealth with its consequences of idleness and the lusts of the flesh, and particularly of distraction from the striving for a "holy" life. And it is *only because* possessions bring with them the danger of this resting that they are dubious. For the "saints' everlasting rest" is to be found in the next life; on earth, if he is to be sure of his state of grace, man must "do the works of him who sent him, as long as it is day." According to God's unambiguously revealed will, it is *only* action, not idleness and indulgence, that serves to increase his glory. [226] *Wasting time* is therefore the first and most serious of all sins. The span of life is infinitely short and precious, and must be used to "secure" one's own calling. Loss of time through socializing, "idle talk" [227], luxurious living [228], even more sleep than is required for health [229]—six to eight hours at the most—is morally, absolutely reprehensible. [230] Franklin's maxim "Time is money" is not yet current, but it applies, to some extent, in a spiritual sense. It is infinitely valuable, because every lost hour means one less hour devoted to labor in the service of God's glory. [231] Hence, inactive contemplation is also valueless and possibly quite reprehensible, at least when it is engaged in at the expense of labor in a calling. [232] For it is *less* pleasing to God than the active doing of his will in a calling. [233] Moreover, Sunday exists for this, and according to Baxter it is always those who are idle in their calling who have no time for God either at the



appointed hour. [234]

Accordingly, there is a thread of constantly repeated, and at times almost passionate, preaching of hard, constant, physical or mental *work* running through Baxter's writing. [235] Two motifs come together here. [236] Work is firstly the well-tryed *ascetic means* for which it was always valued in the Western Church. [237] It is, in particular, the specific protection against all those temptations which for Puritanism comprise the concept of the "unclean life"—and its role should not be underestimated. For Puritanism, sexual asceticism differs only in degree, not in principle, from monastic asceticism, and, since it also applies to conjugal life, is more far-reaching than the latter. For even in marriage, sexual intercourse is *only* permissible as the means willed by God for the increase of his glory, in accordance with the command: "Be fruitful and multiply." [238] Together with a moderate, vegetarian diet and cold baths, the prescription for all sexual temptations is the same as that for religious doubt and overscrupulous self-torment—"Work hard in your calling." [239]

Above and beyond this, however, work is *the* end and purpose of life commanded by God. [240] The Pauline principle "He who will not work, shall not eat," applies absolutely and to everyone. [241] Unwillingness to work is a symptom of the absence of the state of grace. [242]

There is a clear departure here from the medieval doctrine. According to Thomas Aquinas's interpretation of the Pauline principle [243], work is only necessary "naturali ratione" for the preservation of the life of the individual and the community. Where this purpose is missing, the validity of the command ceases along with it. It applies only to mankind in general, not to each individual. It does not apply to anyone who can live off his possessions without having to work, and similarly, of course, contemplation as a spiritual form of work for the kingdom of God is outside the scope of the command in its literal interpretation. For popular theology in particular, the highest form of monastic "productivity" lay in the increase of the "thesaurus eccle siae" by prayer and chanting.

Baxter not only does away with these exceptions to the ethical duty of labor

(which is only to be expected), but also insists as strongly as possible on the principle that even wealth does not excuse anyone from that unconditional command. [244] Those with possessions, too, should not eat unless they work, for even if they do not need to work to cover their subsistence needs, nevertheless God's command remains in force, and they must obey it, just as the poor must do. [245] For everyone, without distinction, God's providence has prepared a calling,<sup>45</sup> which each person must recognize and work within, and this calling is not (as it is in Lutheranism) [246] a destiny to which one must submit and resign oneself, but a command of God to the individual to work to his glory. This seemingly slightly different nuance has far-reaching consequences and is connected to a further development of that *providential* interpretation of the economic cosmos with which the scholastics were already familiar.

The phenomenon of the division of labor, and of the structuring of society according to occupation [*Berufsgliederung*], had already been seen by Thomas Aquinas (to whom we can here most conveniently refer again) as the direct result of God's plan for the world. But the involvement of man in this cosmos occurs "ex causis naturalibus" and is fortuitous ("contingent,"<sup>46</sup> to use scholastic terminology). In Luther's eyes, as we have seen, the integration of men in the given estates and occupations, which followed from the objective historical order, was directly willed by God, and thus the individual's *perseverance* in the position and within the limitations to which God had assigned him became a religious duty. This was all the more the case since the relationship of Lutheran piety to the "world" was always rather uncertain. Luther's thinking produced no ethical *principles* according to which the world might be *shaped*, Luther never having quite rid himself of his Pauline *indifference* to the world. One therefore had to simply take the world *as it was*, and *this* alone could be declared a religious duty.

Subtly different again, in the Puritan philosophy, was the providential character of the interplay of private economic interests. True to the Puritan scheme of "pragmatic" interpretation, one can recognize what is the providential purpose of occupational structures by their *fruits*. Baxter elaborates on these fruits in ways which in more than one respect recall Adam Smith's well-known apotheosis of the division of labor. [247] Specialization in occupations, because it enables the

workman to use his skill, leads to improvements in both the quantity and the quality of performance and thus serves the common best,<sup>47</sup> which is identical with the good of the greatest number. To this extent, the motivation is purely utilitarian and closely related to much that was already common in the secular literature of the time. [248] However, the characteristically Puritan element rapidly emerges, when Baxter prefaces his argument with the maxim: “Outside of a well-marked calling, the accomplishments of a man are only casual and irregular, and he spends more time in idleness than at work,” and concludes: “and he (the worker in a calling) will carry out his work *in order*<sup>48</sup> while another remains in constant confusion, and his business knows neither time nor place . . . therefore is a certain calling (elsewhere termed a ‘stated calling’)<sup>49</sup> [249] is the best for everyone.” The irregular work that the normal day laborer is forced to do is a frequently unavoidable, but always an unwanted, intermediate condition. The life of the man without a calling lacks the systematic and methodical character that, as we have seen, is demanded by innerworldly asceticism.

According to the Quaker ethic, too, man’s life in a calling should be a consistent ascetic exercise, proof of his state of grace by his *conscientiousness*, which expresses itself in the care [250] and methodical approach with which he pursues his calling. It is not work itself, but rational work in a calling that is demanded by God. The Puritan idea of the calling always emphasizes the methodical character of the asceticism of the calling, and not, as with Luther, submission to the destiny which God apportions. For this reason, the question of whether one can combine several callings<sup>50</sup> is answered in the affirmative—if this is beneficial for one’s own [251] or the general good, is not detrimental to anyone else, and does not cause one to be “unfaithful” in any one of these callings. Furthermore, a *change* of occupation is in no way regarded as reprehensible, provided it is not entered into lightly, and the change is to a calling which is more pleasing to God [252], which means, in general, more useful.

Above all, the usefulness of a calling and correspondingly the degree to which it is pleasing to God depends, primarily, on moral criteria, and then on the level of importance for the “community” of the benefits produced; the third, and of course in practice the most important, criterion is private economic “*profitability*.” [253] For if the God that the Puritan sees as acting in all the fortunes of life reveals to one of his children the opportunity to make a profit,

then there is a purpose in this. Consequently, the believing Christian must follow this call by taking advantage of this opportunity. [254] “If God show you a way in which you may lawfully *get more* than in another way (*without wrong to your soul or to any other*), if you refuse this, and choose the less gainful way, *you cross one of the ends of your calling, and you refuse to be God’s steward*, and to accept His gifts and use them for Him when He requireth it: *you may labor to be rich for God*, though not for the flesh and sin.”<sup>51</sup> [255]

Riches are only dangerous when they tempt us to idleness and sinful indulgence; and striving for riches is only dangerous when it is done with the aim of later leading a carefree life of pleasure. As an exercise of the duty of the calling, however, it is not only morally permissible, but actually commanded [256], the parable of the unfaithful servant who was cast aside because he had not invested the pound which God had entrusted to him seemed to express this directly. [257] To *want* to be poor, it was often argued, was the same as wanting to be ill [258]; it was to be condemned as seeking justification by works [*Werkheiligkeit*], detrimental to the glory of God. Most of all, begging by one who is capable of work is not only sinful sloth, but is also, as the apostle said, contrary to charity. [259]

Just as the emphasis on the ascetic significance of the “certain calling” ethically transforms *modern professional practice* [*Fachmenschentum*], so also the knowledge that the opportunity of profit forms part of God’s providence ethically transforms the men of *business*. [260] The easygoing superiority of the lord and the ostentation of the upstart snob are both equally abhorrent to asceticism. By contrast, the plain middle-class [*bürgerlich*] selfmade man<sup>52</sup> enjoys ethical approval in full measure [261]: “God blesseth his trade”<sup>53</sup> is a common expression for those saints [262] who successfully followed that divine guidance, and the whole might of the *Old Testament God*, who rewards his children for their righteousness in *this* life [263], inevitably tended to exercise the same influence on the Puritan, who, following Baxter’s advice, kept a check on his own state of grace by comparing it with the spiritual state of the heroes of the Bible [264], interpreting biblical texts as if they were “clauses in a code of laws.”

In themselves the statements in the Old Testament were by no means unambiguous. We have seen that Luther first used the term “Beruf” in the secular sense when translating a text in Ecclesiasticus. The Book of Ecclesiasticus ( Jesus Sirach), however, in the whole atmosphere with which it is infused, undoubtedly gives the impression of being one of the most traditionalist parts of the Old Testament (including the Apocrypha). It is noteworthy that this book seems to be particularly popular among Lutheran German peasants to this very day, [265] just as the strongly Lutheran character of broad swathes of German Pietism tended to express itself in a preference for the book. [266]

The Puritans, who drew a sharp distinction between the divine and the creaturely, rejected the Apocrypha because it was not the inspired word of God. [267] Its absence, however, only increased the influence of Job, among the canonical books. In it, a magnificent glorification of God’s absolutely sovereign majesty, to which human measures could not be applied, and which was so congenial to Calvinist views, was ultimately allied to the certainty, less important for Calvin but important for Puritanism, that God customarily blesses his children in this life as well as the next, and not only spiritually but in a material sense, too. [268] The Oriental quietism that speaks through many of the most moving verses of the Psalms and Proverbs were glossed over, just as Baxter glossed over the traditionalist tone of the passage in 1 Corinthians on which the concept of the calling is based.

Conversely, great stress was given to those passages of the Old Testament which praise *formal legal observance* as a mark of conduct pleasing to God. The theory was that the Mosaic law was only divested of its validity by the new covenant to the extent that it contained ceremonial or historically conditioned regulations for the Jewish people, but otherwise had always been valid and therefore remained so as the expression of the “lex naturae.” [269] This made it possible to eliminate those regulations which could simply not be applied to modern life, while at the same time, through numerous related features of Old Testament morality, giving free rein to a powerful strengthening of that spirit of self-righteous and sober legality characteristic of this kind of innerworldly Protestant asceticism. [270] So if the tone of English Puritanism is defined as “English Hebraism,”<sup>54</sup> [271] (and many contemporaries as well as more recent writers have defined it as such), this is, rightly understood, quite an accurate definition.

However, it is only accurate if applied to the Judaism that emerged under the influence of many centuries of legalistic and talmudic training, not the Palestinian Judaism of the period when the Old Testament writings were being produced. The mood of ancient Judaism, which was, on the whole, inclined to uninhibited appreciation of life as such, is rather far removed from the specific character of Puritanism.

In a sketch of this nature it would be impossible to set forth in detail the characterological consequences of the permeation of life with Old Testament norms, although it is tempting to undertake this task (so far it has not even been attempted for Judaism itself). [272] Alongside the features already suggested, what is worthy of consideration in particular for the inner disposition of the Puritan is the fact that in him the conviction of belonging to the chosen people of God enjoyed a magnificent renaissance. [273] Just as even the gentle Baxter thanks God that he caused him to be born in England and in the true Church and not elsewhere, so too does this gratitude for their blamelessness (effected by God) infuse the mood [274] of the Puritan middle classes [*Bürgertum*] and bring about that formal rectitude and resilience of character typical of the representatives of that heroic age of capitalism.

We shall now highlight those particular points in which the Puritan concept of the calling and the insistence on an ascetic conduct of life *directly* influenced the development of the capitalist style of life. Asceticism turns all its force (as we have seen) against one thing in particular: the *uninhibited enjoyment* of life and of the pleasures it has to offer. This was most characteristically expressed in the battle surrounding the “Book of Sports,”<sup>55</sup> [275] which James I and Charles I raised to the status of law for the declared purpose of combating Puritanism, and which Charles I ordered to be read from every pulpit. When the Puritans fanatically opposed the king’s decree that on Sunday certain popular pastimes should be permitted by law outside the time of worship, it was *not only* the disturbance of the peace of the Sabbath that enraged them, but the deliberate distraction from the ordered life of the saints that it represented. And when the king threatened any who attacked the legality of those sports with severe penalties, his purpose was precisely to break that *ascetic* tendency, which was dangerous to the state because it was *antiauthoritarian*. The monarchical and feudal society protected the “pleasure seekers” against the rising middle-class

[*bürgerlich*] morality and the antiauthoritarian ascetic conventicles in much the same way as capitalist society today tends to protect those “willing to work” against the class morality of the workers and the antiauthoritarian trade unions. Against this, the Puritans stood for the *principle* of ascetic conduct.

In fact, the Puritans—even the Quakers—were by no means opposed to sport in principle. It did, however, have to serve the *rational* purpose of providing sufficient recreation to maintain physical fitness. As a means of purely uninhibited expression of uncontrolled instincts, it was, of course, viewed with suspicion, and to the extent that it encouraged mere indulgence, let alone if it aroused naked ambition, raw instincts, or the irrational desire to gamble, it was, naturally, regarded as absolutely reprehensible. *Instinctual* enjoyment of life, which was equally prejudicial to the life of the calling and to piety, was quite simply the enemy of rational asceticism, whether it took the form of “seigneurial” sport or of the dance halls and taverns frequented by the common man. [276]

Accordingly, the attitude to cultural products [*Kulturgütern*] that were not directly religious was one of suspicion and often hostility. It was not as though the Puritan ideal of life embodied a gloomy philistinism that despised culture. Precisely the opposite is true, at least as regards science and scholarship—with the exception of “scholasticism,” which they loathed. And the most prominent representatives of the Puritan movement were deeply imbued with Renaissance learning: the sermons of the Presbyterian wing were stuffed with classical allusions, [277] and even the radicals were not averse to the use of such erudition in theological controversy, while not hesitating to criticize others who employed it. Probably no country has been so rich in “graduates”<sup>56</sup> as New England in the first generation of its existence. The satire of their opponents, like Butler’s “Hudibras,” also takes as its starting point the pedantry of the Puritans and the dialectic in which they were schooled. This, as we shall see later, had to do in *part* with the religious value placed on knowledge, a value which derived from the Puritan attitude toward the Catholic doctrine of “fides implicita.”

It is a different matter as soon as we enter the area of nonscientific literature [278] and, beyond that, of the “art that appeals to the senses.” Here asceticism

lay like a frost on the life of “Merrie England.” The fact that in Holland a great, often earthly realistic art could develop [279] only goes to show the limitations of authoritarian controls over morals in these areas. Once the brief dominance of the Calvinist theocracy had given way to a sober state church regime, and the strong ascetic appeal of Calvinism had waned, [280] the influence of the court and the regents<sup>57</sup> and of the pleasure-seeking newly rich petite bourgeoisie proved too strong.

The Puritans found the theater reprehensible; nor did the radicals stop at strictly eliminating eroticism and nudity from the range of what was “possible” in literature and art. The concepts of “idle talk,” “superfluities,” [281] “vain ostentation”<sup>58</sup>—all terms denoting behavior which is irrational, aimless, and therefore neither ascetic nor to the glory of God, but serving man—these were all quickly brought into play in order to decry the employment of artistic motives and decisively to promote plain utility. This applied particularly where personal adornment, such as style of clothing [282], was concerned. The powerful tendency toward increasing uniformity of lifestyle, which today is encouraged by the capitalist interest in the “standardization”<sup>59</sup> of production [283], has its spiritual [*ideell*] basis in the rejection of the “worship of the creature.” [284]

Of course, we should not forget that Puritanism embraced a world of opposites, that the instinctive sense of the timelessly great in art was certainly more highly developed in its leaders than it was in the “Cavaliers,” [285] and that a unique genius like Rembrandt, however little his “conduct” would have found favor in the eyes of the Puritan God, was yet vitally influenced in the direction taken by his creative work by the sectarian milieu in which he lived. [286] That, however, does not alter the total picture at all to the extent that literature (and only that of later generations) was the genre that chiefly benefited from the powerful spiritualization of the personality, which the further development of the Puritan aura was able to produce and in fact helped to form.

Without examining all the directions in which Puritanism exercised influence, let us just recall that the degree of toleration afforded to pleasure in cultural products serving purely aesthetic or sporting indulgence was limited by one characteristic factor: they *must not cost anything*. Man was merely the steward



of the gifts granted him by God's grace; he, like the wicked servant in the Bible, must give an account of every penny [287], and it is at the very least dubious whether he should expend any of this money for a purpose which serves not God's glory, but his own pleasure. [288] Which of us with eyes to see has not met people of this persuasion right up to our own time? [289] The idea of the *obligation* of man to the possessions entrusted to him, to which he subordinates himself as servant and steward or even as "moneymaking machine," lies on life with its chill weight. *If* he will only persevere on the ascetic path, then the more possessions he acquires, the heavier becomes the feeling of responsibility to preserve them undiminished to God's glory and to increase them through tireless labor. Some of the roots of this style of life go right back to the Middle Ages, like so many elements of the capitalist spirit [290], but it was only in the ethics of ascetic Protestantism that it found a consistent ethical foundation. Its significance for the development of capitalism is obvious. [291]

If we may sum up what has been said so far, then, innerworldly Protestant asceticism works with all its force against the uninhibited *enjoyment* of possessions; it discourages *consumption*, especially the consumption of luxuries. Conversely, it has the effect of liberating the *acquisition of wealth* from the inhibitions of traditionalist ethics; it breaks the fetters on the striving for gain by not only legalizing it, but (in the sense described) seeing it as directly willed by God. The fight against the lusts of the flesh and the desire to cling to outward possessions, as not only the Puritans but also the great apologist of Quakerism, Barclay, expressly testify, is *not* a fight against wealth and profit, but against the temptations associated with them.

The latter lie, however, principally in the cherishing of *ostentatious* forms of luxury which are to be condemned as worship of the creature [292], and which are so dear to the feudal mind, instead of the rational and utilitarian use of wealth for the good of the individual and the community. The wealthy man should not be compelled to *mortify the flesh* [293], but he should make use of his wealth for necessary and *practically useful* things. The concept of "comfort"<sup>60</sup> embraces the range of ethically permissible uses of wealth, and it is of course no coincidence that the development of the style of life defined by that concept has been observed earliest and most clearly in the most consistent representatives of this whole philosophy, the Quakers. Their ideal was the cleanliness and security

of the comfortable middle-class home, in contrast to the glitter and dazzle of Cavalier pomp, which, resting on a shaky economic foundation, preferred shabby elegance to sober simplicity. [294]

While favoring the *production* of private economic wealth, asceticism was opposed to injustice and purely *instinctive* greed—for it was this that it condemned as “covetousness” and “mammonism,”<sup>61</sup> etc., namely, the striving for wealth for the ultimate purpose of *being* wealthy. Wealth as such was a temptation. Here, however, asceticism was “the Power that would constantly do good but constantly does evil”<sup>62</sup>—at least what it saw as evil, namely, wealth and its attendant temptations. For, in the spirit of the Old Testament, (and there is a parallel here to the ethical assessment of “good works”), it not only saw in the striving for wealth *as a goal* the ultimate in what is reprehensible; it also regarded wealth achieved as the *fruit* of labor in a calling as a blessing from God. Furthermore, and even more important, a religious value was placed on ceaseless, constant, systematic labor in a secular calling as the very highest ascetic path and at the same time the surest and most visible proof of regeneration and the genuineness of faith. This was inevitably the most powerful lever imaginable with which to bring about the spread of that philosophy of life which we have here termed the “spirit” of capitalism. [295] And if that restraint on consumption is *combined with* the freedom to strive for profit, the result produced will inevitably be the *creation of capital* through the *ascetic compulsion to save*. [296]

The inhibitions which stood in the way of consumption of what had been acquired favored its productive use: as *investment* capital. It is, of course, impossible to put a precise figure on how great this effect was. In New England the connection was sufficiently tangible for it to be detected by that outstanding historian, [John Andrew] Doyle. [297] But even in Holland, where strict Calvinism only really prevailed for seven years, the greater simplicity of life, coupled with tremendous wealth, which was found in the more seriously religious circles, led to an obsessive desire to accumulate capital. [298]

Obviously, the tendency to “ennoble” middle-class [*bürgerlich*] fortunes, a tendency which has always been present everywhere and in all ages, and is still

active in our country today, was significantly reduced by the Puritan aversion to the feudal lifestyle. Seventeenth-century English mercantilist writers attributed the superiority of Dutch capital over that of England to the fact that in Holland those who had recently acquired fortunes did not, as happened in England, regularly seek ennoblement by investment in land and the adoption of feudal lifestyles—for it was this rather than land purchase that really mattered, as it rendered the capital no longer available to be utilized for capitalist investment. [299] The particular estimation of *agriculture* (shared by the Puritans) as an especially important branch of commerce, which was also particularly conducive to piety, applied (for Baxter, for example) not to the landlord, but to the yeoman and farmer,<sup>63</sup> and in the eighteenth century not to the Junker but to the “rational” *farmer* [300].

Wherever the power of the Puritan philosophy of life extended, it always benefited the tendency toward a middle-class [*bürgerlich*], economically *rational* conduct of life, of which it was the most significant and only consistent support. This is, of course, far more important than merely encouraging the formation of capital. It stood at the cradle of modern “economic man.” Certainly, these Puritan ideals of life could be defeated when subjected to an unduly strong pressure from the “temptations” of wealth—temptations well known to the Puritans themselves. Quite regularly—as we shall see later—we find the most authentic followers of the Puritan spirit in the ranks of the *rising* petit bourgeois and the farmers. The “*beati possidentes*,” even among the Quakers, were often prepared to deny their old ideals. [301] It was, after all, the same fate as that which befell medieval monastic asceticism again and again: when rational economic procedures in the context of a strictly controlled life and restrained consumption, had had their full effect, either the gains that had been made went directly into “ennobling”—as in the period before the religious separation—or monastic discipline threatened to disintegrate, and one of the numerous “reformations” had to intervene. The entire history of the monastic orders is, in a sense, one of constant wrestling with the problem of the secularizing influence of wealth.

The same thing applies on a massive scale to the innerworldly asceticism of Puritanism. The mighty “revival” of Methodism, which preceded the rapid development of English industry toward the end of the eighteenth century, can—

if the comparison is taken with a pinch of salt!—be very aptly likened to such a reform of the monasteries. Those mighty religious movements, whose significance for economic development lay primarily in the ascetic *education* they provided, only developed their full *economic* effect after the pinnacle of purely religious enthusiasm had been left behind, the frenzied search for the kingdom of God was beginning to dissolve into sober virtue in pursuit of the calling, and the religious roots were beginning to die and give way to utilitarian earthly concerns. This was the time when, to use [Edward] Dowden's example, "Robinson Crusoe," the *isolated economic man* who engages in missionary work in his spare time [302], has taken the place in the popular imagination of Bunyan's "Pilgrim," hastening through "Vanity Fair," striving, in his inner loneliness, to reach the heavenly kingdom. When subsequently the phrase "to make the best of *both* worlds"<sup>64</sup> gained currency, the quiet conscience (as Dowden has observed) was simply included among the means of achieving a comfortable middle-class life. The idea is neatly expressed by the German proverb "Ein gutes Gewissen ist ein sanftes Ruhekitzen."<sup>65</sup> What that religiously vibrant era of the seventeenth century bequeathed to its utilitarian heir was, however, above all a tremendously clear—indeed, we can confidently say a *pharisaically* clear—conscience when it came to making money, provided only that it was lawfully done. The last remnant of "Deo placere non potest" disappeared. [303] A specifically *middle-class ethic of the calling* arose. In the consciousness of living in the full grace of God and being visibly blessed by him, the middle-class businessman was able to pursue his commercial interests. Indeed, provided he conducted himself within the bounds of formal correctness, and as long as his moral conduct was beyond reproach and the use to which he put his wealth gave no offense, it was his *duty* to do so.

Moreover, the power of religious asceticism made available to him sober, conscientious, and unusually capable workers, who were devoted to work as the divinely willed purpose in life. [304] In addition, he was given the comforting assurance that the unequal distribution of this world's goods was the special work of the providence of God, who by means of these distinctions, and his "particular" grace, was working out his secret purposes, of which we know nothing. [305] Calvin had already made the often quoted remark that only when the "people," that is, the mass of workers and craftsmen, were kept in poverty would they remain obedient to God. [306] The Dutch (Pieter de la Court and others) then "secularized" this to say that the mass of people would only *work* if

driven to do so by necessity, and this formulation of one of the leitmotifs of capitalist economics then became merged with the broader theory of the “productivity” of low wages. Here, too, the utilitarian interpretation has come subtly to underpin an idea which is now cut off from its religious roots, following the pattern that we have observed so many times.

Seen from the *other* point of view, that of the *workers*, the Zinzendorf variety of Pietism, for example, glorifies the faithful worker who does not look for profit but lives according to the example of the apostles and is thus endowed with the charisma of discipleship. [307] Similar but even more radical views were originally widespread among the Baptists. Indeed, the entire ascetic literature of *all* denominations is imbued with the attitude that faithful work, even for low wages, by those to whom life has dealt no other opportunities, is highly pleasing to God. Protestant asceticism added nothing new to this. But it did add tremendous depth to the view and created the psychological *drive* for this norm to achieve its effect by interpreting such work as a *calling*, and as the *sole* means of making sure of one’s state of grace. [308] It also legalized the exploitation of this characteristic willingness to work by interpreting the employer’s moneymaking as a “calling” too. [309] Obviously, the “productivity” of work in the capitalist sense of the word was given a powerful boost by this *exclusive* striving for the kingdom of God through fulfillment of the duty of labor as a calling and through strict asceticism, since Church discipline naturally imposed this on the impoverished classes in particular. Treatment of work as a “calling” was as characteristic for the modern worker as the corresponding view of commerce was for the employer.

A constituent part of the capitalist spirit, and not only this but of modern culture, namely, the rational conduct of life on the foundation of the *idea of the calling*, was born (as this essay shows) out of the spirit of *Christian asceticism*. One only needs to reread Franklin’s tract (quoted at the beginning of this essay) to see that the essential elements of the attitude which is there termed the “spirit of capitalism” are precisely those which we found to be the content of Puritan asceticism of the calling [310], only *without* the religious foundation, which had already ceased to exist at the time of Franklin.

The idea that, in the modern age, work [*Berufsarbeit*] bears the stamp of *asceticism* is not exactly new either. At the height of his wisdom, *Goethe*, in his “*Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*” and in the ending which he gave to the life of his *Faust*, tried to teach us the basic *ascetic* motive of the middle-class style of life—if it aspires to be a genuine style of life at all—namely, that restricting oneself to specialized work, with the inevitable consequence of the abandonment of the Faustian universality of humankind [*Menschentum*], is the precondition in today’s world for any worthwhile action. In other words, the “deed” and “renunciation” are bound together in mutual dependence. [311] For him this recognition meant a resigned farewell to a period of full and fine humanity, the likes of which we shall not see again in the course of our cultural development, any more than the period of the full flowering of Athens in antiquity will be repeated.

The Puritans *wanted* to be men of the calling—we, on the other hand, *must be*. For when asceticism moved out of the monastic cells and into working life, and began to dominate innerworldly morality, it helped to build that mighty cosmos of the modern economic order (which is bound to the technical and economic conditions of mechanical and machine production). Today this mighty cosmos determines, with overwhelming coercion, the style of life *not only* of those directly involved in business but of every individual who is born into this mechanism, and may well continue to do so until the day that the last ton of fossil fuel has been consumed.

In Baxter’s view, concern for outward possessions should sit lightly on the shoulders of his saints “like a thin cloak which can be thrown off at any time.” [312] But fate decreed that the cloak should become a shell as hard as steel [*stahlhartes Gehäuse*].<sup>66</sup> As asceticism began to change the world and endeavored to exercise its influence over it, the outward goods of this world gained increasing and finally inescapable power over men, as never before in history. Today its spirit has fled from this shell—whether for all time, who knows? Certainly, victorious capitalism has no further need for this support now that it rests on the foundation of the machine. Even the optimistic mood of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems destined to fade away, and the idea of the “duty in a calling” haunts our lives like the ghost of once-held religious beliefs. Where “doing one’s job” [*Berufserfüllung*] cannot be directly linked to

the highest spiritual and cultural values—although it may be felt to be more than mere economic coercion—the individual today usually makes no attempt to find any meaning in it. Where capitalism is at its most unbridled, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth [*Erwerbsstreben*], divested of its metaphysical significance, today tends to be associated with purely elemental passions, which at times virtually turn it into a sporting contest. [313]

No one yet knows who will live in that shell in the future. Perhaps new prophets will emerge, or powerful old ideas and ideals will be reborn at the end of this monstrous development. Or perhaps—if neither of these occurs—“Chinese” ossification,<sup>67</sup> dressed up with a kind of desperate self-importance, will set in. Then, however, it might truly be said of the “last men” in this cultural development: “specialists without spirit, hedonists without a heart, these nonentities imagine they have attained a stage of humankind [*Menschentum*] never before reached.”

Here, however, we are getting into the area of judgments of value and belief, with which this purely historical study should not be encumbered. The task before us is rather to indicate the significance (only touched on in this sketch) of ascetic rationalism for the content of the *ethic* of the *social* economy, that is, for the type of organization and the functions of social communities, from the conventicle to the state. Then its relationship to humanist rationalism and its ideals and cultural influences, to the development of philosophical and scientific empiricism, and to technological development and the arts must be analyzed. Then finally its growth from its beginnings in the innerworldly asceticism of the Middle Ages to its dissolution into pure utilitarianism must be charted *historically* and through the individual areas of expansion of ascetic religiosity. Only then will it be possible to discern the significance of ascetic Protestantism in relation to other formative elements of modern culture.

In doing this, however, it must be shown in what way Protestant asceticism itself was influenced in its growth and character by the totality of the cultural, and especially *economic*, conditions of society. Modern man, on the whole, is rarely able, with the best will in the world, to imagine just how significant has been the influence of religious consciousness on conduct of life, “culture,” and “national

character.” However, it cannot, of course, be our purpose to replace a one-sided “materialist” causal interpretation of culture and history with an equally one-sided spiritual one. *Both are equally possible* [314], but neither will serve historical truth if they claim to be the *conclusion* of the investigation rather than merely the *preliminary work* for it.

### EDITORS’ NOTES

[1](#) This and the following subheadings were added by the editors to assist the reader. They do not appear in the German text.

[2](#) Weber’s spelling. The correct spelling is actually “Brüdergemeine.”

Nikolaus Ludwig Zinzendorf (1700-1760), born to an ennobled Austrian father and to a mother of strong Pietist convictions, spear-headed the Moravian Church, a renewal of *Unitas Fratrum* founded in Bohemia in 1457. The Herrnhut Brotherhood, to which Weber alludes, is a reference to the Brotherly Agreement of Herrnhut (a settlement in Saxony and asylum for some Moravian *Unitas Fratrum* refugees), May 12, 1727, in which Count Zinzendorf and his coreligionists sought to establish the ecumenical and communitarian basis of their mission.

[3](#) Weber is referring to the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. See below.

[4](#) Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547-1619), lawyer and statesman, was a major figure in the revolt against Spanish rule and one of the chief architects of an Independent Netherlands. He was a key negotiator of the Union of Utrecht (1579), helped devise the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609), and vigorously promoted Holland’s central position in the Dutch Republic. Leaning toward Arminianism, and caught up in a political conflict with Prince Maurice (who championed both anti-Arminian sentiment and the primacy of the “union” over Holland, putatively one of the union’s “provinces”), Oldenbarnevelt eventually found himself on trial for his life. He was beheaded in The Hague in May 1619.

[5](#) Between November 1618 and May 1619, a Synod of the Reformed Churches of the Netherlands met in the city of Dordrecht. The Synod of Dort, as it was called, convened principally to confront the threat of Arminian doctrine (named after Jacob Arminius, 1560-1609), which denied, among other things, the Calvinist notions of absolute predestination and irresistible grace. The Synod, in rejecting Arminian views as heretical, reasserted orthodox Reformed doctrine in what became known as the Canons of Dort, or the “Five Articles against the Remonstrants.”



[6](#) Weber is referring to the Westminster Assembly that met between 1643 and 1649 in Westminster Abbey, London. Convoled by the Long Parliament in 1643, the Assembly produced the Westminster Confession (1646), consisting of thirty-three chapters devoted to articulating the faith of English-speaking Presbyterians. Among other things, it recapitulated the key Calvinist themes of predestination and the primacy of Scripture.

[7](#) This translates to “no salvation outside the church.”

[8](#) Richard Baxter (1615-1691) was a Puritan minister famous for his pastoral counseling and for his attempt to moderate between various extremes during the period of the English civil wars. A chaplain in the parliamentary army who later supported restoration of the monarchy, Baxter became an advocate of toleration within the Church of England. His best-known work is *The Saints’ Everlasting Rest* (1650).

[9](#) John Bunyan (1628-1688), son of a tinker, was one of the great Puritan writers of the seventeenth century. He saw service during the English civil wars, and though brought up in the Anglican Church, gradually embraced Puritanism. Charged with conducting services proscribed by the Church of England, he was imprisoned from November 1660 to March 1672, and then for a six-month period some time between 1675 and 1677. In prison, Bunyan wrote his autobiography, *Grace Abounding* (1666), and his masterpiece, *The Pilgrim’s Progress* (1678). In the allegory, the chief protagonist, Christian, leaves his city and family, both doomed to hellfire, to make his way toward the Celestial City. On his journey, Christian suffers various self-inflicted setbacks before his final apotheosis.

[10](#) *Die drei gerechten Kammacher* was a novelle by the nineteenth-century Swiss writer Gottfried Keller.

[11](#) The allusion is to Machiavelli’s *History of Florence*, Book III, Chapter 7.

[12](#) This phrase translates as “the Holy Spirit’s mockery.”

[13](#) Théodore de Bèze (1519-1605) was a leading theologian and organizer of the Calvinist movement. With John Calvin he cofounded the Geneva Academy (1559), which thereafter became a powerful vehicle of Calvinist doctrines. As author, translator, and administrator, Théodore de Bèze (also known as Theodore Beza) played a vital role, particularly after Calvin’s death in 1564, in securing the Calvinist faith in Europe.

[14](#) On the Dutch *Preciesen* (the unbending Calvinists) and their conflict with the

*Rekkelijken* (those willing to compromise), see Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, trans. by Olive Wyon (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), pp. 682-86. (Troeltsch's book was published in Germany in 1912.) [15](#) Weber uses the English word.

[16](#) George Whitefield (1714-1770), itinerant Methodist evangelist, was a collaborator of John and Charles Wesley, though later broke with them by affirming the doctrine of "double predestination." Whitefield's evangelical mission, based upon a spiritual "new birth" as a young man, took him to many parts of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, and eventually to America. He died in Newburyport, Massachusetts.

[17](#) Selina Hastings, Countess of Huntingdon (1707-1791), was a major figure within eighteenth-century English Protestantism. She founded Huntingdon's Connexion, a Calvinist Methodist sect, and promoted its activities through the construction of a number of chapels in the south of England.

[18](#) Richard Hooker (1554-1600) played a leading role in the formation of Anglican theology. He is remembered principally for his treatise *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* (1594-1648; eight books—the last three appeared posthumously), a response to both Puritan and Roman Catholic doctrine. Hooker defended the unity of church and state, and affirmed the place of reason, together with Bible and church, as the three cornerstones of the Anglican communion.

[19](#) William Chillingworth (1602-1643), scholar and theologian, first embraced Catholicism and then renounced it in 1634. In 1638, he took holy orders in the Church of England, and published in the same year *The Religion of Protestants: A Safe Way to Salvation*. During the English civil wars, he served as a chaplain in the king's army. Following its defeat, he resided in detention in the bishop's palace at Chichester, where he died.

[20](#) Philipp Jakob Spener (1635-1705) was a founding figure of German Pietism, an offshoot of Lutheranism that demanded stricter moral standards among Lutheran clergy and all believers. A skillful organizer, Spener used his base in Berlin (from 1691 onward) to solicit the support of the Brandenburg-Prussian court for various ecclesiastical and educational reforms. Among his most influential works were *Pious Desires* (1675), *The Spiritual Priesthood* (1677), and *General Theology* (1680).

[21](#) August Hermann Francke (1663-1727) was a prominent figure in the German Pietist movement. He taught theology and Oriental languages at the University of Halle (1695-1727), where he was also active in establishing various Pietist

groups and organizations for the poor and for orphans.

[22](#) On Zinzendorf, see Editors' note 2.

[23](#) Editors' italics. Weber seems to be saying that although it was false to attribute a belief in Terminism to all Pietists in general, a minority of Pietists did in fact hold it (see Weber's notes 162 and 163).

[24](#) *Bußkampf*. See p. 95 for more details of this phenomenon.

[25](#) Branch or tendency.

[26](#) This is a reference to James the brother of Jesus, who became known as "The Just" for his strict adherence to the Jewish law.

[27](#) Weber uses the English phrase here.

[28](#) The literal translation is "bench of fear."

[29](#) Antinomianism is the (heretical) belief that Christians are emancipated by the gospel from the obligation to keep the moral law, faith alone being necessary.

[30](#) Weber uses the English word.

[31](#) Weber uses the English word.

[32](#) Weber uses the English word.

[33](#) Weber uses the English word.

[34](#) Weber uses the English phrase.

[35](#) The distinction anticipates Weber's discussion in "*Churches*" and "*Sects*" in *North America*. See this volume, pp. 203-20.

[36](#) Or Saint Giles.

[37](#) Kaspar Schwenckfeld von Ossig (1490-1561), advocate of the separation of church and state, and opponent of the Lutheran doctrine of consubstantiation, was a leader of the Reformation in Silesia. He proposed his own doctrinal Middle Way, between Luther and Zwingli's positions, and soon found himself persecuted by Roman Catholics and Lutherans alike. His most famous work is *Confession and Explanation* (1540).

[38](#) Robert Barclay (1648-1690), a Scot, was a leader of the Quakers who affirmed that both Scripture and church were secondary to the Holy Spirit's "inner light" working in the faithful. Promoting his Quaker beliefs, Barclay traveled to Holland and north Germany, before settling with a small group of

Society members in East Jersey (now New Jersey). His most famous work, *Apology for the True Christian Divinity*, was published in 1678. Shortly before his death, Barclay returned to Scotland and died at Ury, Aberdeen.

[39](#) Weber uses the English word.

[40](#) See Weber's First Rejoinder to H. Karl Fischer, note 4, p. 228 below.

[41](#) Weber uses the English phrase.

[42](#) Weber uses the English word.

[43](#) I.e., conciliatory.

[44](#) An Ebionite was a member of a second-century Gnostic sect, which rejected Saint Paul, and accepted only the Gospel of Matthew. The term derives from a Hebrew word meaning "poor," and in this context emphasizes the moral worth of poverty.

[45](#) Weber uses the English word.

[46](#) Weber uses the English word.

[47](#) Weber uses the words "skill" and "common best" in brackets after the German equivalents.

[48](#) Weber's emphasis.

[49](#) The parenthetical comment is Weber's own.

[50](#) Weber uses the English word.

[51](#) The emphasis is Weber's.

[52](#) Weber uses the English phrase.

[53](#) Weber uses the English phrase.

[54](#) Weber uses the English phrase.

[55](#) Weber uses the English phrase.

[56](#) Weber uses the English word.

[57](#) In the 1920 edition, Weber adds an explanation of "regents," namely, a class of *rentiers*.

[58](#) The terms "idle talk," "superfluities," and "vain ostentation" are all given in English.

[59](#) Weber uses the English word.

[60](#) Weber uses the English word.

[61](#) The terms “covetousness” and “mammonism” are both given in English.

[62](#) Ironic inversion of the lines spoken by Mephistopheles: “. . . part of the Power which would

Do evil constantly, and constantly does good.”

From “Scene in Faust’s Study,” *Goethe’s Faust*, translated by David Luke, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 42.

[63](#) The terms “landlord,” “yeoman,” and “farmer” are all given in English.

[64](#) This expression is given in English.

[65](#) “A clear conscience makes a soft pillow.”

[66](#) This is the expression that Talcott Parsons famously rendered as “the iron cage.” The rationale for our own formulation is explained in the Note on the Translation, p. lxx, above.

[67](#) In the 1920 edition of *The Protestant Ethic*, Weber replaced “Chinese” with “mechanized.” The association of Chinese history with immobility and petrification was a topos of nineteenth-century European thought. Consider, for instance, John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty” (1859), in *Essential Works of John Stuart Mill*, edited and with an introduction by Max Lerner (New York: Bantam, 1961), pp. 315-19. More generally, see Jonathan D. Spence, *The Chan’s Great Continent: China in Western Minds* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998).

# *The Protestant Ethic.*

## *Part II. The Idea of the Calling in Ascetic Protestantism*

## *Weber's Notes*

63) We shall not treat Zwinglianism separately, since after a short period of influence it declined in importance.

“Arminianism,” whose distinctive *dogmatic* character consisted in the rejection of predestination dogma in its strict form, is only constituted as a sect in Holland (and the United States) and is of no interest to us in this chapter. Its doctrine was dominant in the Anglican Church and in the majority of Methodist denominations.

64) On the development of the concept of “Puritanism,” see especially Sanford, *Studies and Reflections of the Great Rebellion*, p. 65f. When we use this expression here, we do so consistently in the sense that it had taken on in the popular parlance of the seventeenth century, namely, to refer to the ascetic religious movements in Holland and England, irrespective of Church constitutions and dogmas. It thus includes the “Independents,” Congregationalists, Baptists, Mennonites, and Quakers.

65) I scarcely need to emphasize that this brief account, to the extent that it relates to areas of dogma, relies entirely on the literature of Church and dogmatic history, that is, on secondary sources, and so can make absolutely no claim to “originality.” Naturally, I have attempted to immerse myself in the sources of Reformation history to the best of my ability. But it would have been nothing but arrogance to have simply ignored the intensive and sensitive theological work of many decades, instead of allowing myself by a necessary process to be *guided* by this work to an understanding of the sources. I can only hope that the unavoidable brevity of the account has not led to erroneous formulations and that I have at least managed to steer clear of significant factual inaccuracy. The only thing that may seem “new” to those familiar with the most important theological literature is likely to be the fact that everything is oriented toward those points of view [*Gesichtspunkte*] which are important to *us*. Certain of these points—as, for example, the *rational character of asceticism* and its significance for the modern

“style of life”—were naturally of less interest to theological writers.

A number of other aspects—for example, those alluded to on p. 15f [this volume pp. 75f]—are only dealt with superficially here because it is to be hoped that E. Troeltsch will deal with such matters (*lex naturae*, etc.) in his contribution to the work edited by Hinneberg. As we know both from his “Gerhard und Melanchthon” and especially his numerous reviews in the *Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeigen*, he has been concerned with these subjects for years, and, as the expert, is of course better able to expound them than, with the best will in the world, I could myself. For reasons of space, not every work consulted has been cited, but only those which that particular section of text is based upon or relates to. It is not uncommon for these to be older authors, if the relevant aspects were of particular interest to them. The quite inadequate financial provision of German libraries means that in “the *provinces*” the most important sources and works can only be loaned for a few short weeks from Berlin or other main libraries. This includes, for example, Voët, Baxter, Tyerman’s “Wesley,” all the Methodist, Baptist, and Quaker writers, and many other writers of the early period not contained in the *Corpus Reformatorum*. A visit to English or American libraries is essential for any *close* study of many works. For the following account I have, of course, in general, had to make do with what was available in Germany.

The typical deliberate denial of the “sectarian” past by American universities has unfortunately led to the libraries cutting down on new acquisitions, or indeed acquiring none at all, from this area of literature. This is just one feature of the general tendency toward “secularization” in American life, which in a short time will have destroyed the traditional character of this nation and completely and finally changed the ethos of many of the fundamental institutions of the nation. One is obliged to resort to the small orthodox sectarian colleges out in the country.

66) Alongside the fundamental work of Kampschulte, probably the best account of Calvin and Calvinism in general is that of Erich Marcks in his “Coligny.” Campbell’s *The Puritans in Holland, England and America* (2 vols.) is not always critical or free of tendentiousness. Pierson’s *Studien over Johan Calvijn*



is nothing but an anti-Calvinist tract. The Dutch development is covered by Motley and by the classics of the Netherlands, especially Fruin's *Tien jaren uit den tachtigjarigen oorlog* and now in particular Naber's *Calvinist of Libertijnsch*. For France there is now, in addition to Polenz, Baird's *Rise of the Huguenots*. For England, as well as Carlyle, Macaulay, Masson, and—last but not least—Ranke, there are also the various works (to be referred to later) of Gardiner and Firth, and, in addition, for example, *Taylor: A Retrospect of the Religious Life in England* (1845), and the excellent book by Weingarten, *Die englischen Revolutionskirchen*, plus the essay on the English “Moralists” by Ernst Troeltsch in the *Realenzyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd ed., and Eduard Bernstein's excellent essay in the *Geschichte des Sozialismus* (Stuttgart, 1895, vol. 1, p. 506f.), at which we shall look closely in a later context. The best bibliography (with more than 7,000 entries) is found in *Dexter, Congregationalism of the Last Three Hundred Years* (which admittedly deals primarily—though not exclusively—with Church constitutional questions). The book is clearly superior to Price (*History of Nonconformism*), Skeats, and others. On the American colonies, the work of Doyle, *The English in America*, stands out above the numerous other books. On the doctrinal differences the present study is particularly indebted to *Schneckenburger's* series of lectures, which has already been cited in the first article.

Ritschl's basic work, *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* (3 vols., quoted here from 3rd ed.), with its pronounced blend of historical exposition and value judgments, demonstrates the author's strong individuality, which, despite the magnificent precision of the thought, does not always fully convey the impression of “objectivity.” When, for example, he rejects Schneckenburger's view, I often find his justification for doing so doubtful, while not presuming to form a judgment myself. In addition, his definition of what is “Lutheran” doctrine, out of all the variety of religious ideas and sentiments, even those found in Luther himself, often seems to be arrived at by means of value judgments—it is what seems to Ritschl to be *of permanent worth* in Lutheranism. It is Lutheranism as Ritschl believes it *ought* to be, not always what it actually *was*. It hardly needs to be mentioned that the works of Karl Müller, Seeberg et. al. were used *constantly*.

If in what follows I have imposed on the reader *and myself* the penance of a

dreadful proliferation of footnotes, there are absolutely compelling reasons of space saving for this.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, I felt constrained to enable *nontheologically* trained readers in particular at least a provisional means of checking the ideas expressed in this account by indicating a number of related approaches, so that the ideas, in their brevity, do not give the impression of having just occurred to me.

67) In what follows, we shall take the ideas of the ascetic movements in their fully developed form as given. We are not *primarily* interested in the origins, antecedents, and development of these movements.

68) Regarding the following sketch it should be stated at the outset that we are *not* here considering the personal views of *Calvin*, but the doctrine of Calvinism as it developed in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the large regions where it was the dominant influence—regions which, like Holland and England, were at the same time the bearers of capitalist culture. We shall leave Germany on one side for the moment, as Calvinism never *dominated* large territories here.

69) The full text of this passage, and of other Calvinist writings to be quoted later, may be found in Karl Müller, *Die Bekenntnisschriften der reformierten Kirche* (Leipzig, 1903).

70) On Milton's theology, see the essay by Eibach in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1879 (Macaulay wrote a superficial essay on the occasion of the publication of Sumner's translation of the "Doctrina Christiana," edited by Tauchnitz, vol. 185, pp. 1ff.), which had been rediscovered in 1823. For more detailed information the best source is, of course, the (somewhat too schematically structured) six-volume work by Masson, or Stern's German biography of Milton, which is based on it.

At quite an early stage, Milton began to abandon the doctrine of predestination (in the form of the double decree) and to move toward the ultimately quite

liberal Christianity of his old age. In his complete detachment from his own age, he can be compared to a certain extent to Sebastian Franck. However, while Milton was practical and positive, Franck was essentially critical by nature. Milton is a “Puritan” only in the broad sense of the *rational* orientation of life in the world according to the divine will, which is Calvinism’s lasting legacy to posterity. In a similar sense, one could describe Franck as a “Puritan.” As idiosyncratic individualists, neither is relevant to our concerns.

71) The famous passage in *De servo arbitrio* reads: “Hic est fidei summus gradus: credere Deum esse clementem, qui tam paucos sal-vat, justum, qui sua voluntate nos damnabiles facit.”

72) Fundamentally, both Luther and Calvin knew a dual God (see Ritschl’s remarks in the *Geschichte des Pietismus* and Köstlin in the entry on “Gott” in the *Realencyclopädie für Protestantismus und Kirche*, 3rd ed.): the merciful and kindly Father as revealed in the New Testament (for it is he who dominates the first books of the *Institutio Christiana*) and behind him the “Deus absconditus” as an arbitrary despot. For Luther, the God of the New Testament kept the upper hand, as Luther increasingly shunned *speculation* on the metaphysical as unprofitable and dangerous. For Calvin, on the other hand, the idea of the transcendent deity held sway over life. True, in the popular form of Calvinism such a deity could not maintain its hold—but it was not the Heavenly Father of the New Testament, but the Jehovah of the Old Testament, that took its place.

73) On the following, compare Scheibe, *Calvins Prädestinationslehre*, Halle, 1897. On Calvinist theology in general: Heppe, *Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche*, Elberfeld, 1861.

74) *Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. 77, p. 186ff.

75) This exposition of the Calvinist doctrine in roughly the form given here can be found, for example, in Hoornbeek’s *Theologica practica* (Utrecht, 1663), Book II Chap. 1: *De praedestinatione*—typically, the section comes *immediately* after the title: *De Deo*. The scriptural basis for Hoornbeek’s argument is chiefly the first chapter of the Letter to the Ephesians. There is no need here for us to

analyze the various inconsequential attempts to reconcile the responsibility of the individual with the predestination and providence of God, and to rescue the empirical “freedom” of the will, and so on.

76) In his fine book *Puritan and Anglican* (p. 234), Dowden expresses the decisive point in the words “The deepest community (with God) is found not in institutions or corporations or churches, but in the secrets of a solitary heart.”

77) Contra qui huiusmodi coetum (that is, a Church in which there is pure doctrine, sacraments and Church discipline) contemnunt . . . salutis suae certi esse non possunt; et qui in illo contemptu perseverat electus non est. Olevian, *De subs. foed.*, p. 222.

78) This negative relationship to “the culture of the senses,” as Dowden (op. cit.) so elegantly put it, constitutes a fundamental element of Puritanism.

79) The expression “individualism” comprises the most heterogeneous ideas imaginable. I hope that what is understood by it *here* will become clear in the following passage. Using the word in a different sense, Lutheranism has been described as “individualistic” because it knows *nothing* of the ascetic regulation of life. In a quite different sense again, Dietrich Schäfer uses the word in his highly instructive article (*Zur Beurteilung des Wormser Konkordats. Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie*, 1905) when he calls the *Middle Ages* a period of “marked individuality” because, unlike today, irrational factors were of importance for the historically *relevant* events. He is right, but so also, perhaps, are those holding opposing views, as each means something quite different by “individuality” and “individualism.”

Jakob Burckhardt’s brilliant analyses have now been partially superceded, and a new, thorough, historically oriented conceptual analysis would be of enormous value to scholarship now. When certain historians amuse themselves by crudely “defining” the concept purely in order to be able to stick a label on to a historical epoch, then that is quite a different matter.

80) Bailey, *Praxis pietatis* (German edition, Leipzig, 1724), p. 187. Philipp Jacob Spener takes the same view in his *Theologische Bedenken* (quoted here from the 3rd ed., Halle, 1712): the friend seldom gives his advice to honor God, but usually for worldly (though not necessarily selfish) reasons. “He . . . the knowing man . . . is blind in no man’s cause, but best sighted in his own. He confines himself to the circle of his own affairs, and thrusts not his fingers in needless fires. . . . He sees the falseness of it (the world) and therefore learns to trust himself ever, others so far, as not to be damaged by their disappointment.” So philosophizes Thomas Adams (*Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 11).

Bailey (*Praxis pietatis*, op. cit., p. 176) recommends that every morning, before going out and mixing with people, you should imagine you are entering a jungle full of perils, and that you should ask God for the “cloak of prudence and righteousness.”

These feelings permeate all the ascetic denominations and have led directly to a hermitlike existence within the world for some Pietists. Even Spangenberg, in the (Herrnhut) *Idea fidei fratrum*, p. 382, refers expressly to Jeremiah 17.5: “Cursed be the man that trusteth in man.”

As a measure of the peculiar misanthropy of this philosophy of life, one only has to consider Hoornbeek’s *Theologia practica*, vol. 1, p. 882, on the duty of *loving one’s enemy*: Denique hoc magis nos ul ciscimur, quo proximum, inultum nobis, tradimus ultori Deo. . . . Quo quis plus se ulciscitur, eo minus id pro ipso agit Deus. What a cunning intensification of the ancient Jewish “eye for an eye,” and what an example of Christian “love of one’s neighbor”! On this, see also note 86, below.

81) It is *this* combination that is so important for an assessment of the psychological bases of the Calvinist social *organizations*. They *all* rest upon inwardly “individualistic” motives. The individual never enters into them *emotionally*. (At a later stage we shall be looking at the results of this.) “The glory of God” and one’s *own salvation* remain at all times *above* the “threshold

of consciousness.” This has stamped certain characteristic features on the social organization of the nations with a Puritan history.

82) Regarding Bunyan, compare the biography by Froude in the Morley Collection (*English Men of Letters*), as well as Macaulay’s (superficial) account (Miscellaneous Works, vol. 2, p. 227). Bunyan is indifferent to the denominational differences within Calvinism, although he himself is a strict Calvinist Baptist.

83) Admittedly, the *effects* of this fear are strikingly different for Bunyan and Liguori: the same fear that drives the latter to every kind of self-torment, spurs on the former to a life of manly, tireless, and systematic toil.

84) I assume that Ernst Troeltsch, in his essay mentioned earlier,<sup>2</sup> will discuss the great importance, flowing from the requirement of “incorporation in the body of Christ” (Calvin, *Institutio Christiana* III, 11, 10), of the Calvinist idea of the need to be accepted into a *community* which is in keeping with God’s laws in order to attain salvation. This is an expression of the *social* character of reformed Christianity. For *our* particular viewpoint, however, the focus of the problem is rather different. That idea could have come to prominence in a church with a purely institutional character, and indeed has done so. And that community-forming tendency even comes into effect *outside of* the divinely ordained scheme of things. Here the determining factor is the *general idea* that it is by *activity* “ad maiorem Dei gloriam” that the Christian proves his state of grace (see below), and the keen abhorrence of idolatry inevitably directs this energy quietly into the paths of *unemotional* (impersonal) activity. In the Puritan ethic, or any other ascetic ethic, any purely *emotional*—that is, not *rationally* determined—*personal* one-to-one relationship easily falls under the suspicion of idolatry. In addition to what has already been said in note 80, the consequences for *friendship* are clear enough from, for example, the following warning: “It is an irrational act and not fit for a rational creature to love any one farther than *reason* will allow us. ... It very often taketh up men’s minds so as to *hinder* their *love of God*. (Baxter, *Christian Directory*, vol. 4, p. 253). We shall meet this kind of argument again and again.

In particular, for Puritanism this rejection of idolatry led to the idea that the “*public*” good, or “the good of *the many*,” as Baxter puts it (*Christian Directory*, vol. 4, p. 262, backed up with the rather forced quotation from Romans 9.3) in terms reminiscent of later liberal rationalism, should take precedence over all “personal” or “private” benefit of the individual (although the idea was not in itself new).

Of course, the modern American abhorrence of personal *service* is connected (indirectly) with that tradition. There is also the *relatively* high degree of immunity of formerly Puritan nations to Caesarism, and in general the inwardly freer attitude of the English to their great statesmen—an attitude that, on the one hand, is more inclined to an acceptance of the great man, yet, on the other hand, rejects any hysterical “adulation” and the naive idea that anyone could have a duty of political obedience out of “gratitude.” This contrasts strongly with much that we, for example, have experienced from 1878 onward in Germany—in both positive and negative ways.

On the sinfulness of faith in authority—which is only permissible when it is *impersonal* and directed toward Scripture—and the sinfulness of holding even the most holy and outstanding of men in undue esteem (because thereby obedience toward God could be undermined), see Baxter, *Christian Directory* (2nd ed., 1678), vol. 1, p. 56.

We shall have more to say later about the political significance of the rejection of “idolatry” and about the principle that, first in the Church, but ultimately in the whole of life, God alone should “*rule*.”

85) “Social” [*sozial*], of course, without any connotation of the modern sense of the word, but solely in the sense of activity within the political, church, or other community organization.

86) What such “impersonal Christian charity [*Nächstenliebe*],” as determined solely by one’s relationship to God, means in the area of religious community

life can be clearly seen from the conduct of the China Inland Mission and the International Missionaries' Alliance (see Warneck, *Geschichte der protestantischen Mission*, 5th ed., pp. 99, 111). At tremendous expense, hordes [*Scharen*] of missionaries were equipped (some 1,000 for China alone) to literally “offer” the gospel to *all* the heathen by itinerant preaching, because Christ commanded this and made his return dependent upon it. Whether those preached to are won for Christianity and thus become partakers of eternal bliss is a *minor matter* and in any case is in God's hands. According to Hudson Taylor (see Warneck, *op. cit.*), China contained approximately 50 million families. One thousand missionaries could “reach” fifty families a day (!), and thus the gospel could be “offered” to every Chinese in one thousand days, or less than three years.

This is exactly the *schema* according to which Calvinism operated its Church discipline. The chief purpose was *not* the salvation of those subject to it—which is solely a matter for God (and in practice a matter for them)—but to give greater glory to God.

Calvinism as such is not responsible for those *modern* missionary efforts, since they are interdenominationally based. (Calvin himself does not accept that there is a duty to engage in foreign missionary work, since the further expansion of the Church is “*unius Dei opus.*”) However, these efforts clearly do emanate from that general idea which pervades the Puritan ethic, according to which one fulfills one's duty of “Christian charity” if one carries out *God's* commandments for his glory. In this way one gives one's neighbor what is due to him, and anything beyond that is God's own affair.

The “humanity” of relationships to one's “neighbor” is, so to speak, dead. This is expressed in the most varied circumstances. Thus, for example—to mention one small indication of that atmosphere—in the sphere of reformed charity, which is (to some extent justifiably) celebrated: the Amsterdam orphans are still today dressed in coats and trousers with black and red, or red and green, stripes—a form of carnival costume—and paraded to church. In the past this must have been a most edifying spectacle in the minds of those watching, and served to “glorify God.” Yet it must have been offensive to any personal and “human”



feelings. And the same principles apply—as we shall see—in all the details of private activity.

Of course, all this is no more than a “*tendency*,” and later we shall have to make certain qualifications. But *as* a “tendency” of this ascetic religiosity, it needed to be stated here.

87) Hundeshagen (*Beiträge zur Kirchenverfassungsgeschichte und Kirchenpolitik*, 1864, vol. 1, p. 37) defends the point of view (which has often been heard since), that the doctrine of predestination was always a doctrine of the theologians, never a doctrine of the people [*Volk*]. That is only true if the term “Volk” is taken to refer to the *mass* of the uneducated lower strata. Not only Cromwell—whom Zeller (*Das Theologische System Zwinglis*, p. 17) treated paradigmatically as an example of the effect of the doctrine—but also his “saints,” knew perfectly well what it was all about, and the Canons of the Synods of Dordrecht and Westminster relating to the doctrine were national affairs in the grand style. The idea that the reformed Pietists, the members of the English and Dutch conventicles, were unsure about the doctrine is quite out of the questions; it was after all this doctrine that drove them together to seek the *certitudo salutis*. What predestination meant, or did not mean, where it was a doctrine of the theologians, can be shown by Catholicism, which was not entirely unfamiliar with it as an esoteric doctrine in various forms. (The decisive point was that the view that the *individual* had to *regard* himself as chosen and must prove himself was always rejected. Compare the Catholic doctrine, for example, in A. van Wyck, *Tractatio de praedestinatione*, Cologne, 1708.)

Hundeshagen, who dislikes the doctrine, evidently draws his impressions predominantly from the German situation. His antipathy derives from the opinion, arrived at purely deductively, that it must inevitably lead to moral fatalism and antinomianism. This opinion has already been refuted by Zeller, *op. cit.* It cannot be denied that such a danger existed—both Melancthon and Wesley speak of it. But it is noteworthy that both of them were speaking of it in combination with an *emotional* religiosity of “faith.” For this type of religion, which lacked the rational idea of *proof*, such a consequence flowed from the essence of the doctrine.

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The *softening* of the doctrine, which practical experience (e.g., that of Baxter) brought with it, did not detract from its essence as long as the idea remained intact that it was God's decision to elect and put to the test the *concrete single* individual.

Most important, all the great figures of Puritanism (in the broadest sense of the word) started out with this doctrine, and their early years were influenced by its somber earnestness. This applies to Milton as well as to Baxter and even Franklin. Their later emancipation from its strict interpretation corresponds to the development of the religious movement as a whole.

88) This is overwhelmingly true for Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress*, where it constitutes the underlying atmosphere.

89) This question was further from the mind of the Lutheran of the later period than from the Calvinist, not because he was less interested in his soul's salvation, but because, given the development which the Lutheran Church was undergoing, the Church had taken on more of the character of an *institution of salvation*, and the individual felt himself to be an object of its activity. Typically, Lutheranism was only awakened to the problem by Pietism.

90) This is expressly stated in the letter to Bucer, *Corpus Reformatorum*, 29, pp. 883f. Compare also Scheibe, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

91) The genuine Calvinist doctrine was centered on *faith* and the consciousness of sharing with God in the sacraments—it mentioned the "other fruits of the Spirit" only incidentally. See the relevant passages in Heppe, *Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche*, p. 425. Calvin himself emphatically rejected works as *marks* of merit before God, although, like Luther, he does regard them as fruits of faith (*Institutio* III, 2, 37, 38). The practical shift of emphasis toward

looking for proof [*Bewährung*] of faith in the works, which characterizes *asceticism*, parallels the gradual transformation of Calvin's doctrine from being one by which (as with Luther) the true Church is *primarily* characterized by pure doctrine and the sacraments, to one in which the "disciplina" enjoys equal status with them. This development may be observed in the passages of Heppe, *op. cit.*, pp. 194, 195, as well as in the manner in which church membership was acquired in the Netherlands, toward the end of the sixteenth century (definite contractual acceptance of subjection to the *discipline* as a central condition).

92) See, for example, Olevian, *De substantia foederis gratuiti inter Deum et electos* (1585), p. 257, and Heidegger, *Corpus Theologiae*, vol. 24.

93) On this, see, *inter alia*, the remarks of Schneckenburger, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

94) Thus, for example, in Baxter the distinction between "mortal" and "venial" sin reappears—quite in the Catholic manner. The former is a sign of the absence or loss of a state of grace, and only a "conversion" of the whole man can guarantee its restoration. The latter is not incompatible with a state of grace.

95) Thus, in various ways, Baxter, Bailey, Sedgwick, and Hoornbeek. See also the examples in Schneckenburger, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

96) Thus—as we shall discuss later—in numerous passages of Baxter's *Christian Directory* and in the final section.

97) To repeat the title once again: *Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformierten Lehrbegriffs*, edited by Güder Stassfurt, 1855. The very clearly written account by Lobstein in the *festschrift* for H. Holtzmann is argued along the same lines, and should also be considered in conjunction with what follows. It has been criticized for its supposed undue emphasis on the leitmotiv of "certitudo salutis." However, here a distinction needs to be made between Calvin's theology and *Calvinism*, and between the theological system and the

needs of pastoral care. *All* religious movements which reached the broad mass began with the question “How can I be *certain* of my salvation?”

98) It cannot, however, be denied that the *full* development of this concept only took place in the *late* Lutheran period. (It is also present in Johannes Gerhard in precisely the sense here discussed). In the fourth book of his *Geschichte des Pietismus* (vol. 2, pp. 3f.), therefore, Ritschl sees the introduction of this concept into Lutheran religiosity as a revival, or adoption, of Catholic piety. He does not dispute (p. 10) that the problem of individual assurance of salvation was the same for both Luther and the Catholic mystics, but he believes that the solutions they found were precisely opposite to each other. I am in no position to pass any judgment on the matter. Of course, anyone can see that the atmosphere of *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* is different from that of the sentimental dalliance with “dear little Jesus” in later literature, or from Tauler’s religious mood. And similarly the clinging to the mystical and magical element in the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord’s Supper certainly has different religious motives from the “Bernardine” piety—the “Song of Solomon” atmosphere—that Ritschl identifies again and again as the source of the cultivation of the “bride of Christ” idea. But could it not still be the case that the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper was *partially* responsible for the revival of the mystical religion of emotion? It is by no means true to say that (op. cit., p. 11) the liberty of the mystic consisted *per se* in *withdrawal* from the world. In writings that are very interesting for the psychology of religion, Tauler in particular speaks of the *practical* effect of those nocturnal periods of contemplation that he recommends especially for those times when one cannot sleep. The effect was, he said, to bring *order* into one’s thoughts concerning work in the secular calling [*Berufsarbeit*]:

“Only in this way (by the mystical union with God in the night before falling asleep) is the *mind purified and the brain strengthened* and all day long man is disposed in a more peaceful and godly state from the inward exercise of being truly united with God. Then all his works are *ordered*. And so when man has been forewarned of (i.e., prepared for) his work and has directed his thoughts to *virtue*, then the works will be *virtuous and godly*” (*Predigten*, folio 318).

It is evident that mystical contemplation and rational asceticism in the calling *are not mutually exclusive*. They can only be so where religiosity assumes an obviously hysterical character, which was not the case for the mystics or even

for all the Pietists.

99) At this point Calvinism and Catholicism meet. But for Catholics the consequence is the necessity of the sacrament of penance, while for reformed Christians it is the necessity of practically proving oneself by working within the world.

100) Thus, for example, Beza: [De praedestinationis doctrina et vero usu tractatio [ . . . ] ex [ . . . ] praelectionibus in nonum Epistolae ad Romanos caput, a Raphaelo Eglino [ . . . ] excepta (Geneva 1582)], p. 133: “. . . sicut ex operibus vere bonis ad sanctificationis donum, a sanctificatione ad fidem . . . ascendimus: ita ex certis illis effectis non quamvis vocationem et ex electione donum praedestinationis in Christo tam firmam quam immotus est Dei thronus certissima connexionem effectorum et causarum colligimus. . . .” Only with regard to the signs of *damnation* must one be cautious, as this concerned the *final* condition. (In this matter only Puritanism held a different view.)

See also the detailed comments of Schneckenburger, *op. cit.*, who, however, quotes only a limited category of literature. This theme is common throughout Puritan literature. “It will not be said: Did you believe? but: Were you Doers, or Talkers only?” says Bunyan. According to Baxter (*The Saints’ Everlasting Rest*, chap. 12), who teaches the mildest form of predestination, faith is subjection to Christ in heart *and deed*. “Do what you are able first, and then complain of God for denying you grace *if you have cause*” is how he replied to the objection that the will was not free and that God was withholding the ability to obtain salvation (*Works of the Puritan Divines*, vol. 4, p. 155). Similarly, Howe, in the passage quoted elsewhere (note 132). Frequently, it is *Catholic* ascetic writings that led to “conversion” to *Puritanism*—thus for Baxter it was a Jesuit tract.

101) Something has already been said [in this volume pp. 75f.] about the significance of this for the material content of social ethics. For the moment, we are not concerned about the *content*, but about the *motivation* to moral action.

102) It is easy to see how this idea encouraged the penetration of the Old Testament Jewish spirit into Puritanism.

103) Charnock, “A Principle of Goodness” in the *Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 175.

104) Conversion, as Sedgwick occasionally expresses it, is an “identical copy of the decree of election by grace.” And Bailey teaches that “whoever is chosen is also called to obedience *and enabled*.” Hanserd Knolly’s (Baptist) Confession teaches that *only* those whom God has called to faith (a faith which is expressed in the manner of life) are true believers, rather than mere “temporary believers.”

105) Compare, for example, the conclusion of Baxter’s *Christian Directory* .

106) Thus, for example, in Charnock, *Self-Examination*, p. 183, to refute the Catholic doctrine of “dubitatio.”

107) This argument is found (for example) again and again in J. Hoornbeek, *Theologica practica*, e.g., vol. 2, pp. 70, 72, 182, and vol. 1, p. 160.

108) For example, the Confessio Helvetica 16 says “et improprie his (good works) *salus adtribuitur*.”

109) On all the foregoing, see Schneckenburger, pp. 80f.

110) Augustine is supposed to have said “Si non es praedestinatus fac ut praedestineris.”

111) One is reminded of Goethe’s saying, which is essentially similar in meaning, “Wie kann man sich selbst kennen lernen? Durch Be trachten niemals, wohl aber durch Handeln. Versuche, deine Pflicht zu tun, und du weißt gleich, was an dir ist. Was aber ist deine Pflicht? Die Forderung des Tages.” [“How can one know oneself? Never by contemplation, but through action. Try to do your

duty and you will know at once what sort of man you are. But what is your duty? Whatever the day demands.”]

112) For although Calvin states that “holiness” must make its *appearance* (Institutio, vol. 4, I, par. 2, 7, 9), the boundary between sanctified and unsanctified remains unfathomable for the human mind. We must believe that where the pure word of God is preached in a church organized and administered according to his law, some of the elect will be present—even if we cannot recognize them.

113) Calvinist piety is an example of the relationship that exists between certain religious *ideas* and the consequences for practical religious *conduct* arising *logically and psychologically* from these ideas. *Logically*, of course, fatalism could be deduced as a consequence of predestination; but as a result of the idea of “proof” [*Bewährung*] coming into play, the *psychological effect* was precisely the opposite. Hoornbeek neatly expounds this—in the language of the period (*Theologica practica*, vol. 1, p. 159): The elect are, by virtue of their very election, invulnerable to fatalism. In fact, they *prove* themselves precisely in their *rejection* of fatalistic consequences, “quos *ipsa electio* sollicitos reddit et diligentes officiorum.” On the other hand, however, religious *ideas*—as Calvinism demonstrates particularly well—are of *far* greater significance than someone like William James (*The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, pp. 444f.) is inclined to admit. The significance of rationality in religious metaphysics is classically shown in the far-reaching effects which the *idea* of the reformed concept of God has exercised on life. If the God of the Puritans has had an effect in history like no other before or after him, this is thanks to the attributes with which the power of the *idea* has equipped him. James’s “pragmatic” evaluation of the significance of religious ideas according to the degree to which they have been “proved” in life, is, by the way, itself a true child of that Puritan set of ideas in which this outstanding scholar is at home.

Religious experience as such is, of course, irrational, like *every* experience. In its highest, mystical, form it is indeed *the* experience κατ' ἑξοχὴν and—in James’s fine description—is distinguished by its absolute incommunicability. It has a *specific* character and appears as *knowledge*, but cannot be adequately reproduced by

means of our linguistic and conceptual apparatus. It is also true to say that *every* religious experience loses substance as soon as an attempt to formulate it *rationally* is made, the more so, the further the process of conceptual formulation has advanced. Herein lies the basis of the tragic conflicts of all rational theology, as the Baptists sects knew as early as the seventeenth century.

This irrationality, however—which, by the way, is by no means exclusive to *religious* experience, but is common to every kind, although in different *sense* and degree—does not alter the fact that the *nature* of the system of *ideas* that, so to speak, seizes and directs the immediate religious “experience” in its own paths, is of the greatest practical significance. It is *this* that determines the majority of those important practical ethical differences in the various world religions.

114) Baxter, *The Saints’ Everlasting Rest*, vol. 1, p. 6, replies to the question “Whether to make salvation our end be not mercenary or legal?” “It is properly mercenary when we expect it as *wages* for work done. . . . Otherwise it is only such a mercenarism as Christ comman deth . . . and if seeking Christ be mercenary, I desire to be so mercenary.” Furthermore, examples of a collapse into crass “justification by works” [Werkheiligkeit] can be found even among some Calvinists who were regarded as orthodox. According to Bailey, *Praxis pietatis*, p. 262, giving alms is a means of averting *temporal* punishment. Other theologians recommended good works to the *reprobate* on the grounds that damnation might be thereby rendered a little more bearable. They recommended them to the *elect*, however, because God would then no longer love them for no reason, but *ob causam*, which would in some way be duly rewarded. Apologists had already made small concessions to those who argued that good works affected the degree of blessedness enjoyed (Schneckenburger, op. cit., p. 101).

115) Here, too, in order to bring out the characteristic differences, we have to employ the concept of the “ideal type,” even though to some extent it does violence to the historical reality. Without it, the amount of qualification necessary would make any clear formulation impossible. The extent to which the antitheses, which have here been sharply drawn, are in fact only relative, will be discussed later.



116) Compare, for example, Sedgwick, *Buß- und Gnadenlehre* (German translation by Röscher, 1689): The penitent man has “*a firm rule,*” to which he strictly adheres, and according to which he organizes and lives his whole life (p. 591). He lives—wisely, watchfully and prudently,—according to the law (p. 596). *Only* a lasting transformation of the *whole* man, a consequence of election, can achieve this (p. 852).

As Hoornbeek (among others) puts it (op. cit., vol. 9, chap. 2), the difference between works that are only “morally” good and “opera spiritualia” lies in the fact that the latter are the fruit of a regenerate *life*, and that (op. cit., vol. 1, p. 160) constant progress is observable which can only be achieved through the supernatural working of the grace of God (op. cit., p. 150). Sanctification is the transformation of the *whole* man through the grace of God (ibid., pp. 190f.). These ideas are, of course, common to the whole of Protestantism, *but* only reach their logical conclusion in the ascetic branches of the Church.

117) The latter name is, however, according to Voët, derived from the life of the “fine ones” of Holland, which was led precisely according to the teachings of the *Bible*. The name of “Methodists” was also occasionally applied to the Puritans in the seventeenth century.

118) For, as the Puritan preachers emphasize (e.g., Bunyan in “The Pharisee and the Publican,” *Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 126): *each* individual sin destroys *everything* that might have been accumulated in the course of an entire life in the way of “merit” through “good works,” if (unthinkably) man were capable of achieving anything that God might *account* as worthy of merit, or indeed if he were to lead a perfect life. Unlike Catholicism, there is not some kind of current account with a credit and debit balance, but for one’s *whole life* there is just the stark “either or”: either a state of grace or damnation. On the other hand, see below, note 140.

119) This is what distinguishes the saint from mere “Legality” and “Civility,” companions of Mr. “Worldly-Wiseman” in Bunyan’s allegory, who dwell in the

city called “Morality.”

120) Charnock, *Self-Examination (Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 172): “*Reflection* and knowledge of self is a prerogative of a *rational* nature.” And the footnote to this: “*Cogito ergo sum* is the first principle of the new philosophy.”

121) This is exactly how (for example) the article *Ascese* in the Catholic *Kirchenlexikon* defines it, in complete concordance with its highest historical manifestations. Similarly, Seeberg in the *Realenzyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche*.

122) So it is in the many reports of the interrogations of the Puritan heretics in Neal’s *History of the Puritans* and in Crosby’s *English Baptists*.

123) Sanford, op. cit. (as well as many others before and afterward), traced the origin of the ideal of “reserve”<sup>3</sup> back to Puritanism. Compare also, on this subject, the remarks of James Bryce on the American college in volume 2 of his *American Commonwealth*.

The ascetic principle of “self-control” also gave Puritanism a claim to be the father of modern *military discipline*. (On Moritz of Orange as the creator of modern military institutions, see Roloff, *Preußische Jahrbücher*, 1903, vol. 3, p. 255). If Cromwell’s “Ironsides,” their pistols cocked and held at the ready, but not fired, trotting toward the enemy at a brisk pace, were superior to the “Cavaliers,” this was not the result of any frenzied fanaticism, but rather of their sober self-control, thanks to which their leader was able to keep them in hand, while the gallant and fiery attacks of the Cavaliers always ended with their own troops being scattered to the four winds. More can be read on this in Firth, *Cromwell’s Army*.

124) See especially Windelband, *Über Willensfreiheit*, pp. 77f.

125) Only not in such undiluted form. Contemplation, occasionally linked to emotionality, is intermingled with these rational elements in various ways. On the other hand, however, contemplation is itself *methodically* regulated.

126) According to Richard Baxter, *everything* that is against “reason,” <sup>4</sup> with which God has endowed us to set a standard, is *sinful*—not just passions which are sinful in themselves, but all emotions *as such* which are in any way lacking in purpose or restraint, because they destroy the “countenance”<sup>5</sup> and, as things of the flesh distract us from the rational reference of all our action and feeling to God, and insult him. Compare also what is said about the sinfulness of anger (*Christian Directory*, 2nd ed., 1678, vol. 1, p. 285. Tauler is quoted on p. 287). On the sinfulness of *fear* *ibid.* p. 287, col. 2. In *ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 310, and p. 316, col. 1, and frequently elsewhere it is emphatically stated that it is idolatry when our *appetite* is the “rule and measure of eating.”<sup>6</sup> In support, the Book of Proverbs is most often quoted, followed by Plutarch’s *De tranquillitate animi*, also not infrequently the medieval ascetic writings of Saint Bernardine, Saint Bonaventura *et al.* The contrast with “He who loves not wine, women and song . . .” could scarcely be more clearly expressed than by the extension of the concept of idolatry to *all* pleasures of the senses, *unless* they can be justified on *hygienic* grounds, in which case they are permitted (as is sport, within these limits, as well as other “recreations”). We shall have more to say about this below.

127) See especially the article “*Moralisten, englische*,” by E. Troeltsch, *Realenzyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd ed.

128) The extent to which *quite concrete* religious elements, which appear to be “historical chance,” operated, is shown particularly clearly by the fact that, in the Pietist circles which arose on the basis of the Reformed Church, the absence of monasteries (for example) was sometimes actually *regretted*, and that the “communist” experiments of Labadie *et. al.* were merely a surrogate for monastic life.

129) This was even done in some of the confessions of the reformation age

itself. Ritschl, too (*Pietismus*, vol. 1, pp. 258f.), even though he regards the later development as a distortion of the reformed idea, does not deny (e.g., Conf. Gall. 25 and 26, Conf. Belg. 29, Conf. Helv. Post. 17) that, for example, “the Reformed Particular Church is defined by quite empirical characteristics, and that the faithful are not counted as belonging to this true Church *unless they possess the characteristics of moral activity.*” (See above note 91.)

130) “Bless God that we are not of the many” (Thomas Adams, *Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 138).

131) The historically so important idea of the “birthright”<sup>8</sup> was given a considerable boost by this: “The first born which are written in heaven. . . . As the first born is not to be defeated in his inheritance and the enrolled names are never to be obliterated, so certainly shall they inherit eternal life” (Thomas Adams, *Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. xiv).

132) The Lutheran attitude of *contrition and repentance* is in practice (though not perhaps in theory) inwardly foreign and ethically worthless to Calvinism. Neither is it of any use to the reprobate. For the man who is sure of his election, the sin to which he himself may admit is a symptom of retarded development and incomplete sanctification, which, instead of repenting of, he *hates* and endeavors to overcome to the glory of God. Compare the thoughts of Howe (Cromwell’s chaplain 1656-58) in “Of men’s enmity against God and of reconciliation between God and Man,” *Works of the English Puritan Divines*, p. 237: “The carnal mind is *enmity* against God. It is the mind, therefore, not as speculative merely, but as practical and active, that must be renewed.” Ibid, p. 246: “Reconciliation . . . must begin in (1) a deep conviction . . . of your former *enmity*. . . . I have been *alienated* from God . . . (2) (p. 251) a clear and lively apprehension . . . of the monstrous iniquity and wickedness thereof.” Here only hatred of the sin, not the sinner, is spoken of. But the celebrated letter of the Duchess Renata of Este (the mother of “Leonora”) to Calvin—in which she speaks, inter alia, of the *hatred* she would feel against her father and her husband *if* she were convinced that they were among the reprobate—illustrates how this can be transferred to the person, and is, at the same time, an example of what was said above [this volume p. 74ff.] about how the doctrine of election by grace can inwardly free the individual from the ties of community formed by “natural” feeling.

133) “None but those who give evidence of being *regenerated or holy* persons ought to be received or counted fit members of visible churches. Where this is wanting, *the very essence of a church is lost.*” Thus Owen, the independent (Calvinist) vice-chancellor of Oxford under Cromwell, expresses the principle (*Investigation into the Origin of the Evangelical Church*).

134) “*Catéchisme genevois*, 149.” Bailey, *Praxis pietatis*, p. 125: “In life we should act as though no one but Moses had authority over us.”

135) The Reformed Christian sees the law as an ideal to be striven for; the Lutheran feels crushed by it as an unattainable ideal. In the Lutheran catechism it comes *first*, in order to arouse the necessary *humility*; in the reformed catechisms it regularly *follows* the gospel. The Reformed Christians accused the Lutherans of “shying away from holiness” (Möhler); the Lutherans accused the reformed of “servitude under the law” and of arrogance.

136) *Studies and Reflections of the Great Rebellion*, pp. 79f.

137) Of these, in particular the *Song of Solomon*—which was usually simply ignored by the Puritans—should not be forgotten. Its Oriental eroticism influenced, among other things, the development of Saint Bernardine’s type of piety.

138) On the necessity for this self-control, see, for instance, Charnock’s previously quoted sermon on 2 Corinthians 13.5, in *Works of the Puritan Divines*, pp. 161f.

139) The majority of moral theologians recommend it. Thus, Baxter, *Christian Directory*, vol. 2, pp. 77ff., although he does not try to hide the “dangers.”

140) Baxter, too (*The Saints’ Everlasting Rest*, chap. 12), explains God’s

*invisibility* with the remark: “Just as by means of correspondence one can do profitable business with a stranger one cannot see, so one can also acquire a “pearl of great price” by a sanctified transaction with the invisible God.

These commercial metaphors, rather than the forensic metaphors of the older moralists and the Lutherans, are typical of Puritanism, and in effect allow man to obtain his own salvation by means of a business transaction.

Compare also the following passage from a sermon: “We reckon the value of a thing by that which a wise man will give for it, who is not ignorant of it nor under necessity. Christ, the Wisdom of God, gave himself, his own precious blood, to redeem souls and he knew what they were and hath no need of them (Matthew Henry, “*The Worth of the Soul*,” *Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 313).

141) Against this, Luther says: “Weeping comes before working, and suffering surpasses all activity.”

142) In the development of the ethical theory of Lutheranism, too, this is most clearly evident. On this, see Hoennicke, *Studien zur altprotestantischen Ethik*, Berlin 1902, and additionally the informative discussion by Ernst Troeltsch, *Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1902, no. 8. In particular, the formal similarity of the Lutheran doctrine to the older *orthodox* Calvinist doctrine is often considerable, but the difference in the religious orientation breaks through again and again. Melanchthon placed the concept of *repentance* first, in order to establish a connection between morality and faith. Repentance, brought about by the law, must precede faith, but good works must follow, otherwise it cannot be the true justifying faith. (The Puritans would have expressed it in almost the same way.) A certain measure of perfection can (he believes) be achieved on earth. Indeed, Melanchthon originally taught that the *purpose* of justification was to make men capable of good works, and whatever degree of earthly [*diesseitig*] bliss faith could afford consisted in this increasing level of perfection. Even in later Lutheran dogma the idea that good works are the necessary *fruits* of faith, and that faith brings about a new life, is outwardly quite similar to reformed

doctrine. The question as to what “good works” were, was increasingly answered by Melanchthon, and even more emphatically by the later Lutherans, by reference to the law. All that remained of Luther’s original ideas was the lesser extent to which bibliocracy was taken seriously, especially with regard to the individual norms of the Old Testament. Essentially, the Decalogue remained the norm for human action as a codification of the most important principles of the *natural* moral law.

*However*, there is no secure bridge from the statutory validity of the moral law to the exclusive significance of *faith* for justification (which was constantly insisted upon), especially as this faith (see above) had a completely different psychological *character* from the Calvinist faith. The genuine original Lutheran standpoint had been abandoned, indeed it had to be abandoned, by a church that regarded itself as an institution of salvation, but no new standpoint had been adopted. In particular, from fear of giving up its dogmatic foundation (“*sola fide!*”), apart from other reasons, it proved impossible to accept the *ascetic* rationalization of the whole of life as a moral task of the individual. What was lacking was the *motivation* to develop the idea of proving oneself to the level of importance that the doctrine of election by grace had attained for Calvinism. Also, the interpretation of the sacraments as magic (which chimed in with the absence of the doctrine of election), especially the postponement of the *regeneratio* (or at least of the start of it) until *baptism*, and the acceptance of the *universalism* of grace, inevitably worked against the development of *methodical* morality. This was because it (that is, this interpretation of the sacraments) weakened the awareness of the gulf between the *status naturalis* and the state of grace. The strong Lutheran stress on original sin also played a part here. Another factor was the *exclusively forensic* interpretation of the act of justification, which presupposes that God’s decrees can be affected by a concrete act of repentance by the converted sinner—and this was something upon which Melanchthon placed increasing emphasis. That complete transformation of his doctrine in the direction of the increasing emphasis on *repentance* also has a close inner connection with his profession of “free will.” All of this contributed to the *nonmethodical* character of the Lutheran manner of life. In the mind of the average Lutheran, *concrete* acts of grace for *concrete* sins—partly as a result of the continued existence of confession—inevitably made up the substance of salvation, not the development of an aristocracy of saints which created its own certainty of salvation.

Thus neither a morality which was *outside* the law nor a rational *asceticism* oriented to the law could be achieved. Instead, alongside “faith,” the law remained inorganically in existence as a statute and ideal demand. Moreover, since strict bibliocracy was shunned as “justification by works,” it was rather insecure and imprecise, and, above all, unsystematic in its detailed content.

However, as Troeltsch (op. cit.) put it in relation to ethical theory, life remained a “sum of mere beginnings which never quite succeeded.” ... “Individual fragments of unreliable advice” were not able to “combine to give coherence to the whole of life,” but essentially, in accordance with Luther’s own development (see above), called for adaptation to one’s situation in life in matters both great and small.

The much deplored propensity of the Germans to “adapt” to foreign cultures, and their rapid changes of nationality, can *in part* (*alongside* the workings of the nation’s political destiny) be attributed to this development, which is still active in all the circumstances of our life. The subjective appropriation of the culture remains weak, *because* it comes about essentially by means of passive acceptance of what is offered in an “authoritarian” way.

143) On these matters, see, for example, Tholuck’s anecdotal *Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus*.

144) Ritschl, *Geschichte des Pietismus*, vol. 1, p. 152, regarding the period before Labadie, and using only Dutch documents [*specimina*], identifies the following distinguishing marks of the Pietists.

I. Formation of conventicles.

II. Cultivation of the idea of the “vanity of creaturely existence” in a manner “which conflicted with the Protestant [*evangelisch*] interest in salvation.”

III. Seeking for “the assurance of grace in a relationship of tenderness with the Lord Jesus” in a manner alien to the Reformation. The latter characteristic applies, in this early period, only to *one* of the representatives he deals with. The idea of the “vanity of the creature” is actually a genuine



child of the Calvinist spirit and only diverges from the paths of normal Protestantism where it leads in practice to a withdrawal from the world. Finally, the Synod of Dordrecht had itself, to a certain extent (especially for the purposes of the catechism), called for conventicles.

Of the characteristics of Pietist devotion analyzed by Ritschl in his book, the following are worthy of consideration:

1. Punctiliousness [*Präzisierung*] in slavishly adhering to the letter of the Scriptures in all the *outward* things of life, in a manner sometimes advocated by Gisbert Voët.
2. The treatment of justification and reconciliation with God, not as an end in itself, but merely as a *means* to an ascetically holy life, such as may perhaps be found in Lodensteyn but is also hinted at in Melancthon, among others [see note 142].
3. The high value placed on repentance [*Bußkampf*] as a characteristic of genuine rebirth, as first taught by W. Teelinck.
4. Abstinence from Communion where unregenerate persons were partaking in it (about which we shall have more to say in a different context) and, arising out of this (a practice which was not within the bounds of the Dordrecht *canones*), the formation of conventicles, involving a revival of “prophecy,” that is, exposition of the Scriptures by nontheologians, and even women (Anna Maria Schurmann).

These were all things that represented (sometimes considerable) departures from the doctrine and practice of the reformers. However, in relation to the tendencies not included in Ritschl’s account, particularly those of the English Puritans, they represented, *with the exception of No. 3*, only a further extension of tendencies that already formed part of this religious development. The impartiality of Ritschl’s account suffers when this fine scholar brings into play his own value judgments relating to the politics of the Church, or rather, of religion, and when, in his antipathy to all clearly *ascetic* religion, he interprets any tendency toward this as a relapse into “Catholicism.” Like Catholicism, so early Protestantism also embraced “all sorts and conditions of men,” *and yet* the Catholic Church rejected the rigorism of innerworldly asceticism as embodied in Jansenism, just as Pietism would have nothing to do with the specifically Catholic quietism of the seventeenth century.

For *our* particular purposes, at least, the point at which Pietism began to undergo the change into something which is *effectively* different, not just in degree but

qualitatively, was when increased fear of the “world” led to withdrawal from business or professional life and to the formation of conventicles on a monastic and communist basis (Labadie), or—something of which certain extreme Pietists were accused by contemporaries—to the deliberate *neglect* of secular work in favor of contemplation. This sequence of events naturally occurred particularly frequently when contemplation began to take on the character of what Ritschl termed “Bernardinism” (because it was first clearly developed in Saint Bernardine’s interpretation of the “Song of Solomon”). It was a hysterical and sensual type of mystical religiosity of emotion—striving for a “*unio mystica*” coarsened by sexual overtones—which from the point of view of the psychology of religion undoubtedly represented something quite other than Reformed piety, *but differs too* from the *ascetic* variety represented by men like Voët. However, Ritschl constantly tries to link this quietism with Pietist *asceticism* and thus to damn the latter equally, and he points to every quotation from Catholic mysticism or asceticism that he can find in Pietist literature. But even English and Dutch moral theologians who are quite “above suspicion” are likely to quote from Bernardine, Bonaventura, or Thomas à Kempis.

In the case of all the reformation churches, the relationship to the Catholic past is a very complex one. Depending on the particular point of view at any one time, now one, now another appears closer to Catholicism—or to particular aspects of it.

145) Thus the quite informative article on “Pietism” by Mirbt in the third edition of the *Realenzyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche* treats the origin of Pietism simply as a personal religious experience of Spener, which is a little puzzling.

As an introduction to Pietism, Gustav Freytag’s description in the *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit* is still worth reading.

146) This view, as is well known, has enabled Pietism to be one of the main bearers of the idea of *toleration*. Leaving aside for a moment the humanistic, Enlightenment type of *indifference*—which has never had *great* practical effects

on its own—we can say that, historically, toleration arises from the following principal sources.

1. Purely political reasons of state [*Staatsraison*] (archetype: William of Orange).
2. Mercantilism (for example, especially in the city of Amsterdam and in the numerous cities where landlords and potentates welcomed the sectarians as valuable bearers of economic progress).
3. The radical thrust of Calvinist piety. Predestination basically excluded any possibility of the state really promoting religion through intolerance. It was not able to save a single soul in this way, and only the thought of *the glory of God* caused the Church to claim the assistance of the state for the suppression of heresy. The greater the emphasis that was placed upon the need for the preacher and of all communicants to belong to the elect, the more intolerable was any state interference in the appointment to the office of preacher, or of any gift of ecclesiastical benefices to possibly unregenerate graduates of the universities merely because they had been trained in theology. Reformed Pietism strengthened this viewpoint by devaluing dogmatic correctness and by gradually undermining the principle “*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus.*” *Calvin* had regarded the *subjection* not only of the elect, but also of the reprobate, to the divine institution of the Church as necessary for conformity with the glory of God. In New England the attempt was made to constitute the Church as an aristocracy of proven saints; but even the radical Independents refused to accept any interference by the civil or any hierarchical powers in the testing for “proof” [*Bewährung*], which was only possible within the *individual* congregation. The idea that God’s glory demanded that even the reprobate should be brought under the discipline of the Church was superceded by the idea (which had been present from the start but became emphasized more and more passionately) that it was offensive to the glory of God to share the communion with one whom God had condemned. This inevitably led to voluntarism, for it led to the “believers’ Church,” the religious community comprising only the regenerate. It was the Calvinist Baptist Church, to which the leader of the “Parliament of the Saints,” Praisegod Barebone, among others, belonged, that was most rigorous in following through this line of thought. Cromwell’s army advocated freedom of conscience, and the Parliament of the “Saints” even advocated separation of church and state, *because* its members were devout Pietists, that is, on *positive* religious grounds.

4. From their very earliest days, the Baptist sects, as we shall see, always insisted that only those who had been personally born again could be accepted into the community of the Church, and for this reason abhorred the notion that the Church should have “institutional” character, and abhorred any interference by the secular power. Here, too, then a *positive religious* reason existed for the demand for absolute toleration. [Editors’ note: The following section: “Roger Williams . . . Puritanism once again” is missing in the 1920 edition and is replaced by a different passage.] Roger Williams, the founder of the first colony (Rhode Island) that was tolerant for these positive religious reasons, and completely rejected the idea of a state church, was rebaptized there and was then—for a time—the Baptist preacher, but for reasons which are unclear he was already opposed to the principle of the state church. The colony of Maryland, which had been founded by Lord Baltimore, proclaimed toleration—a principle that the Catholic Church, as exclusive institution of salvation, *cannot* concede. It did this, however, merely for opportunist reasons, because a colony that was officially Catholic would have been suppressed. Pennsylvania, of course, held the principle of toleration and the separation of church and state for religious reasons from the beginning.

The preceding remarks, to which we shall return later, have been included here partly because recently Deputy Gröber has seen fit to claim in the Reichstag that Maryland’s practice of “toleration” predated that of Rhode Island. Toleration for *opportunistic* reasons of (ecclesiastical) politics, and toleration as a religious *principle* are, however, two very different things. The latter is unacceptable to the Catholic Church, because, as a divine institution it has a *duty* to preserve people from damnation, to which heresy unfailingly leads.

The question of toleration is basically no different from the modern “liberal” idea. The *religious* foundation of the principle of rejection of all *human* authorities as “idolatry” and a devaluation of the *absolute* subjection of the will which is due to *God alone* and his law (which was found in its most uncompromising form in the Quakers, and in a milder form in all ascetic sects)—this *positive* religious motivation for “hostility to authority” was the historically decisive “psychological” basis for “liberty” in the Puritan countries. However highly one may rate the historical significance of the “Enlightenment,” its ideals of liberty lacked that foundation in those *positive* motive forces which were necessary to secure their continued existence and which were similar to

those that gave Gladstone's political work its "constructive" character. It is well known that Jellinek's "Erklärung der Menschenrechte" is fundamental for understanding the history of the emergence and *political* significance of "freedom of conscience." I, too, am indebted to this work for inspiring me to take up the study of Puritanism once again.

147) This idea finds its practical application in, for example, Cromwell's "tryers," who examined the candidates for the office of preacher. They were trying to establish not so much the specialized theological knowledge as the subjective state of grace of the candidate.

148) We shall refrain, for good reasons, from entering into the "psychological" connotations (in the *technical* sense of the word) of these religious states of consciousness, and even the use of the relevant terminology has been avoided where possible. The conceptual basis of psychology is at present not *remotely* adequate for the purposes of historical research in the area of our problem. The use of psychological terminology would simply tempt us to elevate, in an amateurish way, what is directly comprehensible and even trivial to the level of scholarly erudition, and thus to create the false impression of an enhanced conceptual precision, something which has, unfortunately, become typical of Lamprecht.

For more serious attempts at evaluation of psychopathological concepts for the interpretation of certain historical mass phenomena, see *W. Hellpach, Grundlinien zu einer Psychologie der Hysterie*, chapter 12, as well as his *Nervosität und Kultur*. I cannot here attempt to justify in detail my view that even this author, despite his wide range of interests, has been tainted by the influence of certain theories of Lamprecht. Anyone who knows the available literature is surely aware of how completely worthless, compared with the older literature, are Lamprecht's schematic observations on Pietism (in volume 7 of *Deutsche Geschichte*).

149) Thus, for example, among the adherents of Schortinghuis's "*Innige Christendom*."

150) This occasionally happened among the Dutch Pietists, under the influence of *Spinoza's* philosophy.

151) Labadie, Tersteegen et. al.

152) Such influence emerges perhaps most clearly when he—it is Spener we are talking about!—disputes the competence of the authorities to control the conventicles, except in the case of disorder and misuse, on the grounds that it is a question of *a basic right* of Christians, guaranteed by the apostolic order (*Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 2, pp. 81f.). That is—in principle—precisely the Puritan standpoint with regard to the nature and sphere of validity of the rights of the individual, which are *ex jure divino* and therefore inalienable. Neither this heresy (*Pietismus*, vol. 2, p. 157) nor that mentioned elsewhere in the text (*ibid.*, p. 115) escapes the notice of Ritschl. One can only concur with him when he says that in neither case is there any organic consistency with Luther's standpoint. This remains true despite the unhistorical nature of his positivist (even philistine) criticism of the *basic rights* idea. We do, after all, owe to this idea practically every essential element of our basic individual freedoms, as even the most reactionary person will concede.

The conventicles (*collegia pietatis*) themselves, for which Spener's famous "Pia desideria" provided the theoretical foundation and which he established in practice, corresponded in essence to the English "prophesyings," such as those first found in Joh. von Lasco's London Bible Classes (1547). Thereafter, they were part of the inventory of those forms of Puritan piety persecuted for their opposition to the authority of the Church. Finally, he rejects the Geneva Church discipline on the grounds that its appointed agent, the "third estate" (*status oeconomicus*: Christian laymen) did *not* form part of the Lutheran Church organization. On the other hand, when it came to the question of excommunication, recognition of the secular members of the consistory, deputed by the *Landesherr* as representatives of the "third estate," was faintly Lutheran.

153) The very *name* "Pietism," which originated within Lutheran territories,

indicated that contemporaries saw that “piety” [*Pietät*] was being turned into a methodical *operation*.

154) It must be admitted that while the source of this motivation is predominantly from within Calvinism, it is not *exclusively* so. In fact, it is found particularly commonly in the *oldest* Lutheran Church orders.

155) As in Hebrews, chap. 5, vv. 13 and 14. Compare Spener, *Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 1, p. 306.

156) Alongside Bailey and Baxter (see *Consilia theologica*, vol. 3, 6, 1, dist. 1 no. 47; dist. 3 no. 6), Spener particularly values Thomas à Kempis and especially Tauler (although he does not always understand him: *Consilia theologica*, vol. 3, 6, 1; 1, 1). He has written extensively about the latter in *Consilia theologica*, vol. 1, 1 no. 7. He sees Luther as a follower of Tauler.

157) See Ritschl, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 113. He refuses to accept the “repentance experience” [*Bußkampf*] of the later Pietists (and of Luther) as the *sole* determining characteristic of true conversion (*Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 3, p. 476). Regarding sanctification as the fruit of gratitude arising out of faith in reconciliation—wording that is specifically Lutheran (see *Archiv*, vol. 20, p. 42, note 1)—see the passages quoted in Ritschl, *op. cit.*, p. 115, note 2.

On the *certitudo salutis*, see *Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 1, p. 324: true faith (we read) is not so much felt *emotionally*, as it is *recognized* by its *fruits* (love and obedience toward God). See also *Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 1, pp. 335f.: “With regard to the worry you feel about the assurance of salvation and grace, it is safer to rely on our (Lutheran) books than on the ‘English scribblers.’ ” He does agree with them on the nature of sanctification, however.

158) Here too the religious journals that A. H. Francke recommends the faithful to keep are the outward sign of this. Methodical practice and the *habit* of

sanctification should bring about further growth in sanctification and the *separation* of good people from the wicked. This is roughly the basic theme of Francke's book *Von des Christen Vollkommenheit*.

159) Characteristically, this rational Pietist belief in providence, which is at variance with the orthodox interpretation, emerged in the celebrated dispute between the Pietists of Halle and the representative of Lutheran orthodoxy *Löscher*. In his "Timotheus Verinus," *Löscher* goes as far as to set everything that can be achieved by *human* activity in *in opposition to* the decrees of providence. By contrast, the view that was always firmly held by *Francke* was that the flash of "clearness" about what was to be done (the result of quiet *waiting* for the decision) was "a sign from God." This is analogous to the Quaker psychology and corresponds to the general ascetic idea that a rational *methodical* approach is the way to come closer to God. True, *Zinzendorf* in no way shares *Francke*'s kind of faith in providence. He did, after all, in one of his most important decisions, determine the destiny of his congregation by *drawing lots*.

*Spener*, *Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 1, p. 314, had looked to *Tauler* for his image of Christian "composure," according to which one should place oneself in God's hands and not thwart his designs by hasty and willful action. Essentially, this is also *Francke*'s standpoint. By comparison with Puritanism, the activity of Pietist devotion everywhere appears relatively weak, as it seeks peace in *this* world. The opposing view was expressed as recently as 1904 by a leading Baptist (*George White*, in an address from which we shall quote further) when he defined the ethical program of his denomination with the words "First righteousness, then peace" (*Baptist Handbook*, 1904, p. 107).

160) *Lectiones paraeneticae*, vol. 4, p. 271.

161) *Ritschl*'s criticism, in particular, is directed against this constantly recurring idea. See *Francke*'s book (referred to in the third from last footnote), which contains this doctrine.



162) It can be found in the English *nonpredestinationist* Pietists too, for example, Goodwin. Regarding him and others, compare Heppel, *Geschichte des Pietismus in der reformierten Kirche*, Leiden, 1879, a book which, even after Ritschl's standard work,<sup>4</sup> still fulfills a need for matters concerning England, and occasionally the Netherlands.

163) This was an attempt to combat the laxity resulting from the Lutheran doctrine of the recoverability of grace (especially the usual "conversion" in extremis).

164) Against the concomitant necessity of knowing the day and hour of the "conversion" as an *essential* mark of its genuineness, see Spener, *Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 2, 6, 1, p. 197. He knew as little of the "repentance experience" [*Bußkampf*] as Melancthon knew of Luther's *terrores conscientiae*.

165) Of course, alongside this, the antiauthoritarian interpretation of the "general priesthood" common to all ascetic movements also played its part, of which more later.

Occasionally, the pastor was recommended to postpone absolution until there was "proof" of genuine repentance, which Ritschl rightly designates Calvinist in principle.

166) The essential points for what concerns us can be most conveniently found in Plitt, *Zinzendorfs Theologie* (3 vols., Gotha, 1869f.): vol. 1, pp. 325, 345, 381, 412, 429, 433, 444, 448; vol. 2, pp. 372, 381, 385, 409f.; vol. 3, pp. 131, 167, 176.

Compare also Bernhardt Becker, *Zinzendorf und sein Christentum* (Leipzig, 1900, bk. 3, chap. 3).

167) Admittedly, he only regarded the Augsburg Confession as a suitable document of the Lutheran Christian life of faith when—in his repulsive terminology—it had been doused with “antiseptic.” To read him is a penance, because his language, in rendering the amorphous fluidity of his thought, is even worse than the “Christo-turpentine oil” that Friedrich Theodor Vischer found so dreadful in his dispute with the Munich “Christoterpe.”

168) “In no religion do we recognize as brethren those who are not washed by the sprinkling of the blood of Christ and *continue thoroughly changed* in the sanctification of the spirit. We recognize no revealed (= visible) community of Christ but that where the word of God is taught pure and unblemished and the members *also live holy lives in accordance with it* as the children of God.”

True, the final sentence is taken from Luther’s Little Catechism; but—as Ritschl points out—its purpose *there* is to answer the question of how the name of God should be hallowed, whereas *here* it is being used to demarcate the Church of the Saints.

169) See Plitt, vol. 1, p. 346. Even more decisive is the answer given in Plitt, vol. 1, p. 381, to the question “Are good works necessary for salvation?” The reply: “Unnecessary and harmful in gaining salvation, but after having gained salvation they are so necessary that anyone who does not do them is not saved.”

170) For example, by those caricatures of “Christian liberty” that Ritschl castigates (op. cit., vol. 3, p. 381).

171) Especially by increased stress on the idea of penal satisfaction in his salvation doctrine, an idea which, after the American sects had spurned his missionary approaches, he made the basis of his method of sanctification. Thereafter, he made the preservation of *childlikeness* and of the virtues of self-effacing modesty the aim of Herrnhut asceticism, in sharp contrast to the tendencies in the community, which were much more in accord with Puritan asceticism.

172) An influence which, however, had its limits. For this reason alone it would be a mistake to try to categorize Zinzendorf's form of religiosity as a developmental stage in terms of "social psychology" [*sozialpsychisch*], as Lamprecht does. Furthermore, his whole religiosity is most strongly influenced by the fact that he was a *count* with fundamentally feudal instincts. From the point of view of social psychology, the *emotional* side of these instincts would fit just as well into the period of the sentimental decadence of chivalry as into that of "*Empfindsamkeit*".<sup>10</sup> If it can be understood at all in terms of "social psychology," then, given its opposition to West European rationalism, this should be in relation to the backwardness and patriarchal conservatism of the German East, as we shall see later.

173) This is revealed by Zinzendorf's controversies with Dippel, just as—after his death—the statements of the Synod of 1764 clearly express the character of the Herrnhut community as an *institution of salvation*. See Ritschl's criticism, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 443f.

174) Compare, for example, paragraphs 151, 153, and 160. The remarks on page 31, in particular, make it clear that sanctification may still be absent *despite* true repentance and forgiveness of sins. This is in accordance with the Lutheran doctrine of salvation, and is contrary to the Calvinist (and Methodist) doctrines.

175) Compare Zinzendorf's words, quoted in Plitt, vol. 2, p. 345. Also Spangenberg, *Idea fidei*, p. 325.

176) Compare, for example, Zinzendorf's comment on Matthew 20.28, quoted in Plitt, vol. 2, p. 131: "When I see a man to whom God has given a fine gift, I am glad and make use of the gift with pleasure. But if I notice that he is not satisfied with what he has, but desires to make it into something better, I regard that as the beginning of the ruin of such a person." Zinzendorf—especially in his discussion with John Wesley in 1743—denied the possibility of *progress* in sanctification, since he identified the latter with justification and found it *only* in the

relationship with Christ, which was *emotionally* experienced (Plitt, vol. 1, p. 413).

177) Due to its origins in this tendency, such labor did not have a firm ethical grounding. Zinzendorf rejected Luther's idea that the calling was itself a form of "worship," and that this was therefore the primary reason for faithfulness in the calling. Such faithfulness was, according to Zinzendorf, in fact *repayment* for the "Savior's faithful handiwork."

178) As we know, he said: "A reasonable man should not be an unbeliever, and a believing man should not be unreasonable" in his *Socrates, d.i. Aufrichtige Anzeige verschiedener nicht sowohl unbekannter als vielmehr in Abfall geratener Hauptwahrheiten*<sup>5</sup> (1725). He is also known to have a predilection for authors such as Bayle.

179) The marked preference of Protestant asceticism for rational empiricism on a basis of mathematics is well known and needs no emphasis. On the development of the sciences toward mathematically rationalized "exact" research, the philosophical motives behind it, and their opposition to Bacon's views, see Windelband, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, pp. 305-07, especially the remarks at the bottom of page 305, which trenchantly refute the idea that modern natural science is to be understood as the product of material, technological interests. Extremely important relationships between them obtain, of course, but they are far more complicated than this. See also Windelband, *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, vol. 1, pp. 40f.

The decisive point regarding the attitude of Protestant asceticism, as seen most clearly in Spener's *Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 1, p. 232, and vol. 3, p. 260, was that just as the Christian can be recognized by the *fruits* of his faith, so too the knowledge of God and of his purposes can only be developed from a knowledge of his *works*. Accordingly, the favored discipline of all Puritan, Baptist, and Pietist Christianity is *physics*, followed by other mathematical and scientific disciplines that work with similar methods. It was believed that it was possible to arrive at a knowledge of the "meaning" of the world through empirical understanding of the divine laws as seen in nature. In view of the fragmentary character of the divine revelation—a Calvinist idea—this meaning,

it was believed, could never be comprehended by means of conceptual speculation. The empiricism of the seventeenth century was for asceticism the means of “seeking God in nature.” Empiricism seemed to lead *toward* God, while philosophical speculation seemed to lead away from him. According to Spener, Aristotelian philosophy in particular has done the most fundamental harm to Christianity. Any other philosophy was better, particularly “*Platonism*”: *Consilia theologica*, vol. 3, 6, 1, dist. 2, no. 13. Compare also the following typical passage: “Unde pro Cartesio quid dicam non habeo (he has not read him), semper tamen optavi et opto, ut Deus viros excitet, qui veram philosophiam vel tandem oculis sisterent, *in qua nullius hominis attenderetur* auctoritas, sed sana tantum *magistri nescia ratio* (Spener, *Consilia theologica*, vol. 2, 5, no. 2).

The significance of these beliefs of ascetic Protestantism for the development of *education*, and in particular *technical* education, is well known. Together with the attitude toward “*fides implicita*” they constituted its pedagogical program.

180) “These are the kind of people who divide up their happiness into four sections: 1. To become . . . lowly, despised, scorned . . . 2. To neglect . . . all those senses which they do not need for the service of their Lord . . . 3. Either to have nothing, or to give away what they get . . . 4. To work *as day laborers*, not for the sake of payment, but *for the sake of the calling* and for the sake of the Lord and one’s neighbor . . .” (*Religiöse Reden*, vol. 2, p. 180; Plitt, vol. 1, p. 445). *Not everyone* can or may become “disciples,” but only those whom the Lord calls—but, as Zinzendorf himself admits (Plitt, vol. 1, p. 449), there are difficulties with this, as the Sermon on the Mount is formally addressed to *everyone*. The affinities of this “free *acosmism* of love” with the old Baptist ideals is evident.

181) The emotional internalization of piety is by no means alien to Lutheranism, even that of the later period. The *ascetic* element, and the regulation of life, which in the eyes of the Lutherans smacks of “justification by works” [*Werkheiligkeit*], is rather the crucial difference *here*.

182) “Genuine fear” was a better sign of grace than “security,” according to

Spener, *Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 1, p. 324. Of course, we also find express warnings about “false security” in Puritan writers. But at least the doctrine of predestination always had the opposite effect, to the extent that pastoral care was influenced by it.

183) The *psychological* effect of the existence of the confession was always to *relieve* the subject from personal responsibility for his conduct (this was why it was sought after, of course) and thus of the full rigor of ascetic demands.

184) In his description of Württemberg Pietism, Ritschl has already indicated (in volume 3 of the work which we have frequently quoted) what a powerful role purely *political* factors play in this—even in influencing the *form* taken by Pietist devotion.

185) Of course, Calvinism too, at least the genuine variety, is “patriarchal.” And the connection between the success of Baxter’s ministry and the domestic character of the industry in Kidderminster comes out clearly in his autobiography. See the passage quoted in the *Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. xxxviii: “The town liveth upon the weaving of Kidderminster stuffs, and as they stand in their loom, they can set a book before them, or edify each other. . . .” Nevertheless, the patriarchalism which is based on the Reformed, and especially the Baptist, ethic is of a different kind than that which is based upon Pietism. This problem will concern us in a different context.

186) *Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, 3rd ed., vol. 1, p. 598.

Frederick William I’s description of Pietism in general as being an affair suitable for *rentiers* tells us more about this king than it does about the Pietism of Spener and Francke; the king had very good reasons for opening his states to the Pietists by his edict of toleration.

187) A helpful introductory survey of Methodism is provided by the excellent article on “Methodism” by Loofs in the *Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd ed. The works of Jacoby (especially the “Handbuch

des Methodismus”), Kolde, and Jüngst are also useful. On Wesley: Tyerman, *Life and Times of John W.*, London, 1870f. The book by Watson, *Life of Wesley* (also available in German translation), is popular. One of the best libraries of books on the history of Methodism is at Northwestern University in Evanston, near Chicago.

188) This affinity is historically determined—if we disregard the personal influence of the Wesleys—on the one hand, by the dying away of the dogma of predestination, and, on the other, by the powerful reawakening of the principle of “sola fide” among the founders of Methodism. This, however, was chiefly motivated by the *missionary* character of Methodism, which brought about a rebirth (with certain changes) of certain medieval methods used in the “revivalist” sermon, and combined them with Pietist forms. The phenomenon definitely does not fit into a *general* “subjectivist” line of development. In this regard, it comes after Pietism and even after the medieval piety of Saint Bernardine.

189) This is how Wesley himself occasionally characterized the effect of the Methodist faith. The affinity with Zinzendorf’s “blessedness” is clear.

190) See, for example, Watson’s *Life of Wesley* (German edition), p. 331.

191) J. Schneckenburger, *Vorlesungen über die Lehrbegriffe der kleinen protestantischen Kirchenparteien*, edited by Hundeshagen, Frankfurt, 1863, p. 147.

192) Whitefield, leader of the predestination group, which, through lack of organization, broke up after his death, largely rejected Wesley’s doctrine of “perfection.” In fact, this is merely a *surrogate* for the Calvinists’ idea of “proof.”

193) Schneckenburger, *op. cit.*, p. 145. Slightly differently in Loofs, *op. cit.*

194) Thus the conference of 1770. The 1744 conference had already recognized that the words of the Bible were “a hair’s breadth” away from Calvinism, on the one hand, and antinomianism, on the other hand. In view of their obscurity, there was no reason to split for doctrinal reasons as long as the validity of the Bible remained as a *practical* norm.

195) The Methodists differed from the Herrnhut community over the doctrine of the possibility of sinless perfection, which Zinzendorf in particular rejected. For his part, Wesley perceived the *emotional* quality of Herrnhut devotion as “mysticism” and described Luther’s views on the “law” as “blasphemous.”

196) John Wesley occasionally stresses that whereas everyone else, for example, Quakers, Presbyterians, and High Churchmen, had to believe *dogmas*, the Methodists did not.

On the above subject, compare also the (admittedly summary) account in Skeats, *History of the Free Churches of England 1688-1851*.

197) Although of course it *may* detract from it, as it does in the case of today’s American Negroes.

Furthermore, the often markedly pathological character of Methodist emotion (in contrast to the relatively mild emotionalism of Pietism) *may*—alongside purely historical reasons and the public nature of the process—have more to do with the stronger *ascetic* permeation of life in those regions where Methodism is common. However, this is a matter where only neurologists are qualified to pronounce. (There are a number of perceptive hypotheses on the effect of “emotional repression,” etc., in the previously quoted work by W. Hellpach.)

198) Loofs (op. cit., p. 750) strongly emphasizes that Methodism differs from other ascetic movements by the fact that it came *after* the English Enlightenment era. He places it in parallel to the (admittedly very much weaker) renaissance of Pietism in Germany in the first third of this century.



Nevertheless, following Ritschl, *Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, vol. 1, pp. 568f., we must surely be permitted to draw a parallel with the Zinzendorf variety of Pietism, which—unlike that of Spener and Francke—is *also* a reaction against the Enlightenment. However, in Methodism, as we have seen, this reaction took a very different direction from that taken by the Herrnhut movement, at least to that part of it which was influenced by Zinzendorf.

199) Among the Baptists, only the “General Baptists” can be traced back to the original movement. The “Particular Baptists”—as previously mentioned—are Calvinists, who restrict church membership on principle to the regenerate, or at least to those who make a *personal* profession, and therefore are avowed voluntarists and opponents of all state churches, although in practice under Cromwell they were not always consistent. Our only interest in them is in a different connection. But neither do we need to concentrate on the General Baptists, important though they are as bearers of the Baptist tradition. We are concerned essentially with the Mennonites and—especially—the Quakers. Unquestionably, the latter, which in formal terms are a new foundation of George Fox and his companions, are in their fundamental ideas simply a continuation of the Baptist tradition. The best introduction to their history, which at the same time illuminates their relationship with Baptists and Mennonites, is found in Robert Barclay, *The Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the Commonwealth*, 1876. The best *Baptist* library seems to be the one at Colgate College in the state of New York.

200) It is one of the many merits of Karl Müller’s *Kirchengeschichte* to have given well-deserved prominence to the Baptist movement—outwardly modest but in its way magnificent. More than any other, it suffered under the merciless persecution of *all* the “churches”—simply because it wanted to be a *sect* in the strict sense of the word. After the catastrophe of the eschatological tendency in Münster which emerged from it, the movement was discredited for five generations (e.g., in England). Above all, constantly repressed and pushed into a corner, it was only long after its original foundation that it arrived at a coherent formulation of its religious beliefs. Thus it has produced *even less* “theology” than it might otherwise have done, even though the scope for this was limited, since its principles were, in themselves, hostile to the treatment of faith in God

as an academic “science.” This was scarcely to the liking of the more old-established professional theologians (even those of its own time), who were less than impressed. But even several of the more recent theologians take the same view. Ritschl, for example, in *Pietismus*, vol. 1, pp. 22f., treats the “Anabaptists” with little impartiality, indeed with nothing short of contempt. One feels tempted to speak of a theologically “bourgeois” [*bourgeois*] standpoint. And this was despite the fact that Cornelius’s fine work (*Geschichte des Münsterschen Aufbruchs*) had been in existence for decades. Ritschl interprets all this as a collapse—as he sees it—into “Catholicism” and senses direct influence from the followers of the Spiritual and Franciscan movements. Even if such influences were provable here and there, they would be very sparse. And, most important, the historical facts are, surely, that the official Catholic Church treated the innerworldly asceticism of laymen, wherever this led to the formation of conventicles, with extreme suspicion, and tried to direct it into the path of the formation of orders—in other words, to take it *out of* the “world.” Or it would link it with the mendicant orders and subordinate it to their discipline, thus deliberately categorizing it as second-class asceticism. Where it did not succeed in this it sensed the danger that the cultivation of subjectivist ascetic morality could lead to a denial of authority and to heresy. The Church of Elizabeth—with the same justification—took a similar view of the “prophesyings,” the semi-Pietist Bible conventicles, even where they did not infringe in any way against “conformism.” The Stuarts expressed the same thing with their Book of Sports—of which more later. The history of numerous heretical movements, but also, for example, of the *humiliati* and Be guines, as well as the fate of Saint Francis, provide further evidence.

The preaching of the mendicant monks, especially the Franciscans, no doubt helped in many ways to prepare the ground for the ascetic lay morality of Reformed and Baptist Protestantism. But the many points of similarity between the asceticism within Western monasticism and the ascetic manner of life within Protestantism—which we shall have to stress again and again, as they are so instructive in the context of our investigation—are ultimately due to the fact that of course *all* forms of asceticism based on biblical Christianity *must* inevitably have certain important features in common—also to the fact that *every* form of asceticism of whatever confession requires certain well-tried means of “mortifying” the flesh. Regarding the following account, it has to be said that its brevity is due to the fact that the Baptist ethic is of only limited importance for the problem to be discussed in *this* chapter, namely, the religious foundations of

the “bourgeois” [*bürgerlich*] idea of the *calling*.

The social side of the movement has been deliberately left aside for now. At present we can only deal with those aspects of the history of the *older* Baptist movements that have subsequently influenced the character of the sects which are of most interest to us: Quakers and (less centrally) Mennonites.

201) See above, note 133.

202) On the origin of this term and changes it has undergone, see Ritschl's *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, pp. 69f.

203) Of course, the Baptists have always refused to accept the term “sect.” They are *the* Church in the sense of the Epistle to the Ephesians (5.27). But in *our* terminology, they are a *sect*, and *not only* because they lack any relationship to the state. Admittedly, the relationship between church and state as it existed in the early Christian period was their ideal (for the Quakers too, see Barclay), since for them, as for many Pietists (Tersteegen), *only* the purity of the churches “under the cross” was free from suspicion. But under an *unbelieving* state, and certainly “under the cross,” even the Calvinists would be obliged, *faute de mieux*—as would the Catholic Church in the same circumstances—to favor the separation of church and state. Nor are they a “sect” because acceptance into membership of the Church occurred *de facto* through a contract between the community and the *catachumens*. *Formally*, that was the case, for example, in the Dutch Reformed churches (as a result of the original political situation) after the old Church Constitution (see von Hoffmann, *Kirchenverfassungsrecht der niederländischen Reformierten*, Leipzig, 1902). No, the reason is that, in accordance with its principles (which we shall examine shortly), the Church *could only* be organized on a voluntarist basis if it was not to include within it unregenerate people and thus deviate from the ancient Christian model. In the Baptist communities the *concept* of the “Church” expresses the situation that actually existed for Reformed Christians. We have already indicated that even among *these* people definite religious motives led toward the “Believers’ Church,” and we shall be looking at the consequences of this later.

204) The historical importance of this symbol for the preservation of the church communities—because it created an unambiguous and unmistakable characteristic—has been very clearly shown by Cornelius (op. cit.).

205) We may disregard here certain similarities to it in the doctrine of justification of the Mennonites.

206) It is perhaps this idea that underlies the religious interest in the question of how one should understand the incarnation of Christ and his relationship to the Virgin Mary, which, being often the *only* purely dogmatic section, seems so out of place in the very oldest documents of the Baptists (e.g., in the “Confessions,” published in Cornelius, appendix to vol. 2, op. cit.). See also K. Müller, *Kirchengeschichte*, vol. 2, 1, p. 330). Similar religious interests also underlay the disagreement in Christology between the Reformed Church and the Lutherans (in the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*).

207) It is expressed especially in the strict refusal (originally) to have dealings in *civil* [*bürgerlich*] life with those who had been excommunicated. This was a point which even the Calvinists conceded, despite their principle that civil affairs [*bürgerlich*] were immune from spiritual censure. More on this later.

208) It is well known how this principle was expressed in seemingly unimportant external matters among the Quakers (refusal to remove one’s hat, to kneel, to bow, and to use the plural form of address). But the *basic* idea is common in some degree to *every* form of asceticism, which, in its genuine form, is therefore “antiauthoritarian.” In Calvinism it was expressed in the principle that only *Christ* should rule in the *Church*. As far as Pietism is concerned, we only need to think of the trouble that Spener had in justifying titles by reference to the Bible.

As far as the *ecclesiastical* authorities [*Obrigkeit*] were concerned, *Catholic* asceticism suppressed this tendency through the oath of *obedience*, in which obedience itself was interpreted as a feature of asceticism. By turning this principle of obedience on its head, Protestant asceticism laid the historical foundation for the special character of the contemporary *democracy* of the

nations influenced by Puritanism, as distinct from that which is based on the “Latin spirit.” It is the basis, historically speaking, for the “disrespectfulness” of Americans, which some find repugnant and others refreshing.

209) Admittedly, for the Baptists this applied, from the start, principally to the *New Testament*, and not as much to the *Old Testament*. In particular, the Sermon on the Mount enjoys a special esteem as a social and ethical program.

210) Schwenckfeld had already taken the view that the external administration of the sacraments was an *adiaphoron*, while the “General Baptists” and the Mennonites held firmly to baptism and communion, and the Mennonites added the washing of feet.

211) For this, the Baptist denominations, especially the Quakers (Barclay, *Apology for the True Christian Divinity*, 4th ed., London, 1701—kindly placed at my disposal by Eduard Bernstein), appeal to the words of Calvin in the *Institutio Christiana*, vol. 3, p. 2, where indeed there are quite unmistakable similarities to the Baptist doctrine. Also, the older *distinction* between the revered “Word of God”—as the revelation of God to the patriarchs, prophets, and apostles—and “Holy Scripture” as that portion of it which they *recorded*, came close to the Baptist view of the nature of revelation (although there was no historical connection). The mechanical doctrine of inspiration and thus the strict bibliocracy among Calvinists is likewise only the product of a development in one particular direction, which occurred during the sixteenth century, while the Quaker doctrine of the “inner light,” which rested on a Baptist foundation, is the result of an opposing development. The sharp distinction between the two was no doubt also the result of constant debate.

212) This is emphatically contrasted with the Socinians. “Natural” reason knows *nothing* of God (Barclay, *op. cit.*, p. 102). In this way, the “*lex naturae*” has again undergone a modification from its normal position in Protestantism. There can, on principle, be no “general rules,”<sup>12</sup> no moral *code*, for God shows everyone their *individual* “calling” by means of the *conscience*. We are *not* to do “good”—in the generalizing sense of “natural” reason—but *God’s will*, which is

written in our hearts in the new covenant and is expressed in the conscience (Barclay, pp. 73, 76). This *irrationality* in morality, which follows from the heightened antagonism between the divine and the creaturely, is expressed in words which are fundamental to Quaker ethics: “What a man does contrary to his faith, *though his faith may be wrong*, is in no way acceptable to God . . . though *the thing might have been lawful to another*” (Barclay, p. 487). In practice, of course, this irrationality could not be sustained. The “moral and perpetual statutes acknowledged by all Christians,” for example, represent for Barclay the limits of what may be *tolerated*. In practice these contemporaries felt their ethics to be—apart from some features peculiar to themselves—comparable with those of Reformed Pietists. Spenser constantly reiterates that “everything good in the Church is suspected of being of Quaker origin,” and appears to envy the Quakers for this reputation (*Consilia Theologica*, vol. 3, 6, 1, dist. 2, no. 64.) Refusal to swear an oath, when that refusal was based on a biblical text, is enough to show that their degree of emancipation from the Scriptures was strictly limited. At a later stage we propose to deal with the *social* and ethical significance of the maxim, viewed by many Quakers as the essence of the *entire* Christian ethic: “Do unto others as you would that they do unto you.”

213) Barclay justifies the necessity of assuming this *possibility*, because without it “there should never be a place known by the Saints wherein they might be free of doubting and despair, which . . . *is most absurd.*” Of course, the “*certitudo salutis*” depends upon it. See Barclay, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

214) There remains, then, a difference in tone between the Calvinist and the Quaker rationalization of life. Baxter formulates this difference by saying that the “spirit” should act on the soul as on a corpse, while the principle which was characteristic of the Reformed movement was: “reason and spirit are conjunct principles” (*Christian Directory*, vol. 2, p. 76); *this* kind of contrast, however, was no longer typical of the period.

215) See the very carefully written articles on “Menno” and “Mennonites” by Cramer in the *Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, especially page 604. When we discuss class relationships in Protestant asceticism, we shall return to these. Whereas the above-mentioned articles are

good, the article on “Baptists” in the same encyclopedia is very much lacking in depth, and in places really inaccurate. For instance, the author is not familiar with the “Publications of the Hanserd Knolly’s Society,” which is an essential source for the history of the Baptist movement.

216) Thus Barclay (op. cit., p. 404) states that eating, drinking, and *business* are “*natural*, not spiritual, acts,” which can be carried out *without* a special call from God. This statement is the answer to the (characteristic) objection that if, as the Quakers teach, one was not permitted to pray without a special “motion of the spirit,” neither should one be permitted to plough without such a special motive.

Even modern resolutions at Quaker synods contain the advice to withdraw from business life after having acquired sufficient wealth, in order to be able to live a quiet life entirely devoted to the kingdom of God, away from the activities of the world. This is, of course, significant, even if such ideas may occasionally be found in the denominations, even Calvinist denominations. It is also an indication that the acceptance of the middle-class ethic of the calling was a *concession* by ascetics who had originally withdrawn from the world.

217) We refer here again with emphasis to the excellent writings of E. Bernstein, op. cit. At a later stage, we shall look at Kautsky’s depiction of the Anabaptist movement and his theory of “heretical communism” in general (in the first volume of the same work).

218) In his stimulating book *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, Veblen (Chicago), expresses the opinion that this maxim is merely “early capitalist.” But there have always been economic “supermen,” who, like today’s “captains of industry,”<sup>6</sup> stand beyond good and evil, and in the broad stratum of capitalist activity, the maxim still applies today.

219) “In civil actions it is good to be *as the many*, in religious, to be as the best.” So said Thomas Adams (*Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 138). Admittedly, this sounds rather more far-reaching than the author intended. It signifies that Puritan

integrity is *formalistic* legality, just as the “uprightness”<sup>7</sup> which former Puritan nations like to claim as a national virtue is something quite different from German “honesty” [*Ehrlichkeit*], having been formalistically and reflexively remodeled. There are helpful remarks on this subject by an educationalist in the *Preußische Jahrbücher*, vol. 112, 1903, p. 226. Conversely, the *formalism* of the Puritan ethic is an absolutely natural [*adäquate*] consequence of being tied to the *law*.

220) “Since God hath gathered us to be a people . . . ,” says (among others) Barclay, *op. cit.*, p. 357. I myself have listened to a Quaker sermon which laid the entire emphasis on the interpretation of “saints” = *sancti* = *separati*.

221) See the fine character study in Dowden, *op. cit.* There is a moderately good account of Baxter’s theology after he had gradually departed from strict belief in the “double decree” in Jenkyn’s introduction to his various works printed in *Works of the Puritan Divines*. Baxter’s attempt to combine “universal redemption” and “personal election” satisfied no one. For our purposes it is merely important to note *the fact* that even then he continued to hold fast to *personal election*, which is the ethically crucial feature of the doctrine of predestination. On the other hand, it is important to note his dilution of the *forensic* conception of justification, which represents a certain degree of movement toward the Baptists.

222) Tracts and sermons by Thomas Adams, John Howe, Matthew Henry, J. Janeway, S. Charnock, Baxter, and Bunyan have been collected in the ten volumes of the *Works of the Puritan Divines* (London, 1845-48) in a frequently rather arbitrary manner. Editions of the works of Bailey, Sedgwick, and Hoornbeek have already been mentioned when first referred to earlier. Gisbert Voët’s Ἀσκητικά, which should also have been consulted, was unfortunately not available to me during the writing of this essay.

223) The selection is based on the desire to give prominence to (not exclusively, but as far as possible), the ascetic movement of the second half of the seventeenth century, immediately before the advent of utilitarianism. Desirable



though it would have been, considerations of space have obliged me to omit any depiction of the style of life of ascetic Protestantism based on biographical literature—Quaker sources would have been particularly useful, as they are relatively unknown to us.

224) *The Saints' Everlasting Rest*, chaps. 10 and 12. Compare Matthew Henry (*The Worth of the Soul, Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 319): “Those that are eager in pursuit of worldly wealth despise their soul, not only because the soul is neglected and the body preferred before it, but because it is employed in these pursuits: Psalm 127.2.” (On the *same page* is found the remark—to be quoted later—regarding the sinfulness of time-wasting of all kinds, particularly through recreations.) Similarly in the whole of the religious literature of Anglo-Dutch Puritanism. (See, for example, Hoornbeek’s *philippics* against *avaritia*, op. cit., vol. 10, chaps. 18 and 19. Incidentally, this writer is subject to sentimental, Pietist influences: see his praise of “tranquillitas animi,” which is pleasing to God, as against the “sollicitudo” of this world.) “A rich man will not easily be saved,” says Bailey too (op. cit., p. 182), referring to a well-known Bible text. The *Methodist* catechisms also warn against “laying up treasure on earth.” In the case of Pietism, this goes without saying. And it was no different with the Quakers. Compare Barclay, op. cit., p. 517: “. . . and therefore beware of such temptation as to use their calling as an engine *to be richer*.”

225) This is developed in detail in chapter 10 of *The Saints' Everlasting Rest*: “Anyone desiring to rest permanently at the ‘temporary lodging,’ which is all that God intends possessions to be, God will strike down in this life too. Almost always, complacent resting on accumulated riches is a harbinger of calamity. If we had everything we *could* have in the world, would this be all that we hoped to have? *Absence of desire* cannot be achieved on earth—because it is not God’s will that it *should* be.”

226) *Christian Directory*, vol. 1, pp. 375-76: “It is for *action* that God maintaineth us and our activities: work is the moral as well as the natural *end of power*. . . . *It is action* that God is most served and honored by. . . . *The public welfare or the good of many* is to be valued above our own.” Here we see the starting point for the move away from the will of God to the purely utilitarian

attitudes of later liberal theory. On the religious sources of utilitarianism, see below [note 248 in this edition] and above [note 84 in this edition].

227) The command to *be silent*, after all—based on the biblical threat of sanctions for “every idle word”—has been a well-tried ascetic means of education to self-control, especially since the Cluniacs. Baxter, too, expatiates on the sin of idle talk. The significance of this for character has been assessed by Sanford, *op. cit.*, pp. 90f. The “melancholy” and “moroseness” of the Puritans, which was felt so keenly by contemporaries, is simply a consequence of the break with the spontaneity of the “*status naturalis*,” and the condemnation of thoughtless talk was part of the same process.

When, in *Bracebridge Hall* (chap. 30), Washington Irving finds the reason partly in the “calculating spirit” of capitalism, and partly in the effect of the political liberty that leads to autonomy, it must be said that no such effect was evident in the Romance nations, and that for England the situation was that (1) Puritanism equipped its adherents to create free institutions and still become a world power, and (2) it transformed that “calculating spirit” (Sombart calls it *Rechenhaftigkeit*), which is indeed fundamental to capitalism, from an economic means to a *principle of the whole manner of conducting one’s life*.

228) *Op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 111.

229) *Op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 383f.

230) Similarly, on the value of time, Barclay, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

231) Baxter, *op. cit.*, p. 79: “Keep up a high esteem of time and be every day more careful that you lose none of your time, than you are that you lose none of your gold and silver. And if vain recreation, dressings, feasting, idle talk, unprofitable company, or sleep, be any of them temptations to rob you of any of your time, accordingly heighten your watchfulness.” “Those that are prodigal of their time despise their own souls” says Matthew Henry (*The Worth of the Soul, Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 315). Here, too, Protestant asceticism is

operating in familiar paths. We are accustomed to regard it as a typical feature of the modern man of the calling that he “has no time,” and even take the fact that the *clocks* strike the quarter hours as a mark of capitalist development, as Goethe puts it in his “Wander jahren,” and Sombart repeats in his *Capitalism*. We should not forget, however, that the first people (in the Middle Ages) to live according to *divisions of time* were the *monks*, and that the original purpose of church bells was to mark these divisions.

232) Compare Baxter’s discussion of the calling (op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 108f.), especially the following passage: “Question: But may I not cast off the world that I may only think of my salvation? Answer: You may cast off all such excess of wordly cares or business as unnecessarily hinder you in spiritual things. But you may not cast off all bodily employment and mental labor in which *you may serve the common good*. Every one as a member of Church or Commonwealth must employ their parts to the utmost for the good of the Church and the Commonwealth. To neglect this and say: I will pray and meditate, is as if your servant should refuse your *greatest* work and tie himself to some lesser easier part. And *God hath commanded* you some way or other to *labor for your daily bread and not to live as drones of the sweat of others only*.” God’s command to Adam: “In the sweat of thy face . . .” and Paul’s principle: “He who will not work, shall not eat” are also quoted.

233) Pietism differs here in certain ways on account of its *emotional* character. For Spener (see *Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 3, p. 445), even though he stresses (in true Lutheran style) that labor in a calling is *service to God*, there can be no doubt (and this too is Lutheran) that to be *agitated* about one’s business [*Berufsgeschäfte*] distracts one from God—and this is very clearly contrary to the Puritan view.

234) Op. cit., p. 242: “It’s they that are lazy in their callings that can find no time for holy duties.” Hence the view that it is primarily in the *towns*—where the middle classes [*Bürgertum*] pursue rational economic activity [*Erwerb*]—that the ascetic virtues are practiced. Thus, speaking of his hand-loom workers in Kidderminster, Baxter says in his autobiography: “And their constant *converse and traffic with London* doth much to promote civility and piety among trades-

men (excerpt in the *Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 38). Today's churchmen—at least in Germany—would be astonished at the idea that proximity to the capital should have the effect of strengthening virtue. But Pietists, too, hold similar opinions. Thus we find Spener writing to a young clergyman: “At least amongst the great numbers in the towns, though most are disreputable, some good souls will always be found in whom good things may be achieved; sad to say, in the villages there is sometimes scarcely anything good to be found in the whole parish” (*Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 1, 66, p. 303).

The peasant is simply not adapted to the ascetic rational manner of life. The *ethical* glorification of the peasant is very recent. At this point we are unable to go into the significance of these and similar ideas for the question of the *class* basis of asceticism.

235) Take, for example, the following passages (op. cit., pp. 336f.): “Be wholly taken up in diligent business of your lawful callings when you are not exercised in the more immediate service of God,”—“La bor hard in your callings,” and “See that you have a calling which will find you employment for all the time which God's immediate service spareth.”

236) Harnack has recently stressed once again that the particular ethical value placed upon labor and upon the “dignity” of labor was not *originally* confined to or peculiar to Christianity. *Mitteilungen des evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses*, 14th series, 1905, nos. 3 and 4, p. 48).

237) Thus also in Pietism (Spener, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 429-30). The typically Pietist attitude is that faithfulness in the calling, which is laid upon us as a punishment for original sin, serves the *mortification* of man's own *will*. Labor in a calling is a service of love given to one's neighbour and as such is a duty of gratitude owed to God for his grace (a Lutheran idea!). It is therefore not pleasing to God if it is done reluctantly and resentfully (op. cit., p. 272). The Christian will therefore show himself “as industrious in his labor as a man of the world” (p. 278). Clearly, this falls short of the Puritan attitude.

238) According to Baxter, the purpose of marriage is “a *sober* procreation of

children.” Similarly, Spener, although with concessions to the crude Lutheran view that a secondary purpose is the avoidance of fornication—which could not otherwise be suppressed. As an accompaniment to copulation, concupiscence is even sinful within marriage, and is, in the view of (for example) Spener, a result of the *fall*, which turned what was a natural and divinely ordained process into something which was inevitably linked with sinful sentiments and thus into a *puendum*. A common view among Pietists is that the highest form of Christian marriage is that in which virginity is preserved, and the next highest that in which sexual intercourse is practiced solely for the procreation of children, and so on right down to those which are contracted for purely erotic or external reasons, which, from the ethical point of view, are no better than concubinage. Incidentally, the purely external reasons are rated more highly than the erotic, since they do at least arise from *rational* considerations. We are leaving aside the Herrnhut theory and practice here. Rationalist philosophy (Christian Wolff) took over ascetic theory to the extent that anything that was required as a *means*, including concupiscence and its gratification, should not be engaged in *for its own sake*.

With Franklin, the move to purely “hygienically” oriented utilitarianism is complete. His “ethical” standpoint is more or less identical to that of the medical profession today. By “chastity” he understands the restriction of sexual intercourse to what is desirable from the point of view of *health*, and has, as we know, also expressed a theoretical opinion as to the “how.”

This development has occurred wherever these things have been made the object of purely *rational* considerations. The paths of the Puritan and of the sexual hygiene rationalist are widely separated, but here they “coincide.” In the course of a lecture—the speaker was referring to the control and regulation of brothels—a zealous proponent of “hygienic prostitution” attempted to base the moral permissibility of “extramarital sexual relations” (regarded as *hygienically* useful) by reference to its poetic transfiguration in the figures of *Faust and Gretchen*. The idea of regarding Gretchen as a prostitute, and putting the powerful working of human passions on par with sexual intercourse practiced for “hygienic” reasons, both correspond *clearly* to the Puritan standpoint. Similarly, there is the typical specialist view (occasionally held by very distinguished medical doctors) that a matter like the significance of sexual abstinence, even though this is one

that involves the subtlest questions of personality and culture, lies “exclusively” within the competence of doctors (that is, of “specialists”). Here the “specialist” is the hygiene theoretician, whereas the Puritan “specialist” is the moralist, but the underlying principle remains the same: specialist philistinism is connected with sexual philistinism. The only difference is that the powerful idealism of the Puritan attitude—however narrow, ridiculous, and occasionally repugnant their prudery may appear to us—did have positive results to show for itself, even from the point of view of “hygiene” or racial preservation. By contrast, modern “sexual hygienists,” if only by the way they inevitably have to call for an “unprejudiced” approach, are constantly in danger of “throwing out the baby with the bath water” when delving into these matters.

We have here, of course, left aside the question of how, among the nations influenced by Puritanism, the rational interpretation of sexual relations has given rise to the refinement of marital relationships and their permeation by spiritual and ethical values, and to the finer blossoming of courtesy within marriage. This is in contrast to that patriarchal peasant miasma which has been left behind in often quite tangible amounts right up to the level of the “spiritual aristocracy.” Baptist influences have a decisive role to play in this; protection of the *freedom of conscience* of women and the extension of the idea of the “universal priesthood” to women were the first inroads to be made into patriarchalism here too.

239) This recurs constantly in Baxter. The biblical basis is normally either the one well known to us from Franklin (Proverbs 22.29) or the praise of work in Proverbs 31.10. Compare op. cit., vol. 1, p. 377, p. 382, etc.

240) Even Zinzendorf says on one occasion: “We do not work merely to live, but we live for the sake of work, and if we have no more work to do, we suffer or pass away” (Plitt, vol. 1, p. 428).

241) A *Mormon* statement of faith—which I do not have on hand—ends (according to the quotation) with the words: “But a slothful or lazy man cannot be a Christian and enjoy salvation. He is destined to be stung to death and cast

out of the beehive.” However, in this case it was principally the grandiose *discipline*, steering a middle course between monastery and factory, that presented the individual with the choice of work or extinction and which —*linked* of course with religious enthusiasm and *only possible by means of this* —brought about the amazing economic achievements of this sect.

242) It is therefore carefully analyzed into its symptoms (op. cit., p. 380). The reason why “sloth” and “idleness” are such egregious sins is that they are *continuous* in character. Baxter sees them as “destructive of the state of grace” (op. cit., pp. 279-80). They are the very antithesis of *methodical* life.

243) See above, vol. 20, p. 41, note 2.

244) Baxter, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 108ff. The following passages in particular stand out: Question: But will not wealth excuse us? Answer: It may excuse you from some sordid sort of work, by making you more serviceable to another, but you are no more excused from service of work . . . than the poorest man. . . . See also op. cit., vol 1, p. 376: “Though they (the rich) have no outward want to urge them, they have as great a necessity to obey God. . . . God hath strictly commanded it (work) to all.

245) Similarly Spener (op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 338, 425), who for this reason is opposed to the tendency to take early retirement, seeing it as morally questionable; he stresses that anyone who can live off interest nevertheless has a *duty* to work, since God commands this. His objection to the taking of interest thus differs from that which is based on the argument that it leads to idleness.

246) Including Pietism. On the question of a *change* of occupation, Spener always takes the view that once a particular occupation has been embarked upon, one has a duty to remain in it and to accept it out of obedience to God’s providence.

247) Baxter, op. cit., p. 377.

248) But not necessarily historically *derived* from it. In fact, the motivation expresses the authentic Calvinist idea that the cosmos of the “world” serves the glory of *God*, his self-glorification. The *utilitarian* version, that the economic cosmos should serve the purpose of the “good of the many, common good, etc.,” is a consequence of the idea that any other interpretation leads to (aristocratic) idolatry, or that it serves not God’s glory, but carnal “cultural purposes.” God’s will, however, as expressed (see above) [note 84 in this edition] in the purposeful formation of the economic cosmos, can only, to the extent that *thisworldly* purposes are considered at all, be the good of the “whole,” that is, *impersonal* utility. Utilitarianism is, as we have already said, a consequence of the *impersonal* application of “love of one’s neighbor,” and the rejection of all glorification of the world thanks to the exclusivity of the Puritan principle of “in majorem Dei gloriam.” Any glorification of the *creature* is detrimental to God’s glory and therefore absolutely reprehensible. The extent to which this idea dominated the *whole* of ascetic Protestantism is clearly shown in Spener’s misgivings, and in the effort that it cost this by no means “democratically” inclined man, to stand by the use of *titles* of “αδναφορον” [a matter of individual conscience] in the face of numerous queries. In the end, he consoles himself with the thought that even in the Bible the Praetor Festus is addressed as “κρατηστοζ.” [NEB has “Your Excellency”; AV: “most noble Festus,” Acts 26.25] The *political* aspect of this matter will be dealt with at a later stage.

249) Thomas Adams also says: “The *inconstant* man is a stranger in his own house” (*Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 77).

250) On this, see especially George Fox’s writings in *The Friends’ Library* (edited by William and Thomas Evans, Philadelphia, 1837, vol. 1, p. 130).

251) For as Puritan literature very often emphasizes, God never commanded that we should love our neighbour *more* than ourselves, but *as* ourselves. There is therefore a *duty* to love oneself. Anyone who knows, for instance, that he uses his wealth more wisely, and hence more to the glory of God, than his neighbor



could, is not bound by love of his neighbor to share it with him.

252) Spener himself comes close to this point of view. But even in the case of a change from commerce (particularly morally dangerous) to theology, he remains extremely cautious and is inclined to advise against it (op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 435, 443; vol. 1, p. 524). The frequent recurrence of answers to precisely *this* question (regarding whether it is permissible to change one's calling) in Spener's published responses, which were of course closely studied, shows, incidentally, the eminently *practical* importance of the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7 [Editors' note: "remain in the condition in which you were called"].

253) This kind of thing certainly cannot be found among the leading continental Pietists, at least not in their writings. Spener's attitude to "profit" switches back and forth between Lutheranism ("subsistence" standpoint) and mercantilist arguments about the utility of the "flower of commerce" and the like (op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 330, 332; compare vol. 1, p. 418: *tobacco* cultivation brings money into the country and is useful *for that reason*, and *therefore* not sinful!); (compare vol. 3, pp. 426-27, 429, 434). However, he does not fail to indicate, pointing to the example of the Quakers and the Mennonites, that it is possible to make a profit and still remain virtuous, indeed, that a particularly high level of profit could be the direct *product* of religious probity (op. cit., p. 435). We shall have more to say about this later.

254) In Baxter's writings, these views are *not* a reflection of the economic climate in which he lived. *On the contrary*, in his autobiography he underlines that one of the factors crucial to the success of his domestic missionary work was that those traders who were based in Kidderminster were *not* rich, but only earned "food and raiment" and that the masters were obliged to live "from hand to mouth," just like their workers. "It is the *poor* that receive the glad tidings of the Gospel."

On the subject of striving after profit, Thomas Adams remarks: "He (the knowing man) knows . . . that money may make a man richer, not better, and thereupon chooseth rather to sleep with a good conscience than a full purse . . .

therefore desires no more wealth *than an honest man may bear away*—but that much he *does* want (Thomas Adams, *Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 11).

255) Thus Baxter, op. cit., vol. 1, chap. 10, title 1, dist. 9 (par. 24); vol. 1, p. 378, col. 2. In Proverbs 23.4: “labor not to be rich” means only: riches for our fleshly ends must not ultimately be intended. It is not wealth *in itself* but wealth in its feudal and seigniorial form of *use* that is odious (compare the remark, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 380, regarding the “debauched part of the gentry”).

In his first “Defensio par populo Anglicano,” *Milton* propounded the well-known theory that only the “middle class” [*Mittelstand*] could be the bearer of *virtue*—“middle class” being here used in the sense of “bourgeois” [*bürgerliche Klasse*] as opposed to “aristocracy,” as we see from his contention that “*luxury*” as well as need was an obstacle to the exercise of virtue.

256) *This* is the crucial point. I should like to make a general comment here. We are not, of course, concerned here with developments in theological ethical theory, but with what was the *prevailing* morality in the practical life of the faithful, and *how* the religious orientation of the ethic of the calling was worked out in practice. In the casuist literature of Catholicism, especially that of the Jesuits, one can occasionally read discussions—for example, on the question of the permissibility of interest, which we shall discuss in a later chapter—which sound very similar to those of many Protestant casuists, indeed, which appear to exceed them in the question of what is regarded as “permitted” or “tolerated.” [Editors’ note: In fact there is no later chapter.] Just as the Calvinists are wont to quote the Catholic moral theologians, and not only Thomas Aquinas, Bernard of Clairvaux, or Bonaventura, but also contemporaries, so did the Catholic casuists regularly take note of the heretical ethic. (We can only mention this in passing.) The tremendous difference, however, is this. These latitudinarian views in Catholicism were the products of particularly *lax* ethical theories that were not sanctioned by the ecclesiastical authorities, and the most serious and strict church members distanced themselves from them. By contrast, the *Protestant idea of the calling* placed the most serious devotees of the ascetic life in the service of capitalist commerce [*Erwerbsleben*]. What in the one case could be *permitted* under certain conditions appeared in the other as something which was

positively morally *good*. The fundamental differences between the two types of ethic, which were very important in practice, became finally established with the Jansenist dispute and the bull “Unigenitus.”

257) The passage quoted in the text above is followed by the words: “You may labor in the manner as tendeth most to your success and lawful gain. You are *bound* to improve all your talents.” Direct parallels between striving for riches in the kingdom of God and the striving for success in an earthly calling are found, for example, in Janeway, *Heaven upon Earth (Works of the Puritan Divines, p. 275, bottom)*.

258) As early as the (Lutheran) Confession of Duke Christoph of Württemberg, which was submitted to the Council of Trent, the following argument against the vow of poverty was put forward: Anyone who is poor because of his estate must endure it, but if he takes a vow to *remain* so, this is the same as if he vowed to be continually *sick* or to have a *bad reputation*.

259) Thus in Baxter and also, for instance, in the Confession of Duke Christoph. Compare also passages such as “. . . the vagrant rogues whose lives are nothing but an exorbitant course: the main begging” (Thomas Adams, *Works of the Puritan Divines, p. 259*).

260) The president of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, George White, emphasized in his inaugural address to the Assembly in London in 1903 (*Baptist Handbook, 1904, p. 104*): “The best men on the roll of our Puritan churches were *men of affairs*, who believed that religion should permeate the whole of life.”

261) It is precisely *here* that the characteristic antithesis to all feudal attitudes lies. According to the latter, only the *descendants* of the (political or social) *nouveaux riches* can benefit from their success and become part of the bloodline. (Characteristically expressed in the Spanish as “Hidalgo,” meaning *hijo d’algo* or *filius alicuius*.) These differences are now fading as a consequence of the

rapid transformation and Europeanization of the American “national character” [*Volkscharakter*], but the *very opposite* bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] view, which glorifies business success and profit [*Erwerb*] as a symptom of spiritual achievement, but has no respect for mere (inherited) wealth, is very much at home there. By contrast, in Europe—as James Bryce once remarked—in effect almost any social honor may be bought, *provided* only that the owner has never stood behind the counter *himself* and carries through the necessary transformation of his property (charitable foundation, etc.).

For a statement of opposition to the aristocracy of the *blood*, see, for example, Thomas Adams, *Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 216.

262) For example, for the founder of the “familist” sect [*Familisten-Sekte* ], Hendrik Niklaes, who was a merchant (Barclay, *Inner Life of the Religious Communities of the Commonwealth*, p. 34).

263) This is certainly true, for instance, for Hoornbeek, since even in Matthew 5.5 and 1 Timothy 4.8, purely earthly promises are made for the saints (op. cit., vol. 1, p. 193). Everything is a product of God’s providence, but he takes *special* care of his own (op. cit., p. 192): “Super alios autem summa cura et modis singularissimis versatur Dei providentia circa fideles.” The question is then discussed regarding how one can tell when a piece of good fortune does *not* come from “communis providentia” but from that *special* care. Bailey (op. cit., p. 191) also attributes the success of work in a calling to God’s providence. The idea that prosperity is “often” the reward for a God-fearing life is commonplace in *Quaker* writings (see, for instance, the report in the “Selection from the Christian Advices” of 1848, issued by the General Meeting of the Society of Friends in London (6th ed., London, 1851, p. 209). We shall return later to the links with the Quaker ethic.

264) A good example of this orientation by the patriarchs—which is also characteristic of the Puritan attitude toward life—is Thomas Adams’s analysis of the dispute between Jacob and Esau (in *Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 235): “His (Esau’s) folly may be argued from the base estimation of the birthright”

(this passage is also important for the development of the idea of the birthright, of which more later) “that he would so lightly pass from it and on so *easy condition* as a pottage.” It was *perfidious* of him that he then refused to accept the validity of the purchase on the grounds that he had been tricked. He is simply a “cunning hunter, a man of the fields”—an example of the uncultured man living an irrational life—while Jacob, “a plain man, dwelling in tents,” represents the “man of grace.”

265) *Zur bäuerlichen Glaubens-und Sittenlehre. Von einem thüringischen Landpfarrer* (2nd ed., Gotha, 1890, p. 16). The peasants depicted here are typical products of *Lutheran* church life. I constantly wrote “Lutheran” in the margin, where the excellent author sees only general “peasant” religiosity.

266) Compare, for example, the quotation in Ritschl, *Pietismus*, vol. 2, p. 158. Spener also bases his doubts about changing one’s occupation and striving for profit *partly* on sayings in Ecclesiasticus (*Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 3, p. 426).

267) True, Bailey still recommends that it should be read, and quotations from the Apocrypha do occasionally appear, although rarely. I do not happen to recall a single one from Ecclesiasticus [Jesus Sirach].

268) Where outward success is given to those who are obviously reprobate, the Calvinist (e.g., Hoornbeek) consoles himself with the “theory of hardening of hearts,” according to which God grants success to such people in order to harden their hearts and thus damn them with even greater certainty.

269) We shall return to a more detailed discussion of *this* point in a different context later. What interests us *here* is simply the *formalist* character of “legality.”

270) According to Baxter (*Christian Directory*, vol. 3, pp. 173f.), the ethical

norms of the Scriptures are binding only in as far as they (1) are merely a “transcript” of the law of nature, or (2) bear within them the “express character of universality and perpetuity.”

271) For example, Dowden (with reference to Bunyan), op. cit., p. 39.

272) This is not the place to analyze the tremendous influence exercised by, in particular, the *second commandment* (“Thou shalt not make thee any graven image!” etc.) on the development of the rational character of Judaism, which is alien to the culture of the senses. It is, however, symptomatic, that one of the leaders of the “Educational Alliance” in the United States, an organization which undertakes the “Americanization” of Jewish immigrants with astonishing success and lavish resources, told me that the first aim of the “civilizing” process [*Kulturmenschwerdung*], which it tries to achieve by means of all kinds of artistic and social instruction, was “emancipation from the second commandment.”

The Israelite taboo against any humanization of God [*Gottvermenschlichung*] (*sit venia verbo!*) is paralleled by the Puritan ban on the deification of the creature which, though differing in some respects, is nevertheless broadly similar. Undoubtedly, numerous key features of Puritan morality are also related to talmudic Judaism. The Talmud, for example (as in Wünsche, *Der Babylonysche Talmud in seinen hag gadischen Bestandteilen*, Leipzig, 1886-89, vol. 2, p. 34), stresses that it is better, and more richly rewarded by God, to do good as a *duty*, than to do it when one is not legally compelled to. In other words: to do one’s duty without love is on an ethically higher plane than philanthropy carried out with feeling. The Puritan ethic would find this acceptable, just as *Kant*, who was Scottish by descent, and whose upbringing was strongly influenced by Pietism, finally comes close to the same principle. (Incidentally, a great deal of his phraseology is directly linked with the ideas of ascetic Protestantism. We cannot pursue this question further at this point.) The talmudic ethic, however, is steeped in Oriental traditionalism: “Rabbi Tanchum ben Cha nilai said: No man should ever alter a custom” (*Gemara to Mishna*, vol. 7, 1. 86b, no. 93 in Wünsche): the subject is the feeding of day laborers, only strangers were exempt from this obligation.

However, as compared with the Jewish view of it as simply obedience to a commandment, the Puritan view of “legality” as *testing* [*Bewährung*] evidently provided a stronger motive for positive *action*. At this point we can do no more than mention the huge change undergone by the inner attitude to the world as a result of the Christian version of the ideas of “grace” and “redemption,” which always concealed within it the seeds of possible *new* developments. On the Old Testament concept of “legality,” compare Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, vol. 2, p. 265.

273) For Baxter, the *truth* of the Holy Scriptures is derived from the “wonderful difference of the godly and ungodly,” the absolute other-ness of the “renewed man,” and from the evidently quite specific concern of God for the salvation of the souls of his own people (something which, of course, can also be expressed in “*testing*” [*Prüfungen*]) (*Christian Directory*, vol. 1, p. 165, col. 2, margin).

274) As an illustration of this point, one only has to read Bunyan’s tortuous interpretation of the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican (see the sermon *The Pharisee and the Publican*, op. cit., pp. 100f.). (At times, Bunyan seems to have an affinity with Luther’s “Freedom of a Christian Man,” for example, in *Of the Law and a Christian, Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 254, bottom). What is the Pharisee accused of? He does not truly keep God’s commandments, for he is clearly a *sectarian*, concerned only with outward trivialities and ceremonies (p. 107); most of all, however, he ascribes the merit to himself, *and yet*, “as the Quakers do,” taking God’s name in vain, he gives thanks to God that he is so virtuous, sinfully *relying* on the worth of this virtue (p. 126), and thereby implicitly calling into question *God’s election by grace* (pp. 139f.). His prayer is thus idolatry and that is what is sinful about it. The Publican, on the other hand, as the sincerity of his confession shows, is inwardly reborn, *since*—as Bunyan puts it with a characteristically Puritan lessening of the Lutheran feeling of sinfulness—“to a right and sincere conviction of sin, there must be a conviction of the *probability* of mercy” (p. 209).

275) Published in (for example) Gardiner’s “Constitutional Documents.” This struggle against asceticism can be roughly compared with Louis XIV’s

persecution of Port Royal and the Jansenists.

276) Calvin's standpoint was considerably more lenient, at least as far as the more *refined* aristocratic forms of enjoyment were concerned. The *Bible* alone is the criterion; anyone who sticks to it and whose *conscience* is clear has no need to view *every* stirring of desire for enjoyment of life with nervous suspicion. The passages on this subject in Chapter 10 of the Institutes of the Christian Religion (for example, "nec fugere ea quoque possumus quae videntur oblectationi magis quam necessitati inservire") might, in themselves, have opened the floodgates to a very lax practice. However, two factors militated against this development. Firstly, the rising level of anxiety concerning the *certitudo salutis* among the later generations of the faithful. And, secondly, the fact, which we shall consider later, that in the area of the "ecclesia militans," it was the *petite bourgeoisie* [*Kleinbürger*] that became the bearers of the ethical development of Calvinism.

277) Thomas Adams (*Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 3), for example, begins a sermon on "the three divine sisters" ("the greatest of these is love") by pointing out that Paris, too, handed the apple to Aphrodite!

278) Novels and suchlike are described as "wastetimes" and should not be read (Baxter, *Christian Directory*, vol. 1, p. 51, col. 2).

It is well known that lyric poetry and the folk song, as well as the theater, went into decline after the Elizabethan age. As regards the plastic arts, there was probably not a great deal for Puritanism to suppress. What is striking is the dramatic fall from what appears to have been a quite good musical life to absolute zero—a situation that continued among the Anglo-Saxon peoples and indeed still holds today. In America, apart from the Negro churches—and those professional singers engaged by the churches as "attractions" (Trinity Church in Boston hires them for \$8,000 a year)—one usually only hears the screeching that passes for "congregational singing" and is so unbearable for the German listener. (*In part*, the same situation exists in Holland.)

279) Evidently, the "Renaissance of the Old Testament" in art must have contributed to making the *ugly* more "possible" as an artistic subject. The



Puritan rejection of idolatry also played its part. However, no one cause can be singled out. In the Church of Rome, quite different (demagogic) motives led to superficially similar phenomena, although with quite different artistic results. Anyone contemplating Rembrandt's marvelous *Saul and David* (in The Hague) can directly experience the powerful effect of that Puritan idea.

The perceptive analysis of Dutch cultural influences in Carl Neumann's *Rembrandt* probably tells us as much as one *can* know today on the question of how far *positive* effects that can be fruitful for art are attributable to ascetic Protestantism.

280) The weakening of the ascetic spirit and the relatively low degree to which the Calvinist ethic penetrated practical life in Holland under the governorship of Friedrich Heinrich, and the more limited expansion of Dutch Puritanism in general, were due to a great variety of causes. These lay partly in the political constitution (particularist federation of cities and provinces) and in the far lower level of military preparedness (the War of Liberation was soon to be waged principally with *money* from Amsterdam, using mercenary armies: English preachers used the Dutch army as an illustration of the Babel of tongues). In this way, any serious participation in the religious wars was passed on to others, which meant, however, that the chance of a share in political *power* was lost. By contrast, Cromwell's army—even though it was in part conscripted—saw itself as a *citizens'* army. (It is noteworthy, however, that *precisely this* army included in its program the abolition of *conscription*—simply because it was held that one should only fight for the glory of God and for a cause which did not conflict with the dictates of one's conscience, and not merely on the whim of the prince. The constitution of the English army, which to German eyes was “immoral,” actually derives *historically* from very “moral” motives, and was the result of demands by soldiers who had never been defeated).

Only half a generation after the Synod Dordrecht of the Dutch “schutterijen,” the bearers of Calvinism in the period of the great war, can be seen in Frans Hals's pictures behaving in ways that are anything but “ascetic.” The Dutch concept of “earthiness” is a mixture of rational bourgeois [*bürgerlich*-rational] worthiness and patrician consciousness of rank. Even today, the aristocratic character of

Dutch church life is evidenced by the way seating in the churches is arranged according to class—more about this later. Regarding Holland, see, for example, Busken-Huët, *Het land van Rembrandt* (also published in German by von der Ropp).

281) Here also it is decisive that for the Puritan it could *only* be a matter of one thing or the other: either the divine will or the vanity of the creature. There could therefore be no “adiaphora” for him. As already mentioned, it was different for *Calvin*. What one eats, what one wears and so on is a matter of indifference—provided it does not lead to the enslavement of the soul under the power of the *appetites*. *Freedom* from the “world” should—as with the Jesuits—express itself in the use of the gifts of the earth with indifference and without desire (pp. 409 ff. of the original edition of the *Institutio Christianae Religionis*)—a point of view that is effectively closer to Lutheranism than to the precisionism of the epigones.

282) The attitude of the Quakers in this regard is well known. As early as the beginning of the seventeenth century, the congregation of exiles in Amsterdam was shaken for a whole decade by violent controversy about the fashionable hats and clothes worn by a minister’s wife (delightfully described in Dexter’s *Congregationalism of the Last Three Hundred Years*).

Sanford (op. cit.) has pointed out that the “hairstyle” favored by men today is actually that of the much ridiculed “Roundheads,” and that the equally ridiculed male *costume* worn by the Puritans is, in all essentials, the same *in principle* as that which is worn today.

283) Regarding this, see once again Veblen’s book (already referred to) *The Theory of Business Enterprise*.

284) We shall return to this aspect frequently. It explains statements like the following: “Every penny which is paid upon yourselves and children and friends must be done as by God’s own appointment and to serve and please him. Watch narrowly, or else that thievish carnal self will leave God nothing” (Baxter, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 108, bottom right). The crucial point is: that which one spends on

*personal needs is taken away from the service of God's glory.*

285) We are often rightly reminded (for example, by Dowden, op. cit.) that Cromwell rescued Raphael's cartoons and Mantegna's *The Triumph of Caesar* from destruction, whereas Charles II tried to sell them. It is well known, too, that Restoration society was extremely cool, and even hostile, toward English national literature. The influence of Versailles at court was simply all-pervasive and all-powerful.

It would be a task beyond the scope of this account to analyze how the mentality which could turn away from unthinking indulgence in the pleasures of everyday life influenced the spirit of the most outstanding representatives of Puritanism and those who had been subjected to its schooling. Washington Irving (*Bracebridge Hall*, op. cit.), employing the customary English terminology, expressed its effect thus: "it (he means political liberty; we say Puritanism) evinces less play of the *fancy*, but more power of *imagination*." One only needs to think of the position occupied by the *Scots* in science, literature, technological invention, and even in the business life of England, to sense that this rather too narrowly formulated comment is close to the mark.

In due course we shall return to the significance of this mentality for the development of technology and the empirical sciences. The connection is also very much in evidence in everyday life. For the Quakers, for example, the permitted "recreations" are (according to Barclay): visiting friends, reading historical works, *experiments in mathematics and physics*, gardening, discussion of commercial affairs and world events, and so on. The reason is the one we have previously discussed.

286) There is a superb analysis of this in Carl Neumann's *Rembrandt*, the whole of which should be considered in relation to the above remarks.

287) Baxter says something similar in the above-quoted passage, vol. 1, p. 108, bottom.

288) Compare, for example, the well-known description of Colonel Hutchinson (often quoted, for example, in Sanford, op. cit., p. 57) in the biography written by his widow. After setting out all his chivalrous virtues as well as his cheerfulness and vitality, she writes: “He was wonderfully neat, cleanly and genteel in his habit, and had a very good fancy in it; but *he left off* very early the wearing of *anything that was costly*.”

In Baxter’s funeral oration to Mary Hammer (*Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 533), there is a quite similar depiction of the ideal of the open-minded and highly educated Puritan woman, who, however, is sparing of two things: (1) time and (2) expenditure on “pomp” and pleasures.

289) I recall in particular—among many other examples—a manufacturer who had been unusually successful in his business life and had become very wealthy in old age. When, on account of persistent indigestion, his doctor advised him to eat a few oysters each day, it was only with the greatest difficulty that he could be persuaded to follow this advice. The very substantial foundations that he had set up during his lifetime for charitable purposes, and his “open-handedness,” showed, on the other hand, that this had nothing whatever to do with “meanness,” but was *merely* due to a residual “ascetic” feeling of the kind which regarded one’s own *enjoyment* of possessions as morally reprehensible.

290) The *separation* of workshop, office, in fact “business” in general, from private residence, the separation of company and name, of business assets and private wealth, the tendency to make the “business” (or at least the company’s assets) into a “corpus mysticum” are all part of this trend. On this question, see my *Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter*.

291) In his *Kapitalismus*, Sombart has correctly referred to this characteristic phenomenon. It should simply be noted that the phenomenon derives from two very different psychological sources. One of these extends back to distant antiquity and is expressed in foundations, inherited property, entailed estates, *etc.* Similarly, and indeed much more distinctly and clearly, it is expressed in the striving to die some day laden with great material substance. There is also a

desire to ensure the continued existence of the “business,” even at the cost of prejudicing the personal interest of the majority of children who are joint beneficiaries. Alongside the desire to lead an incorporeal [*ideell*] life beyond the grave in one’s own creation, we are concerned in *these* cases with the wish to preserve the “splendor familiae,” that is, with the vanity which seeks to extol the personality of the founder, in other words, with basically self-centered aims. It is not so with that “bourgeois” [*bürgerlich*] motive with which we are here concerned. Here the ascetic demand “Entsagen sollst du, sollst entsagen”<sup>8</sup> gets a positive, capitalist twist: “Erwerben sollst du, sollst erwerben,”<sup>9</sup> and appears before us with its pure and simple irrationality as a kind of categorical imperative. Only *God’s* glory and one’s own duty, not the vanity of man, is the Puritans’ driving force, and *today*, it is *only* duty to one’s “calling.” Anyone who enjoys pursuing an idea to its logical conclusion should recall the theory held by certain American billionaires that one should *not* leave one’s billions to one’s children, in order not to deprive them of the moral benefit of having to work and make money themselves [*erwerben*]. *Today*, of course, this would be a purely “theoretical” bubble.

292) *This*—as we must repeatedly emphasize—is the ultimately decisive religious motive (apart from the purely ascetic aspects of the mortification of the flesh). This is particularly evident in the case of the Quakers.

293) Baxter rejects this (*The Saints’ Everlasting Rest*, p. 12) on grounds similar to those of the Jesuits: the body should be given its due, otherwise one becomes a slave to it.

294) This ideal is especially clearly present among the early Quakers, an idea that Weingarten has developed convincingly in his *Englische Revolutionskirchen*. Barclay’s detailed analyses (op. cit., pp. 519ff., 533) also illustrate this with great clarity. To be shunned are: (1) carnal vanity, that is, all ostentation and frippery, and the use of things which have no *practical* purpose, or which are only valued for their rarity (in other words, for reasons of vanity); and (2) thoughtless use of possessions, as expressed in a *disproportionate* expenditure on less necessary needs compared with the necessary requirement to sustain life and make provision for the future: the Quaker is a kind of walking

“law of marginal utility.” “Moderate use of the creature”<sup>10</sup> is certainly permissible, but one should focus *especially* on things like the quality and durability of the material, provided always that this does not lead to “vanity.”<sup>11</sup>

295) We have already stated that we intend to deal separately with the question of the degree to which religious movements are determined by class. But in order to see that Baxter, for example, to whom we refer in particular, was not simply looking through the “bourgeois” spectacles of his age [*durch die Brille der “Bourgeoisie”*], it is sufficient to bear in mind that in his view too, in the ranking order of careers according to how much they are pleasing to God, the hus bandman comes immediately after the learned professions [*Berufe*], and *only then* the random assortment of mariners, clothiers, book-sellers, tailors, *etc.* Even the use of the word “mariner” may refer to fishermen as much as to seamen.

A number of passages in the Talmud differ in this respect. Compare, for example, in Wünsche, *Babylonian Talmud* II. 1, pp. 20-21, the sayings of Rabbi Eleazar, all of which (though they have been questioned) suggest that commerce is better than agriculture. (Somewhere between the two is the recommendation in II. 2, p. 68, on capital investments: one-third in land, one-third in merchandise, one-third in cash).

For those whose “causal conscience” can find no rest without an economic (or should I say “materialist”?—the word is unfortunately still used) “interpretation,” it should be mentioned here that I regard the influence of economic development on the destiny of religious thinking as highly significant, and I shall later attempt to demonstrate what form the mutual adaptation processes and relationships of both have taken. However, these ideas are simply *not* capable of being “economically” *deduced*. There can be no doubting it—they are *themselves* the most powerful elements of “national character,” and carry their own compelling force within them. It should be added that to the extent that nonreligious factors have a part to play, the *most important* differences—notably those between Lutheranism and Calvinism—are, in the main, *politically* determined.

296) This is what Eduard Bernstein is thinking of when in his previously quoted essay (p. 681 and p. 625) he says: “Asceticism is a bourgeois [*bürgerlich*]

virtue.” His essay (op. cit.) is the *first* to have even hinted at these important links. The connections are, however, much more far-reaching than he suspects. It is not merely capital accumulation, but the ascetic rationalization of working life as a whole [*Berufsleben* ] that is crucial.

297) Doyle, *The English in America*, vol. 2, chap. 1. The existence of metallurgical works (1643), weaving for the market (1659), and the full flowering of the craft professions in New England in the first generation after the founding of the colony are, from a purely economic point of view, anachronisms, and contrast most strikingly with conditions in the south, as well as with those in Rhode Island, which was not Calvinist, but enjoyed complete freedom of conscience. It was here that in spite of the existence of an excellent harbor, the report of the Governor and Council of 1686 said: “The great obstruction concerning trade is the want of merchants and men of considerable Estates amongst us” (Arnold, *History of the State of Rhode Island*, vol. 1, p. 490). There can indeed be no doubt about the role played here by the compulsion (resulting from the Puritan restrictions on consumption) to constantly reinvest capital that had been saved. We shall look later at the part played by Church discipline in this matter.

298) The account by Busken-Huët shows, however, that these circles rapidly declined in the Netherlands (op. cit., vol. 2, chaps. 3 and 4).

299) In the case of England, a petition by a royalist nobleman after the entry of Charles II into London called for a legal ban on the acquisition of country estates by bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] capital, which should thereby be forced to invest in trade (quoted by Ranke, in *Englische Geschichte*, vol. 4, p. 197).

The Dutch “regents” distinguished themselves as an “estate” [*Stand*] from among the bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] patriciate of the towns by the purchase of old feudal estates. Admittedly, these circles were never seriously Calvinist by inward conviction. But the notorious craving for nobility and titles that was common among the Dutch bourgeoisie [*Bürgertum*] in the second half of the seventeenth century is sufficient to show that for *this* period, at least, we should

be wary of accepting too readily the supposed contrast between conditions in England and Holland. Here, the power of money proved too strong for the ascetic spirit.

300) The widespread purchase of English country estates by bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] capital was followed by the great age of agriculture.

301) For an account of how this was expressed in the political life of Pennsylvania in the eighteenth century, especially during the War of Independence, see Sharpless, *A Quaker Experiment in Government*, Philadelphia, 1902.

302) Defoe was an ardent Nonconformist.

303) Even Spener (*Theologische Bedenken*, op. cit., pp. 426f., 429, 432ff.), though he regards the merchant's calling as full of temptations and snares, declares, in answer to a question, "I am pleased when I see that a dear friend has no scruples regarding business itself, but recognizes it as the way of life it is, so that the human race may be profited and *charity* be shown according to God's will." True, Spener does occasionally, in the Lutheran manner, with reference to 1 Timothy 6.8-9, and to Jesus Sirach [Ecclesiasticus]—see above!—describe the desire to be rich as a great snare which must be avoided at all costs, and adopts the "subsistence standpoint" (*Theologische Bedenken*, p. 435, top). However, he modifies this by pointing to the prosperous and yet God-fearing sectarians [note 253 in this edition]. For him, too, wealth as the *effect* of industrious labor in the calling poses no problem. Owing to the Lutheran strand in his thinking, his standpoint is less consistent than Baxter's.

304) Baxter (op. cit., vol. 2, p. 16) warns against the employment of "heavy, flegmatic, sluggish, fleshly, slothful persons" as "servants" and recommends the use of "godly" servants, not only because "ungodly" servants would be mere "eye-servants," but especially because "a truly godly servant will do all your service in obedience to God, as if God himself had bid him do it." Others were



inclined “to make no great *matter of conscience of it.*” The hallmark of sanctity, however, was not the outward *profession* of religion, but the “conscience to do their duty.” It is evident that the interests of God and that of the employer are here becoming suspiciously merged. Even Spener (*Theologische Bedenken*, vol. 3, p. 272), who elsewhere urges his readers to allow *time* for thinking about God, makes the assumption that the workers must be content with an absolute minimum of leisure time (even on Sundays).

305) The analogy between the predestination of the few (which is, in human terms, “unjust”) and the distribution of wealth (which is equally unjust, but equally willed by God) is very clear. (See, for example, Hoornbeek, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 153). Moreover (see Baxter, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 380), poverty is very often seen as a symptom of sinful sloth.

306) As Thomas Adams (*Works of the Puritan Divines*, p. 158) also says, God probably allows so many people to remain poor because he knows that they would be unable to resist the temptations that wealth brings with it. For all too often wealth drives religion out of a man.

307) Similar phenomena have occurred in England too, where, for example, a form of Pietism existed which, in accordance with Law’s *Serious Call* (1728), preached *poverty*, chastity, and—originally—isolation from the world.

308) Baxter’s work in the community of Kidderminster, which on his arrival was in a state of complete moral decline, was almost uniquely successful in the history of pastoral care, and is at the same time a typical example of how asceticism educated the masses to labor, or, to use Marxist terminology, to the production of “*surplus value*,” and thus *for the first time* made possible their utilization in the capitalist labor relationship (putting out industry, weaving). In general, there is a causal relationship here.

For his part, Baxter used the adaptation of his charges to the workings of capitalism in the service of his religious and ethical interests. In terms of the

development of capitalism, these interests were used in the service of the development of the capitalist “spirit.”

309) One more thing: there may be some doubt about the significance, as a psychological factor [*psychologisches agens*], of the “pleasure” taken by the medieval craftsman in “what he had created” (about which we hear so much). No doubt there was something in the idea. But however that may be, asceticism *divested* work of this earthly delight (which in any case capitalism has now destroyed forever). Its *raison d’être* was now found in the life to come. Work in a calling *as such* was willed by God. Whereas today work is *impersonal* in nature, lacking either pleasure or meaning (from the point of view of the individual), at that time it was still transformed in a religious sense. In its early days, capitalism *needed* workers who were willing to subject themselves to economic exploitation for the sake of their *conscience*.

310) We shall show in another context the Puritan origins of even those components which have not yet been traced back to their religious roots, namely, the saying “honesty is the best policy” and the discussion on *credit*.

311) Beautifully analyzed in Bielschowsky’s *Goethe*, vol. 2, chap. 18.

At the conclusion of his “Blütezeit der deutschen Philosophie” (volume 2 of the *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*), Windelband has expressed a related idea regarding the development of the *scientific* “cosmos.”

312) *Saints’ Everlasting Rest*, chap. 12.

313) “Couldn’t the old man retire on his \$75,000 a year? No! The front of the store must be extended to a width of 400 feet. Why? That beats everything, he thinks.<sup>12</sup> In the evenings, when his wife and daughters are reading together, he longs for bed. On Sundays he looks at the clock every five minutes—he can’t wait for the day to finish. What a wasted life!” With these words the (immigrant)

son-in-law of this leading “dry-good-man”<sup>13</sup> (of German descent) from a city in Ohio summed up his opinion of his father-in-law—an opinion that would undoubtedly have seemed to the “old man” totally incomprehensible and a symptom of German lassitude.

314) The present sketch has deliberately restricted itself to the circumstances in which the influence of religious consciousness on “material” civilization [*Kulturleben*] is truly beyond doubt. It would have been a simple matter to go on to create a formal “construction” in which, by a process of logical deduction, every “characteristic” feature of modern civilization [*Kultur*] is seen to derive from Protestant rationalism. But only a dilettante, for whom the “social psyche” is a “unity” that can be reduced to a *single* formula, would adopt this approach.

It should merely be noted that of course the development of capitalism in the period *preceding* that which we have been considering was *in every respect* affected by Christian influences, some of which hindered this development while others favored it. The question of the nature of these influences must be reserved for a later chapter. Whether any of the problems touched on above can be discussed within the framework of *this* journal is uncertain, given its particular scope. But the idea of writing weighty tomes that would have to rely so heavily on the theological and historical work of other scholars holds few attractions for me.

#### *EDITORS' NOTES*

[1](#) Presumably, this mention of space saving refers to the main body of text!

[2](#) See p. 129 in this volume.

[3](#) The word *reserve* is in English in the original.

[4](#) The term *standard work* is in English in the original.

[5](#) This title, which appears somewhat illogical in the German, could be translated as “Socrates, or an honest account of various important truths which, while not unknown, have suffered from neglect.”

[6](#) The phrase *captains of industry* is in English in the original.

[7](#) The word *uprightness* is in English in the original

[8](#) This translates as “You must deny yourself.”

[9](#) This translates as “You must make profits.”

[10](#) Weber is here quoting in English from the seventeenth-century Quaker writings.

[11](#) The word *vanity* is in English in the original.

[12](#) The expression *That beats everything* is given in English.

[13](#) The term *dry-good-man* is given in English.

# “Churches” and “Sects” in North America

## *An ecclesiastical and sociopolitical sketch*

*Editors’ Preface:* “ ‘Churches’ and ‘Sects’ in North America” is one of Weber’s more exuberant essays. Composed shortly after he returned from America, it combines vivid firsthand observation—the evocative description of adult baptism in North Carolina is a memorable highlight—with the famous distinction between “churches” (inclusive, obligatory organizations which minister to all that have been born into them, faithful and reprobate alike) and “sects” (exclusive, voluntary communities of the religiously qualified). Weber argued that sects like the Quakers, with their insistence on the priority of God over man, and of individual conscience over state authority, were powerful vehicles of modern autonomy and freedom.

The essay appeared in *Die Christliche Welt*<sup>1</sup> and reworked an earlier version that Weber penned for the German liberal newspaper, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. In a final metamorphosis, the article became “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism” and was published in the first volume of his *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion* (1920). It can be found in the anthology, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited and translated by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. We have chosen to translate the *Christliche Welt* version because of its close relationship to *The Protestant Ethic* of 1905 and because of its prominence in Weber’s rebuttals of Felix Rachfahl.

For the context of the essay translated below, and for the twist it gives to the more famous argument in *The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism*, see the Introduction, pp. xiiiiff.

# 1

Only the most superficial visitor to the United States could fail to notice the strong growth of community life within the Church there. The permeation by the Church of the whole of life, however, which was an integral part of true “Americanism,” is today everywhere being undermined by rapid Europeanization. An example of the strange compromises to which this process can lead may be seen in the following statutory regulation of one of Chicago’s two universities: Firstly, failure to meet the attendance requirement at **chapel**,<sup>2</sup> which is compulsory for students on pain of relegation, can be “made up for” by attendance at certain additional lectures in excess of the required minimum. Secondly, for anyone who has demonstrably exceeded the required “**chapel record**” (**sic!**), whether by actual attendance or extra lectures, in one period of study, these *opera supererogationis* may count toward subsequent periods.

In conversation with Europeans, the “modern,” or would-be modern, American gradually becomes embarrassed when the subject turns to matters relating to the Church in his country. However, such embarrassment is a recent phenomenon for the genuine Yankee, and the “secularization” of life has still not gone very deep within *Anglo-American* circles. The exclusiveness of these circles, and—as we hope to show here—part of their superiority in the struggle for existence, rests on these “remnants.” In fact, it is almost an understatement<sup>3</sup> to talk of “remnants” when we are dealing with what remains one of the most powerful elements in their whole conduct of life [*Lebensführung* ], an element which affects their life in a way that must seem to us grotesque and frequently repellent.

German-American families, who have lived for more than a generation in Brooklyn, which, unlike “**New York proper**,” is regarded as “pious,” still have problems when it comes to forming more intimate relations with the old-established residents. Among these problems is how to give a satisfactory, as opposed to a merely “formal,” answer to the inevitable question: **To what church do you belong?** Even today it is perfectly normal for a land speculator, wishing to see his sites occupied, to build a “church,” that is, a wooden shed

with a tower, looking for all the world like something out of a box of toys, and to employ a young graduate just out of a seminary run by some **denomination** or other for five hundred dollars as its pastor. He will come to an agreement, spoken or unspoken, that this position will be a lifelong post provided only that he can soon succeed in “preaching the building sites full.” And usually he does succeed.

The private statistical surveys available to us<sup>4</sup> show well below one-tenth (about one-thirteenth) of the population as having “no religious affiliation.” This is in a country where there is a constitutional ban on official recognition of any church. It is not even permitted to compile official statistics of religious affiliation, as any official inquiry regarding one’s religious denomination is considered unconstitutional. Furthermore, it must be appreciated that the concept of “belonging” to a church community means something quite different from what it means for us, even from the material point of view. For instance, unskilled dockworkers and lumberjacks belonging to a Protestant church in the Buffalo region each give over eighty marks annually in regular contributions. This is in addition to the extremely numerous **collections** that are vital to support the pastor and the church itself.

The question concerning church affiliation, officially frowned upon, but privately still highly significant, is on par with the Homeric question regarding place of birth and parentage, as a German nose and throat specialist, who had opened a practice in Cincinnati, discovered. On asking his first patient what was ailing him, the very first thing the man said, to the utter astonishment of the doctor, was: **I am from the Second Baptist Church in X Street.** This piece of information, of course, had no bearing on the etiology of his nasal condition, as the puzzled doctor realized. The real purpose of the statement was to convey something different, which was not without interest for the doctor, namely: “Don’t worry about your *fee!*”

Membership of a church community “of good repute” (according to American criteria) guarantees the good standing of the individual, not only socially, but also, and especially, in terms of business. “Sir,” said an older gentleman who was a commercial traveler for **Undertakers’ Hardware** (iron tombstone

lettering), with whom I spent some time in Oklahoma, “as far as I am concerned, everyone can believe what he likes, but if I discover that a client doesn’t go to church, then I wouldn’t trust him to pay me fifty cents: **Why pay me, if he doesn’t believe in anything?**” This is an immensely vast and sparsely settled land, where people are often on the move, where there is an excessively formal Anglo-Norman legal system, where the law of seizure and impounding [*Exekutionsrecht*] is lax and, indeed, has practically ceased to exist, thanks to **homestead** privileges granted to the mass of farmers in the West. In such a land, it was inevitable that *personal credit* would have to be supported on the crutches of a church guarantee of creditworthiness like this. In the same way, in the Middle Ages it was the bishops who were the first fully creditworthy debtors, because papal excommunication threatened them, should they default on payment for no good reason. A more recent example is the huge system of credit, which, in my student days, practically did away with the necessity for a Heidelberg “fraternity” student [*Kouleurstudent*] to keep a “cash reserve” for his living expenses. As soon as the freshman “won his colors,” his creditors would release his student registration (which at that time they were permitted to seize). Or take that highly questionable credit which the German lieutenant receives because his colonel has the power to take action against him. Such creditworthiness also rests on that (real or imagined) significance of “social guarantees”: the borrower’s whole life in society is based on membership of the community which, in return, guarantees his creditworthiness.

So it is too, to the highest degree, with the American church member. In a country like the United States, where the various associations [*Zweckverbände*]<sup>5</sup> differ little from one another, the most fundamental and universal community, the religious congregation, embraces almost all “social” interests that take the individual out of his own front door. The local church offers not only edifying lectures, tea evenings, Sunday school, and every kind of charity event, but also a whole variety of **athletic** activities, **football** training, and the like. Details of these events are even announced at the end of Sunday service. Anyone who is excluded from the church for **dishonorable conduct**—as used to happen—or—as now—is tacitly deleted from its membership list, falls victim to a kind of social ostracism; anyone who is outside the church community is deprived of social contacts. Of course, these effects have been weakened, not just by modern developments in general, but also by the rampant competition between the denominations to win converts. But in spite of the general decline in the



influence of religious factors, the guarantee of reliability in *business* that comes with church membership remains significant.

Any number of “orders” and clubs of every conceivable kind have now started to take over some of the functions of the religious community. There is hardly a small businessman with ambitions who does not wear some **badge** in his buttonhole. But the original model for these formations, *all* of which serve to guarantee the “respectability” of the individual, remains the church community. However—and it is important to emphasize this point in a few words at this stage—this function is most fully developed in those communities that are “*sects*” in the particular sense of the word, which we are about to explore.

I personally first fully became aware of this one cold October Sunday, in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains in North Carolina, as I witnessed a service of Believers’ Baptism. About ten persons, both men and women, **fully dressed**, stepped one after another into the icy water of the mountain stream, where the reverend, all in black, was standing up to his waist in water. After a lengthy expression of commitment, they bent their knees, leaned back on his arm until their faces were submerged in the water, and reemerged spluttering and shivering, whereupon they were **congratulated** by the farmers, crowds of whom had turned up on horseback or in wagons, and were speedily driven home—although some of them lived several hours’ journey away. It was **faith** that preserved them from catching cold, they said. I had been taken there from his farm by one of my cousins, who watched the process while disrespectfully spitting over his shoulder (in keeping with his German origins, he had *no* church affiliation!). His interest was aroused, however, when an intelligent-looking young man underwent the procedure: **Oh see: Mr. X! I told you so!** When asked to explain himself, he at first simply answered: “Mr. X intended to open a bank in Mount Airy and needed a substantial loan.” Further explanation revealed that admission into the Baptist church was so important not so much on account of the potential Baptist clientele but rather to attract *non-Baptist* clients. This was because the *thorough scrutiny* of the candidate’s moral and business conduct [*Lebensführung*] that preceded admission—I couldn’t help thinking of our scrutiny of applicants for reserve officer—was regarded as by far the most rigorous and reliable of its kind. The slightest unpunctuality in the payment of a debt, careless expenditure, frequenting the tavern—in short, anything that cast a shadow on the business qualification of the man in question—would lead to his being rejected by the local church community. Once he has been voted in, the

sect will accompany him for the rest of his life in everything he does. If he moves to a different town, it will provide him with the testimonial without which he will not be accepted in the local church of his “denomination.” If he should find himself in financial difficulties for which he bears no blame, the sect will attempt to “help him out,” to protect its reputation. In fact, this practice is now on the decline among sects, although it is still found in numerous “orders.”

Throughout their history, all the sects that grew up on the basis of the Baptist movement, especially the Quakers, exercised a ruthlessly rigorous *control* over the conduct of their members, paying particular attention to their *business* probity. The “Church discipline” exercised by Puritan “innerworldly asceticism” came to focus particularly on *this* aspect. The principal, indeed virtually the *only* means of demonstrating one’s qualification as a Christian and thus achieving moral legitimation for membership of the sect, depended on absolute rectitude. Hence the system of fixed retail prices, exemplary management of credit, and avoidance of all “worldly” extravagance and any kind of **debauchery**—in short, sobriety and hard work in one’s “calling” throughout life.

In America today, the discussion in sermons of questions of dogma is frowned upon—particularly the so-called distinctive doctrines. **Pulpit exchange** (temporary exchange of popular preachers between sects) is common, and there is at the moment a noticeable tendency to form interdenominational cartels to prevent “unfair competition” in the recruitment of members. These things are *today* in part a symptom of the mood of indifference that Europeanization has brought with it. But in the past, too, there have been other such “undogmatic” eras, and (relative) indifference toward dogma can almost be described as a feature of what we might broadly describe as “Pietist” Christianity.

A single basic tenet is common to all the different varieties of “ascetic” Protestantism. Radical Calvinists, Baptists, Mennonites, Quakers, Methodists, and the ascetic branches of continental Pietism all believe that only proving oneself in life [*Bewährung*], and particularly through labor in a calling, can bring assurance of regeneration and justification. This belief led inevitably to the conviction that the “proven” Christian is the one who is proven “in his calling,” in particular the efficient *businessman* (from the capitalist point of view). This

type of Christianity was one of the chief educators of “capitalist” man. As early as the seventeenth century, Quaker writers were rejoicing at the visible blessing of God, who brought the “children of the world” as customers into their shops, confident in the knowledge that they would find there the most dependable service, fixed prices, *etc.* It was the constitution of these religious communities as “sects” (in this particular sense of the word) that contributed to this “educational” effect then, as indeed it continues to do so in some degree to this day.

What, then, is this particular sense? And what, within Western Christianity, is a “sect,” as opposed to a “church”?<sup>6</sup>

It is not *in itself* the mere smallness of the numbers of adherents that is the critical factor—the Baptists are the most numerous of all the Protestant denominations. Neither is the absence of legal “recognition” of the church by the state, and the privilege that goes with it a critical factor—in America none of the denominations is recognized in this way. We know, however, that the *size* of a social group generally has the most far-reaching effect on its inner structure. And the limitation of the size of the church congregation (the unit recognized by church law), to a size small enough for all the members to *know each other personally*, has always been one of the fundamental principles of the Baptist movement. This enabled them mutually to assess and keep a check on how they are “proving” themselves. So-called **class meetings**, in which the members kept a check on each other through mutual confession, was also an essential feature of genuine Methodism. Pietists practiced something similar in their “ecclesiolae.” One only has to look at the Berlin Cathedral to know that it is certainly not in this grandiose Caesaro-Papist showpiece but rather in the small meeting halls of the Quakers and Baptists, where there is no such mystical adornment, that the “spirit” of Protestantism is most truly manifested. The great expansion of *Methodism*, which represents a unique blend of “church” and “sect” principles, has, on the other hand, visibly encouraged the undoubted preponderance of “church” principles that we see today.

It should be noted that although the mere fact of small numbers is, in itself, closely linked with the inner “essence” of the sect, it is not itself that essence. Furthermore, with regard to the relationship to the state, the “church” may, of course, share with the “sect” the de facto absence of state “recognition.” The true difference lies in the fact that what is for the “church,” whether Lutheran, Reformed, or Catholic, “contingency,” and is definitely *not* a matter of principle governing their whole structure, is for the “sects” the expression of a religious idea. For all the sects that grew out of the magnificent popular Baptist movement, the “separation of church and state” is a principle of dogma, while for radical Pietist communities (Calvinist Independents and radical Methodists), it is at least a structural principle.

A “church” claims to be an “institution” [*Anstalt*], a kind of divine gift in trust [*Fideikomißstiftung*] for the salvation of the souls of those who are *born into it*. These people are, as a matter of principle, the *object* of its ministrations, which are tied to its “office.” A “sect”—according to the terminology adopted here ad hoc, one that of course would not be used by the “sects” themselves—is, by contrast, a free community of individuals who *qualify* for membership on purely religious grounds. They are *accepted* into this community on the basis of a decision freely entered into by both sides.

As usual, the historically given forms of religious community life do not fit neatly into these conceptual opposites. One can only ask in what respects a particular denomination corresponds to, or is close to, one or other of the two “types.” But the difference in principle between the basic ideas of each type stands out again and again. Baptism administered purely on the grounds of a decision freely taken by *adult* believers was the adequate symbol of the “sect” character of the Baptist faith. By contrast, the inner falsity of “confirmation” (and we know that even Stoecker<sup>7</sup> takes the view that children are too young for this) reveals the inner contradiction between this purely formally “spontaneous” confession of faith and the structure of our “churches,” which, as such, are never able, in principle, to progress beyond the rustic notion that the priest, as the administrator of that divine gift in trust, has to have a *stronger* faith than his congregation and, thanks to special gifts of grace, is capable of this. The “universalism” of the “churches” lets their light shine on the just and the unjust: only open rebellion against authority, expressed in notorious and obstinate hardening of the heart, leads to excommunication.

The identity of the “chosen few,” the “invisible church,” is known only to God. For the genuine “sect,” however, the “purity” of its membership is vital. When the Pietist sects were being formed, the driving force was always a profound horror of sharing Holy Communion with a “reprobate,” let alone receiving it from the hand of a reprobate, an official “hireling,” whose conduct did not mark him out as one of the elect. The “sect” claims to be a religious “elite,” and sees itself, the “invisible church,” visibly portrayed in the community of the “proven” members. Interference in its internal life by those not *religiously* qualified is intolerable to it. This includes, in particular, any relations with earthly rulers. In

this context, the principle “We ought to obey God rather than men,” whose various interpretations and implications encapsulate, in a sense, the whole cultural mission of Western European Christianity, takes on a distinctly antiauthoritarian tone.

To judge a man solely according to the religious qualities which he demonstrates in his conduct inevitably cuts off any feudal and dynastic romanticism at the roots. Abhorrence of every kind of “idolatry” was, it is true, neither limited to the “sects” as we understand them, nor was it necessarily found in *all* communities built on the sect principle. It was rather an attribute of every essentially *ascetic* form of religiosity. And in the case of the Calvinist Puritans, it was a direct consequence of the idea of predestination, before whose terrible gravity any claims by earthly powers to have been appointed by God would inevitably be swept aside as a blasphemous fraud.

Nevertheless, it was on the naturally antiauthoritarian ground of the sects that this attitude came to its fullest flowering. If the Quaker, in his determination to eschew all forms of courtly reverence, or those which derived from courtly life, took upon himself not only the martyr’s crown, but the far heavier burden of daily mockery, he did this out of the conviction that such tokens of reverence were due to God alone and that it was an insult to his majesty to grant them to a man. The absolute rejection of all those demands made by the state which went “against the conscience” and the demand for “freedom of conscience” as an absolute right of the individual *against* the state were only logically conceivable as a positively *religious* demand when made by a sect. It was in the Quaker ethic that this demand was most firmly based. It was a Quaker principle that the same thing could be the duty of one person and wrong for someone else. This was the case if one person, after thoroughly searching his *conscience*, became convinced that he should do a certain thing, while another person’s conscience told him to refrain from it. In this way the autonomy of the individual became anchored, not in indifference, but in religious standpoints, and the struggle against all kinds of “authoritarian” arbitrariness assumed the proportions of a religious duty. And at the same time, individualism, in the era of its heroic youth, gained a remarkable power to form a community. The universalism of the “Church,” which tended to be linked with ethical complacency, was confronted in the sect by a leaning toward propaganda, linked with ethical rigor. This is again developed most

consistently in the Quaker ethic, according to which God may impart his “inner light” even to those who have never been reached by the gospel. The continuing, never completed, revelation comes not through objectivized documents and traditions, but through the religiously qualified individual.

The “invisible” church, then, is *greater* than the “visible” sect, and the task is to gather its members. The main burden of the Protestant *mission* has been taken up not by the orthodox “churches,” tied to their “official” parochial functions as they are, but by Pietism and the sects. The examples previously quoted have demonstrated the powerful economic interests that the sects harnessed to form their communities. The sect itself is a naturally “particularist” formation, but the religiosity of the sects is one of the clearest examples of living (not merely traditional) “folk” religiosity. It is only the sects that have succeeded in combining positive religiosity and political radicalism. They alone, on the ground of Protestant religiosity, have been able to inspire the mass of the people, especially the modern workers, with an interest in the Church which, for intensity, can otherwise only be compared with the bigoted fanaticism of the backward peasantry. In this way their significance extended well beyond the religious sphere.

It was only they who gave, for example, to American democracy its characteristic flexibility of structure and its individualistic character. The individual knew that nothing but the religious qualifications bestowed on him by God would decide his fate. No sacramental magic could assist him, only the “proof” provided by his practical conduct could be a *sign* [*Symptom*] that he was on the path of salvation. He was thus left entirely to his own resources. This “proof,” manifested in each individual, then became the exclusive foundation for the social cohesion of the congregation. And the great mass of social formations, which have penetrated every corner of American life, is constituted according to the schema of the “sect.”

Anyone who, in the manner beloved of our romantics, imagines “democracy” to be a mass of humanity ground down to atoms, is profoundly mistaken, at least as far as American democracy is concerned. It is bureaucratic rationalism, not democracy, which leads to this thoroughgoing “atomization”—and it cannot be

removed by the imposition of “order” from above, in the manner so often favored. The genuine American society—and we are talking here about the “middle” and “lower” strata of the population—has never simply been such a heap of sand. Neither has it ever been an edifice where anyone who comes along could expect to find open doors. It always was, and remains, riddled with all kinds of “exclusiveness.” [1] Where the old circumstances still prevail, the individual can never get firm ground under his feet *or* really get established, whether in the university or in business life, unless he succeeds in being voted in as a member of an *association* [*soziale Verband*] of some kind or another (formerly, this was almost always a church association), and *making his mark there*. And deep within the heart of these associations the old “spirit of the sects” rules with unsparing force. They remain “artifacts”: in the terminology of Ferdinand Tönnies, “societies” [*Gesellschaften*] and not “communities” [*Gemeinschaften*]. That is to say, they rest neither on the needs of “emotion” nor do they strive for the values of “emotion.” The individual seeks to make his mark *himself* by integrating himself into the social group. There is none of that undifferentiated organic “Gemütlichkeit” of the peasant kind, without which Germans feel incapable of cultivating any close community.

The cool objectivity [*Sachlichkeit*] of sociation encourages the individual to find his precise place in the purposeful activity [*Zwecktätigkeit*] of the group—whether this be a football club or a political party—but it does not in any way diminish the necessity for the individual to be constantly looking for ways to assert himself. On the contrary, it is precisely *within* the group, in the circle of his companions, that the task of “*proving*” himself becomes most urgent. For this reason, too, the association to which the individual belongs is never something “organic” and all-embracing that mystically hovers above him and surrounds him. Instead, it has *always* been quite consciously a mechanism for his own *purposes*, whether material or ideal [*ideell*]. This includes the highest social corporations, toward which the typical “disrespectfulness” of the modern American is so vigorously shown. Thus, discounting bills of exchange is a **business** and entering decrees in state files also a **business** and the latter is not distinguished from the former by any particular “solemnity.” And “it works!” as unprejudiced German officials regularly have to admit, to their surprise, when they see the excellent work done by American **officers**, though the work is performed out of our sight—hidden from our eyes under a thick layer of big-city corruption, party machinations, and **bluff**.



Certainly, the democratic character of North America is determined by the *colonial* character of its culture, and therefore tends to become weaker as the culture becomes weaker. Even some of those peculiarly American qualities that we have discussed have been determined by the sober, pessimistic judgment of men and of all the works of men which is common to of all manifestations, of Puritanism, even the “ecclesiastical” ones. But this combination of the inner isolation of the individual, which leads to a maximum degree of energy being directed outward with the empowerment of the individual to form highly coherent social groups with the maximum thrust—this combination first emerged in its most highly developed form from within the sects.

We modern, religiously “unmusical” people find it difficult to imagine, or even simply to *believe*, what a powerful role was played by these religious elements in that age, when the character of the modern civilized nations [*Kulturnationen*] was being formed. At that time, when concern about the “afterlife” was the most real thing in the world to people, these elements overshadowed everything else. It remains our fate that, for numerous historical reasons, the religious revolution at that time took a form for us Germans that did not give new energy to individuals, but rather added to the aura of the “office.” Along with this, a situation arose which, because the religious community still only existed in the form of the institutional “church,” *inevitably* drove all the individual’s striving for emancipation from “authority,” in fact all “liberalism” in the broadest sense of the word, in the direction of *hostility* toward the religious communities, at the same time depriving it of that community-building force which—alongside other historical factors!—was provided by (among other things) the school of the “sect” in the Anglo-Saxon world, a world which was quite different in all these matters.

Of course, this development cannot be “repeated” among religious communities today, even if that were desirable. Today’s “free churches” would not wish or be able to become “sects.” Above all, a “cultural religion” based on Goethe is the absolute antithesis of genuine sectarianism, as also is any theology, especially liberal theology. Of course, even the sects have not failed to develop their own theology. But there is nothing against which the genuine and consistent “sect” protests more passionately than the esteem accorded to learned analysis of religious questions. It is the religious qualities of the *personality*, not some

erudite knowledge, that gives legitimacy to the leadership of the congregation—all the sects within Protestantism have fought for this principle. It is for this reason that, for example, the fight conducted by Cromwell's "saints" finally intensified into what was virtually a war against theology, against the "office," and against the "tithes," which supported the "office," and thus a war against the economic and ideological [*ideell*] foundations of the politically and intellectually educated "leisure classes," and especially against the universities. It was the tragic inner rift in Cromwell's life's work that in this point he, as a "Realpolitiker," was forced to part company with his own followers. It meant that he measured religious assumptions against *extrareligious* political and intellectual *cultural values*. This is why he said, on his deathbed, that he was *once* "in a state of grace." About one thing, however, there can be no mistake. All the arguments against the "narrowness" and "abstruseness" of the sects which we hear from the finest, "most modern," and dogmatically least committed advocates of the ideal of the universalist Protestant "Church," mean the same thing: cultural values, not genuine religious needs, are the decisive factor for them.

Far be it for me to pronounce a "value judgment" on the religiosity of the "sects." As anyone would admit, the examples given earlier are by no means chosen with the purpose of winning sympathy for it. These examples would be more likely to strengthen the belief, which in Germany is commonly held about "Puritanism," that it has basically never been anything but "hypocrisy." Now, it was not my intention to challenge this foolish distortion on this occasion; it is, however, my personal opinion that *however and wherever* the contents of intense religious consciousness have been expressed in external social form and have since—whether knowingly and voluntarily or not—become allied with political, economic, and "social" interests, the result is very similar. While it may be similar it is not identical, however, for when it comes to "evaluation," the question might well be asked as to whether, for example, the "plain" Quaker Meeting, which does at least reduce the "actions" and "intentions" of the religious encounter to a minimum and often consists only of profound silence and meditation, is not the most adequate form for a "divine service." This could certainly be true for someone who does not confuse "religious" *contents* with the formal psychological quality of aesthetic twilight moods of the kind people today so much love to create by musical and visual mystification.

In reality, however, it is usually the case that even where “modern” man actually does have an “ear” for religion (or thinks he does), he is usually in no way a “religious *community* person” and *therefore* tends to be predestined for the “church”—which he can disregard if it suits him—but not for any kind of “sect.” On the other hand, we should be under no illusion—the “state church,”<sup>8</sup> or indeed the “Church” in general, is likely to benefit for the foreseeable future from *this* factor, coupled with the absolute indifference of those who inquire only about what is conventional and advisable for the “well-behaved” citizen, in other words, to benefit from the *febleness* of *religious* motives.

At the same time I should like to add, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, that I am by no means unaware that even a highly ideological, and genuinely religious, theory of the state church is perfectly plausible. Such a theory would take as its starting point the absolute irrationality of the religious individual and of his experiences, and proceed to draw the conclusion that a union *agreed on* as an “association” (sect) based upon certain beliefs or ways of acting is contrary to the essential nature of religion.

The profound inner insincerity of a commitment to the state church, like that represented even by such innovators as Frederick William IV, and now Stoecker too (men who are undoubtedly serious about their zeal for reform), certainly does not lie in the “concept” of the state church as such. It lies in the naive yet massive cunning<sup>9</sup> with which the postulated *exclusive* “believing” church “is happy to accept” a monopoly of the educational and cultural budget and—more important, as these material factors are by no means decisive here—*secular privilege* in the life of state and society. Then, simply because, in spite of its “exclusivity,” it is, after all, “*the Church*” and intends to remain so, it cultivates an erastian<sup>10</sup> “modesty” in its religious demands on the strata which enjoy “privilege” in the “world.” What Stoecker had to say about Moltke is a classic example of such an attitude.

All of the above is true, in my opinion, not only of such caricatures of objectively “genuine” Christian reforming zeal, but also of the attitudes of “educated” people generally toward the state church *as empirically given*. At the same time—and it was my intention to avoid any possible misunderstandings here—I should *not* wish it to be thought that I believed that all those who devoted their lives to an (ideal) state church only ever gained this position via

nonreligious cultural values. That would not be true to the facts, as I am very well aware. But the view that arises out of the irrationality of the religious personality inevitably leads to Rothe's dictum: "the maximum degree of religion and the minimum degree of church," and this, alongside the sectarian philosophy, has consequences for the religious permeation of social life "from below." Such consequences, it seems to me, are plainly to be seen.

## WEBER'S NOTE

1) In this area there lie a few of those points in which I differ from my friend and colleague *Troeltsch*, and which he discussed at the Breslau *Evangelisch-soziale Kongress*.<sup>11</sup> If I were not so heavily involved with other work, I would gladly debate these here. I should just like to indicate at this point that his habit of identifying “conservative” with “aristocratic” (and he is far from alone in this) leads to a number of questionable theses.

In my view, it is incontrovertible that the two concepts are by no means identical, and are only held to be identical *here in Germany* on account of today's historical constellation. A “full” democracy—in the customary sense of this word—is in more than one sense the “most conservative” structure possible, and social, economic, and political differentiation represents a revolutionizing developmental trend by contrast.

Furthermore, usage of the words “aristocracy” and “democracy” by *Troeltsch* (and many others) is, in my view, too undifferentiated: if one assumes that aristocracy simply equals social exclusivity of a human group, then one must first distinguish whether membership of that group is linked to *personal qualities* or to individual achievements (predestination, “proof” in a religious, business, sporting, “human,” or other sense), or whether it (that is, membership of the group) is constituted by qualifying features passed on by inherited social stratification or the social position of one's ancestors attributed to one, etc., etc. In short, it must be established whether it is the *quality* of the person or that person's *position* that determines membership of the exclusive group. We tend to think of the latter characteristic when we speak of “aristocracy.” Looked at in the cold light of day, this is remarkable enough, since there is no mention here of a community of personal ἀριστοι as in the case of that other form, which is proper to the adopted exclusivities of American “democracy.” Even the millionaires' clubs over there are not necessarily an exception. For us, it is only the grandson of the “upstart” who is venerated. It is an observable fact, however, that true Americans reserve their admiration for the man who has succeeded in *earning* the million. They attach less value to the million itself or the *position* of

millionaire.

If then, as Troeltsch does, we wish to investigate the position of Christianity with regard to “democracy” or “aristocracy,” we must first consider the very different meanings of the word “democracy” contrasted with the concept of “aristocracy” which is generally set against it. A clear distinction will have to be made between the aristocracy of “position” and that of “quality.” We should first ensure, however, that the concept of “conservative” be kept quite separate.

### EDITORS' NOTES

1 “ ‘Kirchen’ und ‘Sekten’ in Nordamerika. Eine kirchen-und sozial-politische Skizze.” *Die Christliche Welt: Evangelisches Gemeindeblatt für Gebildete aller Stände*, nos. 24-25, Marburg, June 1906.

2 Throughout this essay, Weber often resorts to vernacular English. To make this clear to the reader, we have placed English words and phrases in bold type.

3 The German text has “hyperbole” (*Hyperbel*) but the opposite —“understatement”—appears closer to what Weber means.

4 According to the Luther scholar Wilhelm Pauck, the source of these “private statistical surveys” was Hans Haupt, a pastor of an immigrant German evangelical church in Towanda, New York. Pauck reports that Troeltsch and Weber, in advance of their American trip, asked Haupt “to collect as much material as possible about American denominations and their moral teachings and attitudes, especially in relation to economic practices.” In conversation with Pauck, Haupt remarked that it appeared “the professors knew all that could be known without having to weigh the empirical evidence.” See Wilhelm Pauck, *Harnack and Troeltsch: Two Historical Theologians* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 72. Weber may have consulted other sources as well. (The editors are indebted to Hans Rollmann, scholar of Troeltsch and of the Moravian movements, for providing them with the information necessary for this note, and for note 11.) 5 *Zweckverband* is an association set up for a specific purpose.

6 The distinction between “church” and “sect” (and among “church,” “sect,” and “mysticism”) was a prominent theme in Ernst Troeltsch’s *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, translated by Olive Wyon with a foreword by James Luther Adams (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster /John Knox Press (1992 [1931,

1912]), especially pp. 515-54, 691-820.

[7](#) Adolf Stoecker (1835-1909) was a conservative politician and reformer who founded the *Christlich-soziale Arbeiterpartei* (Christian Social Workers' Party), hoping to win the working classes back to the Church, but met with little success as the monarchist and nationalist ethos of the party had little appeal for them. From 1879 to 1898, he was a member of the Prussian *Abgeordnetenhaus* (parliament) and was a cofounder of the *Evangelisch-soziale Kongress*.

[8](#) The German word is *Landeskirche*, that is, the official church of the *Land* (one of the constituent states of the German empire).

[9](#) The German word is *Schlangeklugheit* (wisdom of the serpent). Matthew 10.16 has "be ye wise as serpents," but in the present context the word is clearly being used ironically.

[10](#) This word means advocating the supremacy of the state over the church in ecclesiastical affairs.

[11](#) The Congress was founded in 1890 and met annually in different cities; the Breslau meeting took place in 1904. Ernst Troeltsch's speech to the Congress was published in an extended and revised form as *Politische Ethik und Christentum* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1904), 43 pages. For more information on the speech and its background, see Hans-Georg Drescher, "Demokratie, Konservatismus und Christentum: Ernst Troeltsch's Konzept zum Umgang mit politischer Ethik auf dem Evangelisch-sozialen Kongress, 1904," *Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik* 30 (1986), pp. 84-98; and Drescher's *Ernst Troeltsch: His Life and Work* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), pp. 101-06.

## *Critical Remarks in Response to the Foregoing “Critical Contributions”<sup>1</sup>*

*Editors' Preface:* In two articles published in 1907 and 1908, H. Karl Fischer critically appraised Weber's *The Protestant Ethic* on both substantive and methodological grounds.<sup>2</sup> Fischer's most salient points were that Weber handles the concept of the “spirit of capitalism” in a contradictory manner (Franklin's “spirit” is at first conceived of as different from the capitalist spirit, Fischer alleges, but later becomes identical to it); that Luther's use of the term “Beruf” was not innovative but rather reflected common parlance of the day; that religious ideas were just as likely to have been adaptations to economic life as factors influencing it. More generally, Fischer taxes Weber with offering an “idealist” interpretation of history; claims that Sombart's analysis, showing that capitalist enterprises (*Betriebsformen*) existed long before the Reformation, is more plausible than Weber's; and adds for good measure that both Sombart and Weber ignore what might have lent greater credence to their investigations: a “psychological” account of the rise of the capitalist spirit. In Fischer's view, J. S. Mill was on to something when he noted that the acquisition of money becomes an end in itself, valued independently of what money can buy. The capitalist spirit, Fischer continues, can be construed in a similar manner: as a psychological pleasure derived from the feeling of power that money confers on those who possess it. Religious motives may be secondary or irrelevant. Still, Fischer concedes, there is undoubtedly some connection between denomination (*Konfession*) and capitalist development. The problem is that we can only note the parallels, not establish causation.

Responding to Weber's reply, Fischer recapitulates the main thrust of his critique, underlining the importance of a psychological approach to the understanding of historical events. Fischer speculates that Puritanism may have simply strengthened a spirit that was already present; and he insists that while Weber's remark that theory must fit the facts is obviously true, it misses the crucial point. Facts, or source material, make little sense without a rigorous methodology to evaluate them.

Weber's two rejoinders are notable for their analysis of psychological forms



of explanation of historical events; and for their forceful restatement of his “problematic”—the attempts to deal with Protestant asceticism’s influence on “the spirit of the methodical conduct of life” (*Lebensführung*), and “with the rise of that ethical ‘style of life’ which was spiritually ‘adequate’ to the economic stage of ‘capitalism’ and which signified capitalism’s victory in the ‘soul’ of man.”

\* \* \*

I am grateful to my two joint editors<sup>3</sup> for agreeing to the publication of the foregoing article. For however obscure a critique may be—and I believe the foregoing to be this—it does still call attention to the points in the criticized work that *can* give rise to misunderstandings —misunderstandings which the author, whether or not through any fault of his own, has done too little to prevent.

Admittedly, for almost all the objections raised by my critic, I must reject any blame on my part, and for some I deny any possibility of misunderstanding for an attentive reader. Whereas I (vol. 20, p. 15; [p. 11 in this volume])<sup>4</sup> assume an *antithesis* between the “spirit” expressed in the words of Jakob Fugger quoted by my critic, and those of Franklin, he alleges that I find that “spirit” in *both* equally. [1] Whereas I quote Franklin (vol. 20, p. 26 [p. 19f in this volume]) as one of various examples [2] that show that what I have called ad hoc the “spirit of capitalism” does not depend simply on the form of the economic *business*, the critic has me treating Franklin’s *attitude* [*Gesinnung*] on one occasion as differing from the capitalist “spirit,” and on another occasion as identical to it. I have taken considerable pains (vol. 20, p. 36 [p. 28 in this volume]) to *demonstrate* that the ethically tinged concept of the “calling” [*Beruf*] (and thus also the corresponding meaning of the word), which is common to all Protestant peoples since the first Bible translations, but is absent from *all* others, is, where it relates to the point that is decisive for my investigation, a *new coinage* from the Reformation. My critic,<sup>5</sup> however, is of the opinion that Luther, in using this new coinage, would have adopted the “common popular expression”—although he makes no attempt to cite any evidence that it was “common.” Naturally, my findings may need to be corrected at any time by philological research. But

merely asserting the opposite point of view is scarcely an adequate response in the light of the present state of knowledge.

Furthermore, I myself have attempted to justify in detail my view, and give reasons for it, that the idea of the “calling” as it appeared in the form of Lutheran religiosity remained specifically *different* from the manifestation which the idea assumed within the “ascetic” forms of Protestantism, where it became an integral part of the capitalist “spirit.” And yet my critic holds this finding of mine, which constitutes one of the basic ideas of my essays, as an objection *against* what he calls my “idealistic historical interpretation,” which (he claims) seeks to derive capitalism from Luther.

Whereas (in vol. 20, p. 54 [p. 36 in this volume]) I have explicitly repudiated the “foolish” thesis that the Reformation *alone* could have created the capitalist spirit “*or even*” capitalism itself (as an economic system), by reason of the fact that important *forms* of capitalist business activity date from well before the Reformation—I still suffer the fate of having this absolutely indisputable fact quoted *against* me by my critic, who appeals to my friend Sombart. And whereas I have most unambiguously *deplored* any attempt to construct some “idealistic” (in vol. 21, p. 110, I wrote “spiritual” [p. 122 in this volume]) interpretation of history out of the historical configurations [*Zusammenhänge*] which I have described, I then find that my critic not only imputes this very interpretation to me in the remarks just quoted, but he also poses the question elsewhere whether I imagine the transformation of the Baptist ethic to be a “logical process in the sense of Hegel.” [3] He then presents as his own view things which, at the appropriate place (vol. 21, p. 69 [p. 101 in this volume]), I myself have said clearly enough for everyone to understand. I feel not in the least guilty if he is unconvinced by the explanation I gave there (and frequently elsewhere) for the way in which the Baptist attitude to life infiltrated the “world.” It is well known, by the way, that the explanation applies also to the experience of other sects that are similar to them in this respect, for example, a number of Russian sects, which of course existed under completely different economic conditions. [4]

Neither do I feel responsible for my critic’s assumption that I wrote my essays

simply to explain the relationship (still noticeable *today*) between denominational circumstances and economic and social stratification. I have stressed very strongly (vol. 20, p. 23; p. 17 in this volume; and frequently elsewhere) that present-day capitalism, which is built on a mechanical foundation and imports Polish workers into Westphalia, and coolies to California, takes a totally different attitude to this problem from the capitalism of the early period. The fact that, despite all of this, even today differences in economic behavior between the denominations may still be observed, and have occasionally been debated, merely gave me, as I have said (*op. cit.*, p. 25; p. 19 in this volume), the starting point and the occasion justifiably to pose the *question* of how denomination and economic conduct may have related to each other in the early period of capitalism.

The fact that these two cultural components even then did not stand in a relationship of “lawful” dependency—so that where *x* (ascetic Protestantism) is, there *y* (capitalist “spirit”) will also be, without exception—is, a priori, self-evident, given the nature of the causal linkage of historically complex phenomena with each other. [5] However, the remarks of my critic on the Dutch capitalists are inaccurate even from the factual point of view: the process of the purchase of feudal estates by certain strata of the city patriciate was typical there too (see vol. 21, p. 103 [p. 198, note 299 in this volume]). I have also made some (purely provisional) observations on the determinants (to be discussed in detail later) of the development in Holland in volume 20, page 26 [p. 51, note 32 in this volume], and volume 21, pages 85-86 [p. 110 in this volume, but Holland is not mentioned there], observations with which my critic also to some extent confronts me as though they were objections. I shall probably also have more to say at a later stage about the significance of certain religious groups for the development of the Lower Rhine region in the early capitalist period. [6] Furthermore, I should like to remind readers that “Reformed” is not simply identical to “Calvinist,” and also that “Calvinism” did not exhibit those characteristics of concern to my investigations to their *fullest* extent prior to its development into ascetic Puritanism. I should also like to stress once again that “Calvinism” is by no means identical to the genuine doctrine taught by Calvin. I refer once again to what I wrote in volume 21, pages 103-104 [p. 117f. in this volume]. Surely no one could think me capable of believing that denominational allegiance *alone* could produce out of thin air in this way a certain type of economic development—that Baptists in Siberia, for example, would inevitably turn into wholesalers, or Calvinist dwellers in the Sahara become factory owners

— clearly, no one would wish to attribute such an opinion to me. To give an example, in a country in the geographic and cultural situation of Hungary at the time when it was repeatedly being subjected to and liberated from the Turks, the assumption that Calvinism ought to have created capitalist forms of business would be as bizarre as the assumption that the dominance [*Herrschaft*] of capitalism in Holland ought to have led to the production of seams of coal under the ground there. By the way, even in Hungary it *did* have a characteristic effect, although this was in another sphere. I have also (vol. 20, p. 4, notes 1-2 [p. 44, notes 7 and 8 in this volume]) referred incidentally to figures which show that, despite everything, there are signs *even there* of the appearance of those characteristic phenomena regarding choice of occupation [*Berufswahl*] by Reformed people which was my starting point. I believe I have already made my views on the relationship between religious and economic conditions in general sufficiently clear for the time being, albeit briefly (see, for example, vol. 21, p. 101, note 69 [p. 197, note 295 in this volume]). There is little I can do about it if such passages, together with numerous others, in particular the concluding remarks to the entire essay, are simply ignored.

I therefore reject any responsibility for the misunderstandings that appear to me to underlie the present “critique.” I shall, however, in the forthcoming separate edition of the essays, which for technical reasons concerned with publication really cannot be put off any longer, attempt once again to eliminate any phrasing that could be erroneously taken to imply the suggestion on my part that economic *forms* could be derived from religious motives. I shall also try to make *even* clearer that it is the spirit of the “methodical” *conduct of life* [*Lebensführung*] which should be “derived” from “asceticism” in its Protestant form, and that this spirit stands only in a relationship of “adequacy” to the economic *forms*—a relationship which is, however, in my view most important from the standpoint of cultural history. I am grateful to my critic for helping me to appreciate the need to do this, although it has to be said that no critique in this area of infinitely complex causal relationships can be genuinely factually [*sachlich*] based without a thorough familiarity with the source material, something which he lacks. [7]

Regretfully, I must inform him that his positive “psychological” analyses get us absolutely nowhere. When I declared today’s agreed body of “psychological”

concepts to be inadequate (vol. 21, p. 45 [p. 157, note 148 in this volume]) to be safely employed to solve a concrete problem of religious history, namely, the significance of certain hysterical phenomena, in early Pietism, I was obviously not speaking about attempts like those made by my critic, but about *exact* researches in the area of hysteria. It is *only* from these that I would expect any new insights [8] of value for this problem. By contrast, the arguments of my critic in his critique precisely illustrate the uselessness of what passes for “psychology” as a means of historical explanation of phenomena like those with which I am concerned. “If,” he says, “we express the idea of the acquisition of money. . . , purely as an end in itself, in psychological terms, we can look upon it as the individual’s pleasure in powerful activity.” [9] Even this first step into the territory of this “psychology” is, from the historical point of view, a false step. Such “pleasure in powerful activity” may be an accurate description of a side effect of moneymaking for many types of *modern* businesspeople, and similarly in the past for types like Jakob Fugger and similar economic “supermen,” of whom I myself have also spoken. These were types who since Babylonian antiquity have existed wherever there was money to be made [10], but who are precisely *not* characteristic of that spirit of the *sober methodical* life [*Lebensmethodik*], the analysis of which was my concern. The “powerful activity of the individual” and his “pleasure” in this may be studied in the so-called Renaissance men—but if we apply the *same* expression to Puritans, who were subject to ascetic discipline in the same way as the monks were, then (how could it be otherwise when dealing with such imprecise abstractions?) we understand something fundamentally different.

Generalizing doctrines of *this* kind are worlds away from the phenomena of historical reality. This, in my view, is evident from his subsequent exploration of questions such as the following. To which category [*Schema*] of psychological phenomena should this “pleasure” be assigned? Should a certain kind of “transference of emotional states” be seen as a “general psychic occurrence” and if so what should theoretically follow from this? What historical processes were consequently “conceivable” and which ones were not? When could the “high regard for money” have arisen and when could it not? (Such high regard, as I stress again, embraces quite heterogeneous “psychic” phenomena from Molière’s *Avare* to Carnegie and the Indian raja, and, in itself, has simply *nothing* to do with the methodical life of the Puritans.) [11] How might an abstract concept like the “sense of duty” have arisen, and, in particular, could the origin of the duty of the calling have a more “natural” explanation than that

which I had offered? I have already demonstrated on so many other occasions that such generalizing doctrines rest upon fundamental errors that it would be superfluous to do so again here.

It would certainly be a far more convenient way of tracing certain effects back to their historical causes if we could simply deduce the origin of certain characteristic styles of life from the abstractions of “psychology.” However, historical reality is outside our control and does not first ask whether the psychological schemata of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer [12], or even of my critic, can accommodate the fact that the people of that past age had very concrete ideas of what awaited them after death, that they held firm views on how best to improve their chances in this regard, that they designed their actions accordingly, and that how they did this, which depended on the different views regarding the conditions to be met in order to guarantee salvation, was important for cultural development. It is, of course, hard for modern man to imagine the agonizing force of such metaphysical notions.

Nevertheless, after all the various “psychological” considerations, my critic finally admits the obvious connection between the development of the capitalist “spirit” in France and the Huguenot movement. I am sufficiently lacking in modesty to believe that (1) I have found a similar “parallelism,” which he at first finds quite inexplicable, in a number of other areas, and (2) I have made a reasonably plausible attempt at an explanation, and backed this up with a series of noteworthy facts. It is, to be honest, a matter of indifference to me whether or not some abstract “psychology” happens to fit the facts I have adduced: the theory must be made to fit the facts, not vice versa. I warmly welcome the assistance of any psychology whose concepts help me in any way to assign concrete historical phenomena to their concrete causes. Regarding *my* problem, however, I can derive nothing from what I know of “psychological” literature, including the works cited by my critic, that goes any way toward satisfying my need to find causes. It is, unfortunately, well known that exact scientific work on religious pathology, as far as the questions which interest me are concerned, is still in its infancy.

## WEBER'S NOTES

1) And, moreover, *only* in these two statements. He will surely have to concede that on pages 18-35, op. cit. [pp. 13-36 in this volume] I have contributed rather more to the elucidation of the concept (even if all this is merely provisional).

2) For the precisely opposite case, see, for example, the remarks in volume 20, page 28 [p. 21 in this volume].

3) Self-evidently, as I have stated myself, the reshaping of the Baptist ethic (which was originally in part eschatological, in part enthusiastic, <sup>6</sup> and in part antipolitical) is “conformity to the world,” just as it was for early Christianity.

4) In one single instance a printing error—albeit one that could easily be recognized as such—may have been partly responsible. On page 69 (op. cit.) [p. 101 in this volume] it is said of the Anabaptists: “Admittedly, the effect of this “waiting” *can* result in hysterical states, prophecy, and, where eschatological hopes are cherished, even to an outbreak of fanatical reforming zeal, as has existed in the Münster movement, which was crushed.” Owing to a printing error, “hysterische Zustände” [“hysterical states”] appeared as “hysterischen Zuständen.”<sup>7</sup> However, the context immediately makes it clear, in my view, that this is a printing error, and what follows reinforces this. What could possibly be meant by “*Waiting* in hysterical states”—and yet the author understands this as contrasting with sober work in the calling?

5) The *only* incautious formulation of which I could be accused is the remark (vol. 20, p. 8 [p. 16 in this volume]) that Calvinism shows the coincidence of intense piety and capitalist acquisitiveness [*Erwerbssinn*] “wherever it [Calvinism] occurred.” When saying this I had in mind the Calvinism of the diaspora, of which Gothein also speaks in the passage I quoted shortly afterward.

6) For the *present* period, of course, what I have said about capitalism *today* still

applies. In particular regarding Belgium *today*. By contrast, the gradual migration of Calvinists northward from Belgium to Holland was highly significant, both politically and economically, as we can see from any history of the Thirty Years War. These were Calvinists who originally, in the sixteenth century, had moved into the southern regions of Belgium, where they found themselves in a minority.

7) Although there may be some who see this as “old-fashioned,” I would regard *theologians* as *most competent* to provide this critique.

8) From this source, light *could* be shed on the influence of religious institutions and attitudes on everything that is covered today by the insubstantial concept of “national character” [*Volkscharakter*]. More on this in due course in the separate edition.

9) On this he again quotes Fugger’s maxim, which, as I have already said, I had placed in *opposition* to what *I* had *called* the “spirit of capitalism.”

10) I myself have frequently discussed this (for example, vol. 21, p. 109 [p. 121 in this volume]). Obviously, this type exists not only in this pure American form; something of it can be found among broad strata of the business community today.

11) See volume 20, page 19 [p. 14 in this volume], and the whole of the final section of the second essay.

12) The quoted “explanatory methods” of the two important scholars named are specifically English and to some extent themselves a late embodiment of that kind of “natural” philosophy of life that we find in Franklin—which, however, is the antithesis of empirical historical analysis. The only aspects of such constructions that are correct are a few trivialities from everyday experience with which all economic historians operate even if they lack any knowledge of Mill



and Spencer.

### EDITORS' NOTES

[1](#) Max Weber “Kritische Bemerkungen zu den vorstehenden “Kritischen Beiträgen,” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 25 (1907), pp. 243-49.

[2](#) H. Karl Fischer, “Kritische Beiträge zu Prof. M. Webers Abhandlung: ‘Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus,’ ” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 25 (1907), pp. 232-42; “Protestantische Ethik und ‘Geist des Kapitalismus.’ Replik auf Herrn Prof. Max Webers Gegenkritik,” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* , vol. 26 (1908), pp. 270-74.

Curiously, in the first article (1907), the author’s name is given as H. Karl Fischer, whereas in the second article (1908) it is given as K. H. Fischer.

H. Karl Fischer has proved to be a tantalizingly elusive figure to track down, but the following biographical information has been very kindly supplied by Dr. Michael Matthiesen, of the Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte, Göttingen, through the good offices of Dr. Guenther Roth.

Karl Heinrich Otto Fischer was born on June 3, 1879, in Berlin. From 1899 to 1902 he taught in schools in Hamburg, the Magdeburg region, and Lüdenscheid. From 1902 to 1904 he taught in Berlin and Pots-dam. During this period he began to study philosophy and history as a *Gasthörer* (attending lectures only) at the University of Berlin, enrolling as a full-time student in 1904 and adding economics [*Nationalökonomie* ]. From 1905 to 1908 he continued his studies at the University of Zurich, adding pedagogy and psychology to his range of subjects. In 1908 he took his doctorate at Zurich, the title of his dissertation (which makes no mention of Weber) being “Die objektive Methode der Moral-philosophie bei Wundt und Spencer.” It was published in Leipzig in 1909. The supervisor was Gustav Wilhelm Störing (1860-1946), who had been a student of Wilhelm Wundt. Unfortunately, after the controversy with Weber and the award of the doctorate, the trail goes cold. All we know is that he was employed as *Schulrat* (official in the local education authority) in Berlin, where he died on March 22, 1975.

[3](#) The reference is to Edgar Jaffé and Werner Sombart, coeditors with Weber of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*.

[4](#) The reference is to volume 20 of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und*

*Sozialpolitik*, in which Weber's essay appeared.

5 Weber consistently refers to H. K. Fischer as "Mein *Herr* Kritiker," but *Herr* is merely a conventional form of address (though not without a touch of irony in this case), and we have omitted it in the translation. By contrast, Weber is seldom even prepared to dignify Professor Rachfahl with the title of "critic" without putting it in quotation marks.

6 The word used is from the older meaning of *enthusiasm*, namely, a state of religious ecstasy.

7 The former is in the accusative case, and implies a transformation *into* a hysterical state, whereas the erroneous form is in the dative case, implying that the waiting itself occurs in a hysterical state.

## Remarks on the Foregoing “Reply”<sup>1</sup>

A READER WHO WISHED to orient himself in this (rather fruitless) debate would need to be not only “thoughtful” but above all *patient* enough to inform himself at every point by reference to *my* essays about what I said and did not say. He would then no doubt be amazed to hear the assertion that I had not “seen” the childishly simple “methodical” principles and problems of historical causality about which we have been lectured, and that I *therefore* “had nothing to offer” by way of thoughts on the decisive causal questions of my investigation. The assertion seems all the more astonishing when one compares it to the purely a priori approach with which my critic himself imagines he can tackle these problems, knowing absolutely *nothing* about “our” material, which concerns us here, not even the most general literary characteristics of the sources. In his supposedly “methodological” study he calls them “religious books of edification” and confuses them with “dogmatic systems.”

This shows a lack of *specialist* knowledge. He simply does not know that the sources (which are crucial for my study of the influence on the *conduct of life*) arose from collections of responses which are directly based on quite concrete practical inquiries to the minister (who was at that time simply the most universal counselor known to history) and have nothing whatever to do with “edifying” or “dogmatic” purposes. They are concerned with the problems of everyday living, which they therefore illustrate as few other sources can do. Except where the nature of the concrete problematic [*Fragestellung*] required other sources, these were the only ones I used. His “methodological” views on what a literature of which he was totally ignorant could or could not “at best” prove to him are therefore likely to be of little significance. He dismisses as insignificant (because too “general”) my comment regarding the difficulty that modern man has in putting himself in the place of someone in those days dealing with practical questions of life under the influence of religious motives. I now say to him that I propose to be more precise and tell him that *he* lacks the ability to do this. Furthermore, I have little hope of even winning him over to my views in the future. For he himself has a very simple answer to the question as to *why*, despite the plausibility of the arguments, “one” should hesitate to acknowledge

an influence such as that which I had proposed. The firm conviction that he *himself* holds in his hand—in the form of what he calls “psychology”—an infinitely simple means of establishing historical “psychogeneses,” was, naturally enough, hardly likely to be conducive to the impartiality of his judgment of the efforts of others (which he regards as unduly complicated and laborious). One needs no assistance from “psychology” to see this.

A discussion that is not based on *any* knowledge of the subject can, however, even with the best “methodological” intentions, hardly lay claim to being a verification of historical investigations. For instead of his ostensibly “methodological” assertions, we are constantly presented with *substantive* [*sachlich*] assertions, which, moreover, have merely been thrown in at random on the basis of ignorance. For example, the suggestion that “adaptation” by the religious framework of ideas to the existing economic conditions had to be “presumed” and all similar suggestions are matters of *fact* [*sachlich*]. They are on a completely different plane from the historical problematic of today that forms my starting point, and are completely empty of meaning. [1] These questions have, in any case, been discussed from this very point of view in a not inconsiderable range of literature, by writers ranging from Kautsky to Dilthey. The main point here, contrary to the assertion of my critic with which we began, is: such suggestions simply ignore the fact that I myself, in accordance with my explicit declarations and the whole tenor of my investigation, *by no means* regard the question of the influence of the economic processes on religious movements as resolved. My critic now thinks he can simply disregard my explanations as irrelevant, on the grounds that I had allegedly not acted (indeed, nowhere acted) in accordance with them. Of course, nowhere in his “Critical Contributions” did he make the attempt to propose *this* rather strong claim, let alone to substantiate it by an analysis of my arguments. Instead, he “relies upon”—or rather “clings to”—“words.”<sup>2</sup>

It will be clear to every *reader* of my essay from its content what precisely is *meant* by the *expression* “derive” (and I deliberately put the word in quotation marks), as in to “derive” the ethic of the calling from the Protestant form of asceticism, and to “derive” certain economically relevant components of the modern style of life from the “ethic of the calling.” But even for the *nonreader* it really should be abundantly clear from the *words* quoted by my critic himself

three lines later (the “*effect*” of religious consciousness on cultural life) that it did not occur to me to find “*the driving factor of the historical action*” of any era, or to find any “*truly driving forces*”—for me, such specters do not exist in history. It should be clear that I was in fact investigating, precisely in accordance with my declared intention, the *direction* in which conduct of life was influenced (where such influence *existed*) by the religious characteristics [*Eigenarten*] of the various ascetic branches of Protestantism—characteristics which were crucially determined (at least in part) by fundamental metaphysical presuppositions.

Faced with these simple facts, my critic had not a shred of evidence for his somewhat rash assumption that I had produced, as it were, an idealistic historical construction [*Geschichtskonstruktion*]. My “vigorous” protest, however, was directed against the suggestion (which is without foundation) that I was acting contrary to my own statements. For the perhaps even wilder allegations that I had given no consideration to the possibility of influence from other motives, particularly economic ones, I hardly need to point out to those who have *read* my essays what we are to think of this. I should merely like to recall to mind the following. In my opinion, which I have justified above, the *degree* of influence by religious motives was often *very* great. I have, however, not shown that it was everywhere *equally* great, nor that it could never have been modified or completely nullified by other circumstances, and have never claimed to do so. I *have*, though, set out to prove my sole contention, namely, that the *orientation* of that influence was in decisive points the *same* in Protestant countries with very widely differing political, economic, geographic, and ethnic conditions—New England, German diaspora, southern France, Holland, England (the “Scotch-Irish,” Friesland, and numerous other German territories could be added to the list)—and in particular, that this orientation existed *independently* of the degree of development of capitalism as an *economic* system. On the other hand, I have established that even in the area of the highest development of capitalist economy *before* the Reformation, namely, in Italy (similarly in Flanders)—the “capitalist” *spirit* (in *my* sense of the word!) was *lacking*—and that this (as I would now like to add) did not fail to have the profoundest consequences for “style of life.” [2]

One may regard my attempt to prove the *similarity* of that “influence” —a

similarity which derives from the *religious* character [*Eigenart*] of ascetic Protestantism—as incomplete or as lacking in rigor, or it may be attacked by a *competent* [*sachkundiger*] theologian. *However*, in view of firstly my argument, secondly my repeated statements (linked with this argument) regarding the *meaning* of my thesis, and thirdly my statements on the orientation of the planned further investigations to complement, interpret, and further test the thesis [3], it should be perfectly understandable that the opinion of my critic (which he has now *explicitly* expressed) that I had failed to see those rather simple “methodical” principles of which he speaks, and that my work shows *no signs whatever* of any methodical “*considerations*” of this nature, inevitably seemed rather flippant, and that this caused me to reply in what he calls a rather “vigorous” manner, that is, without making any special allowances. [4] I missed then, and I miss now, not just expert knowledge, but also the “good will” to examine the issue closely before expressing disagreement. Admittedly, if my critic, in his holy (and in this case at the same time so “cheap”) “methodological” zeal, now says that I should have been required to “exclude” “*every possibility*” of any other causal connection, so that no other interpretation *whatsoever* was permissible and “*conceivable*,” other than simply and solely the one that I proposed, then the historian will, of course, scarcely be able to recognize such a burden of proof for a negative result as a *general* “norm” for his work. Normally, the historian will, conversely, approach the question from the positive angle and investigate the *other* factors, namely, those that were likely to be causal components, seeking to discover the nature of their influence, in order to arrive at an evermore comprehensive (but scarcely ever completely conclusive) causal regress [*kausalen Regressus*]. All this I have already *explicitly* stated as my intention and have begun to carry it out in the articles that have appeared so far.

Most of all, that ideal criterion by which my critic is so keen to judge the arguments of *others* is in marked contrast to the modest standards that he applies to his *own* argument. Consider for a moment. He himself has stated that he intends to “*show*” (!) *what* constitutes the “psychogenesis” of the “duty of the calling,” of the “capitalist spirit,” and of the “spirit of the methodical conduct of life.” How has he fared (over ten pages) in this, on his own admission, unusually difficult attempt—one in which I totally failed? We can read this in his “Critical Contributions”: he has done it by “proceeding”—“beyond” Sombart [5] and me—to a higher synthesis, that is, as he puts it, “to a psychological explanation” of those processes. Let us recall what this explanation is. “If we express (p. 238)

the idea of acquisition of money, . . . purely as an end in itself, *in psychological terms*, we may understand it as the pleasure of the individual in his powerful activity . . . pleasure in powerful activity is in no way religiously determined; it is directly connected with the powerful activity itself.” (Anyone may read for themselves on page 240, *op. cit.*, his findings—which are on the same sort of level—on the “psychogenesis” of the sense of duty in general, and of the sense of duty toward the calling in particular that, according to him, came about because “the idea of fulfilment of the calling had a higher validity than the idea of neglecting the activity of the calling,” in other words, almost exactly as poverty comes from lack of money. My critic is quite right: these adages are not worthy of the name of “abstractions” and “psychological schemata” that I attributed to them. They are nothing but a harmless playing around with definitions, from which further deductions are made, irrespective of whether the point of the phenomenon “defined” in this way is lost in the process—as I have shown in my reply as far as it seemed necessary to do so.

If he now in all seriousness wishes to present such generalizations of imprecisely reproduced mundane trivialities as “historical *psychology*, ” then all psychologists worthy of the name will probably have to smile, just as we economists [*Nationalökonomien*]<sup>3</sup> can only smile at the quotation of the words of John Stuart Mill (no doubt “excellent” in their day but now surely somewhat out-of-date) on the historical rise of the importance of money (arising from the supposedly original idea of money as a “means to happiness”). I must confess that I have neither tried to “refute” these words nor have I so far felt tempted to do so. If in the final sentence of my reply I spoke specifically of exact research into religious *pathology*—but not simply, as the critic alleges, research into hysteria [6]—as perhaps being significant sometime in the future, I was merely hinting at something that any informed person knows, namely, that in spite of all its imperfections and tendency to jump to conclusions, the “psychology of religion” which deals with the “experienced” and irrational aspects of the religious process and treats them as a “pathological process” is likely to do *more* in the future (and occasionally has *already* done more) for the explanation of the relevant “*characterological*” effects of certain kinds of piety than the work of “ordinary” theologians *can* achieve. *These*, however, are of course precisely the kind of questions that are relevant to *my* problems. Naturally, I have no intention whatever of trespassing on the territory of genuine “*exact normal psychology*” [*Normalpsychologie*]. “Psychology” of the type represented by my critic’s

exposition, on the other hand, can, it seems to me, at best only provide a well-merited opportunity for him to show his ignorance in this area.

I would scarcely have dwelt so long on these matters if it did not appear here once more how a superstitious belief that “psychology” has a quite specific meaning for history, a belief that is, I am happy to say, *no longer* shared by the most eminent psychologists themselves, is inclined on the one hand to prejudice the impartiality of historical research, and on the other hand virtually to discredit scientific psychology (for which I have the greatest respect in *its own field*), and to make the historian suspicious of its help *even* in those circumstances—which are not unusual—where he would be well advised to have recourse to it. I, too, could not help laughing at the supposedly “psychologically” based “historical laws” of a man as distinguished in his own field as *Wundt*—and I believe I had every right to do so. And we unfortunately know (I shall return to this later) what happened when a writer who once gave us “*Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im Mittelalter*”<sup>4</sup> attempted to utilize for history this so-called psychology (and subsequently an assortment of other kinds of psychology of varying origins).

The findings of specialized psychology can occasionally be of relevance for history in *exactly* the same sense as those of astronomy, sociology, chemistry, jurisprudence, theology, engineering, anthropology, etc., etc. There is a popular view that because history is concerned with “intellectual processes,” it must *therefore*—as people believe and as the fashionable common expression has it—“arise from psychological presuppositions.” The conclusion is then drawn that history must rest to a particularly unique degree on “psychology” as a specialized discipline *like any other*. This assumption is no more tenable than the assumption that because the great deeds of “historical personalities” are today tied without exception to the “medium” of sound waves or ink, acoustics and the physics of liquids are the sciences that underlie them, or because history takes place on the planet Earth, the relevant science should be astronomy; or, because history is about people, anthropology. “I’m sorry,” history makes “general psychological assumptions” *only* in the same sense as, for example, it makes general “astronomical assumptions.” Anyone who has not at least thought through this series of seeming “paradoxes” does not have the right to get on his high horse and pontificate pedantically about “epistemology” or “methodology.” And if my critic, from his lofty perch, imagines that he can emphasize the



“higher standards” that he has applied to his “criticism” (as compared with the lower ones that I have applied to the methodology of my work), then I regret to say that I must refer him to my earlier comment that the “standards” that he applies to *himself*, from the standpoint of method as well, do in fact fall below those that *any* criticized writer must demand from a “critique.” If in his forthcoming book he would be so good as to provide us with writings that actually relate to his area of expertise, instead of rapping others over the knuckles for what they have to say about areas with which he is *not* sufficiently familiar, then, however substantial the difference of views, he could be assured of a most ready hearing and a more respectful reception than has been possible in this case, I regret to say, after the way in which he has been arguing. Formal “courtesy” is not necessarily incompatible with arrogance in matters of fact. And, by the way, *even* the words of *praise* that my critic saw fit to include in his “critique” [7] were not without arrogance. I will not accept even these words from a man who is incompetent. I should add that in this I go along with the great G. F. Knapp, who in a similar situation once said: “I certainly do not like to read in print that I am an ass. But I am not pleased either if someone feels it necessary to write that I am *not* an ass.”

## WEBER'S NOTES

1) In historical life, everything—or nothing—can be said to be “adapted” to everything else, if that concept is not precisely defined. Mormonism is “adapted” to the economic “conditions” of Utah, just as the forms of life [*Lebensformen*] of the other states of the Rocky Mountains would be; the Jesuit state in Paraguay was adapted to the primeval forest there, just as the life of the Indians was before and after it; the economic conduct of life of the Skoptsy, Stundists, and other sectarians in Russia is adapted to the conditions of existence there, as is the way of life of the neighboring Orthodox Mushiks, despite the quite marked differences between all three. Calvin’s theocracy, when it was created, was *not* adapted to the economic conditions in Geneva, if we consider the economic *decline* (or the striking, but easily explicable, stagnation) that followed it. And so on and so forth. Indeed, I could formulate the theme of my investigations as an attempt to answer the question: In *what sense* can one speak of “adaptation” (of the various cultural elements to each other) in these contexts?

2) The tension between economic *form* and ethical style of life—tension that resulted from the absence of the “ethic of the calling” (in my sense of the word)—had consequences for the character of the Florentine bourgeoisie [*Bürgertum*] which have been analyzed by a highly sensitive art historian right down to the distinctive characteristics [*Eigenart*] of the artistic motives.

One simply must *know* these (and a good many other) historical problems and facts before attempting, as my critic does, casually to make the suggestion (N. B.!: this was once again *factual* in character) that the methodical conduct of life had “of course” (!) “appeared in the human race” before the advent of Puritanism. Would he kindly tell me where? And of what kind it was? For it should be clear by now that *I* am speaking of “methodical conduct of life” as a component of the modern “ethic of the calling” in the sense (analyzed over dozens of pages in my essays) in which it has influenced life. I am not talking about the “method” [*Methodik*] of (for example) the Japanese samurai, nor of the “Cortigiano,” nor of the chivalrous medieval concept of honor, nor of the Stoics, nor of the “objective treatment” of life in the attitudes of the Renaissance in the

sense in which Burckhardt coined this term, and not even of certain ideas (which in *this* respect are close to Puritanism) of Bacon, who stands midway between the influences of the Renaissance and the Reformation, nor, finally, of the Counter-Reformation. All of these had their specific “method,” and therefore elements of *all* of them have entered the style of life of leading modern nations (I shall be speaking of some of these in due course). But—and I have already *explicitly* stressed this for one case closely related to my theme—they are rationalizations of life of a quite *different* orientation and *sense* from those with which I have been concerned.

3) The reason why I am not yet in a position to publish them lies not in any material factors. It is partly to be found in personal circumstances of no general interest, is partly related to some quite different works of mine (as anyone who has taken the trouble to glance at the *Archiv* will know), and is partly to be found in the fact that my colleague and friend E. Troeltsch has since brought his own brilliant insights to bear on a whole series of problems that I was planning to deal with, and I wished to avoid any unnecessary duplication of work in an area in which he had by far the greater expertise. In the current year, however, I hope to get around to this work and by the spring to be able to revise at least the essays for a separate edition.<sup>5</sup> Undoubtedly, the delay has had, and continues to have, the disadvantage that superficial readers might be tempted to regard these articles as finished pieces of work. This is, of course, *no* excuse at all for the kind of “criticism” with which I am concerned *here*. My critic had every right to say: the counterarguments and more detailed interpretation, *which have been promised*, are *still* lacking. But to impute to me an “idealist” construction of history [*Geschichtskonstruktion*] which I have fundamentally denied, and now even to assert explicitly that I was not *aware* of these problems, is more than I am prepared to take—especially from someone who is completely lacking in competence in the field.

4) Although I immediately recognized the author’s ignorance of the sources, I recommended acceptance of the “critique” to my joint editors, because a number of individual comments and apparent difficulties were touched on in it. I well remembered having debated these points at the time *in my head*, but recommended publication in order to make use of the opportunity to discuss them, believing that I had not included such a discussion in my essays. I was not

a little astonished, but not at all pleased, to discover, on rereading my essays, that *all* these matters were quite clearly contained in them and put into their context. The “critic,” uncritically and through lack of understanding, had ignorantly wrenched them out of context, and held them against me as “objections.” I regret not having spared the “*Archiv*” and its readers the burden of this worthless discussion, which—once it had been accepted—then obliged me after all to engage in a lengthy disentanglement of the confusion which had been caused. If the “critique” had been published elsewhere, I should not have deemed it worthy of a reply.<sup>6</sup>

5) He claims that Sombart, too, has been “challenged.” The proof is provided by a quotation from one of those reviews, equally dubious in both content and form, which Hans Delbrück is wont to devote to Sombart in the “*Preußische Jahrbücher*.” Now, it so happens that this is the section of Sombart’s exposition—the explanation of the significance and the technique of calculability [*Rechenhaftigkeit*]<sup>6</sup>—that is undoubtedly the least controversial, and for myself I regard it as absolutely accurate in the vital points, bearing in mind Sombart’s theme, namely, the origin of significant modern capitalist economic forms.

Of course, the fully developed trades [*Handwerk*] did bring with them a certain degree of “rationalization” of economic activity [*Wirtschaften*], and the *ancient* forms of capitalist business, which go back to the earliest millennia of human history, did bring with them a certain degree of “calculability.” The question remains as to *why* “calculability” in those (quantitatively) at times immensely highly developed capitalist economic forms of antiquity remained so far *below* what it was in those of the early modern period that Sombart can rightly speak not only of the existence of individual capitalist *businesses*—there is evidence of these four thousand years ago—but also of the existence of “capitalism” as an economic stage. The question will have to be discussed elsewhere. It goes without saying that for *his* problematic, Sombart designates *technical* “calculability” as the decisive feature of the “spirit of capitalism.” For my problematic [*Fragestellung*], which is concerned with the rise of that ethical “style of life” which was spiritually “adequate” to the economic stage of “capitalism” and which signified capitalism’s victory in the “soul” of man, I believe my terminology is justified. Other features of the phenomena which are being investigated by both of us from different approaches necessarily come into

consideration for me. It is, then, a question of terminological differences, and not—at least not on my part—of differences of substance. In particular, as far as I can see, there are *no* differences whatsoever with regard to our respective attitudes toward historical materialism. It is not *my* fault if others have exaggerated the significance of my remarks for the weight they give to “ideological” causal factors. It is perfectly possible that when my investigations are finally completed, I may, just for a change, be accused with equal indignation of capitulating to historical materialism, instead of, as now, to ideological factors.

6) I *did* mention this in a quite *different* connection (with regard to certain phenomena in Pietism)! It really is a bit rich to conduct a polemic against me in this matter. After I had pointed out to my critic that his remarks on the “hysterical conditions” [*hysterische Zustände*] among the Baptists arose from a quite evident misunderstanding, he still comes back with the claim that I “admitted” that I was expecting research into *hysteria* to shed light on the Baptist phenomena. This claim is implicit in the “amusing” question whether this research was supposed to offer assistance in explaining the rise of the “methodical conduct of life.”

My answer to this is:

(1) I have quite simply “admitted” *nothing* that has not already appeared in my essay.

(2) My critic has not taken the trouble to as much as check on *what* I declared that I was particularly expecting (or not expecting) from research into hysteria. We can see that “the chain of unfortunate misunderstandings” seems never ending—and for the same reason now as before.

(7) Incidentally, the fact that such epithets as “thorough” were attributed—“at that time!”—to an essay which has—“now!”—failed to “see” the simplest causal problems, does not say much for either the specialist *knowledge*, or,

unfortunately, for the *objectivity* of the author.

### EDITORS' NOTES

[1](#) Max Weber, “Bemerkungen zu der vorstehenden “Replik,” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 26 (1908), pp. 275-83.

[2](#) Echoing Mephistopheles' cynical advice to the student in Goethe's *Faust*, part 1, *Scene in Faust's Study*: “Im ganzen haltet Euch an Worte! . . . Denn eben wo Begriffe fehlen, / Da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein.” (In the main rely on words! . . . For if ideas are what you lack / Just pick a word to fill the gap.) Translation by the editors.

[3](#) *Nationalökonomie* was a distinctive German tradition of economics that, unlike British political economy, emphasized the centrality of “human need.” For the term and its context, see Keith Tribe, “Introduction” to Keith Tribe (ed.), *Reading Weber* (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 1-14, at pp. 4-5.

[4](#) Karl Gottfried Lamprecht: *Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im Mittelalter* (*German Economic Life in the Middle Ages*), 4 volumes (Leipzig: 1885-86).

[5](#) As things turned out, Weber postponed his revisions until the summer of 1919.

[6](#) Notwithstanding this protestation, Weber did respond at length to a critique that was published “elsewhere” (that is, in a journal other than the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*): Felix Rachfahl's appraisals in the *Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik*. Weber's rejoinders are translated on pp. 244-339 of this volume.

## *Rebuttal of the Critique of the “Spirit” of Capitalism*<sup>1</sup>

*Editors’ Preface:* Felix Rachfahl,<sup>2</sup> professor of history at the University of Kiel, provoked Weber’s fiercest defense of *The Protestant Ethic*. In two essays written in 1909 and 1910,<sup>3</sup> Rachfahl criticized Weber’s argument on a number of grounds. A key objection was that the concept of the capitalist “spirit” was both too broad and too narrow. It was too broad in supposing a clear distinction between traditional subsistence economies (and their corresponding attitudes toward work) and capitalist ones. It was too narrow in its focus on work: concern for family, striving for luxury, honor, and power are also central to the capitalist spirit. Besides, Rachfahl continues, there is a danger in Weber’s analysis that the capitalist spirit will look more “ethical” than in fact it was and is. While some successful entrepreneurs may have had qualms about eating oysters (one of Weber’s illustrations in *The Protestant Ethic*), many others have consumed such culinary luxuries with gusto, indicating no particular relationship between the spirit of capitalism and a guilty conscience. On the contrary, an entrepreneur may have a strong *Berufsethik* while engaging in conduct that cannot be described as moral in the accepted sense of the word. Weber’s “ideal type” analysis has led him astray; Rachfahl purports to stick to historical realities.

Another criticism that Rachfahl leveled at Weber concerned the discussion of asceticism in *The Protestant Ethic*. Rachfahl denies the continuity between monastic asceticism and its Protestant successor, but he also questions the plausibility of depicting asceticism (Catholic or Protestant) as “rational.” Rachfahl also takes issue with Weber (and Weber’s friend and colleague Ernst Troeltsch) on other empirical claims. Among Rachfahl’s counterassertions are that Dutch capitalism owed little to Calvinism; that the link between Puritanism and the development of American capitalism is doubtful; and that Jacob Fugger is much more representative of the spirit of capitalism than Baxter. More generally, since capitalism preceded Puritanism, the latter cannot be said to be a cause of the former. Weber and Troeltsch have wildly overestimated the importance of religious motives in the emergence and trajectory of capitalism. Conversely, both scholars have underestimated the impact of toleration for capitalism’s growth. If capitalism was strongest in the Protestant lands of England and Holland, it was because the practice of toleration was strongest

there.

Weber's response to these accusations and counterclaims can be found below. They led Rachfahl to take up Weber's arguments once more. In his rejoinder of 1910, Rachfahl defends some of his own earlier views on toleration and asceticism, claims that Weber has misunderstood one of his own new sources, William Petty, and reaffirms the point, Weber's recent protestations notwithstanding, that Calvinism is at the center of the argument in *The Protestant Ethic*. In addition, Rachfahl continues to deconstruct Weber's notion of the "spirit" of capitalism. Far from caricaturing that concept, as Weber claims, Rachfahl argues that he has described it faithfully—and continues to chart its metamorphosis. To prove the point, Rachfahl offers the following précis: The capitalist spirit, according to Weber, is not the capitalist spirit per se but a particular species of it that only emerged in modern times under the influence of ascetic Protestantism. That species has coexisted with the older capitalist spirit. So the "spirit" of Weber's usage is a particular feature of the capitalist "spirit" more generally, a feature that Weber identifies with the rational conduct of life (*Lebensführung*). Yet Rachfahl discerns a problem. Weber has previously described that rational conduct of life as a constituent component of the capitalist spirit. What does this mean? Is it a component of equal rank among others unstated? Or is it the essential component? In any case, Weber clouds the historical issue of the spirit of capitalism by an idiosyncratic "ideal type" that excludes big financiers and others. It is as if Weber had said: "When I talk about a horse, I mean a gray, which is a horse in my sense." Even more confusingly, the "spirit" of capitalism now appears to be a mere "habitus" or disposition, whereas previously it amounted to something stronger: the potent presence of innerworldly asceticism.

As this summary has indicated, Rachfahl's critiques of 1909 and 1910 are aimed at Troeltsch as well as Weber.<sup>4</sup> Sometimes the two scholars are treated as collaborators that can be tarred with the same brush. At other times, Rachfahl drives a wedge between them, either by drawing on their somewhat different formulations or by claiming that Troeltsch is distancing himself from some of Weber's arguments. Weber found this argumentative tactic particularly infuriating.

Weber called the debate with Rachfahl sterile and worthless. A more dispassionate analysis shows something more fruitful. Weber's rebuttals led, firstly, to the redescription of key terms (notably, "the spirit of capitalism") and the introduction/emphasis of others (for instance, *Habitus* and *Lebensstil*).



Secondly, Weber's rejoinders show him now to be principally concerned with the nature of the Protestant *Berufsethik*, the "ethic of the calling," that helped shape the spirit of capitalism and thereby contributed to the development of a qualitatively new kind of human being. Thirdly, the replies to Rachfahl furnish an explicit account of Weber's methodological procedure (especially his "ideal type" approach to historical investigation) and offer a number of additional historical illustrations to support his argument; some of them were incorporated into the second draft of *The Protestant Ethic*, published in 1920.

Perhaps most intriguing of all, the debate prompted Weber not only to confront directly the counterfactual question of what would have happened to capitalism, as an economic system, if the capitalist "spirit" had been absent. It also directed him to recount the thought processes that eventuated in *The Protestant Ethic* and to describe the relationship of that essay to its companion text "*Churches*" and "*Sects*" in *North America*. For inciting this reconstruction, located in part two of the second rebuttal, we can be grateful to Felix Rachfahl. Weber, of course, felt differently. "Petty," "opinionated," "quibbling," and "smug" were just a few of the insults that he hurled at his adversary. And these were not the harshest.

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In the *Internationale Wochenschrift* (vol. 3, nos. 39-43, Sept. 25-Oct. 23, 1909), Professor Rachfahl has published a critique of my essays on *The Protestant Ethic and the "Spirit" of Capitalism* (vols. 20-21 of this journal, as well as vols. 25-26 and the article in *Christliche Welt*, 1906, pp. 558ff., 577ff.). [1] To the extent that the critique is incidentally directed against my friend E. Troeltsch, he will respond to this in the same journal. Even though it would be most natural and, for me, most sensible to do the same, I unfortunately do not feel able to do so, in spite of the high esteem in which I hold the editor, in particular for his work as head of the "Deutsche Literaturzeitung." In the case of a mere polemic such as this, I would, of course, as would E. Troeltsch, have overlooked the fact that the *Internationale Wochenschrift*, which was founded by F. Althoff, has certain editorial customs to which I would not be inclined to adapt. But the editor has chosen to leave it to the *sole* discretion of my colleague Troeltsch, who is only incidentally involved, as to whether he would like to reply to this article, which is directed almost entirely against *me*. I would, naturally, even be prepared to ignore this incivility—for that is what it is under the present circumstances. However, my esteemed critic has a habit of treating the two of us as a single unit, in order to make each of us responsible for the other—which has

the advantage that actual (or supposed) errors of the one appear to apply to the other too. Moreover, he cannot resist playing one of us off against the other when it suits him, so that the “Weber-Troeltsch” unit, which he posits as the embodiment of the views of the one and the other, appears to suffer from an evident inner conflict. In view of this (it must be said) somewhat underhand practice, it seems sensible to go my own way in external matters too, and expressly to disclaim any responsibility for what *I* did not say, just as Troeltsch would undoubtedly do as far as he is concerned.

If I may, I should like to add the following. Anyone who had properly read our respective essays knows that Troeltsch has absolutely no need of my findings for his purposes and propositions (quite apart from the concept of sects, which Rachfahl fails to mention at all—compare Archiv, vol. 21, pp. 63-64, note 1 [p. 169, note 200 in this volume], and the article in the Christliche Welt previously cited). His findings could be correct even if mine were wrong, and vice versa. He examines the historical process of the structure of the social doctrines of the Christian churches—I have so far only attempted to explain a particular phenomenon regarding the conduct of life [*Lebensführung*] of their members with regard to its (originally) religious determination. If he occasionally refers to my work [2], then this is always regarding matters which are peripheral to his concerns but which happen to coincide with mine. There is only one exception, namely, the question of church and sect, and this is not our concern here. And it is appropriate to emphasize strongly that absolutely no collaboration [Kollektiv-Arbeit], even of a latent kind, has occurred. My work on these matters, some of which I was lecturing on twelve years ago, was not (as Rachfahl, following Troeltsch, assumes) only inspired by Sombart’s “Kapitalismus” (see my emphatic remark in Archiv, vol. 20, p. 19, note 1 [p. 49, note 26 in this volume]). It may be that Troeltsch, who approached the topic that interested him by his own route a long time ago as well, may have been stimulated by individual comments in my essays to rethink a few of his problems from economic and sociological angles. Indeed, he has stated this from time to time. There is no question of one of us “taking over” the other one’s “theory.” It is simply this: anyone who considers these matters at all must arrive at a similar way of viewing them. It is therefore not surprising that Troeltsch’s findings in his far more comprehensive problem area should be such that the essential features of what I have set out in tackling my problem should complement his work. If I had extended my essay, I should have had the task of dealing with large sections of the area now being examined by Troeltsch. As a nontheologian, I should

assuredly never have been able to carry this out in a manner equal to that of Troeltsch. However, as far as my own early studies permit me to judge, I am aware of no significant points in which I would have had any reason to dispute his account. Least of all can I deduce any such reason from the trivialities that Rachfahl holds against him. But Troeltsch will of course have to take the responsibility as a scholar for what he has said in the face of criticism, just as exclusively as I must for my writings. I have only made these observations on Troeltsch's article in order that critics of the stamp of Rachfahl do not read into this division of responsibility a rejection of Troeltsch's findings on my part. But now to the matter in hand.

The distortions of Rachfahl's polemic begin with the first word of the title of his essay: "*Calvinism and Capitalism.*" From the very first occasion [3] that I mention Calvinism at all (to contrast it with Catholicism and Lutheranism), I speak in terms of complete equality of those *sects* (or sectlike formations within the Church) that I have drawn together in the title of the second chapter of my essay and throughout the chapter as "*ascetic Protestantism.*"

If I may make this point straight away: Rachfahl attacks at the greatest possible length the use of the word "asceticism" to describe the conduct of life that I have attempted to analyze. This is, in fact, the only point that *he himself* is still arguing for by the end of his curious "critique." And yet, at the beginning of his article (col. 1217, line 7), *he himself* evidently could not avoid using the same expression for the same thing. [4] We shall see, however, that he is happy to apply this double standard in his "critique"—after all, it is one thing for the "specialist" historian to make his pronouncements, but if the outsider, <sup>5</sup> who "fabricates" history, says the very same thing, then this is a different matter altogether! For him, asceticism is "flight from the world," and since Puritans (in the broad sense encompassing all the "ascetic" sects) were neither monks nor pursued the contemplative life, then that which I term "*innerworldly asceticism*" must ipso facto be a "false" concept, which wrongly implies an affinity with Catholic asceticism. I can scarcely imagine a more sterile polemic than one about *names*. I would happily exchange the *name* for any other that is more suitable. But unless we resolve to coin completely new words ad hoc on each occasion, or, like chemistry or Avenarius's philosophy, make use of formulas [5], we shall have to continue to employ the most obvious and most appropriate

words in traditional language, taking care to *define* them unambiguously—something which I believe I have done quite well enough with regard to “innerworldly asceticism” [*innerweltliche Askese*].

However, as far as the matter in hand is concerned (the inner affinity with Catholic asceticism), I might just mention that no less a man than Ritschl has gone so far in identifying the ascetic features (as *I* understand them) of “Pietism” (which he understands in a broad sense), with traces of “Catholicism” left behind within Protestantism, that I had to try to get him to *modify* his position. Rachfahl’s strictures would presumably apply equally to a contemporary of the Reformation like Sebastian Frank (justifiably cited by Troeltsch), who regarded it as one of the achievements of the Reformation that from now on not only monks by vocation [*Berufsmönche*], but *every man* must be a monk for his whole life—essentially the same as I have been saying.

Rachfahl would no doubt admonish us to recall that a monk is not allowed to take a wife, to earn money, or to cling to the things of the world in any way, and that therefore the term was highly inappropriate for a layman. But everyone knows that when we speak of “asceticism” *today* (whether it be in the sexual sphere in particular or in that of “indulgence” [*Lebensgenuss*] in general, or whether it concerns attitudes to aesthetic, or other “nonethical” values) we mean by it essentially conduct of life similar to that which the whole Puritan movement (*not* simply Calvinism but, even more, the Baptist movement and its allies) imposed upon itself.

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This was an ideal of life that was “spiritually” akin to those Protestant tendencies having *rational* forms of monastic asceticism—forms that functioned as *methodical* rules of life. The difference was simply that the “asceticism” had to function *within* the orders [*Ordnungen*] of the world: family, commercial life [*Erwerbsleben*], the community; consequently, its material demands have been correspondingly modified. I have dealt briefly, but, I believe, clearly enough with this matter as it applies to various spheres of life, not exclusively “commerce” to dispense with a repetition here. [6]

Even the *means* with which Protestant asceticism works run completely in parallel with monasticism, as I have commented (vol. 21, pp. 77ff [p. 106f. in this volume]). On the other hand, as I have also pointed out, it was precisely the asceticism of the monasteries that made possible their considerable economic achievements. I could have added that the rational ascetic sects, or sectlike formations, of the Middle Ages constantly exhibit quite similar features in the character of their bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] behavior, as do (in particular) the Baptist sects later and certain categories of Russian sects (not all!) right up to recent times. The notion that “old Protestantism” *as a whole* took over asceticism “from medieval Catholicism” [col. 1263] is one of the many foolish assertions that Rachfahl attributes to me. I have repeatedly emphasized how severely and uncompromisingly what I call the *nonascetic* “old Protestant” denominations such as the Lutheran, the Anglican, and others attacked those features analyzed by me as “justification by works” [*Werkheiligkeit*]*—*as they also attacked Catholic monasticism. Protestantism is very far from forming a united front in its attitude toward asceticism (as I understand asceticism). For the moment I can think of no better word than “ascetic” as a *common* description of the features of the groups in question as compared with Lutheranism, Anglicanism, and the less distinct kinds of churches in the Reformed tradition. These *common* distinctive features, however, are *present*. And the development of those “ascetic” groups is *just as much* a product of the processes collectively known as the “Reformation” as, for example, “Gnesio-Lutheranism,” the spirit of which (God knows) differed no less from the Luther of the 1520s than the “Calvinism” which interests me differed from the personal views of Calvin himself. *This is a point I have forcefully stressed* [6a], and, as on almost every occasion, have despite this—or perhaps because of it—been lectured on it by Rachfahl.

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What kind of a “historian” is it who, for the simple reason that an immensely important phenomenon (he does concede its importance), namely, the Puritan commercial ethic (because it is not “ethical” [cols. 1250, 1324] and he has an *antipathy* toward it) does not fit into the *conceptual* schema he has devised for the development of the Protestant ethic as it really *should* have been (for *this* is what it is really all about), what kind of a “historian” is it, I say, that now labels

this phenomenon (N. B.! the phenomenon *itself*, not my description of it) with *value judgments* such as “distortion” and the like? [7] What kind of a “methodologist” is it that (col. 1294) puts forward the curious proposition that the existence in England of the capitalist spirit could be “*understood* without this (religious) factor,” although “we do not wish to deny its influence *in any way*.” So: this is a “factor” that was causally important for a certain context, but one which the “*historian*” can leave aside as irrelevant if he wishes to understand that context. Instead of “understand,” we could equally well say “construct.” We can then see in Rachfahl, with his fierce professional pride directed against the “fabricators of history” [*Geschichtskonstrukteure*] from outside the profession, an “ideal type” of what commonly befalls historians when they unwittingly employ *undefined concepts*, full of prejudices and value judgments.

There is no approved concept of “asceticism.” [8] I freely admit that the concept can be understood in a far broader sense than that in which I used it when I compared the conduct of life that I termed “*innerworldly*” asceticism with the “*otherworldly*”<sup>6</sup> asceticism of monasticism. When speaking of Catholic asceticism, I refer *expressly* to *rationalized* asceticism (its most potent form is seen in the Jesuit order) in *contrast to* (for example) “unplanned flight from the world” (on the part of Catholics) and mere emotional “asceticism” (on the part of Protestants). My concept is therefore one that clearly *differs* from that of Troeltsch, as any person with any degree of goodwill—even Rachfahl—must see. And he *has* “seen” it. He even speaks [9] of “*fundamental*” differences between our respective views. But he is still quite happy to operate with a “Troeltsch-Weber” concept of asceticism, when it suits him to do so, and then to refute it by assembling all kinds of different concepts of “asceticism” from other authors, which may well be appropriate for *their* purposes, but are not so for mine.

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At the beginning of my first essay (vol. 20, p. 35 [p. 27f. in this volume]), I argued at length that one could consider the “rationalization” of life from very different points of view, and could therefore understand it in very different ways, a point that I have repeatedly emphasized (vol. 26, p. 278 [p. 239f. in this volume]). In spite of this (or perhaps because of it), Rachfahl even raises the

point as an “objection” (col. 1263), although here, too, as he well knows, what I understand by it for *my* purposes had been fully explained. I confess that I regard this kind of discussion as rather pointless and find it a bit much for a writer who thrives to such an extent on the confusion provoked by mere *linguistic* “criticism” to express the fear that my well-defined, ad hoc linguistic creations could “blur fundamental distinctions.” I defy anyone to extract anything positive from Rachfahl’s confused argument. One is left wondering where these “fundamental” distinctions are to be found?

Let us, however, return to our starting point. Rachfahl’s quite arbitrary restriction of the topic to “Calvinism” persists for almost the whole of his argument against me. [10] He begins straight away by basing his polemic upon this point (col. 1217), and at numerous places in the essays the same distortion of the subject of the discussion recurs. Indeed, the only serious argument used against me would not be possible without it.

Let us deal with this argument first. Rachfahl is convinced of the paramount role played by “*toleration*” as such in economic development. Now, as anyone who has read my essays will know, I have no argument with him on this point, indeed, I myself have mentioned these matters (vol. 21, p. 42, note 1 [p. 155, note 146 in this volume]), although they are not really relevant in detail to my argument at this stage. But the decisive point here is that although under the circumstances of the time undoubtedly any kind of toleration inevitably played its part in “populating the country,” and importing *wealth* and trade from abroad, *this* aspect of the question does not interest me. What was evidently important for the development of the *disposition* [*Habitus*] that I (ad hoc and purely for my own purposes) dubbed the “capitalist spirit” was the question of *who benefited from the toleration in the specific case*.

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If the beneficiaries were (for example) the Jews or (in the sense of the word used by me—vol. 21, pp. 28f. [p. 81f. in this volume]) “ascetic” Christian denominations, *then* toleration regularly tended to promote the dissemination of this “spirit”—but of course this effect was not simply a result of “toleration” as

such. Furthermore, the *degree* of “toleration” is, in general, far from being the determining factor for the development of the “capitalist spirit” (as ever, using the term in my sense). Conversely, it is a well-known fact (compare vol. 20, p. 5 [p. 4 in this volume]) that *incomplete* toleration (especially the systematic exclusion of religious minorities from the enjoyment of equal rights in state and society) has been shown to have the effect of driving those so deprived [*Deklassierten*] with particular force along the path of economic activity. Accordingly, it is the “churches under the cross” that seem to be most deeply involved. This very point is made strongly by Sir William Petty (*Political Arithmetick*, London, 1691, p. 26), quoted by Rachfahl. Petty says that it is always the heterodox that run “commercial life,” and in particular in the countries dominated by the Roman Church, “three-quarters” of the commerce is in the hands of heretics.

Now, however—and this is the clinching argument—we are confronted by the *fact* that disenfranchised or at least disadvantaged *Catholic* minorities—as I was quick to emphasize (vol. 20, p. 6 [pp. 4-5 in this volume])—have not *to the present day* [11] exhibited this phenomenon *anywhere* in any unambiguous way, and that this phenomenon cannot anywhere be observed even among Lutheran minorities in the way that it can among the “ascetic” denominations —while, on the other hand, Calvinist, Quaker, and Baptist strata, which are by no means always in a minority but may equally well be *dominant*, generally demonstrate the qualities that are normally characteristic of this kind of economic behavior and conduct of life. Where “ascetic” Protestant denominations competed on level terms with other Christian denominations, the rule was that the former were more prominent in commercial life. Right up until the most recent generation, the conduct of life of the “Reformed” people in the classical old industrial region of Wuppertal was fundamentally different from that of the rest, and the areas in which they differed were *precisely those that concern us here*. The business activity of the “man of the calling,” together with what I (ad hoc) called “ascetic compulsion to save,” differed sharply and conspicuously in the case of the Reformed and Pietist groups (Pietism is of Reformed origin) despite all Rachfahl’s ad hoc invented “morality common to all Christians,” as anyone from that part of the country will confirm.

Incomplete though my efforts undoubtedly were, the entire essence of that



conduct of life corresponded so closely to what I said about it that a wide range of people from that background themselves assured me directly that with the knowledge of these historical antecedents, they now completely understood the specific character of their own traditions for the first time.

And when (to mention another point) Rachfahl points to Lutheran Hamburg as a place where the “capitalist spirit” has continually flourished *without* help from “ascetic” Protestant influences, I can only refer to a letter from my colleague Adalbert Wahl of Hamburg. According to him, in typical contrast to conditions he used to be familiar with in the Reformed city of Basel, with its thrifty accumulation of old patrician wealth, in Hamburg *none* of the wealthy families, even those regarded as having ancient inherited wealth, went back as far as the seventeenth century. The *single* exception was one well-known *Reformed* family. I could add more evidence from many similar personal communications from other sources, regarding the position of Baptists and others, but that will suffice. As I should like to emphasize, my crucial “thesis” regarding the significance of the “calling” was “new” only in the manner of its presentation. In matters of substance, that preeminent contemporary, Sir William Petty, who is well known to Rachfahl (and whom he evidently acknowledges as an authority, since he sees fit to use his arguments on the economic blessings of toleration—wrongly, as we see—*against* me), is still correct when he writes *only two pages earlier* (pp. 23-24) about the *reasons* why toleration (especially in Holland, the country where his interest lies) had such a favorable influence on “business”: “I now come to the first policy of the Dutch, viz.: liberty of Conscience . . . dissenters of this kind”—meaning those carrying on the Dutch struggle for freedom, primarily Calvinists—“are for the most part thinking, sober, and patient Men, and such as believe *that Labor and Industry is their Duty towards God* (How erroneous soever their Opinions be).” [12] It now seems to me that the passage is so close to one of the fundamental theses of my essay that the latter must appear as a piece of *plagiarism against Petty* [13] (albeit an unconscious one). I could therefore leave it to the reader to choose between the authority of Petty and that of modern critics. [14] I could then drop out of this discussion altogether. I would do this all the more willingly, since I must also admit that Groen van Prinsterer, a writer who, with the greatest respect to Rachfahl, should be credited with a more thorough and original knowledge of the character of his Dutch homeland, has from time to time said essentially the same thing about the reasons for wealth creation there (ratio of—relatively!—low consumption to earnings) as I have.

The following section of the passage in Petty then elucidates a further point that Rachfahl has made the subject of one of the many pseudo-controversies with which his essay is teeming: “These people” (that is, the Puritan dissenters) “believing the Justice of God, and seeing the most Licentious persons to enjoy most of the world and its best things, will never venture to be of the same religion and profession with voluptuaries and Men of extreme Wealth and Power, who they think have their portion in this World.”

It is *not* the really big concessionaires and tycoons: the economic “supermen,” but their *adversaries*: the considerably broader strata of the *rising middle classes* [*bürgerlicher aufsteigender Mittelstände*] that were the typical exemplars of the Puritan attitude to life—as I, for my part, have stated most emphatically, and, although Rachfahl knows this (indeed, he quotes it), he still continues to hold it against me as an “objection” whenever it suits him. [15] Petty’s remarks, taken together with the previously quoted passage, are an excellent illustration of the (apparently!) paradoxical attitude of “Protestant asceticism” toward wealth (in my sense of the word). This corresponds very well with what I had deduced from other sources, and especially from the principles of the ascetic denominations (which are even today still having their effect). Wealth as such, as the source of the greed for pleasure and power, is not only *a* danger, but *the* danger, and the striving for earthly possessions is (and I could quote any number of examples) in itself simply reprehensible: Petty says the same thing. And yet, Petty himself had just presented the “industry” of these elements (which were so *hostile* toward rich people and toward wealth) as a particularly important source of wealth creation, and stressed that they comprise the overwhelming proportion of the business community. Again, this is precisely what I have done myself.

Anyone who is familiar with my essays will be aware of how easily the seeming paradox can be resolved. Even Rachfahl knows this, although the manner in which he reproduces my argument is odd in the extreme. [16] He is well acquainted with my quite extensive work on the relationship of Puritans (in the broadest sense of the word) to commerce, a relationship which is, admittedly, strange and hard for modern man to conceive of without suspicion of hypocrisy and self-delusion, but for those who had to find a bridge between *this* world and that which is to come by no means all that “complicated.” He also knows the

sharp *distinction* I have made between this and the disposition [*Habitus*] that finds expression in Fugger's phrase, quoted by Sombart. [16a] Similarly, he knows that I expressly stated that the whole *type* represented by the great Italian, German, English, Dutch, and overseas financiers is simply a type that has always existed, as I have to keep repeating [17], *from as far back as our knowledge of history extends*. The nature of this type has *none* of the characteristics of the "early capitalism" of the modern age [*Neuzeit*]; indeed, "early capitalism" contrasts in the sharpest possible manner with those of its features that I was most anxious to reveal, because they are so easy to miss and yet are among the most important. But this exact knowledge of my intentions does not prevent Rachfahl from pointing, as though it were an argument against me, to that type of capitalist who lacks the features that I have called "ascetic," and which, as he should be aware, has been known since the time of the pharaohs. One can read in my essays with the utmost clarity that I am not concerned with this type, thus, for example, in Holland [18], *not* with the universally known type of businessman who is "greedy for gain," and who (*and it should be noted that I quoted this myself*) [18a]: "would go through hell for the sake of profit, even if it meant getting his sails singed." Despite this, he *still* puts the question to me whether *this* is not the "true" capitalist spirit? I scarcely need to provide an answer for anyone who has *read* my essays. The same thing applies when Rachfahl's zeal is turned toward the search for any regions where there has been a powerful development of a capitalist economy, in which, however, "Protestant asceticism" did *not* play a decisive role (actual or alleged), or in which conversely it did play such a role without a large-scale capitalist economy becoming established. We have already discussed the details of this criticism. I have already repeatedly spoken at length about this, but am happy to go into it again, if necessary. For we may have arrived at a point where it seems possible for our respective points of view to confront each other.

I say "*seems*," for in truth it has to be said that Rachfahl does not have *any* point of view of his own that one could argue with. Arguing with him is like shadowboxing. One asks oneself in vain what his peculiar onslaught against me, which goes on for five sections, is supposed to have achieved, when he himself finally announces the result, namely, that he would have to "concede that the religious factor discussed by me (col. 1349) is of great significance for the development of economic conditions." But he goes on to say that he would "not expect to find this significance in quite the same area" or—conceding a further point here—"at least not exclusively in the same area" as I am supposed to have

done—although I am at a loss to know where I am supposed to have done this. He goes on to say that the ethic of the calling characteristic of the Reformation was “*undoubtedly*” one of the elements which drove economic development (he even uses the expression “one of its motivating forces”), while (erroneously—see above) maintaining that I had first analyzed it in this sense. His only reservation with any substance concerns the *description* (much criticized by him in his article) of this ethic of the calling [*Berufsethik*] as “ascetic”—which we have already discussed. I could be perfectly satisfied with these admissions by my severe critic [*Herr Zensor*], since I myself had stressed with the greatest possible force that it never entered my head to assume any more than the mere presence of this “*motive force*.”

Important though this task is, I have not in fact attempted to discover “in detail” (as Rachfahl would like me to) to what extent this motive force, in comparison with other elements, has actually worked in the adequate direction. Such a task would, of course, have to be tackled for each individual country separately, and would not be an easy one. [19] One quite useless proposal of Rachfahl’s is that I compile some kind of table of statistics. My opinion would be shared by anyone who knows from personal experience what unbelievable difficulties mount up when one tries to *measure*, on a living subject, the import of a certain “philosophical” [*weltanschauungsmässigen*] motive, even though its existence and effectiveness may be beyond doubt. [20] The task I chose—it is described with the greatest possible clarity in my essay—was first of all to establish, not *where* and how strongly, but *how*, through what process of spiritual [*seelisch*] motivation, certain forms of the Protestant faith were enabled to have the effect that even Rachfahl admits they had. I *illustrated* the effect by citing a number of examples, otherwise—as there was nothing “new” about it—I assumed that it was generally known. Rachfahl also, like me, takes it for granted as an *undoubted fact* (col. 1265, top) [21]—which makes the following remark all the more curious [22] (and not just for the nonhistorian!), for he goes on to say that the next task is to demonstrate the existence of these connections—having just told us that their existence is beyond doubt. Speaking of *this* “task”—one that, as I have said, I never set myself—Rachfahl then declares that I had made it “easy” for myself. I must wait to see if the readers have the impression that I made the task that I *really* had in mind too “easy” for myself.

In light of what one can only call these really arrogant remarks, the question arises as to how “hard” this demanding critic has made this task for *himself*—a task which I, he alleges, have failed to accomplish. And in view of the fact that in all of his five sections he has contributed *precisely nothing* (or can anyone think of anything?) on the subject of the relationship between Calvinism (and Rachfahl speaks only of this) and capitalism that could not already be found in my essay, I hardly need to answer this question. There remains nothing further for me to say on the matter other than the simple, but admittedly demanding, request to any interested parties that they should now—*after* Rachfahl’s “critique”—take up my essays once more and read them (as Rachfahl presumptuously failed to do) *in their entirety*. Certain things will then become clear: (1) In my essay, I myself dismissed as “foolish” the suggestion that it was possible to simply derive the capitalist *economic system* from religious motives, or from the ethic of the calling associated with “ascetic” Protestantism (as I have called it). I went into great detail, and indeed stressed as virtually the *foundation* of my problematic [*Problemstellung*], that at different times there has been *both* the “capitalist spirit” *without* a capitalist *economy* (Franklin) *and* the reverse (all of which Rachfahl quotes himself, but, whenever it suits him, immediately forgets again, only to produce the same argument as an “objection” *against* me). [22a] (2) It never occurred to me to *identify* those “ascetic” motives that in my view were religious in origin with the capitalist “spirit” (as Rachfahl tries to persuade his readers from start to finish, indeed as early as his résumé of my essays, col. 1219). On the contrary, I maintain only (vol. 21, p. 107 [p. 120 in this volume]) that they were *one* constituent part of this “spirit” (and indeed of *further* modern forms of culture as well) *alongside others* (something which, as I have said, Rachfahl himself, after much to-ing and fro-ing, finally admits). (3) I have expressed myself so unambiguously on the relationship of the so-called *acquisitive drive* [*Erwerbstrieb*] to the “capitalist spirit” that Rachfahl’s remarks on this point are only further proof that he is *either* disinclined to conduct a controversy with the goodwill that assumes *any* good sense in his opponent’s argument (let alone the best possible sense), *or* that at the moment of writing his “critique” he can no longer remember what the work he is criticizing says.

We may leave aside the question of whether one should apply the general term “acquisitive drive” [*Erwerbstrieb*], which is taken from a very much outdated form of “psychology,” at all to the varied psychological [*psychischen*] facts underlying the striving for money and wealth. The term is certainly not indispensable. This so-called drive [*Trieb*], *especially* in the *compulsive*

[*triebhafter*], irrational, unbridled form, may be found on a huge scale in all stages of cultural development and in all social strata: in the Neapolitan “barcaiuolo,” the ancient and modern Oriental trader, the “respectable” Tirolean landlord, the “impoverished” farmer, or the African chief. By contrast, it *cannot* be found in this naive and compulsive form in the “type” of the Puritan or in a man like Franklin, with his strictly “respectable” [*respektabel*] ideas. This is one of the most distinctive starting points of my thesis, and I was entitled to expect that it would not be forgotten by (of all people) a man who intended to “criticize” it. To repeat once again: wherever large-scale capitalist development has taken place, in distant antiquity or in our own days, that type of unscrupulous moneymaker has existed, whether in the exploitation of the Roman provinces, in the plunder colonies [*Raubkolonien*] of the Italian maritime cities and the worldwide speculations of the Florentine patrons, in the plantations of the slave owners and the gold fields all over the world, in the American railways, the practices of the grand princes in the Far East, or the similarly worldwide speculations of the City [of London] “Imperialists.” The difference lies in the technical means and opportunities, *not* in the *psychology* of acquisitiveness. Since few people are likely to challenge them, Rachfahl need not have bothered to express such astounding verities as that the striving for “happiness,” for “benefit,” “enjoyment,” “honor,” “power,” “the future of one’s descendants,” and the like were, in all places and at all times, involved, in different combinations, in arousing the striving for the highest possible level of profit. [23] I have only mentioned these motives where they *appeared to conflict* with the ascetic “ethic of the calling” (my particular interest). [23a] When I did mention them, however, I did so with emphasis.

Equally blindingly obvious is Rachfahl’s statement that psychological links exist between all the other kinds of inner relationship with acquisitiveness and the one with which I am concerned, and that the motive described by me “in isolation” [24] could not in reality be “completely detached,” was normally “combined with others,” and “even today” could not be completely . . . etc., etc. [25] This probably applies to every possible motive of human action, and in the case of an attempt to represent the *specific* effects of one particular motive, it has never yet prevented anyone from analyzing the motive in the greatest possible “isolation” and internal consistency. I would advise anyone who has no interest in all this “psychology,” and is interested only in the external forms of economic *systems*, to leave my essays unread, but then to have the courtesy to leave it to *me* whether I wish to pursue an interest in this psychological aspect of modern

economic development, an aspect which is revealed by the great inner tensions and conflicts between “calling,” “life” (as we like to say today), and “ethic,” which were in a stage of equilibrium such as has never existed before or since.

All this took place in an area where the traditions of antiquity and the Middle Ages pointed in a different direction, while today we live in a state of renewed tensions which—far beyond the limitations of the sphere I have selected—are developing into cultural problems of a magnitude known only to our modern world [*bürgerliche Welt*]. It is simply not correct for Rachfahl to declare airily—and, incidentally, as throughout his polemic, in flagrant contradiction to his own aforementioned admissions at the end of his “critique”—that the “ethic of the calling” familiar to the “ascetic” followers of Protestantism (as I understand them) had already been dominant in the Middle Ages. Regarding the contrast with the Middle Ages, the more external points such as Church doctrine on “usury” are by no means decisive for me, as anyone who has read my essays will know, whereas, on the other hand, Rachfahl’s remarks on the subject are classic examples of his total lack of comprehension of the subject matter of these problems. Let us listen to his words: “And if a capitalist really felt so troubled by this (prohibition of interest) that he thought he had to *soothe* his conscience with pious foundations—is that not precisely a proof that his *basic philosophy* was antitraditional? For the *acquisitive drive* was so powerful in him *that he did not even need the vehicle of a religious ethic, as the later Protestant ascetics did, to feel driven to making money . . .*” (col. 1300). [26] The “acquisitive drive” of all those founders and speculators who “operate on the fringes of criminality” to earn their millions, the “acquisitive instinct” of the waiter in the Riviera holiday resorts, who has been trained to shamelessly and routinely cheat his guests by falsifying the bill, needs far less an “ethic” than a “vehicle”—and if a league table of the strength of the “acquisitive instinct” were to be drawn up, Puritanism would certainly not be near the top, and neither would the type of rationalist moneymaker, of whom I chose Benjamin Franklin as the prime example. [26a] But we are not here talking about the instinctive desire for money, happiness, the *splendor familiae*, etc.—all of which are things that hold fewer attractions for *serious* Puritans than they do for others: they become rich *in spite of* their otherworldliness [*Weltabgewandtheit*]. The point is, rather, that “ascetic” Protestantism creates the appropriate “soul,” the soul of the “man of the calling” [*Berufsmensch* ], who has no need of the means required by medieval man to feel at one with his activity.

The merchant of the Florentine early Renaissance was not like this. This is not the place to analyze how profoundly torn the more serious men of those days were, despite their apparent wholeness and vibrant energy. One phenomenon that fits into this picture is the restitution of wealth acquired through “usury.” It may be one of the more superficial ones, but it certainly does fit into this picture. I—like any more or less unbiased person—can only see these “means of appeasement” as one of the numerous symptoms of the *tension* between “conscience” and “action,” of the irreconcilability of the principle of “Deo placere non potest” (which even Luther never superseded), the ideals of precisely those people who were *serious* about their Catholicism, and the “commercial” striving for profit. And I see the innumerable practical and theoretical “compromises” [27] as simply that—compromises. It is simply not true that every kind of activity has simply—as Rachfahl maintains and is indeed “what one might expect”—created its “ethic of the calling” at all periods in the same manner. I had hoped that my essays would contribute to the awareness of how far this conception (essentially one of “historical materialism”), whose superficial veracity no one, least of all myself, would dispute, has its *limits* with regard to historical development. [28]

To summarize, I would say that my essays are concerned with a certain constituent element [*Komponente*] of the *style of life* which stood at the cradle of modern capitalism and had a share—together with numerous other forces—in building it. My essays aim to analyze this constituent element and to follow it through its transformations and its waning. Such an undertaking cannot set itself the task of discovering what was present at *all* times and everywhere where capitalism existed. On the contrary, it aims to discover what is *specific* about a unique development. [29] I have already categorically refused to be responsible if other people overemphasize [*verabsolutieren*] the religious factors (which I have *expressly* and most emphatically described as an *individual* component) and identify them totally with the “spirit” of capitalism, or even *derive* capitalism from them. Rachfahl, however, has felt under no obligation to take account of this. My efforts may or may not be successful. But when a historian can think of nothing better to do than to list a series of *other* components which—as no one doubts—have *always* accompanied economic expansion, he does scant service to the tasks and interests of his discipline. Why profess an interest in “history” if all that history tells you is that basically “nothing has changed”?



Enough of that, and now a few remarks on the relationship between the “spirit” of capitalism and the capitalist economic *system*.

In the previous volume of this journal, pages 689 ff., Werner Sombart devoted an article to this subject which, in view of the large measure of agreement between us [30] in all essential points, especially in questions of *method*, relieves me of the need to deal at length with the subject. Both the concept of “capitalism” and, even more certainly, that of the “spirit of capitalism” are only conceivable as thought constructs of the “ideal type” variety. [31] They can either be conceived of in the *abstract*, so that features that are *permanently* alike can be extracted in conceptual purity. In this case, the second of the two concepts becomes rather empty of content and almost purely a function of the first. Or they may be conceived of *historically*, so that “ideal type” thought images are formed of the features *specific* to a particular era in *contrast* to others, while features that are *generally* present are assumed to be likewise given and well known. We must then, of course, concern ourselves with those features which are *not* present *at all* in the other eras of the construct’s existence or are present in a clearly different way in terms of degree. Incidentally, I have tried, in an admittedly quite imperfect manner, to do this for the “capitalism” of antiquity as an economic *system* (in the “Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften” in the article: “Agrargeschichte des Altertums”). [32] For the “*spirit*” of *modern* capitalism, as I wished to call it, my essay was intended to represent the *beginnings* [33] of an analysis which aimed primarily to pursue the new threads woven through the period of the Reformation.

And now to the question: What are we to understand by the “spirit” of capitalism in relation to “capitalism” itself? As far as “capitalism” *itself* is concerned, we can only understand by this a particular “economic *system*,” that is, a form of economic behavior toward people and goods that can be described as “utilization” of “capital.” We analyze the workings of this behavior “pragmatically,” that is, by whatever can be shown to be, according to the given circumstances, the “inevitable” or “best” *means*. As we have said: We either analyze everything that was common to such economic systems at all times, or we analyze the specifics of a particular historical system of this type. Here we are concerned solely with the latter alternative. A historically given form of

“capitalism” can be filled with very different types of “spirit”; this form can, however, and usually will, have different levels of “elective affinities” to certain historical types of spirit: the “spirit” may be more or less “adequate” to the “form” (or not at all). There can be no doubt that the *degree* of this adequacy is not without influence on the course of historical development, that “form” and “spirit” (as I said previously) tend to adapt to each other, and, finally, that where a system and a “spirit” of a particularly high “degree of adequacy” come up against each other, there ensues a development of (even inwardly) unbroken unity similar to that which I had begun to analyze.

Since in the case of the crucial concept: “spirit” of (in my case modern) [34] capitalism, we are dealing with a historical, unusually complex phenomenon, any *definition* of this concept, as with all highly “historical” concepts, is only possible not at the outset but at the conclusion of the investigation, as a result of the step-by-step synthesis that needs to be undertaken. I emphasized this point at the start of my essays.

At the beginning of such an investigation, one can only employ the most graphic *illustration* possible. The example I chose was drawn from a milieu which was still in many ways a barter economy, or at any rate (relatively speaking) a very *uncapitalist* milieu, namely, that of Benjamin Franklin. I did this with the express purpose of showing that the capitalist “spirit” could live a life *of its own* in relation to the capitalist “economic system” adequate to it. I had already pointed out, by way of illustration, the fact that the “spirit” was not without influence on the development of the “economic system” and *expressly* referred the discussion of the reverse causal relationship to a planned continuation of the essays, which, as I was at pains to stress, were incomplete.

For reasons that I have clearly stated (and repeated above) and which have only grown more weighty in the meantime, those essays have never reached “completion”—to my lasting regret, as I have said. Essentially, the essays deal with only a part of the historical development of the idea of the “calling” [*Berufs-Idee*] and its effect on commerce [*Erwerb*]. They claim no more for themselves, and indeed could not do so. All that remained was for a “critical” historian to take it upon himself to anticipate the result of the prospective

synthesis in the form of a “definition.” What has emerged from this can be read in column 1236, bottom, namely, that the “capitalist spirit” (that is, for Rachfahl—col. 1238—the motive that is crucial for the origins of a certain amount of *capital*) consists of a mixture of “acquisitive drive” and “other” motives: “considerations” of “happiness” and “utility,” one’s own or those of others, “especially” of the family, plus the striving for pleasure, honor, power, the finest possible legacy for one’s descendants, and so on. Of course, in this “and so on” are concealed *every imaginable* kind of other motive, including, for example, charity—to name one “purpose” of “the accumulation of capital” which is of real practical importance. And since Rachfahl is incapable of distinguishing the (subjective) “spirit” of capitalism from the (objective) economic *system*, equating both with the “acquisitive drive,” he naturally overlooked my statement of *what* was actually the alpha and omega of the “gospel of avarice” in my example (Franklin; vol. 20, p. 17 [p. 12 in this volume]). He also failed to grasp what I said (on the same page) about the *antithesis* between greed and the duty of the calling. Finally, despite my express reservations, he treated the *other* antithesis between “traditionalist” and “commercial” economy as the key point of my argument.

And yet, if it is only a question of acquiring more than one’s “needs,” *then* the savage, in his insatiable greed, unrestrained by any rationalist considerations, for wives and treasure, would be the *peak* of acquisitive humanity—and the Puritan would be at the opposite end of the scale. True, an economy supported by the “spirit of capitalism” (in my sense of the phrase) is directly opposed to traditionalism—and *this* is what I wanted to establish first of all; but it is very far removed from the striving for the greatest possible surplus over and above one’s *needs*. It therefore forms an antithesis, it is true, but not an exhaustive one, to “traditionalist” economy—especially so, as it does *not* correspond to a (*formally*) capitalist economy, as I expressly said (vol. 20, p. 23 [p. 17-18 in this volume]) and illustrated with an example (vol. 20, p. 27f. [p. 20f. in this volume]).

Finally, that component of the capitalist “spirit” that I analyzed, especially—the idea of the “duty of the calling” with all that depends on it—as it is found within the form of economy supported by the “spirit” of capitalism (in the *general* sense of the expression), can only be found in one *particular historical period*,

and yet projects out *above and beyond* the economic sphere into quite varied areas of human activity. My essays *expressly and deliberately restricted* themselves to the subject of the development of “the calling as a mode of human existence” [*Berufsmenschentum*] as a significant component of the capitalist “spirit.” If careless readers choose to ignore this, then there is absolutely nothing I can do to prevent them.

I must conclude my remarks here. It has not been possible to expand on particular sections and aspects of my essays, such as that which relates to the importance of the sect—the *sect* being in an important sense the archetype in the early modern age [*werdende Neuzeit*] of those social group formations that today determine “public opinion,” “cultural values,” and “individuality.” Neither have I been able to discuss in greater detail the extensive ramifications which have led from the Puritan style of life to that of the present days. [35] It is regrettable that this reply to a quite sterile critique, typical of the worst kind of academic sneering and *deliberate* misunderstanding, had to turn out to be so sterile itself, but circumstances dictated this and the *Archiv* had to devote space to it. Everything that has been said here can already be found in my essays. Everything that Rachfahl has said (with a few completely irrelevant exceptions) has been taken from them and “misrepresented.” I would again refer anyone who, after reading the preceding exposition, still does not believe this, to read my essays with an open mind *after* reading Rachfahl’s critique. In the face of *this* critique, I would not change *a single word*.

## WEBER'S NOTES

1) Rachfahl simply ignores this essay, even though Troeltsch quoted from it.

2) In doing so, Troeltsch may have been guilty of a few expressions (which were quite irrelevant for *his* topic) which did not quite reproduce the views I expressed in my essays accurately. This is almost unavoidable when one is forced to attempt to reproduce other people's views in so very few words.

3) This journal, volume 20, pages 10, 50 (bottom), and 52 (bottom [pp. 7, 33, 35 in this volume]). On page 10 [p. 7 in this volume], I have stressed that in the case of the ascetic sects (Quakers, Mennonites, etc.) at least the direct connection between "asceticism" and bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] wealth creation is often "*even more striking*" than it is in the case of Calvinism. The reason why Calvinism has been treated first and in particular detail (vol. 21, pp. 5-38 [p. 69-87 in this volume]) has also been clearly explained: namely, because in relation to the motives for the *methodical* way of life [*Lebensgestaltung*] implicit in its doctrine, it seemed to me to represent the "most consistent" antithesis to (Catholicism and) Lutheranism. It should not be forgotten that the thirty-three pages devoted to Calvinism are immediately followed by an equal number (vol. 21, pp. 39-72 [p. 87-105 in this volume]) on the remaining ascetic denominations.

4) The difference from my text consists merely in the quotation marks added to the word "ascetic." (We are not talking about a quotation here.)

5) It is an open question whether or not the former may be useful at times. I feel that Knapp deserves credit for having the courage to use this method comprehensively; it is similarly used with evident success in eliminating ambiguity in Alfred Weber's book on the locations of industry. However, with today's readers it all too often provokes head shaking, and in particular the vanity of professors prevents the acceptance of any term other than one that *they*

*themselves* have coined.

6) In column 1249, Rachfahl says: “In contrast to the wealthy businessman, of whom Weber says that he could only be persuaded with difficulty to partake of the oysters that his doctor had prescribed for him . . . anyone could easily point to more than one capitalist, whose ‘capitalist spirit’ *in the usual sense of the term* (N.B.!) is beyond doubt, . . . but who does not hesitate to savor these delicious shellfish. . . . I am almost tempted to believe that the delicatessen dealers would have to close their doors for lack of custom if ascetic habits suddenly made their presence felt in the sphere of the capitalist spirit.” Such “criticism” cannot be said to be on a particularly high plane. I was not concerned with the “usual meaning” of “capitalist spirit,” any more than whether the “Tiergarten district” or the “farmers” or lieutenants or other young people with well-stocked wallets consume the most oysters. In referring (quite incidentally!) to this example, I was concerned to illustrate a very specific inner relationship to commerce and wealth: the feeling of “responsibility” toward one’s own wealth, a feeling that not only rejects “irrational” expense, but regards it as a particular kind of “sinfulness” (something that has nothing to do with the usual kind of avarice of which Rachfahl speaks elsewhere). It is an *ascetic* suspicion of *pleasure* as such.

6a) Volume 21, page 6, note 5 ([p. 131, note 68 in this volume]).

7) As ever, here again Rachfahl shows that he will happily make flatly contradictory statements if it suits his polemical purpose. The same striving for profit for its own sake that in column 1320 (quoting Fugger) he maintains may very well spring from an “ethical maxim based on the conduct of life” cannot, apparently, in columns 1250 and 1255, be called “ethical” at all, because Rachfahl finds it reprehensible.

8) See the whole passage, columns 1250-51.

9) Column 1257. His argument is feeble, however, as the differences are purely those of *terminology*, not of substance.

10) Although, when summarizing my essay (col. 1228) and occasionally later, he has no option but to reproduce the relevant passages from my work.

11) The economic reaction of the Poles (which I myself have quoted) rests on a *national* foundation.

12) Thus Shakespeare, a connoisseur of Puritanism who observed it with the keen eye afforded by hatred, evidently had good reasons to make his caricatured “middle classes” [*Mittelklassen*] base their caricatured program on the principle: “It is written: labor in your vocation.” [Henry VI, Part 2, Act 4, Scene 2]

13) I have not picked up a work by Petty since the time when I was studying the history of trade, and am grateful to my colleague H. Levy for reminding me of this passage.

14) Incidentally, I should like to mention that, of course, when I contrasted the rigorously *intolerant* Calvinist New England with the *apparently* less developed but *tolerant* Rhode Island with regard to the development of the “capitalist spirit” (see below), I obviously intended to demonstrate that *in spite of* the lack of toleration in the former and *in spite of* the toleration in the latter, the *intolerant* region seems to have emerged more favorably (even though it was far less well endowed by nature), in my view, *because* in it the “spirit” of Protestant asceticism was dominant. I must add that I only mentioned this in passing by way of conjecture; as I am more than willing to repeat, I might be able to support it with a few further pieces of evidence, but would not claim that I had “proved” anything.

This might be a suitable juncture to clear up some of Rachfahl’s *factual* “objections.” He seems to have no knowledge, with regard to their influence on style of life and conception of the calling, of the internal development of Pennsylvania, the tragic ethical conflicts with the “world” within Quakerism, or

the intensity of the aura of that blend of asceticism and rationalism which is testified to in *every* reliable older description by European visitors, the remnants of which can be sensed everywhere even now. In New York, too, this aura persisted right to the threshold of the present day (although for some time Manhattan, being a center of immigration, lagged far behind Brooklyn in church membership). Rachfahl seems unaware too of the history of the New Englanders and the character of these people, traces of which still persist to this day. I refer readers to my (admittedly *very* sketchy) essay in *Christliche Welt*. As far as *my* problem is concerned, the agricultural “capitalism” of the Episcopalian Southern states differed *in no way* from the “capitalist” economy of ancient times. From my own observations when visiting relations living in old plantation houses in the Southern states, I was able to gain a fairly clear picture, including external details, of the seigneurial mixture (in the sharpest contrast with the “spirit” of Puritan Yankeedom) of impoverished neglect and aristocratic ostentation in the economy and in life which dominated this strongly *nonbourgeois* [*unbürgerlich*] society. This was in addition to what I learned from the well-known literature, some of which is excellent.

It is a well-known fact that New England was a hairbreadth away from falling into the hands of one of the numerous court favorites who were trying to obtain and exploit colonial land concessions. Even allowing for the fact that the region was not suitable for cotton plantations, no one can tell how different the face of North America might have been in that eventuality—that is to say in the absence of the settlements of the Pilgrim Fathers, together with those of the Baptists, the Dutch, and the Quakers further south. It certainly would not have been determined by the “spirit” of these strata in the way that it was and continues to be so determined right up to the present to a quite significant degree. There has certainly never been any doubt in my mind that a “capitalist” development, indeed, any commercial development, in seventeenth-century New England was not only an anachronism, but almost a geographic impossibility as well. I myself have cited the beginnings of commercial development that, after the Puritan immigration, arose there *despite* this, as being remarkable *for that reason*.

At the start of my first essay, I cite *Franklin* as a representative of the “capitalist spirit.” Everyone knows that this small-time printer was *very* far from being a “big capitalist” in the style of Fugger, and finally I insisted most emphatically on



the fact (so important for my argument) that the “spirit” developed in a region whose economy was still in its infancy, being largely still a barter economy (vol. 20, p. 33 [p. 26 in this volume]). So even a critic like Rachfahl ought to have refrained from holding these and similar things against me in the guise of “objections.” Furthermore, the fact that a historian cannot distinguish between the economic circumstances in which commerce existed in a *colonial* territory like New England and *medieval Europe*—as the contemptuous, but in my view somewhat ridiculous, comment at the bottom of column 1294 indicates—is bad enough. But it is far more serious that he simply knows nothing of the significance of the Huguenots and their relationship to industry in France.

I am now required to “admit” for the second time<sup>Z</sup> that the Calvinism of the Hungarian *puszta* in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was unable to create a capitalist economy, but I stress again that *even there* it exhibits (in the calling chosen by the Reformed Christians) the typical side effects to which I referred at an early stage of my essay.

With his gaze fixed exclusively on the big money men, who are essentially *no* different from similar phenomena of all ages and lands, Rachfahl is not even capable of expressing anything other than quite superficial sentiments when it comes to the extremely complex and interesting problem (his own subject, as it happens) of the particular character [*Eigenart*] of Dutch capitalism and the inward attitude of the people toward it. I therefore doubt whether he knows more about this subject than I do, and I am grateful for his acknowledgment that I am not entirely ignorant of these problems, even though I am still very far from having a thorough grasp of them. Everything that he holds against me regarding the Arminianism of the merchant class, I have—as usual—said *myself*, as well as having referred to the same phenomena from art history that Rachfahl uses against me. But these are only the outer fringes of the problem—which in any case I had no desire to pursue. To mention just one factor that takes us deeper into the question, the nature of the Dutch “spirit” was undoubtedly determined in part in those days by the fact that the reclaiming of land to form polders was one of the most profitable commercial enterprises available, and that here the cities (to exaggerate a little) largely created the flat land themselves. Alongside colonial business, which was somewhat suspect to the Puritans, the utilization of capital was directed to a large extent into this channel for the creation of a

livelihood for the farmers—something which was bound to have consequences for the appearance of the land in an inward (amply attested on numerous occasions) as well as an external sense. This was especially true of the way in which the tendency of “ascetic Protestantism” to operate in its characteristic manner was constantly disrupted in important respects—though *not* in all. It is quite clear that these farmers were very different from the traditional peasantry of the continent, as well as being rather different from the farmers of New England. They even played a part in the art market: they are known to have invested sums of money in pictures amounting to a small fortune for those days—and some of it was certainly speculative in character.

The influence of what remained of the Puritanism of Holland on its art is a very complex problem, and my casual comments on the matter are really of no account. Nevertheless, the contrast between Rubens and Rembrandt, though neither this nor their conduct of life can be equated with the differences in their background, is still very far from being fortuitous. One is reminded of Baudelaire’s verses [in *Les fleurs du mal*], which are admittedly something of a caricature as far as Rembrandt is concerned, but remain true to the basic mood.

When a historian can speak of the Dordrecht Decrees<sup>8</sup> as something almost irrelevant to the history of Holland, this can only mean that he has no idea about modern Dutch ecclesiastical and political history. The neo-Calvinism of Holland is certainly a structure with some very modern features, but this view strikes one as rather odd when one considers how the Kuyper<sup>9</sup> schism, which even now is still the basis of the entire political constellation in Holland, rests at all points upon legal concepts and doctrines that were created in and after Dordrecht, starting with the genuinely “Puritan” requirement that the congregation of those participating in the *Lord’s Supper* must be allowed to maintain its “purity” for the glory of God. The view must seem odd, too, to anyone who is familiar with the surviving printed documents relating to the history of Church discipline in Holland in those old times, and knows of the tremendous authority of the “sacrosancta synodus” which for centuries its devotees would never speak of without baring their heads. The fact that the neo-Calvinist church of Kuyper was founded in the “unbelieving” city of Amsterdam, of all places, or that Amsterdam went over to the side of the Calvinist Party against Oldenbarnevelt, could, according to Rachfahl, be just a matter of “chance.” On the other hand,

this strange modern “chance” could lead some people to ponder whether or not that event in 1618<sup>10</sup> was due to more than the *mere* day-to-day shifting alliances among the various “cliques” in the Vroedshap<sup>11</sup> such as might happen at any time. (As a *minority* in the world, asceticism has existed *everywhere and at almost all times*: in Holland at that time and under Kuyper, in England under Cromwell, in Pennsylvania immediately after Penn, in France from the very beginning, and in the Pietist period in Germany.) To judge from his remarks, Rachfahl seems to know little of the part played by the Puritan dissenters in England in Cobden’s anti-Corn Law agitation.

The interesting phenomenon which can be observed in the relationship between the *classes* and religious life—in almost every country—is the way in which the originally *vertical* rifts (often including the Baptists) running through the social strata were gradually transformed into *horizontal* ones: *here* is where historical materialist “interpretation” begins to assert itself.

15) When (col. 1320) Rachfahl decides to ask how I *know* that the statement he quotes (after me) by Jakob Fugger is the expression of something *other* than the Puritan “ethic of the calling,” my answer is: because anyone who knows how a Puritan would express himself in a similar situation, also knows that he would—with complete subjective truthfulness—have expressed himself *differently*. And sure enough, by no later than column 1324, Rachfahl himself *knows*—without telling us how!—that the ethic of the calling of the Calvinists *does* differ from Fugger’s style of life in that for the Calvinists profit and wealth “were *only* factors of accessory importance”—just as I had explained!

16) Column 1231: “However, *as Weber admits*, in the end the Calvinist ethic proved to be a force that wanted the good but created evil, . . . namely wealth with all its temptations.”<sup>12</sup> To say of a writer that he “admits” one of his own, almost literally quoted, basic theses, is, to say the least, a version of the facts which is liable to mislead the reader.

16a) *Archiv*, volume 20, page 15 [p. 11 in this volume].

17) Compare *Archiv*, volume 25, page 247, note 110 [p. 229, note 9 in this volume]. Rachfahl knows this essay too, as he occasionally quotes from it himself.

18) I have spoken about the Arminianism in the leading strata of the Dutch wealthy bourgeoisie [*Großbürgertum*] and have also made reference to Busken-Huët. It is a bit rich for Rachfahl, who contributes *nothing* new of any significance to the subject, to maintain that I “*know*” nothing about these matters.

18a) *Archiv*, volume 20, page 20 [p. 15 in this volume].

19) The main emphasis would not, for example, be on the distribution of *capital* and so forth in any way at all.

20) Compare my remarks in this journal (*Archiv*, vol. 28, p. 263, and vol. 29, p. 529)

21) “*There can be no doubt* that an inward relationship exists between Calvinism” (on this quite mistaken restriction, see above) “and capitalism.”

22) And of course a fortiori the assertion, which he constantly stresses, that it was the “common Christian” Reformation morality (so this *does* include both non-and anti-Calvinist morality) that continued to exist.

22a) I have concluded from the appearance of the “capitalist” spirit (in my sense of the term!) in a place where the economic conditions for it (even then!) were as unfavorable as they could possibly be, that the methodical conduct of life that was dominant in New England and Pennsylvania at the time contained *within*

*itself* the driving force [*Antriebe*] for this. To obviate any possible misunderstanding, I *also* said that such a seed then needed the appropriate “conditions” in order to be able to contribute (and I emphasize the word “contribute”!) to the rise of a capitalist “economic system” (vol. 20, p. 53; vol. 21, p. 110 [pp. 35 and 122 in this volume]). I believed such a comment to be superfluous (mistakenly, it seems!).

23) I fail to understand where I am supposed to have spoken of an “*absolute*” domination [*Herrschaft*] of Puritanism in the economic life of England. The struggle of the capitalist middle classes [*bürgerlich-kapitalistischen Mittelklassen*] took place on two fronts. Firstly, against the “squirearchy,” where it took the form of a clash between “asceticism” and “Merry England,” in which the Crown intervened with the Book of Sports. Secondly, against the monopolists and powerful financiers, who, in the seventeenth century, were based at Court (compare the action taken by the Long Parliament to this end). This struggle was supported by a very clear theory of the “*justum pretium*,” (“just price”) which was satisfied by the Puritan ethic. I had planned to demonstrate this latter point in a future article.

23a) Compare, for example, *Archiv*, volume 21, p. 98, note 65 [p. 195-96, note 291 in this volume].

24) But not (God forbid!) what he asserts in column 1249, namely, that I allege the existence of a motive working in an absolutely unique capacity in all (or even most) bearers of the “capitalist spirit” (in my sense).

25) Since Rachfahl well knows that I have gone to great lengths to attempt to explain the waning of those motive forces which were effective in the heyday of ascetic Protestantism—after all, he attacks my method of explanation—this “even today” is another example of his kind of “criticism,” which seizes on any old expression just for effect. On top of that, just to complete the picture, *he himself* (col. 1324) sets the lifestyle of *today*’s large-scale capitalism against that of Calvinism —reproducing exactly what he has read in my essays, only with a slightly different choice of *words*.

26) The italics here are my own. I should add that the italics in the previous quotations from Rachfahl's articles are also my own.

26a) Sombart (*Archiv*, vol. 39, p. 701) quite correctly draws attention to the words of the entrepreneur, Walther Rathenau (in the latter's *Reflexionen*), who claims "never to have known a truly great businessman and entrepreneur for whom earning money was the most important aspect of his business [*Beruf*]." Rathenau adds: "I maintain that anyone who hankers after personal financial profit can never be an entrepreneur." (Notwithstanding his "sermon," this is exactly what Franklin, and even more certainly the Puritans, would have said. The accumulation of wealth is something "accessory" to all of them—to use Rachfahl's word.)

27) I quoted far more graphic examples of this than "pious foundations," which—for *completely* different motives, and the difference is significant!—were every bit as common within Calvinism and Reformed Christianity in general.

28) I emphasized very strongly that if I were to complete my essays, I should then, instead of being accused of "exaggerating the influence of religious factors," probably be accused of "surrendering to historical materialism," as I should then be giving prominence to the effect of economic conditions on the religious sphere (the reverse causal relationship). In column 1325, Rachfahl even applies the epithet "monstrous" to what he alleges to be my thesis, which sits rather oddly with the fact that he *appropriates* the content of what I have said *for himself*. Incidentally, that influence in the political sphere is fundamentally different from what it is believed to be by those historians who claim to be "nothing but politicians." By the "great powers," these men understand only the big battalions on the field of battle, and we all know that "God is on the side of the big battalions." Many of these "powers" have never been able to prevail against the biblical text: "We ought to obey God rather than men" *as long as* it sustained the faith of determined men, even if they were only a small minority, as the Puritans always were. It was this that defeated those that were waging the "Kulturkampf" in the seventeenth century, and again in the nineteenth, and on both occasions their defeat had consequences that were not overcome for generations. It goes without saying that this principle is very far from having

been the one and only foundation of political individualism (I assume this expression is unambiguous in this case). But the fact that this element is necessarily lacking in today's political individualism, and that in Germany, thanks among other things to Lutheranism, it has always been either entirely absent or was understood in a purely *passive* sense, is responsible for far more than those clever people could imagine in their wildest dreams.

29) It defies belief that Rachfahl (col. 1251) should point to the “agonal instincts” [*agonalen Triebe*] as an element which I am supposed to have overlooked in my concept of the “spirit” of capitalism. In fact, I have frequently stressed that they have today often *taken the place of* the extinguished ascetic “spirit.” The nature of these “agonal” instincts (the plural is more appropriate here) is illustrated very well by Rockefeller's statement to the Industrial Commission (compare Sombart's remarks on the subject: *Archiv*, vol. 29, p. 710). I have also given an example of it in volume 21, page 109, note 85a [p. 201, note 313 in this volume].

30) It is quite true that Sombart (p. 709) regards the typical “tendencies” in the purposeful action of entrepreneurs (that is, those which arise from the exigencies of the situation) as part of the “psychology” of the entrepreneur, whereas I designate all such causal components as “pragmatic” or “rational” (because they are derived from the inevitable means to the end of economic success). However, this is purely a difference in terminology, as in practice Sombart's work brings out the critical points very clearly. The reason why I, for my part, have certain terminological reservations about the expression “psychology” to describe this kind of analysis of action is set out in this journal (vol. 27, p. 546). For example, there is a tendency, when talking about “the psychology of the stock exchange,” to think particularly of “irrational” phenomena which *cannot* be rationally deduced from the business situation.

Of course, the substance of Sombart's arguments could be amplified with an abundance of comments and examples. To take, for example, the subject of the “pragmatically” conditioned limits of “calculability” [*Rechenhaftigkeit*]: I once happened to be introduced to the internal affairs of a very large business, one that had developed out of a family business, which engaged in practically every

imaginable form of wholesale trade in three large trading centers and two foreign ones. The individual “seats” had to work at *very* different levels of intensity—almost unbelievably different in terms of quantity as well as intensity—and their respective contributions to the total profit, which, as in the Middle Ages, went into a *single* fund, were also very different, as was the capital requirement. One of the relations, the most brilliant businessman among them, had grown tired of the office and was living in Paris, from where he would travel to meetings at the appropriate location when there was anything important to discuss. Be that as it may, the profit, which ran into very high figures, was simply divided into portions per head; the only distinction made was that between double or single portions. Double portions were allocated to the head of the largest branch, which operated with a really enormous office, and to a man who had to reside in a particularly uncongenial overseas location. All the others, including the “casual” worker who resided in Paris, received single portions. A more precisely calculated distribution was described as perfectly possible, but was rejected as “inconvenient,” “petty,” and “unnecessary,” given the *level* of profit. On the other hand, there was a close relation of the boss, a man who was very highly valued and an intimate friend of his, whose smaller share in the business had been forfeited in a financial crisis and who now “served” as an “employee” (actually as a “Prokurist” or company secretary). The idea of giving this man a higher than usual salary (but *one that he could earn elsewhere*) was regarded as contrary to all “business principles” and out of the question, because the other employees could demand the same, and especially because he “should not expect anything different.” His salary was part of the *costs*, and therefore governed by purely economic, “accounting” [*rechenhaft*] factors. The “profit” which showed up on the balance sheet, however, was *not*. *This* was beyond the reach of accounting, because accounting was “pragmatic” and not indispensable for the existence of the business. *Such* phenomena, of which there are many, can be rationally explained without any “psychology” by reference to the “essence” of “capitalism” with the aid of the categories “means” and “ends.” But if we wish to consider the matter *historically*, this rational approach *will not suffice*, for elements that are explicable in terms of the economic *system* as such unite with others that emanate from a whole variety of sources and work together to create the “spirit” which breathes life into it.

At any rate, categories such as “acquisitive drive” or “the craze for profit” are—as Sombart has rightly emphasized—*by no means* sufficient to account for the “capitalist spirit”—*whatever* we understand by this concept.



31) On the concept of the “ideal type,” see my essay in volume 19 of this journal. [See Editors’ introduction, note 34.]

32) I have made a change of terminology to the extent that previously I was not inclined to term anything more than isolated phenomena of the economy of the ancient world “capitalist,” and therefore was reluctant to talk about ancient “capitalism.” I now hold a different view on this, as is shown by my article “Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum” in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, ed. J. Conrad, 3rd edition, volume 1, 1909, pages 52-188.

33) In this journal (*Archiv*, vol. 26, p. 279, note 3 [p. 240, note 3 in this volume]) I have myself stressed that non-completion has had the unfortunate result that “superficial readers might be tempted to regard these articles as finished pieces of work.” A “critic,” however, does not have the right to be such a superficial reader. Even a consideration of my little sketch in the *Christliche Welt* should suffice to make it obvious that the problem in my essays in the *Archiv* was deliberately approached from the angle that was *most difficult* to grasp and “prove,” namely, that which concerned the inner disposition [*Habitus*], and that the powerful influence of education, the discipline of the sects, and other matters—right up to the threshold of the present—were merely adumbrated, and not explored in any depth at all. Though Rachfahl lays emphasis on the importance of *education*, it takes very little knowledge of the role played by *Pietist* educational principles in this context to realize that here, too, specific influences of “ascetic Protestantism” (in the sense I have described) were at work.

34) This is the only kind of capitalism I am concerned with. I might have been better advised to indicate this in the title and in the nomenclature throughout the text. However, I did not do this when composing the essays for the reasons stated above in note 32.

35) The manner in which Rachfahl finds fault with my brief remarks about the development of bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] “comfort” in contrast to the *grand seigneur* lifestyle can only be called pathetic. Anyone with a nodding

acquaintance with cultural history knows of the existence of this contrast. Of course, it is true that the “boundaries” between historical phenomena (however strongly contrasting) are *always* fluid. Certain historians seem unable to grasp that this is precisely *why* it is so vital to distinguish between concepts. I refer the reader to what I have said on this matter in the *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften* (3rd ed., p. 183, right-hand column).

### EDITORS' NOTES

1 “Antikritisches zum ‘Geist’ des Kapitalismus,” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 30 (1910), pp. 176-202.

2 The historian Felix Rachfahl (1867-1925) studied in Breslau, where he was deeply involved in one of the *Burschenschaften* (fraternities), achieved his *Habilitation* in 1893 in Kiel, and became außerordentliche Professor (a professor who does not have his own “Institut,” or department) in Halle in 1898, then *Ordinarius* (full professor) in Königsberg in 1903. There followed professorships at the universities of Gießen (1907), Kiel (1909)—the dispute with Weber took place during this period, and Freiburg (1914). His particular academic interests lay in the fields of medieval studies, in the history of his native Silesia, and in that of the Netherlands, as evidenced by his major publication: *Wilhelm von Oranien und der Niederländische Aufstand* (*William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands*) in three volumes (1906-24). At the time of his death, plans for a fourth volume were well advanced, but he left instructions for all his literary estate to be destroyed, instructions which his executors duly carried out. A former student, Georg von Below, paints a picture of a dedicated if somewhat pedantic scholar and a demanding and rather formidable teacher, who was nonetheless deeply concerned for the well-being of his students. His lecturing style seems to have left something to be desired. Von Below writes: “He would read out word for word in a monotonous and very loud voice from a manuscript without paragraphs or subheadings.” He was a Catholic and politically conservative, and is reported to have expressed the view that the Catholic Center Party played a valuable role in keeping the working masses away from Social Democracy. (Information kindly supplied by Dr. Christian Boyens, Kiel, and based on Georg von Below, *Felix Rachfahl* [Schlesische Lebensbilder, 2 vols., 1926], held by the library of the University of Kiel.) 3 Felix Rachfahl, “Kalvinismus und Kapitalismus,” *Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik* 3 (1909), cols. 1217-38, 1249-68, 1287-1300, 1319-34, 1347-66; Felix Rachfahl, “Nochmals Kalvinismus und Kapitalismus,” *Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und*

*Technik* 4 (1910), cols. 689-702, 717-34, 755-68, 775-94.

[4](#) Ernst Troeltsch, *Die Kulturbedeutung des Calvinismus*, *Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik*, ed. Paul Hinneberg, vol. 4, 1910.

[5](#) Weber uses the English word in the original.

[6](#) The literal translation is “extrawordly” (*außerweltlich*).

[7](#) The first time Weber made such an “admission” was in his first response to Fischer. See this volume, pp. 235-36.

[8](#) Weber is referring to the Canons of Dort, or the “Five Articles against the Remonstrants,” promulgated by the Synod of Dort in 1619. For more information on the Synod, see Editors’ note 5 in *The Protestant Ethic*, p. 123.

[9](#) Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) was a Dutch theologian, journalist, statesman, and educator. A man of strong Calvinist convictions, Kuyper founded the Free University of Amsterdam in 1880 to establish more rigorous training for Calvinist pastors, and in 1886 broke with the liberal Reformed Church (*Hervormde Kerk*) of the Netherlands (this is the “schism” to which Weber refers). In 1892, he established the alternative Reformed Churches of the Netherlands. Kuyper’s mission was simultaneously religious, social, and political, combining Calvinist orthodoxy with a “progressive” social program. As leader of the Anti-Revolutionary Party, he served as prime minister between 1901 and 1905. During the course of his life, he wrote more than two hundred books.

Weber discusses Kuyper and the schism (or secession) at greater length in “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism,” Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge, 1970), pp. 302-22, at 316; also pp. 452-53.

[10](#) This was the start of a strict Calvinist period in Holland.

[11](#) Refers to that part of the Catholic ruling aristocracy that governed the city.

[12](#) See *The Protestant Ethic*, p. 116 in this volume.

## *A Final Rebuttal of Rachfahl's Critique of the "Spirit of Capitalism"*<sup>1</sup>

Contents: I. Rebuttal of critique II. Positive résumé

Professor Rachfahl has replied to my rebuttal of his critique [*Antikritik* ], this time over four issues of the *Internationale Wochenschrift* (vol. 4, nos. 22-25). However, he fails to admit that his superficial reading has led him to make crude errors. Instead, he both tries a new tack and exacerbates the majority of his previous errors with increasing desperation. Furthermore, he continues to conduct the debate in exactly the same manner as I was obliged to indicate previously. He concludes with the confident assertion (strikingly reminiscent of American political parties in their election campaigns) that he has “achieved” the “goal” of his critique: the “bubble on the Neckar has burst.” And in another place he professes to believe that he (Rachfahl) must appear *to me* as “the vulture that feeds on the carcass of the opponent.” This “carcass,” as we shall see, is still very much alive, and Rachfahl appears to him to bear no likeness to a bird of prey [*Adler* = eagle] or anything of the kind. On the contrary, to judge by how he presents himself in this “critique” and “reply,” he continues to appear as a rather lightly feathered and at the same time unduly schoolmasterly author. One can only shake one’s head over such a man; yet one cannot really bear him any ill will, because his often quite unbelievable deficiency in literary integrity is due to the awkward spot he has got himself into, and is exceeded by the naivety of his self-justification, which evidently makes him convinced he is right—however hard it is to believe this at times. [1]

Having once acceded to the wish expressed by (impartial) friends that I should embark upon the sterile and wearisome business of taking issue with his sophistry, which is solely about *words* and obscures the plain facts, I am obliged to see it through to the end. In what follows, I shall attempt two things. Firstly, I shall necessarily have to establish the “spirit” of R.’s<sup>2</sup> polemics once again. As things stand, it is necessarily a rather tedious process to follow R. into all his

bolt-holes, and I recommend any reader who is not particularly interested in it to skip this part. Then, secondly, to counteract the confusion that Rachfahl, in an effort to avoid admitting that he is in the wrong, has sown and has now compounded, I propose to summarize in a few pages some of the features of my *true* “thesis” that R. has obstinately ignored. I do this merely for the benefit of those who have not carefully reread my essays. For the others it is superfluous, but they are, of course, a dwindling minority.

## I [REBUTTAL OF CRITIQUE]<sup>3</sup>

Since I have called Rachfahl's polemic "professorial," he maintains that I am denigrating his standing as a "professor," and claim to be something "better." In the context of our otherwise totally sterile discussion, this is an instructive error, which is also typical of Rachfahl's lack of understanding of the matter in question. It is indeed the case that he not only *is* a "professor," he has also written what is in my view an unusually "professorial" essay. Everyone knows, however, that not everything that a professor writes (even Rachfahl, thank God!) must necessarily be tainted with the familiar flavor of that petty, opinionated quibbling and smug superiority that is the essence of the "professorial." Nor must every piece produced by an editor necessarily have a "journalistic" flavor (note the quotation marks!). Nor must every state that operates according to bureaucratic forms be dominated by the "bureaucratic spirit." Likewise, not every army, organized on the German or French pattern, and the state it serves, need be inspired by the "military spirit" (think of Italy and contrast it with Germany or France). Nor does every *Gewerkverein* (French: "syndicat"; English: "trade union"), though organized along the same lines, have to be imbued with the spirit of either "trade unionism" or of "syndicalism" (take your pick). A country with a colonial empire is not necessarily filled with the "spirit of imperialism." And finally, not every economy that is organized on capitalist lines is imbued with the "spirit of capitalism"—and certainly not with that particular manifestation of this spirit that I have found in modern capitalism (in contrast to the capitalism of antiquity or the Middle Ages) and most strongly during the heroic age of early capitalism.

Nevertheless, we still speak of such a "spirit" in conjunction with the adjectival form of one of those systems. The reason for this is (to repeat) that the possible attitudes that we so term seem to us to be particularly "adequate" to just those forms of organization, that is, seem to have an "elective affinity" with them arising from *internal* causes, yet without having in every case, or even in any significant number of cases, any necessary link with them. It is a typical historical process for a (state or other social) institution to continue to exist in exactly the same form as before, but to have undergone a change in its "meaning" for historical life, and in its significance for the history of culture. If

we speak of a change in its “spirit” in such cases (and we tend to do this), we are, of course, duty bound to make clear what is meant by this and what concrete causes have determined this change. The task which I set myself was to reveal *one* (particularly important) series of causes which determined the formation of *one* (again, particularly important) constituent *component* of the spirit of modern capitalism: that is, a variety of this spirit which differed in specific important ways from that of either the classical period or of the Middle Ages.

Rachfahl, confident that 99 percent of his readers have read neither my essays nor my rebuttal of his critique, and are not going to read them, now behaves as if this carefully considered restriction of my task has only been introduced after the fact (and, of course, on account of his “critique”). I should therefore like to assist my readers to make up their own minds by reminding them once more of the following.

As a result of my investigations (I *quoted* the passages in my rebuttal!), I established (vol. 21, p. 107 [p. 120f. in this volume]) that *one* (NB!) constituent component of the “capitalist spirit” derived from the origin which I claimed for it, namely, the specifically middle-class [*bürgerlich*] “ethic of the calling” (vol. 21, p. 105 [p. 119 in this volume]) and especially the “ascetic” quality that clung to this ethic and retained its importance in the face of the powerful psychological resistance of tradition until the capitalism of the present day, which rests on a purely mechanical basis, was able to *dispense with* its support (vol. 21, p. 108 [p. 121 in this volume]). Furthermore, I described as “foolish” the attempt to trace the derivation not only of the capitalist *system* but specifically also of the capitalist “*spirit*” (in *my* sense of the word, be it noted—a matter to which I shall return) back to the Reformation *alone* (vol. 20, p. 54 [p. 36 in this volume]). Additionally (vol. 21, p. 4, notes 1 and 2, vol. 25, p. 246 [p. 43, notes 3 and 4; p. 225 in this volume]), I explicitly asserted that it was obvious that those religious and psychological conditions could only bring about the development of capitalism in conjunction with numerous other “conditions,” especially those of nature and geography.

Finally, on a number of occasions, and especially in 1908, in reply (vol. 26, p. 275 [p. 232 in this volume]) to a critique of the same type as Rachfahl’s, just to

make quite sure of eliminating *any* possibility of “overemphasis” [*Verabsolutierung*] from the causal connection I was investigating, I stated again that my investigations were concerned with the analysis of the development of an ethical “style of life” [*Lebensstil*] which was adequate to the rising capitalism of the modern period [*Neuzeit*], and *only* with this. I would also remind the reader that if other people have “overestimated the import of my words,” then I cannot be blamed for this: my investigations were concerned with the analysis of the development of a “style of life” [*Lebensstil*] adequate to the rising capitalism of the modern period, and with this *alone*; it was, I added, even perfectly possible that after completion of my essays, I would be “accused of capitulation to historical materialism”.<sup>4</sup> In his “critique” (vol. 3, col. 1288, footnote), Rachfahl had even *quoted* the polemical little essay in which these latter remarks appeared. In answer to my objection (based on the foregoing quotations) that in spite of everything he had never felt under any obligation to take all this into consideration, although he was well aware of it, he now has the astonishing effrontery to assure the readership of the *Internationale Wochenschrift* that he *knew nothing* of these remarks of mine, indeed that “even today he had been unable to find them” (col. 790). I leave it to the reader to decide what expression would be appropriate for this “inability.” I prefer to merely shrug my shoulders at a man who is afflicted with a mania to prove himself in the right at all costs, even the cost of literary integrity. I merely make the point that Rachfahl *even now*, whenever it suits his polemical purpose, keeps harping on about “Weber’s view of the Calvinist” (sic) (after all his protestations that he has represented my views “accurately”!) “monopoly” (sic) on “the” (sic) “capitalist development” (col. 757, bottom), although, on the other hand, he assures us that “he *never* implied that I had derived the capitalist economic system from religious causes” (col. 759).

In view of all this, the fact that R. placed an “excerpt” from my essays at the head of his critique and summarized if not all of the content then at least the greater part of it correctly is neither here nor there. For having done so, in the very next columns he immediately forgot what he had written, as I demonstrated to him again and again and will continue to do. He was and remains in a predicament. He wanted to write a *festschrift* article on Calvin and fancied he would show an “outsider” his critical superiority as a historical “specialist.” However, he chose a field for which he first had to gather “material” ad hoc. It is therefore scarcely surprising that his “critique” turned out the way it did. Now,



however, for [*ressortpatriotischen*] reasons of professional pride, he has to show that he is “in the right,” and, to make this possible, my “thesis” must be made to fit his “critique.” This is scarcely the right “spirit” in which to approach a literary task.

To give some idea of the level of the polemic that results from this, I should just like to point out that Rachfahl was kind enough to indicate to my “friends and supporters” (who are clearly to be pitied) that I am now “abruptly shaking them off” [2] (presumably in order to escape his polemics?). Apparently, he regards such antics as “acerbic shafts of wit.” To me, they are all rather childish for a serious article, but I am sorry to say that his critique and reply are full of them. But let us now come to the point.

Rachfahl’s reply begins with a lengthy attack on Troeltsch’s rebuttal in the *Internationale Wochenschrift* (vol. 4, nos. 15-16). Whether Troeltsch will think it worth bothering to reply, I do not know. For my own part, since I am now in the process of replying, I have an interest in calling attention to the following extract from the discussion. In Rachfahl’s “critique” (vol. 3, col. 1329), he writes (after citing examples in which, in reality or allegedly, religious circumstances are said to have had *no* effect on political events): “From all of this one thing is clear: how little the political, economic and secular development can be constrained by religious doctrines when the latter go beyond the religious sphere.” [3] Now, he says (col. 718): “I (Rachfahl) have referred to certain concrete cases, in which the influence of religious factors . . . has been exaggerated; I have, however, drawn no (sic) general conclusion along the lines asserted by Troeltsch [4], and if he implies that I have (sic), I should prefer not to say what I think of this, as I should have to choose very harsh words (sic)” — R.’s whole response is written in this tone, as we shall see. But should I myself employ “harsh words”? I am merely amused, and sincerely regret ever having taken as seriously as I did a critic so confused [5] as to suffer anxiety when confronted with *his own* assertions. R. can clearly not conceive of a dispute as having any purpose other than that of *appearing* to be in the right in the eyes of the public.

To continue: in my rebuttal (*Archiv*, vol. 30, p. 177, line 23 [p. 247 in this

volume]) I refer (stating the source, namely, *Archiv*, vol. 20, p. 19, note 1 [p. 49, note 26 in this volume]), contrary to the erroneous statements made by Rachfahl concerning the relationship of Sombart's works to mine, to *my* emphatic and exhaustive remarks on this point in *my* essay, which R. had "criticized." In his response to this, Rachfahl states that "Troeltsch reports (sic) that Sombart's *Capitalism* [*Modern Capitalism*, 1902] had exercised an influence on Weber's thesis" and asks, "What (sic) could have given me the idea that he (Troeltsch!) . . . was on the wrong track?"

As far as the relationship between the work of Troeltsch and my own is concerned, both he and I have made the following points *perfectly clear*:

1. For reasons which we have stated, neither of us is responsible for the work of the other.
  2. My "thesis" cannot be adduced as proof of the "theses" that Troeltsch represents, and vice versa. Either of us could be totally correct in his theories even if the other should be completely mistaken in his.
  3. The results of my work represent an excellent *complement* to those of Troeltsch, to which he has accordingly
  4. *made reference*.
  5. In so doing, he may have been guilty of minor errors in a few *individual* points that for *him* were quite insignificant (but which Rachfahl then, as I stressed, has attempted to "capitalize upon" in an extremely petty manner).
- [6]

I had then called it "underhand" for a so-called critic to use differences between Troeltsch and me, which everyone can see are merely differences in *terminology* (together with those quite immaterial errors in the representation of some few of my formulations) to present to his readership a picture of supposed differences in *substance*, which simply do not in fact exist. This does not prevent him from speaking of "Troeltsch-Weber concepts" at *precisely those points* ("asceticism") at which those (*purely terminological*) differences exist between us [7]—differences that he exploited for the purposes of creating a "polemical" effect. Even now R. continues to pursue this line occasionally. [7a]. But when he goes on to say (col. 731) that both Troeltsch and I "recognize (sic) that 'asceticism' suggests different kinds of ideas to each of us," the attempt to attribute this "recognition" to the merits of his "critique" can deceive no one except those who have read neither the works of Troeltsch nor my own. Troeltsch deliberately spoke of asceticism in *Lutheranism*, whereas I had made quite clear that my

quite different concept of asceticism not only did *not* apply to Lutheranism (or certain other Protestant communities), but indeed was in marked contrast to it. There was therefore no need of any “spirit to arise from the grave”—or rather, from the inkpot—to establish *this* terminological distinction. Indeed, even the most superficial reader could not help seeing (and Rachfahl *had* seen it) that this was a case of differences of terminology rather than of substance. Without wasting another word, I therefore leave it to anyone who can spare the time to compare with this clear statement of the facts the little tricks by which Rachfahl *even now*, in spite of everything, that is, even after Troeltsch and I have explicitly stated our position, is still trying to show that he “knows better.” [8]

It is time to bring this really rather silly controversy about terminology to a conclusion. As the reader will recall, I *did* make it plain, and I am happy to *reiterate* it, that of course the expression “innerwordly asceticism” is available to *anyone* else to use as they see fit. I do this because Rachfahl, as usual, makes no mention of this to his readers, and, in what can only be described as his customary “spiteful” tone, attributes to me a desire to assert “paternal rights” over my mode of *expression* (although such expression is dictated by the subject matter, as I have explained at length).

Admittedly, it is a very different matter when we come to matters of *fact*. We shall have more to say about this in connection with my positive résumé (Section II). At the present juncture, however, we need to emphasize that the same sloppy kind of polemic, which shies away from an honest admission of its own superficiality, runs through R.’s entire response.

R. assures us that he neither asserted that *toleration* was the bearer of the capitalist spirit, nor that it was the effective cause of capitalist development. This is despite the fact (in addition to the remarks in his critique, which I have quoted with *complete* accuracy) that he again gives an assurance on the *same* column (bottom of col. 756), where he states: “It (toleration) was the soil that the capitalist spirit *needed*, in order for it to take firm root and not simply wither away; that is not invention [*Konstruktion*] but a historical fact [9]”. No, even if, making allowances for Rachfahl’s quibbling, we substitute the word “condition” for “cause,” that is *neither* a fact *nor* a (meaningful!) invention [*Konstruktion*],

but a quite superficial assertion, and one that reveals that he has failed to grapple with the real problems.

The capitalist spirit (as defined by *Rachfahl's* own words) ran riot in Venice, Genoa, Florence, Flanders, and large parts of France in the late Middle Ages, and—for example—even in Seville in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and yet the intolerance there, which was a matter of course at that time, did it no harm at all as such. It is clear to anyone familiar with Spanish economic history that the sources of the decay of Seville really lay in the well-known conflicts of the uncompromisingly Catholic city with church and state. (This applies, at least, to the extent that the distinctive character of Catholicism was involved in it—as indeed it was, to a considerable degree.) In particular, intolerance did *no harm at all* to the “economic supermen” singled out by *Rachfahl* as the true “bearers” of the capitalist spirit, that is, the really powerful bankers and monopolists (who, as we all recognize, have come to terms with it with relative ease from earliest times). The Fuggers as well as, for example, the big capitalists in Seville and elsewhere in the sixteenth century enjoyed outstanding success in business despite the greatest intolerance; the Peruzzi and the Bardi and others like them in the intolerant Middle Ages did the same, and so too did the English and Dutch big capitalists of similar type in both intolerant and tolerant countries. The long period of extremely far-reaching practical “toleration” shown by the Norman state failed to shift [*hinwegzuziehen*] the center of gravity of medieval Mediterranean capitalism from the thoroughly ecclesiastical and “intolerant” cities of Upper Italy to the Sicilian cities. Neither did the almost complete toleration practiced by the Roman Empire (within the bounds of “Staatsräson”) prevent the decline of either the specifically ancient capitalist “spirit” or that of ancient capitalism itself. Finally (another point that *Rachfahl*, in his eagerness, has simply forgotten), the fact that Protestant England—whether Anglican or Presbyterian —(as well as New England) was, in principle, just as intolerant as any Catholic state [10] was no obstacle to the rise of the capitalist spirit (in *Rachfahl's* general, unhistorical sense). By contrast, where this was permitted at all, the *existence* of the Puritans (whether officially tolerated or not), as well as their *rule* [*Herrschaft*], whether intolerant or tolerant, did in general promote *precisely that* “nuance” (to use R.’s word) of the capitalist spirit, which to me is of crucial importance.

It is precisely *this* “nuance,” *not* the existence of Rachfahl’s big financiers, whose development was broken by the intolerant *Catholic* state, for example, France, when it revoked the Edict of Nantes, a fact that was well known to contemporaries, and, of course, especially to Colbert. In a word: Protestantism, and especially ascetic Protestantism, whether tolerated, tolerant or intolerant, *helped* the capitalist spirit *both* in its general (Rachfahl’s) sense *and* in my specific understanding of the term, to take root. *Nowhere* has Catholicism, whether tolerated or dominant, *furthered its growth*. If anyone thinks differently, let him produce the evidence. Toleration achieved this, as Rachfahl now admits, only where toleration, as such, assisted the capitalist spirit to take root. This, however, *could* only occur where certain sections of the population were *bearers* of that (*specific*) spirit *for precisely religious reasons connected with some kind of intolerance*. And according to R.’s own words, this is simply *not* the case for those big financiers, since they are found in all ages and in all states, tolerant and intolerant alike.

To conclude—in modern times, intolerant Catholicism was only fatal for the capitalist spirit in the following two instances.

Firstly, where it eliminated the *heretical bearers of the middle-class [bürgerliche] business spirit*, and, to repeat: it is *no accident*, as contemporaries (for example, Petty) knew, that ascetic heretics, or at least those suspected of heresy, were such bearers “κατ’ ἑοικωσιν.”<sup>5</sup> (There were examples of this as early as the Middle Ages, incidentally, such as the *Humiliati*—to whom I have already referred—but they were more common in the Reformation and Counter-Reformation periods.)

Secondly, Catholicism was also fatal for the capitalist spirit where it enforced the foundation of monasteries and thus eliminated the accumulation of property acquired from private business life (something which, as my essay emphasized, was brought about *even* in the monasteries by the ascetic *method* of living), and diverted it into a “dead channel” (from the point of view of *private* capitalism). At the same time (and this is something which interests us particularly) those *people* whose rational, ascetic character [*Eigenart*] (a product of disposition and upbringing) would have specifically *predisposed* them to make a “vocation,” were, in a manner of speaking, taken *out* of the world by Catholicism, away from “divinely willed” work, and directed into monastic cells.

Thus, what pure toleration as such, that is, *apart from* the question of what kind of religiosity it benefited, could actually mean for the development of the capitalist economy and frequently has in fact meant for it, was precisely what *I* had previously said in my essays and what Rachfahl attempted to imitate, without even being capable of doing so accurately. This was, firstly: under certain circumstances it [that is, toleration] retained [*erhielt*] within the country not only inhabitants but also—in some cases—assets that would otherwise have been driven away by intolerance. [11] Secondly: it benefited the capitalist “spirit” (however we define it) in those instances (and *only* those) where it was *toleration* that was keeping the specific bearers of this spirit in the country. That is to say, people who as such, that is, as already stated, *because this “spirit” was connected with the particular nature of their religiosity*, would not have survived in a climate of intolerance. This was the case with the representatives of ascetic Protestantism. Thirdly: it is, however, nonsense to maintain, as Rachfahl does merely in order to prove that he is “in the right,” that religious intolerance, *as such*, could undermine any “spirit of capitalism” which was *not* anchored in religion. Where has it done this? Where could it have done this? And why would it have attempted to do so? It did, after all, allow the Florentines and all the later big capitalists to pursue their business in peace, *provided that* they gave the required obedience to the Church. Indeed, the Church did business *with* them, and made colossal amounts of money by doing so. But enough has surely now been said on this subject!

I have no intention, if I can help it, of letting pass without scrutiny a single one of the significant points he makes in the course of his polemic, characterized as it is by the “spirit” of an embarrassing lack of disingenuousness (for however improbable such a degree of negligence might appear, there is *not a single one* of them that is not based on distortion, superficial reading, or worse). I therefore propose to indicate a number of such individual points in a footnote [11a], and conclude this polemical section of the essay with just a few more particularly egregious examples of the sort of thing he believes he is entitled to permit himself.

In lengthy, quibbling, and (in my view) trivial detail (cols. 777 ff.), Rachfahl attempts—*despite* his express denial of this intention, which, along with his own

quotations from my essay, he promptly forgets about in the next column—to impress the opinion on his readers that I have either *denied* the significance of those features of the capitalist spirit that have been proper to the bearers of capitalism at *all* times, or have *only* spoken of the capitalist spirit when the ascetic features which I have described as being involved in the birth of the modern capitalist spirit were present. [12] I have already demonstrated to Rachfahl in my “rebuttal” that this is not correct, and that in my essays I limited my task in precisely the manner stated in the rebuttal. R.’s readers, however, are now presented with a version of this fact (a fact which even he can no longer deny—col. 779) which states that *I* was *now* admitting—evidently because of Rachfahl’s critique!—that the component analyzed by me “did not remotely suffice as an explanation of the capitalist system (sic) of the modern period.” This offering, itself “a bit rich” in view of the above-quoted passages from my essays, is thrown into the shade by the sentence immediately following it, according to which I am supposed to have “admitted” that “the capitalist spirit with which I am concerned *in no way relates to* big capitalist development.” What I actually said will no doubt be recalled by *readers* of my essays (although admittedly his “critique” and the “rebuttal” are not designed for them). I said that an accumulation of wealth acquired through a specifically “ascetic” conduct of life unfailingly tends to break the power of asceticism—as the repeated “reformations” of the medieval monasteries (to which I had referred as parallels) show, and as the Puritans, the Quakers, the Baptists, the Mennonites, and the Pietists understood only too clearly from their own experience. It may not be true of the upstart **selfmade** [sic] **man**<sup>6</sup> himself, but it is certainly the case that it is *even* rarer for his sons or grandsons, unaided, simply to resist “temptation,” or the “world” (in this case, *indulging in the consumption* [*genussfrohen*] of acquired wealth), than did the medieval monasteries that had become wealthy.

It is one of the achievements of ascetic Protestantism that it works against this tendency, that it resists, in particular, “idolatrous” tendencies. These include securing the “splendor familiae” by converting wealth into real estate and using it to generate *rental income*, the “seigneurial” pleasure in the “high life,” the heady delights of aesthetic enjoyment, “living it up,” and the pretentious craving for ostentatious display. And it is these tendencies, which are abhorred by ascetic Protestantism, which in turn constantly give rise to the danger of “capitalist weariness”: the inclination to use one’s wealth for purposes *other than* those of “building up capital” [*Erwerbskapital*], and which therefore work against the

capitalist “spirit” (in *whatever* sense one uses the term); every one of these characteristics, whenever they are found in entrepreneurs, is an obstacle to its full development, and hinders “capital formation.” And at the same time, these characteristics are precisely the kind which tend to cling in equal measure to *all* those with great wealth or income, whether feudal landlords [*Rentengrundherren*], or those who live on interest [*Kuponschneidern*], or highly paid state or court officials, or the really big capitalists. Perhaps, though, this is necessarily less true of the latter, if they wish to *remain* “capitalists” in the precise commercial sense of the word, than of all the others. For their wealth is *deprived* of its capitalist generative power in parallel with the growth of “unproductive” consumption (to use today’s imprecise terminology). On the other hand, the private capitalist motives that drive a big capitalist of this type (one who is *not* under the influence of the ascetic method of living), for example, the conscious and deliberate striving for the expansion of his economic sphere of achievement, in other words, the striving to use his economic resources of power “to achieve something in the world,” is *common* to *both* the style of life which is emancipated from all religious determining factors *and* the style of life which I have analyzed. It should be added that the direction of his striving is determined by the nature of the means that must inevitably be employed in the sphere of commerce.

All that is lacking is the decisive *foundation in personal life*. For the optimism which has been customary since the Enlightenment, and which later reached its climax in “liberalism,” was no more than a *socially* oriented surrogate: it is a substitute for the “in majorem Dei gloriam.” It is, however, no substitute for the *personal* significance of “proof” [*Bewährung*], which, when applied in a purely this-worldly [*diesseitig*] sense, exhibits a tendency to turn into a struggle pure and simple, or to join the ranks of the various elements of trivial bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] complacency (see my essay). All those specific characteristics that really fit a life that is completely imbued with something one might call the “spirit” of capitalism: the “objectivity” [*Sachlichkeit*] that is cool and lacking in humanity, the “calculation,” the rational consistency, the serious approach to work with no trace of any naive attitude to life, and the specialist [*fachmenschliche*] narrowness, in fact all those characteristics that have always provoked emotional antichrematist sentiments when viewed from the artistic, the ethical, and particularly the purely human angle—all these characteristics, in the eyes of serious-minded people, lack a convincing ethical justification, which, as I have indicated, tends to be replaced, if at all, by all kinds of surrogates, which



can easily be recognized as such.

In this situation, capitalism *can*, of course, exist quite comfortably, but either, as it increasingly does today, as a fatalistically accepted inevitability, or, as in the Enlightenment period, including modern-style liberalism, legitimated as somehow the *relatively* optimum means of making (roughly in the sense of Leibniz's theodicy) the *relative* best of the *relatively* best of all worlds. But capitalism *no longer* appears to the most serious-minded people as the outward expression of a style of life founded on a final, single, and comprehensible unity of the personality. And it would be a great mistake to believe that this fact will be without consequences for the position of capitalism within the total culture: firstly, for capitalism's *effects*, but also for its own inner essence and, ultimately, for its destiny.

What I said about those characteristics of the "capitalist spirit" which were *not* influenced by Protestant asceticism was therefore in fact not the sort of rubbish suggested by Rachfahl, such as that the big capitalists in particular "have no place in modern economic history" and the like, but firstly: that economic "supermen" (if I may retain the expression for the sake of brevity) exhibited far fewer of the *specific* ascetic characteristics of the capitalist ethic of the calling even in the Reformation period, and that these characteristics can far less easily be studied in them than (at that time) in the rising bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] middle classes. This can of course be explained, not only by the previously mentioned specific "temptations" to which they in particular were exposed, but also by, among other things [13], the simple fact that having once found themselves in this position of power, with the opportunities of political and aesthetic horizons such power offers, they were *capable of enduring* the inner situation of "beyond good and evil": of being cut loose from the ethical and ecclesiastical obligations of conscience, in a way that, to judge from all the experience of history, was far more difficult for the bourgeoisie [*Bürgertum*], which was at that time rising to power in the modern state institutions [*Staatenverbänden*], *if* it was inwardly to grow into the "spirit" of capitalism, and construct its style of life according to the dictates of this spirit.

Secondly: I also said that the mere "auri sacra fames," the striving for money,

has always been present in all periods of history, and is not somehow peculiar to the “capitalist class”; it has been at least as widespread outside of it as within it, and still is; indeed, the Oriental small-time dealer, the *barcaiuolo*, the coachman, the waiter, the porter in modern Italy and other countries (with the significant exception of those under predominantly Puritan influence), similarly the “impoverished farmer,” etc.—they all have it *in far greater measure* than the “capitalist” type, who, if he is to be continually successful, is generally characterized by at least either (1) devotion to the “cause” or (2) rational self-control. The achievement of the “innerworldly asceticism” was the creation of unified *basic motives* for the cultivation of these qualities. With typical overconfidence, Rachfahl now replies to my pointing out his ignorant coarsening of the problems with which we are concerned by saying that he is well aware of “the weakness of the psychological position (sic) of the *acquisitive drive*.” If I may say so, he knows *nothing of the kind*, otherwise he would not have argued against me in his “critique” in favor of the strength of this very instinct (in those *other than* the Puritans) in the wide-ranging and blunt sense that I rejected. But then, despite this—or precisely because of it—“he knows best.” He has appropriated some of what I said in reply (which he could have found explored in detail in my essay, if only he had read it with even a modicum of care): not enough, however, to prevent him reiterating the very same platitudes *now* in various places in his “response.” All he can do is cheerfully to ramble on, in what one might call a “worldly-wise” manner, about how the raising of this “drive” out of the sphere of the “naively instinctual” to the level of the “rational” was by no means “merely” the work of the “*reformed* ethic of the calling” (to which I by no means restricted myself, as is well known!). Do we find any hint or suggestion as to whose work it might otherwise be? We do not! [14]

The level of his argument is no higher when dealing with what I have called the “ascetic compulsion to save,” whose ethical emphasis forms the negative complement to that rationalization and ethical transfiguration of the striving for profit as a calling through innerworldly asceticism. Rachfahl now makes the astonishing discovery that the accumulation of capital (which, by the way—something that he is evidently unaware of, even though any first-year student of *Nationalökonomie* knows it—is in no way identical to the amassing of great “wealth,” as he seems to think)—in other words, *saving*, involves the “spirit of thrift.” And since it has always been necessary to “save” in order to accumulate capital, it follows that innerworldly asceticism represents nothing “new” as regards this function either. This follows the pattern of the “acquisitive drive,”

which has always existed, and which, we recall, therefore needed no “support” from the ethic of the calling, which I have been analyzing. I do not wish to add anything to the profundity of this argument.

The rather excessively “clumsy paws” of the practitioner of this so-called historical criticism are probably incapable of grasping the simple, but, as I have shown, fundamentally important fact that against the “Thou shalt not lay up treasures on earth,” and thus “Deo placere non potest” of medieval Catholicism, it was the characteristic, and, if you will, paradoxical, achievement of asceticism, to preach *precisely that* biblical text which is directed *against* saving, but *at the same time*, thanks to the conduct of life it promotes, repeatedly to create those abominated “treasures” with a force and continuity never before seen, and to protect them from naively hedonistic consumption (*as long as* its “spirit” kept the upper hand over “temptation”). [15]

I leave it to the reader’s imagination to judge what one should think of Rachfahl’s assurance, on the one hand, that in his critique he distinguished, “just as I did,” between “the spiritual driving forces and the capitalist spirit in Weber’s sense,” and, on the other, his statement that the characteristics *of* the capitalist spirit of the modern age are “the same as they have been in all ages” (col. 786). Again, on the one hand, he states that the characteristics emphasized by me are only a “nuance” of that “spirit,” which “also” (sic) belongs to the modern age (and to what other eras?), and that in particular the “influence of the methodical conduct of life [*Lebensführung*] is quite modest” (col. 762), indeed, in the case of many “capitalist phenomena” (sic), it is “not possible” that the motives analyzed by me could have had any influence (col. 787); of course, not the slightest attempt is made to indicate *which* phenomena this could apply to. On the other hand, he asserts that no one has any doubt—and thus, he implies, I have said nothing new here—about the existence of an “inner relationship between Calvinism” (which, as we have said, is too narrow) “and capitalism.” Even less (he continues) does anyone doubt the leading role of Puritanism in forming the American style of life. Yet R. in his “critique” *had* most seriously questioned this role, with regard to the aspects of this style of life specific to this context, namely, the importance of the Puritan ethic of the calling for business life. *Even now* he disputes this influence—although few support him in this, quite apart from the evidence in my essay in the *Christliche Welt*, from which I

have already frequently quoted, but which R. persists in ignoring.

The very same thing applies, of course, when, without even the flimsiest of reasons, and without so much as an explanation, he simply out of the blue assures his readers in the manner of the “connoisseur” that the capitalist has always been a “man of the calling” (col. 786), that there were *no* misgivings *whatsoever* regarding enjoyment in the Calvinist ethic (col. 710), that the “ethical conception of the calling [*Beruf* ] had not been first produced by Reformed (sic) morality” (col. 783), that ascetic misgivings toward enjoyment were “not at all typical of the modern capitalist class,” especially in *my* sense, as he makes a point of adding (cols. 728, 748), and that “the ethic of the calling, even one which was religious in character,” had existed even before the Reformation. I, however, firstly, have demonstrated that even the *name* “Beruf” [“calling”] was quite specifically a product of the translation of the Bible, and, originating from purely religious meanings, then became secularized. Secondly, I have analyzed on numerous occasions the differences between both the Thomist and the Lutheran positions toward what since the Reformation has been known as the “Beruf” [“calling”] and that of ascetic Protestantism, without R. making even the slightest vestige of an attempt to question it. Instead, he has had the effrontery to simply affirm that this is nothing but an assertion on my part.

In column 779, and frequently elsewhere, when commenting on what I say about the specific significance of the ascetic Protestantism of the seventeenth century [16] for the bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] middle classes, which were in the ascendant at *precisely* the time and place where it flourished, he appears unaware that I had already said this before, for the most part word for word, in my essay. Let the reader be the judge of what one should think of this. He then adds a further twist when he tries to suggest that when I talk about “bourgeois middle classes” [*bürgerlich*] I am thinking of “mere artisans” [*Flickschuster*]. [17] Perhaps this example of Rachfahl’s efforts is a good point to conclude the analysis.

We might just add that R. expresses the opinion that if I write an essay on the “spirit of capitalism” and in so doing deal with *one* particular “nuance” of it, this is as though a writer were to declare in an article about “the horse” that he intended to deal only with the “gray.” I would refer the “critic,” who is as witty

(evidently) as he is forgetful (as we have already noted), to the *title* of my essay, namely: the Protestant ethic *and* the spirit of capitalism. This of course implies: not the *totality* of both (otherwise R. could have accused me of only talking about the “gray” because on the subject of *ethics*, for example, I did not deal with Luther’s sexual ethics or similar matters), but dealt rather with *the relationship* between the two. From this it follows, of course, that I have only dealt with that which can be considered as either causative of, or caused by, the other. In my experience, it always bodes ill for any controversy when the polemicist, in order to give at least a semblance of being “in the right,” is forced to resort to the tactic of making himself look *even more* foolish than (as in the present case) he actually is.

## II. [POSITIVE RÉSUMÉ]

Enough of all these polemics. I am completely forgetting that R.<sup>7</sup> has done me the great kindness of giving me a useful lesson in how I could have done things better. In column 780, bottom, and column 781, top, he informs me that I should have written: “Under the influence of the Reformed ‘ethic of the calling’ a certain subspecies of capitalist spirit developed in the course of the modern age; I propose to investigate its origin, the limits of its expansion, and the nature of its particular quality, that is, to attempt to discover whether the capitalist spirit which has created the capitalist economic system of the present (sic) has received certain characteristics from this source which are of vital importance for its essence.” In other words: firstly, I should have made an assumption that elsewhere R. himself abhors, namely, that some “capitalist spirit” (however defined) had created the capitalist economic *system* out of itself *alone*—a purely spiritualist construction that I have expressly rejected in my essays. Secondly, if I understand him rightly, I should have made the *assumption* (even though this was the very thing that I had set out to *prove*) that the Reformed ethic of the calling (we will let R.’s “pars pro toto” pass) crucially influenced the formation of a “subspecies of the capitalist spirit” (we will let this expression pass as well). Thirdly, that I should do something that I could definitely not pursue in this essay in its whole conception, in some respects not at all, and in others not yet (that is, not in those parts which are so far the only ones to have been published), namely, that I should investigate the limits of its *expansion*. Fourthly, that I should have investigated the question (wrongly posed, compare point 1) as to the “qualitative characteristics of the capitalist spirit.” If I had done this, I would have (fifthly) oriented my problem in a manner which simply *did not correspond to* my intentions: for it was not the promotion of capitalist expansion that *primarily* interested me, but the development of the *type of humanity* [*Menschentum*] that was created by the coincidence of religiously and economically determined components. This I said clearly at the conclusion of my essays.

It has since become clear that, in order to carry out the program he proposes, as far as it is meaningful, it would have been most important to begin my investigations with a *definition* of everything that the complex concept “spirit of

capitalism” can contain, as without this it would be quite impossible to establish the existence of a “subspecies.” I have, however, said in my essay why I have not done this and why I could never do so, if I were not to do violence to history from the outset. A specifically historical formation such as the one that we are positing under that name, and which is at first undefined, can only achieve conceptual clarity—and I see no sign of any attempt to refute these arguments—by means of a synthesis of its individual components such as the reality of history offers. This should happen in such a way that out of the reality of the historically given, we may select the most precise and consistent form of those individual features whose effects are frequently indirect, or refracted, and may be more or less consistent and complete, and more or less mixed with a variety of others. These we then combine where they belong together and thus produce the concept of the “ideal type,” a construction of ideas to which the *factual* average content of the historical only *approaches* to varying degrees. In truth, every historian, consciously or (usually) unconsciously, constantly employs concepts *of this kind*, if he uses clear-cut “concepts” at all. On this subject I have often expressed myself elsewhere, without ever having been contradicted (though of course I do not imagine that this by no means simple problem was somehow finally “solved” by these methodological experiments—on the contrary, I have every reason to consider my previous work along these lines to be extremely modest).

In the present case, at any rate, I could only take as my starting point, given a highly complex historical phenomenon, what was *concretely given*, and gradually, by eliminating anything “inessential” for the concept (one which is necessarily formed by isolating and abstracting), attempt to grasp this concept.

Accordingly, I proceeded as follows. Firstly, by citing examples I reminded the reader of the fact (which no one has hitherto doubted) of the striking congruence between Protestantism and modern capitalism: for example, capitalist-oriented choice of calling and capitalist “prosperity.” Secondly, by way of illustration, I presented some examples of *such* ethical maxims of life (Franklin) as we judge to be indubitably generated by the “capitalist spirit,” and posed the question as to how these ethical maxims of life differ from divergent ones, especially those of the Middle Ages. Thirdly, I attempted, again by means of examples, to *illustrate* the manner in which such mental attitudes related causally to the economic system of modern capitalism. At the same time, fourthly, I arrived at the idea of the “calling” [*Beruf* ], and called to mind the quite specific elective affinity

which has long been established (especially by Gothein) between Calvinism (together with Quakerism and similar sects) and capitalism, and at the same time attempted to show that our modern concept of the calling is in some way grounded in religion.

The problem then arose, *not* for the entire series of essays as originally planned (as I explicitly stated at the end), but for those studies which were to be published in the *immediately* following numbers of the *Archiv*, namely, what is the relationship of the various branches of Protestantism to the development of the idea of the calling as regards the specific significance of this idea for the development of those *ethical* qualities of the individual which influence his suitability for capitalism? Of course, the question only made sense if such religiously determined specific ethical qualities actually existed. The nature of these qualities could, in the first instance, only be illustrated in general by means of examples. In connection with the investigation of the problem itself, I therefore had to find, by probing ever deeper, evidence (complementing what had already been said as the problem unfolded) *that* such qualities did in fact exist in certain elements of Protestant ethics, *what* these were, which *types* of Protestantism were able to develop them to a particularly high level, and *in what way* they differed from the qualities which were in part taught, in part merely tolerated, by the medieval Church and by other variants of Protestantism.

In dealing with the problem itself, therefore, we had firstly to seek to locate (as far as a theological layman is able) the theoretical and dogmatic anchoring of the ethic in the individual branches of Protestantism, in order to show that we were not talking about purely accessory matters which had no connection with the thought content of the religiosity. Secondly, however (and this is very *different*), to investigate what *practical, psychological* motives for real ethical *conduct* were contained in the character of the religiosity of each of them. Quite apart from all his other distortions and superficialities, Rachfahl has not even been able to grasp the fact that these two questions *refer to quite separate matters*. It may indeed, from the practical point of view, be important and interesting to discover what kind of ethical ideals the Church *doctrine* of Catholicism, of Luther, of Calvin, and others contains and to what extent these doctrines agree or conflict with each other, or whether certain kinds of conduct, which were instilled in a practical and psychological manner by ascetic Protestantism, were,



as Rachfahl claims, “demanded of the Catholic layman too” (not only of the monk) by the theory of the Church, or “were valid” for him. What he fails to understand, however, is that by establishing such matters, he has told us *absolutely nothing* about whether the particular type of religiosity was also fitted to create in its followers the *psychological vehicles to generate conduct* typical of that church doctrine (or conduct that was in fact quite different, or conduct that exaggerated the doctrine in certain unilateral directions). As I myself have demonstrated, there has, of course, at all times been (for example) frequent praise and commendation for conscientious *labor* performed by the layman in the world, both from theoreticians of ethics and from medieval preachers (Berthold of Regensburg and likewise others), although primitive Christianity essentially shared the view of antiquity regarding “labor” [18]—as Harnack pointed out in a short essay. Luther’s statements along the same lines are well known.

There has certainly been no lack of teaching of the blessings of labor in the world from sources outside ascetic Protestantism. But of what use is this if (as in Lutheranism) there are no *premiums*—in this case, *psychological premiums*—for following these theoretical teachings in a methodically consistent manner? Or if (as in Catholicism) far greater rewards are applied to *quite different* kinds of conduct, and, moreover, in the institution of confession a means is available which permits the individual again and again to unburden himself from absolutely every kind of transgression against the Church’s precepts? [19] By contrast, Calvinism, in its development since the latter part of the sixteenth century (and likewise the Baptist movement), created, in the idea of the necessity of ascetic *proof* [*Bewährung*], in life in general and especially in working life [*Berufsleben*], a very specific and, in its effectiveness in *this* area, a psychological premium [*Prämie*] for the ascetic method of life which it demanded, which could scarcely be bettered in *this* sphere. Such a reward was a subjective guarantee of the *certitudo salutis* (that is, not as *real* grounds, but as one of the most important grounds upon which one could *recognize* one’s election for salvation).

In my essays I felt obliged to demonstrate *these facts* and to set out the method of life that followed from them. I did this, in accordance with the aim of such an analysis, primarily with regard to its *specific* characteristics and inner

consistency, although it is certainly true that not every *individual* who grew up in the atmosphere created by these religious powers was completely *conscious* of the absolutely unbroken unity of this method of life or fully aware of the connections [*Zusammenhang*].

Both in my essay in this *Archiv*, and in the sketch in *Christliche Welt* (mentioned on numerous occasions), I have briefly attempted to illuminate more graphically what powerful support these motives also found in the *social* institutions of the Church and in those influenced by the churches and sects. I recapitulate. Firstly, for “ascetic Protestantism” the central ritual act of the Lord’s Supper gained a very specific accent. The idea that anyone who does not belong to God’s invisible church and still participates in this act, “eateth and drinketh damnation to himself,”<sup>8</sup> carries an emotional charge whose import, even for the majority of “Christians” among us, has been almost entirely lost, although it can perfectly well be brought back to life through the youthful reminiscences of the generation which is now dying out, and through what remains of that earnest Church attachment which has (from our perspective) been swept to one side.

What is lacking in ascetic Protestantism is simply (and this is certainly no accident!) the institution of confession, which affords *relief* to the Catholic from the pressure of the emotional [*pathetischen*] questioning of his individual qualification. Here too, as elsewhere, the problem of whether he was among the qualified ones was not answered for the Protestant in the medieval Catholic fashion by reckoning guilt and merit and weighing them up against each other, resulting in a plus or minus that was more or less acceptable, and which could then be complemented by the use of the Church’s means of grace. For the Protestant (and, as I have shown, especially the ascetic Protestant), the question was answered by a strict either-or of the entire *personality*, as it manifested itself in the totality of the ethical conduct of life. Here, for the first time, once again infinitely more starkly on the ground of ascetic Protestantism than on the ground of Lutheranism (as I have also justified in detail), the individual is left to face his God with nothing to rely on but himself and his own state of grace, which can only be evidenced by the whole conduct of his life.

On the other hand, again, his external pattern of life in this situation is very

much more subject to *control by his fellows*: by the members of the congregation. In Catholicism and also in Lutheranism, it is ultimately only the representative of the “office” who has to agree between himself and the individual communicant as to whether the latter is ready to partake of the Lord’s Supper. In Calvinism, *every individual member* of the entire congregation bears the responsibility for ensuring that the “glory of God”—to which end, after all, the whole life of society is *unambiguously* directed with the *kind* of force that is foreign to the other great churches—is not defiled by the participation of one who evidently bears the signs of damnation upon him. Scarcely a generation ago, it was the laypeople who created the Kuyper schism<sup>9</sup> (Kuyper was a lay elder) by demanding that confirmands who in their opinion were not qualified, although they had been examined by external preachers, be turned away from the Communion. Ultimately, what lay behind this was a protest in principle against intervention in this question, one which directly affected every individual member of the congregation, by any authority whatever that did not belong to a concrete *community* of the Lord’s Supper [*Abendmahlsgemeinschaft*] with control over the correct management of its own affairs.

Probably the clearest example of the powerful social significance of these thought processes emerged in the churches of New England, where the demand for the *ecclesia pura* and for the purity, in particular, of the congregation of the Lord’s Supper provoked real “class distinctions” in the truest sense, and brought about struggles and compromises concerning the position of those who claimed to be Christians, including, among other things, their right to bring their children to baptism and to represent them there.

When one looks at the church orders of Protestantism, follows their development and practical implementation (as far as one can), and considers the consequences of all this, what first strikes one is the way in which quite large parts of the moral regulation of life had been taken over by the churches. In the Carolingian period these powers were exercised by the *Sendgericht*,<sup>10</sup> in the late Middle Ages frequently by the cities, and in the period of the territorial states by the royal police. The extent to which the churches had done this varied, of course, and on the whole it occurred less strongly in the Lutheran territories than in the Calvinist territories, where the particular *subjection* to Church discipline on acceptance into the congregation, as I already indicated previously, actually

became more significant *after* Calvin.

However—as I have already emphasized—far stronger and more effective *still* was that kind of ethical “**training**” that the ascetic *sects* imposed on their members. (Remnants of this can still be found to day.) I have given an account of some of this on the basis of recent observations in the United States in my essay in *Christliche Welt*. The present secularization of American life and the tremendous immigration of heterogeneous elements are rapidly sweeping such remnants away, and the ruthless “fishing for souls” of the competing denominations further weakens the intensity of their educational achievement. Nevertheless, even now the observer can scarcely fail to see the remnants of these once so effective phenomena with his own eyes. I refer the reader to what I said in the essay on the function of the sects in economic life (one which today is gradually being taken over by all kinds of purely secular organizations). I should like to refer in particular, for example (rather than cite numerous similar experiences), to the case of the young man who (so I was informed) was motivated to join a Baptist congregation in North Carolina by his intention to open a bank. On inquiring further I was informed that he was not so concerned about attracting clients from the Baptist community, but rather those who were *not* sect members in that area (the overwhelming majority). The reason was that anyone who wished to be admitted to baptism had to submit, as part of his “catechismal instruction” to quite astonishingly systematic questioning from the congregation concerning his conduct (frequenting the inn? ever drunk? ever play cards? ever led an “unclean life”? wasteful? checks not paid punctually? other debts? any traces whatever of unreliability in business? etc., etc.), with inquiries being made at the locations of all his previous residences. If he were received into membership, then his creditworthiness and his business qualification were thereby guaranteed to such an extent that he could beat any competitor who did not enjoy such legitimation, especially since (as with all sects) exclusion on grounds of bad behavior would mean social excommunication. [20]

We find the same development as much as two centuries ago. Furthermore, for example, the Quakers have always prided themselves on having created the system of “fixed prices,” which is so important for capitalism, to replace Oriental-style bargaining. In fact, historical investigation shows that two hundred years ago the flourishing of the Quaker retail businesses was due to the

confidence customers felt that this principle would be adhered to, a confidence greater than any medieval or modern pricing system was able to produce. The Quaker community also intervened if anyone started a business without having the necessary capital or knowledge to run it. Further examples could be given. And in the literature of all these sects, quite soon after their founding, one can find rejoicing at the fact that the Lord was visibly blessing them because the “children of the world” brought their money (as deposit, as investment, or whatever) to them rather than to those who shared the same religion, or shared their lack of one, because in the sects they were more confident of finding the personal ethical guarantees they required. For similar examples I refer the reader to that sketch, and would only make the following remarks. Everyone knows that right up until recent decades (and the same attitude is still sometimes found today) the Yankee of more or less the old school, *especially the businessman*, found it unacceptable that a man might not belong to any “denomination” at all (he didn’t particularly mind *which* one he belonged to: he was absolutely “tolerant” in this respect). He found a religious **outlaw** of this kind to be suspect both socially and in business, *because* he was not ethically “legitimated.” A similar phenomenon existed in Scotland and in middle-class [*bürgerlich*] English circles (and still persists here and there, as the tourist could be reminded, as recently as fifteen years ago, especially on Sundays). Today, the middle-ranking American businessman has withdrawn from this once-overpowering pressure for religious legitimation and instead has at his disposal any number of other organizations, of which more and more are being formed all the time. Legitimation now arises from having been voted into membership and therefore having the qualities of a “gentleman.” He often still wears the organization’s “badge” in his buttonhole. (The attentive observer will see these badges, which are reminiscent of the rosettes of the Legion of Honor, in huge numbers.)

As long as the genuine Yankee spirit reigned, and wherever it reigned, American democracy, even without its trusts and trade unions, was never just a collection of isolated individuals thrown together like a heap of sand, but was to a high degree a tangle of *exclusive* associations, whose prototype was the *sect*, and which cultivated those qualities that make up the business gentleman needed by capitalism, demanding such qualities as a self-evident condition of membership. Of course, someone in the situation of Mr. Pierpont Morgan has no need of this legitimation to establish his own economic standing. And in other ways, too, things look very different today. But the penetration of the whole of life with that specific “spirit” demanded by these associations was an extremely important condition enabling modern capitalism to “take root,” that is, to find a “style of

life” adequate to it in the broad stratum of the bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] middle classes, and finally in the masses who had to adapt to its mechanism. Modern capitalism thereby succeeded in gaining control of life in the way that we know it has done.

Understandably, historians of Rachfahl’s type have no notion of the degree of training that was necessary to make this possible. [21] If, however, anyone should ask himself the question (a “natural” one for those of Rachfahl’s ilk who pride themselves on their common sense) of whether the propensity of this form of religious **training** to produce businesspeople, indeed this whole complex relationship between business and religion, was not simply the *result* of these religious communities having developed in a “milieu” that was already capitalist, then I ask: Why did the Catholic Church not develop these combinations and a type of training similarly oriented toward capitalism? Yet it did not do so in the great cities (*Zentren*) of the Middle Ages, like Florence, which, heaven knows, were far more “developed” in a capitalist sense than, for example, the still thinly populated farming region in the west of North Carolina, about which I have spoken, or the regions of the American colonies which were still essentially based on a barter economy, in which as early as two hundred years previously the same development occurred. And why not Lutheranism?

There was simply a marriage between a strand of psychological elements, which originated from quite specific moral and *religious* roots, and capitalist *opportunities* for development. It is true, on the other hand, that in areas of mixed religion the style of life of the ascetic communities that was cultivated with such immense energy, despite all the violent clashes [22], nevertheless “rubbed off on” the style of life of *rival* denominations from the start. This occurred increasingly as economic life became evermore permeated with the capitalist spirit. It did so at a very early stage for Dutch and American Lutheranism, and also for American Catholicism (while in Germany, of course, the older Pietism had the same effect on Lutheranism there).

Naturally, this happened in such a way that en route to this “adaptation” [*Angleichung*], the differences were only reduced step by step, never completely obliterated. [23] However, all the evidence indicates that the Protestants among

them almost always did adapt to the *most consistent* versions of Protestant asceticism (especially the Calvinist variety). For this reason, if for no other, mere statistics of the numbers of true Calvinists among, for example, the Protestant emigrants, would be no argument against the significance of those ascetic forms of life. Discussions currently in progress within Catholicism as to how one might appropriate the superior economic competence of the Protestants can be paralleled (in substance if not in form) in many of Spener's remarks regarding the good progress made by the Quakers, and the same motive has, of course, always been effective, if *unspoken*, everywhere, and remains so in America to this day.

Finally—leaving aside the *term* “innerworldly asceticism” for the moment [24]—it may be asked whether I am justified in *materially* [*sachlich*] comparing the phenomenon I have defined by this term with Catholic monastic asceticism. In response, I could point to the fact that the medieval monastic literature of edification (Bonaventura, among others) is frequently quoted by the relevant Protestant writers on ethics, especially those from England, when those demands that I have called “ascetic” are being discussed. I prefer, however, to draw the following comparison. Monastic asceticism demands chastity. Protestant asceticism (in my sense of the word) demands chastity *in marriage too*, meaning the suppression of “desire” and the restriction of morally acceptable sexual intercourse to the *rational* “natural purpose” of procreation. And these regulations were no *mere* theorizing. We know of certain ascetic Protestant (Pietist, Moravian) rules of life in this area that today strike us as in some respects directly contrary to nature. Indeed, the way in which women were treated in general was profoundly influenced by a *refusal* to consider women as primarily sexual beings, by contrast with, for example, Luther's unbroken attachment to the peasant outlook.

Monastic asceticism demands poverty, and we know the paradoxical result of this: the economic prosperity of the monasteries (the only exceptions being a few strictly spiritual orders [*Denominationen*], which were all treated by the popes as highly suspect). This prosperity was regarded everywhere as a consequence of God's blessing and *was* in fact *due* partly to the endowments, but chiefly to their rational economy. As for Protestant asceticism, it condemns not only hedonistic “enjoyment” of one's wealth, but also striving for it “as an end in itself.” I have

already described the equally paradoxical result of this. Monastic asceticism demands independence from the “world” and condemns in particular naive enjoyment. The Protestant variety does precisely the same, and both converge in the *means* of “exercise” (for this is what the word “asceticism” means): strict allocation of time; labor; silence as a means of control of all the life of the instincts; furthermore detachment from all unduly strong ties to the creaturely (suspicion of excessively intense personal friendships, etc.); abstinence from pleasure as such, whether it be “sensual” (in the narrow sense), aesthetic, or literary in kind; abstinence, in short, from any use of the benefits of this life that could not be justified on *rational*, for example, hygienic, grounds.

I have reminded readers at length and in detail of the fact that in the Middle Ages the man who lived “methodically” for the specific reason of his “*calling*” was indeed the monk—and thus Sebastian Frank’s words perhaps show rather more understanding of these matters than my “critic.” With his customary fidelity to the truth [*Loyalität*], Rachfahl asserts that my scientific [*wissenschaftlich*] thesis “is based” on these words of Frank, even though in my rebuttal I spoke of them as an example of the opinion of *contemporaries*. What distinguishes *rational* Protestant asceticism (in *my* sense of the word) from monastic asceticism is, firstly, rejection of all irrational ascetic means, which, however, are similarly rejected or restricted by certain particularly important Catholic orders, specifically by the Jesuits; secondly, rejection of contemplation; and, thirdly and principally, the application of asceticism to the innerworldly sphere of family and (ascetically interpreted) calling. From this, all the aforementioned differences, as well as all others mentioned, naturally arise.

Yet if the “spirit” which reveals itself in the principles of monastic life should be judged *not* to be parallel to or to have, in its innermost essence, an affinity with that which is revealed in Protestant asceticism, then I do not know when one can ever speak of an “affinity.” I shall only mention in passing how strongly many Pietists lamented the disappearance of the monasteries. Nor do I intend to say much about the many instances of the creation of monastic-style organizations by these same Pietists. I should just like to remind the reader of what I said in my essays about the likes of Bunyan. Finally, inner tension and an inner affinity between both sides regarding the position of ascetic ideals in the total system of the religiously oriented life originate from the already mentioned source. What



for the monks was important as the *real basis* for the expectation of salvation [*Seligkeit*] was important for ascetic Protestantism because it was regarded as *an indication that they possessed it* [*Erkenntnisgrund*] (not the *only* one, but probably one of the most important). And since even modern “methodologists” (especially in the sphere of historical method, as I have occasionally observed) cannot always distinguish between these two matters, it is scarcely surprising that Protestant “justification by works” [*Werkheiligkeit*] often appears identical with Catholic practice. However, the seeds of each have a different spiritual paternity, and, consequently, the fruits developed into a very different inner structure.

There is no space here to recapitulate the *dogmatic* basis of innerworldly asceticism. For this I must refer the reader to my essay, where I have also indicated, at least provisionally and in outline, that the question of whether that basis was formed by the Calvinist doctrine of predestination or the untheological dogma of the Baptist movement (even though the two were very similar) was not without relevance for the practical orientation of life. In this part of my work (the only one yet published), these differences, which were in many ways very tangible, inevitably had to take second place to what they had in common. There is no space to elaborate on this any further at this point. When, in my essays, I made an empirical investigation of the question of whether those fundamental matters of religious psychology really did have the specific effects for the *practice* of the conduct of life I claim for them, I must emphasize once again that I did not base this investigation on textbooks of dogma, or on theoretical treatises on ethics, but on quite different source material, namely, Baxter’s and Spener’s publications in particular, which are based on pastoral care, and especially on answers to questions on concrete practical problems put to them by those in their care. And these answers represent, to the degree that they reflect *practical* life, a type that approximately corresponds to the *responsa* of the Roman lawyers to questions on business and legal practice. Undoubtedly, the works of Baxter and Spener and their like also contain the casuistic speculations of their originators, and this applies to the Roman lawyers also. One could say the same of the Talmud, indeed the speculative content is incomparably greater here than it is in either of the two previous examples. It is, however, similar in that it is also linked directly to practical response material.

The form and configuration [*Zusammenhang*] of these pastoral works are sufficient (not always, of course, but, fortunately, often enough) to make it clear *where* they have drawn from life. And where they have done so, there is *no* source, other than correspondence and perhaps autobiographies, that is anywhere near as authentic or true to life. Unsatisfactory, too, are popular pamphlets and little tracts, or sermons, although one has every right to make the fullest use of these *in addition*, to complement the above sources. Even less helpful are the products of contemporary literature (however important they may become as a secondary source), nor, finally, the denominational statements by *individual* groups of capitalists which fail to penetrate beneath the surface, especially since they are often influenced by the “atmosphere” created by Protestant asceticism. Rarely are we in the fortunate position of being able to see so precisely the interlocking of religious and capitalist interests in work as, for example, in the case of the weavers of Kidderminster (quoted by me).

This is not in the least to diminish the importance of the sort of academic work that Rachfahl wishes to see. *But, the specific direction* in which a particular variety of religiosity *was able* to have its effect could, in my view, only be discovered along the path which I chose—and this was the point I especially wanted to establish. This direction was not, however, a mere “encouragement” of a psychological disposition which was present anyway. It meant, at least within the secular sphere, a *new “spirit.”* Out of their own religious life, out of their religiously determined family tradition, out of the religiously influenced style of life of their environment, there grew within people a disposition [*Habitus*] that suited them in a quite specific way to meet the specific demands of early modern capitalism. To express it schematically, instead of the entrepreneur, who in his “chrematism” [moneymaking] was able to feel *at best* “tolerated” by God, and who, in common with, for example, the Native Indian trader today, had to atone for or make up for his “*usuraria pravitas*,” the entrepreneur emerged with an utterly clear conscience, filled with the consciousness (1) that Providence was showing him the path to profit, so that he might tread it to God’s glory, (2) that God was visibly blessing him in the increase of his profit and possessions, (3) that he could measure his worth, not only before men, but before God, above all by success in his calling, provided this was achieved by legal means, and (4) that God had a purpose in selecting precisely *him* for economic advancement and had equipped him with the means to achieve it—in contrast to others, whom for good, if imponderable, reasons he had destined to suffer poverty and hard toil. With the certainty of the “Pharisee,”

this man treads his path in strict formal legality, which to him is the supreme virtue and, since there is no “sufficiency” before God, indeed the only virtue to have any tangible significance.

On the other hand, in the home-based craftsman or the worker, we have the man with a specific “willingness to work,” whose conscientiousness in the God-given “calling” gives him the consciousness of his religious state of grace. And his abhorrence of the particular crime of idolatry of the flesh, that is, relaxing with one’s possessions, enjoying oneself, or wasting time and money on matters unconnected with the calling, forces him (in the case of the entrepreneur) again and again along the path of the investment of capital (as required by the calling), or of “saving,” and thereby toward the greatest possible advancement (for the “ethically” qualified poor [*Besitzlosen*]). The calling and the innermost ethical core of the personality—that is the decisive point—are here an unbroken unity. Any number of individual attempts to create a practical ethic of the calling of this kind in the Middle Ages—and I have stated that I plan to deal with this matter in due course [25]—do not alter the fact that such a “spiritual bond” was simply *lacking* at the time.

In the present, where we operate so much with the concept of “life,” “experience,” etc., as a specific *value*, the *inner dissolution* of that unity, the contempt for the “man of the calling,” is tangible. Modern capitalism, however, against whose mechanism, after all, that modern sentiment referred to above is in revolt, not only for reasons of social politics, but now even more strongly because of modern capitalism’s links with the spirit of the “man of the calling” [*Berufsmenschentum*], has long since ceased to have any need of such support. Even today, though, we find the remnants of the erstwhile significance for capitalist development of the religious elements in life, as I have shown repeatedly in my essays and elsewhere. Industry, for example, is still dependent upon those qualities of its staff which resulted from that style of life, which is apparent often enough in the denominational composition of its foremen and employees, who have risen from below, in contrast to the ordinary workers, and the same goes for the management [*Unternehmertum*]. All this is, of course, only reflected in the statistics when one eliminates chance factors that are introduced by the location (which is often clearly determined by the presence of indispensable raw material) and by the inclusion of craft businesses, which are

not shown separately in the statistics.

On the whole, however, today's capitalism, I repeat, is very largely emancipated from the effects of such factors. As far as the period of early modern capitalism is concerned, however, it had so far not occurred to anyone to *doubt* that the Huguenot movement was most closely linked with the French bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] capitalist development, and that the Huguenots, *wherever* they emigrated at the end of the eighteenth century after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, took with them their typical business qualities *not* merely to countries where the economies were less developed, but *precisely* to Holland, where the capital investment, as I have already observed, was in part differently organized [*instradiert*] and in part, if only in certain strata, had lost its vigor in favor of living off one's income, social ostentation, and a corresponding degree of consumption. The idea that the bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] capitalist development in the northern states of the United States did *not* rest in a quite *specific* manner on its similarly quite specifically Puritan-derived style of life had never before been voiced until R. did so in his "critique" (but *not* in his reply). In his customary imprecise manner, he himself conceded the existence of the same phenomenon in England. The English Romantics recognized the same connections in Scotland [25a], while Goethe had already established that the same thing applied to Germany, and I added some further examples myself. With regard to Holland, I have cited reasons why the forces of ascetic Protestantism, which (I repeat) were operating in *exactly the same* direction, were defeated by a cluster of factors. (I have mentioned some of these factors above, though I do not flatter myself that I have indicated anything like even the most essential of them.) The degree to which these forces were defeated [26] roughly corresponded to the remarkable extent, which was soon to become apparent, to which its capitalist expansion had stagnated (and I am not particularly referring to its colonial expansion). [27]

All this (visible in the economic qualities of certain sects from early as the Middle Ages) has been known about for a long time, mostly since the seventeenth century, and has hitherto never been doubted by anyone who has studied the subject at all. And, of course, there is *nothing* that can lead us to question it, least of all—for the reasons mentioned above—the existence in Frankfurt of Dutch Lutheran immigrants as well as the Calvinist ones, and similar facts, even though, of course, such facts may well, in themselves, be of

real historical interest. This is why in my essays I have merely *reminded* the reader of these things. I *remind* the reader likewise that the Russian schismatics and sectarians whose innermost being is characterized by *rational* ascetic features (this does not apply to *all* the Russian sects, of course) display quite similar economic features as soon as they have grown out of their first otherworldly youth. The most extreme combination of business qualification and ethical “world rejection” is represented by the sect of the *castrati*.

I had to restrict myself to this *illustrative* reference to quite well-known matters (and despite Rachfahl’s pedantry, it will still have to suffice). Further research into the relative strength of the individual denominations is, no doubt, useful and necessary for specialized historical analysis of the development of the individual areas. Equally necessary (or rather considerably *more* necessary) is the *comparison* of the distinctive character [*Eigenart*] of the development of the individual countries influenced by ascetic Protestantism (which alone can explain the reasons for the emerging difference in their development). For me, however, the most urgent questions lie elsewhere. Firstly, of course, in the *differentiation* between the effects of Calvinist, Baptist, and Pietist ethics on the style of life. Additionally, in the detailed investigation of the beginnings of similar developments in the Middle Ages and in early Christianity, to the extent that the work of Troeltsch has not already dealt with these topics. For this, however, the closest possible collaboration with professional theologians is needed. [28] Urgent, too, is an investigation of how to explain, from the *economic* point of view, those elective affinities of the bourgeoisie [*Bürgertum*] with certain styles of life (affinities that reveal themselves repeatedly, in constantly varying but fundamentally similar manner), including (but not *exclusively*) affinities with certain individual components of religious stylizations of life offered most consistently by ascetic Protestantism. A great deal has already been said by many people about that more general problem, but a great deal, and, I believe, much of fundamental importance, still remains to be said.

I can at least give a brief answer to *one* question that R. seems hopelessly obsessed with, namely, the question of *which* personalities in the total picture of modern capitalism absolutely *cannot* and *should not* be understood from the angle of “innerworldly asceticism.” To this I say: the “*adventurers*” of the

capitalist development—taking the concept of the “adventure” here in the sense in which G. Simmel recently defined it in a neat little essay.<sup>11</sup> The importance in economic history of the “adventurers” is known to be extremely great in the history of early capitalism (and not only there). Yet in a certain sense, and if taken with a grain of salt, one can almost draw a comparison between the development toward the growing dominance of capitalism over the whole of economic life, and the *development from economic casual profit to an economic system*; and equally one can compare the genesis of the capitalist “spirit,” in my sense of the word, to the development *from the Romanticism of the economic adventure to the rational economic method of life*. [29]

Finally, if anyone should inquire of me what would have been the probable fate of the capitalist development (as an economic system) if the specifically modern elements of the capitalist “spirit” had *not* been present—it may be recalled that Rachfahl threw in a few (in my view) frivolous comments on the subject—one can in all conscience only reply that, all things considered, we just do not know. I may however perhaps be permitted to call to mind the main features of the development, for the benefit of those nonspecialists who usually cannot quite rid their minds of the popular fallacy that certain *technical* “achievements” were the unambiguous cause of the capitalist development. The capitalism of the ancient world developed *without* technical “progress”; indeed, it can almost be said that it developed simultaneously with the cessation of technical progress. The additional technical achievements of the continental Middle Ages are not without importance for the *possibility* of modern capitalist development, but they certainly do not constitute a decisive “incentive to development.” In the final analysis, the necessary historical preconditions include, firstly, certain objective factors such as climatic factors which influence both the conduct of life and labor costs, and, secondly, factors which were produced by the political and social organization of medieval society and the consequent specific character of the medieval, and especially the inland, city and its middle class [*Bürgertum*]. These latter factors were determined in the main by the *inland culture* which was characteristic of the Middle Ages, relative to antiquity (see my previously cited article in the *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*). In addition, there is the specifically economic factor of new forms of organization in trade [*Gewerbe*] (domestic industry)—new, that is, in terms of structure, dissemination, and significance, even if not absolutely new when compared with antiquity.

The great development process, which lies *between* the late medieval, and still extremely *unstable*, capitalist development processes and the *mechanization* of technology which was decisive for the capitalism of today, consists of the creation of certain important objective political and economic *preconditions* for the latter. *Above all*, however, it consists of the preparation for and the creation of the rationalist and anti-traditionalist “spirit” and the whole new kind of human being [*Menschentum*], that in practice absorbed this whole process of development. The sources to which we must look for a greater understanding of this process are, on the one hand, the history of modern *science* and of its recently developed practical relationship to the economy, and, on the other hand, the history of the modern *conduct of life* in its practical significance for the economy.

In my essays I have discussed the latter component and intend to discuss it further. The development of the *practical* rational method of the *conduct of life* is, of course, something fundamentally different from the development of *scientific* rationalism, and not an automatic accompaniment of it: the first foundations of modern natural science originated from *Catholic* regions and *Catholic* minds, and it was only the methodical application of science for *practical* purposes that was primarily “Protestant,” just as certain principles of thought which were important for the *method* seem to have had an affinity with the Protestant manner of thinking (we cannot pursue this here).

The majority of the English heroes of science, from the seventeenth century to Faraday and Maxwell (one of whom is known to have *preached* in the church of his sect in the nineteenth century), are living proof that it would be quite mistaken to regard “religious faith” [*Gläubigkeit*] *as such*, whether at that period or later, as an obstacle to the development of the *empirical* sciences. The *practical* and *methodical* (not merely occasional) harnessing of the natural sciences to the service of the economy is one of the cornerstones of that *whole* development of the “methodical life,” to which certain Renaissance and Reformation influences, the latter especially in the manner I have described (albeit incompletely), have made a decisive contribution. If anyone were to ask me to say honestly how great I would estimate the significance of this *latter* factor in particular to be, I could only reply that, after repeatedly and conscientiously considering the matter, in my opinion it was *very* great. I can

scarcely be blamed for the fact that there is no “statistical” distribution ratio for the attribution of historical phenomena.

Enough and more than enough. In the eyes of the mass of the “public,” faultfinding “critics” like Rachfahl (and I think I have at least demonstrated that this description of him is apt) are always in the right. The public cannot, after all, really be expected to read the “criticized” works thoroughly themselves simply because they have read a frankly incomprehensible and factually inaccurate “critique.” That a professor of history, particularly one with *this* degree of self-assurance, could, as a result of a grossly superficial reading based on his own preconceptions, so fundamentally misunderstand the whole *question* under discussion, and that he should then be unable to bring himself to *admit* this when it is pointed out to him—this will undoubtedly be difficult to believe for people without an exact knowledge of the subject. This does not alter the fact that it is unfortunately *true*, and that I have been able to prove it [30], regretfully at the expense of the space in this journal, which cannot be made as freely available to be filled to overflowing with necessarily *sterile* polemics (a sterility that is entirely the fault of the “critic”) as, apparently, that of the *Internationale Wochenschrift*.



## WEBER'S NOTES

1) I should like to stress that the absolute worthlessness of R.'s "critical" efforts does not in the least prevent me from highly valuing other works of his in which he does not stray on to territory that is frankly unsuitable for his particular temperament. "Unsuitable" not only because he is, quite frankly, poorly informed on matters of *fact*, but also because his love of academic "dueling" for its own sake is coupled with the persistent tendency to attempt thrusts that infringe dueling "etiquette"—the student jargon used to be "Sauhieben" [foul thrusts]. Moreover, love of dueling can in any case easily get out of hand, to the inevitable detriment of the "subject" under discussion. R. complains of the inconsiderate form of my reply to him. But when Troeltsch responded to him in a deliberately generous and accommodating style, in both form and content, it is clear that R. has merely attempted to profit "tactically" from this accommodation in a most unworthy manner, and that his attacks on Troeltsch are characterized by a degree of animosity that exceeds even that which he directs toward me. It seems that whenever he "criticizes," he inevitably turns into a mere faultfinder, and if you talk to such people at all, it can only be in plain language. I hope I never again have to deal with a "critic" of this kind. A polemic with more integrity, even if it were sharp, would observe other considerations and, however fiercely I might still have to contest it in matters of substance, would not fill me with such—to speak plainly—disdain. What other than this, admittedly unpleasant, feeling can I have, though, toward a "critic" who, *without having the slightest contribution to offer*, felt the need to begin his "argument" by assuring me that I had set myself too "easy" a task, and who now thinks he can end it by issuing a warning that "the Weber findings" should be treated with caution?

2) So that there can be no doubt as to whom I meant on that occasion by those "others," whose assessment of my views seemed to me (here and there) one-sided, I would say this. In particular, Hans Delbrück in my opinion has been holding forth for far too long about how particular historians are still overly keen to discover "refutations" of the materialist view of history. Also, I can only regard F. J. Schmidt's "edifices of ideas" (also published in the *Preußische Jahrbücher*)—even if they have been undertaken with much intelligence—as mere "constructions," as I feel that they also conclude too much from what I

have so far been able to set down, although I do not wish to disparage them in themselves. The “British imperialism” of my friend von Schulze-Gävernitz is assuredly very far from being a mere construction, and certainly not one based entirely on my views, as R. has maintained. As far as he has assessed these at all, he has complemented and extended them in a very felicitous manner. He himself will not deny that he “one-sidedly” pursues the causal series in a spiritualist direction: this is both his strength and, if you like, his weakness; in particular, I completely agree with my Bonn colleague when he makes the point that the dualism of the squirearchy and the bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] middle classes, (which again and again, and even in the Cobden movement, are typically allied with the dissenters), runs right through the last three hundred years of English history. But even Schulze-Gävernitz will not dispute this. Exaggerations like those indulged in by Delbrück in particular, really did not serve the purpose of my essay, which dealt with a clearly defined subject, and did so, if I may say so, with unpretentious and straightforward objectivity. But I was not responsible for this, as I was at pains to point out and moreover, as Rachfahl *very well knew*—for, as I have mentioned, he cites the article concerned—I did what I could at the *first* opportunity that presented itself to ensure that they did not even come up for discussion, so that there was scarcely any need for Rachfahl’s belated assistance in the matter. How he proposes to reconcile the use of such exaggerations against *me* with his sense of literary propriety is a matter for him.

This is not the place to discuss the representation of my views by Troeltsch except to say that it contains *just a few sentences* that *might* give the assiduous “critic” who likes to dissect quotations like these in the manner of a talmudic exegesis of the Torah (and then declares that this is the essence of “historical criticism”) an opportunity to utilize them [*Fruktifikation*] in the way Rachfahl does. The brief remarks of von Schubert cannot, of course, be considered here either. As far as Gothein is concerned, however, who has also been named, Rachfahl either does not know, or since he could have read my quotation of it, has once again simply forgotten, that his relevant remarks were printed more than a decade *before the publication* of my essay. Naturally, Gothein has not altered his standpoint since.

Where I believe I have genuine differences with authors whose findings are tangential to my own, it is not, of course, my practice to make any secret of this.

For example, thanks to Rachfahl's blatantly self-assured manner, Troeltsch has now gained the impression that I actually did "retrospectively" add something by way of justification of my views. Much to the delight of Rachfahl, of course, who, typically, now, for want of any other proof, appeals *to him* as a witness. For my part, I can only request my readers again to study my essay and convince themselves that *everything* I said in my rebuttal I had already said equally clearly in my essays. In my rebuttal I *merely* mentioned a couple of details by way of response to the objection regarding Hamburg and the Dutch development—something which, since Gothein had already demonstrated the significance of Calvinism, in particular, for Germany, I had not considered worthy of mention—and I have cited the situation in Wuppertal (I could have added Calw where Pietism is concerned). That is all! What are these tiny "new elements" to what I had said in my essays regarding *all* the great principal regions where ascetic Protestantism spread (England, France, the Netherlands, America)? It is not difficult to understand that Troeltsch, who was simply answering for himself and only mentioned me in passing, was not prepared to trawl through my essay again from A to Z ad hoc for the sake of a polemic about *his* theses. He simply credited Rachfahl with at least a modicum of reliability. But someone who claims to have made a fundamental "critique" of these essays, and, as we shall see, makes great play with the "exactitude" of his "historical criticism" (and explicitly contrasts this with Troeltsch!), can have no such excuse.

Columns 792-93 present us with a particularly characteristic effort, where in the expansive manner favored by Rachfahl, using bold print for the particular *words* by which he sets the greatest store, he informs his readers that, because at one point I speak of "ascetic Protestantism creating for capitalism the 'soul' that corresponds to it, namely, the soul of the 'man of the calling,'" my thesis therefore *in fact* already states that the "disposition" [*Habitus*] analyzed by me in and of itself alone contains *everything* by way of motives that is effective in today's (!) capitalism. He fails to mention that the context shows quite naturally that I am referring to the particular kind of *bourgeois* [*bürgerlich*] capitalist development specific to the period of which I speak. He is also kind enough to imply that I excluded the capitalism of Jewish origin from my analysis, basing his implication solely on the fact that in a *completely different* place I said *just one word* about the attitude of states toward the Jews being an instance where toleration or the lack of it could in fact—see below—be economically relevant.

The best of it is that R., basing his argument on this pathetic quibbling, finds it (col. 793) “at least pardonable” that others, on his interpretation of my words, have “made absolute” that single motive. He goes on to name (col. 792) as those to whom this applies not only Troeltsch but also Gothein (who as I have said was writing more than a decade before me) and von Schubert, after having previously (col. 791) given an assurance that he himself had not misunderstood my intentions in this way, although as we have seen, both in his original critique and *even now*, when it suits him, he still does so. All of this I find merely “pathetic.” And how is one supposed to answer a “critic” who talks about my having recently attempted, in a “rebuttal,” to solve problems that I “had not dared” to approach before?

3) For a historian, this formulation is itself surely unduly naive. It is a well-known fact that the question of *whether* something “goes beyond the religious sphere” has been *precisely* the unresolved point at issue, on which everything turns, in all the cultural struggles throughout history. R. claims that *he* has no difficulty in identifying the boundary line. The fact that he nonetheless refrains from attempting this seems to me to be no loss for us, for he goes on to express the strange view that on this point “the actors in history have often demonstrated a remarkably fine instinct.” Well, this “fine instinct” permitted, for example, many a Huguenot army commander to engage in piracy, while the same instinct caused the Huguenot merchants to persuade the economically disinterested members of the Huguenot synod (who were, after all, also “actors”)<sup>12</sup> to make an attempt to call them to account for this. The same “instinct” caused the Stuarts to take up the struggle against the Puritans’ ascetic Sunday observance, and the radical strata among the latter to take up the struggle against the tithes, on which, for example, the existence of the universities was based, which in turn led Cromwell to break with them. This very same supposedly unambiguous instinct inspired, on the one hand, Bismarck’s May Laws, and, on the other hand, the Pope’s decrees regarding the political stance of the Catholics in Italy and Germany, and finally the opposition of the Center Party both to the May Laws and (on occasion) to the Pope.

All the difficulties to which the dogma of the Vatican is exposed and will continue to be exposed, and all the difficulties of the separation of church and state, are the result of the intrinsic impossibility of determining with certainty

where the limits of what is religiously relevant lie. So the idea that only “modern theologians” could be in any doubt about those limits (col. 719) can only be described as politically infantile. Such things are widely known and it certainly never occurred to me to claim “originality” for them, as R. maliciously suggests. And although I really did not therefore take the view that “whole generations of historians” ought to devote themselves to an exhaustive treatment of these palpable matters—for no serious-minded historian would forget such things in the way that Rachfahl does when attempting, in the course of his polemic, to prove that he is right—I do continue to believe that R. himself and his ilk occasionally need to be forcefully reminded of them.

Rachfahl has taken on the special task of attacking a supposed “Heidelberg” speciality. I have in front of me a doctoral dissertation that he supervised, dealing, inter alia, with G. Jellinek’s writings on the role played by religion in determining “human rights.” The style in which the writer of this dissertation reproduces opinions with which he disagrees, and the way he homes in on alleged “contradictions,” etc., bears all the hallmarks of R.’s “critical” effort. Of course, no one is inclined or obliged to take responsibility for everything that is written in dissertations that he has supervised—I would certainly not accept it for myself. But the “*style*” can scarcely be coincidental in the present case.

Moreover, when R. sums up his view of the development of American democracy (vol. 3, col. 1358) by saying that it “essentially *developed by itself*,” this original solution to the problem would at least appear to have the advantage of a simplicity which could be recommended for all historical questions. Seriously, though, the fact that the religious basis of life was completely *taken for granted* was what most clearly *distinguished* the American state, with its strict formal neutrality, from European and other democracies, and—as Troeltsch himself has convincingly demonstrated—is the reason why the notion of the “separation of state and church” has such a totally different cachet there from what it has for us. In all seriousness, it is questionable whether the original character of American democracy would have been possible if the religious basis of life had *not* been universally taken for granted in this way (as I also stressed in *Christliche Welt*). Today this is in decline, and, for example, the prayer, with which the Supreme Court, as well as almost every *party convention* was opened, or the “chapel record” (sic), which according to the statutes of many universities

is a requirement for the official recognition of the semester, has become a farce, rather like the act of worship before the opening of the Reichstag here in Germany. At one time that was very different!

4) Troeltsch says (and Rachfahl quotes this): Rachfahl wanted to use examples “to illustrate how little effect the religious factor has on life in general.”

5) Rachfahl himself informs us that he has become confused by my arguments. I decline to accept responsibility for this, and Rachfahl’s critique and reply show the reason why, for anyone willing to see it.

6) Let there be no doubt about this. We are talking about trivialities such as Troeltsch’s errors regarding my relationship to Sombart, or what I had already said in my essay about the Reformed people in Hungary and similar matters, in other words about things that even now Rachfahl still serves up to his public, even after I have pointed out to him in my rebuttal the erroneous nature of the assertions he has taken from Troeltsch. None of this stops him informing Troeltsch, who rightly looks upon these things with undisguised indifference, that historical criticism, faced with such sins, “will not have the courage to rise to this sublime and pleasing standpoint” (sic).

7) Volume 3, column 1257: “so we arrive at the *fundamental* difference (between Troeltsch and me) . . . the conception (sic) of the old Protestant asceticism,” and this is (col. 1258): “that he” (I) “*knows nothing* of a general old Protestant ascetic ethic (sic) in the sense that Troeltsch understands it.” But compare this with column 1260: the “Weber-Troeltsch asceticism concept” (similarly in his reply where he explicitly refers to “the Weber-Troeltsch thesis”), and further, column 1259: the assurance that what I say about the “ascetic style of life amounts to the same” as Troeltsch’s “definition” of the asceticism concept, and indeed the entire polemic on this “question,” aimed at the two of us jointly, a question which was only created by Rachfahl for polemical purposes.

7a) Compare columns 755, 782, 786 and throughout.

8) Typical of the general tenor of this so-called critique is what I can only call the little faultfinding trick of contrasting Troeltsch's remark that he had simply "taken over" my findings where these *complemented* his own with my remark that my theories had not been "taken over" by Troeltsch, and printing the words "taken over" in bold, thus making the two remarks appear to "contradict" each other. In fact, anyone can see that in the first case what is meant is that Troeltsch *reproduced* my findings and reported them with approval, whereas in the second I meant that he did not "take over" my theories as a scientific *justification* for his own researches, which were quite unlike mine and had different aims.

Now (col. 689) R. even tries to make his readers believe that Troeltsch's writings are "the only coherent attempt to show that the Weber schema underlies the course of history" (sic)—a "chemically pure" nonsense about which Troeltsch would probably be just as amused as anyone who knows what his work is actually about, but which may fool the uninformed reader, on whom R., here as ever, depends. In another place (in his first "critique"), von Schulze-Gävernitz and von Schubert were depicted as being in the same position, that of being actually no more than apostles of my "doctrines." And (according to Rachfahl) "it is well known that I have left the Jews" to Sombart. It would seem, then, that I have a whole vassal army of the most outstanding scholars dancing to my tune. Presumably, their number now even includes Professor H. Levy, whom, after I had referred to a favorable notice he had given me, R., in malicious and (I would say) childish fashion, greets as a fellow conspirator in the "working party" he alleges to exist, and, finally, I suppose, Professor A. Wahl as well, whom (according to R.) I "can scarcely be said to have done a favor" by reproducing a comment of his.

Similar standards are in evidence when Rachfahl falsely alleges the existence of a contradiction in the following instance. Rachfahl *knows full well* that Troeltsch, where he explicitly agrees with me, has in mind the aspects relating to theology and the psychology of religion (the only ones treated in depth), that he as a specialist is certainly far better qualified to judge than I am. Where this agreement is not self-evident, he has expressly declared it. As a *nonspecialist*,

however, he declares himself not competent to judge those passages outside his *specialist* area, that is, those dealing with economic history, where I have quoted, by way of illustration, examples of the (well-known) economic dominance of ascetic Protestantism. Nevertheless, Rachfahl claims to see here a contradiction or even a “recantation” by Troeltsch of his agreement with my theses on the psychology of religion, even though he has *now explicitly* reiterated this agreement.

9) It is clear from my essays, to which I referred in my rebuttal, where I am in agreement with Rachfahl on the role of toleration. Rachfahl has simply added nothing new.

10) A “*constructor* of history” could very easily make the mistake of deriving the character of the Dutch development from the fact that in this country Calvinism was obliged to abandon its intolerance to a particularly large extent (incidentally, it did so to the least extent in the province of Holland). And there would be a grain of truth (if only a small one) in this.

Since we have gotten onto the subject of Holland, I will take the opportunity to deal with a few of Rachfahl’s “critical” efforts on the subject. I have mentioned the fact that Groen van Prinsterer, like me, *mentions* the combination of high levels of earnings and limited expenditure as a specific feature of the Dutch economic development. (Prinsterer’s special political position toward Prussian Conservatism, which was to a large extent religiously motivated, stands out in sharp relief, especially in the correspondence and disputes with the Stahl Circle, to which he was close and which was influenced by him). Rachfahl, who does not know the passage (he should look it up to widen his reading!), *doubts* that I have read the works of this scholar. In an author of less dubious pedigree, I should have to call this “effrontery.” In the case of Rachfahl, whose own standards of behavior led him to see practically nothing wrong with it, I shall, of course, refrain from so doing.

To digress: when Busken-Huet occasionally speaks of Erasmus as a father of Dutch culture, this may make good sense with respect to the things of which he



is speaking and in the sense in which he does so. With respect to the *religious* character [*Eigenart*] of Holland, Rachfahl has “generalized” [*verabsolutiert*] the word in a most questionable manner. Erasmus as father of the *economic* features [*Eigentümlichkeiten*] of Holland? Both Groen van Prinsterer and Busken-Huet would have laughed, as I did. Anyone with an unbiased interest in sixteenth- and especially seventeenth-century Dutch history knows that in view of the wider concept of “culture” with which we are here dealing, it would be foolish to speak of “the” Dutch culture in the way that Rachfahl does, in Busken-Huet’s name; in fact, within Dutch history and essentially up to the present day, the most stark antitheses have existed alongside each other and flourished.

Anyone who has examined the internal disputes within these communities in any depth can see that these facts concerning the character [*Eigenart*] of the Dutch, which are explicitly confirmed by Groen, are very closely connected with the strict discipline of their religious communities. They are absolutely typical problems of the conduct of life [*Lebensführung*], which appear among the Huguenots, in America, and among the continental Pietists. They may differ in characteristic ways depending on the cultural milieu, yet the manner in which they are dealt with is identical in its basic tone. I would rather not ask Rachfahl, who adopts the pose of an expert throughout the whole of his polemic, to confess to his intellectual bankruptcy in this area. Anyone who has done any work on the subject can see that he knows *nothing* about it, indeed that for the most part he is not even aware of the literary character of the tiny *fraction* of the published literature on it quoted by me in the “criticized” essay. Perhaps he will at least make good *this* deficiency. Admittedly, to gain a true overview he would need to do more than what he has achieved so far: merely a brief stroll through unfamiliar works with his schoolmaster’s cane in his hand, hoping to rap the unqualified nonhistorians over the knuckles with it. For my part, I have not given up hope of being able to continue with these sections of my work (and to deepen them a great deal further), a task that would, of course, necessitate a further period in America, as much material for both the Quaker and the Baptist communities is only available there. A great deal can be found in the old sectarian colleges in America, and also (I am not sure whether in complete form) in England, which is not available in the libraries of the European continent, including Holland.

In contrast to those Pietist circles and ascetic sects in Holland, there was undoubtedly much ostentatious display and gourmandizing by the nouveau riche, together with rustic and unsophisticated exuberance on the part of those marsh peasants who owed their livelihood to the capital investment [*Kapitalverwertung*] taking place in the cities, and who from the ascetic point of view were doing “too well”; the same thing applied to the petite bourgeoisie [*Kleinbürgertum*], who were in a comparable situation. There were also the artistic bohemian circles, and lastly the humanist educated strata with their fine aesthetic, literary, and scholarly tastes and judgment. These antitheses were included, in a rather different form, in the composition of the emigration from the south of the Netherlands to the north: it comprised, *besides* political refugees *without* any fervent religious belief, both numerous Calvinists and, for example, *artists* who were liable to suffer persecution or at least discrimination by the Church on account of the incorrectness of their personal or even artistic opinions, but whose personal style of life [*Lebensstil*] took such a form that it was possible to maintain in all seriousness that their unconventionality was methodically cultivated “as a matter of principle,” as a sort of negative version of the ethic of the calling. Even this kind of assertion is characteristic—it tells us something about those who make it.

11) Such reductions in the volume of wealth and population have, of course, often been the consequence of intolerance, both Catholic and Protestant (for example, in Geneva, as I stressed earlier). But wealth is not to be equated with acquired capital [*Erwerbskapital*], and not every population is fitted by psychological disposition for the capitalist activity. The decisive factor remained the “spirit” that was prevalent in the population (whether or not enjoying toleration) and therefore in economic life.

11a) These include:

1. “solidly Lutheran Hamburg.” Rachfahl objects to what I, referring to information from Adalbert Wahl, said about this, namely, that commercial wealth was more unstable than industrial wealth (hence the difference between Basel and Hamburg). Assuming the general correctness of this thesis (which was told to him by a “valued external colleague”—presumably, the same highly respected historian who also made the remark to me), then this simply lends weight to my *original* argument: namely, that

what was apparently the *only* big *merchant* fortune that had been utilized as capital in the same family ever since the seventeenth century, and therefore remained *just as stable* as the industrial fortunes of Basel, belonged to members of the *Reformed* churches [*Konfession*]. This is the proof of the effects of denominational [*konfessionell*] differences. I repeat, *once again*, that to be perfectly honest I cannot personally at this moment check this individual instance in detail in all its causal connections, and it may, of course, be attributable to a number of “coincidences”—except that the “coincidences” are becoming rather *numerous*, and the great developmental connections between capitalism and Protestantism within whole countries that I have cited cannot be dismissed as such. I only mention this instance because the mere fact that in that period there were some places with capitalist development but without ascetic Protestantism, which I myself have termed absolutely self-evident, has nevertheless been put to me as an “objection.”

2. When he made the remarks quoted by me, Petty—whom Rachfahl first quoted, naturally in incomplete form, that is, only as far as it happened to suit his “critique”—was allegedly not (according to Rachfahl) “thinking of” capitalists, despite the fact that his whole argument is based on the fact that *business* in all Catholic countries was essentially in heretical hands. Moreover, his special topic of investigation (as in so many writings of that period) is the question of why *this* should be, and in particular the question of what the source of Holland’s powerful international economic position might be, that is, its “capitalist” prosperity, which mercantilism measured by the volume of money flowing into individual countries. The paradoxical thing about Petty’s statement lies in *precisely the same point* which (although I did not notice the passage at the time) I also found to be a problem and attempted to explain: namely, that the broad strata of the rising bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] middle class, although and indeed because they were hostile to the sinful enjoyment of the consumption of wealth, and were hostile to those who possessed wealth (see the passage from Petty in my essay in *Archiv*, vol. 30, p. 188 [p. 255 in this volume]) and *therefore* maintained no religious fellowship with them, became, on the basis of their own kind of religiously oriented ethic of the calling, bearers of the “spirit” of that early modern capitalism which no longer rested on the ethical *laxity* of the Middle Ages, and which was the subject of my investigation.

As usual, what Rachfahl uses as an objection is something that I myself have already said (p. 184 [p. 253 in this volume]), namely, that Petty had in

mind the Dutch freedom fighters; the fact that he interpreted them not as a historian, but with the eyes of a man of *his* time (the seventeenth century) (which gives R. the opportunity just for a change to question the significance of the words of an author whom he himself had introduced), just shows how things appeared at that time to a man who was well informed in business affairs, that is, at a time when, according to Rachfahl's own thesis, Holland had already *ceased* to be dominated by those religious motives. Probably not even all of Rachfahl's readers will believe him when he alleges that I had the "misfortune" to identify the Dutch freedom fighters with those English dissenters close to Petty. But only someone who is completely ignorant of these things could maintain, as R. does, that the Dutch heresy at the time of the break with Spain had "nothing to do" with the later English dissenters. Puritan dissent in England, as is shown not only by the religious trials already taking place under Elizabeth but by all other contemporary sources, was continually boosted and spiritually supported in the strongest possible way by refugees from the southern Netherlands coming from Holland (as was Holland itself).

Ultimately, Dutch influences underlie not only the specifically ascetic direction taken by Calvinism, but also the development of the Baptist movement (so important for the Independents) whose writers have always claimed for it the distinction of being the bearer of specifically modern political and economic principles. Dutch influences are also important for the Mennonites (whose "mercantilist" usefulness caused even the Prussian soldier-kings to grant them a dispensation from military service), indirectly for Quakerism (the last renaissance of the Baptists), which grew out of the Baptist predispositions of English Independent circles, and whose tradition also claims the distinction of having, since the seventeenth century, been the constant bearer of the modern business ethic and of therefore "being blessed by God with wealth," and, finally, for Pietism.

As in New England and Pennsylvania, so too in the Netherlands, the basic schema of the practical ethic of the calling had to develop on a relatively small area of capitalist ground (East Friesland), and is therefore not a consequence of capitalist development; then, however, Amsterdam and Leyden became the breeding grounds from which, for example, specifically sectarian principles of community life, after having come to fruition there, spread to England; and this historian could equally have been expected to know that the impetus for the voyage of the Pilgrim Fathers came from Holland, even if he could not be expected to be familiar with the positions

taken up by the Scottish element and the English Quaker element, in fact, English dissent in general, right up to the threshold of the present day.

3. The fact that, according to Rachfahl, Calvin (col. 730) *called for* the “sensual” enjoyment of life (in any case a very distorted interpretation of the passage quoted by *me*, which is, by the way, only one of a number of similar ones I could have quoted) does not prevent him from asserting elsewhere that even Calvin himself stood for the same principles that are characteristic of ascetic Calvinism and important for the development of the capitalist spirit.

12) Compare column 776, lines 10ff.: With a pettifogging pedant like Rachfahl, one is forced to quote precise lines as though one were studying a manuscript, otherwise—see above—he is incapable of finding his own assertions. Compare further column 777, line 22, where one is informed that one’s opinion is a mere “figure of speech, that at school (sic) one was taught to call ‘pars pro toto.’ ” For *his* part, Rachfahl has forgotten that he *himself* had questioned (vol. 3, col. 1322) whether the “capitalist ethic,” “*in whatever sense one understood it,*” bore any relation to the Calvinist ethic of the calling.

13) At this point, with regard to present-day America, I may, for example, refer to Veblen’s excellent book *The Theory of Business Enterprise* . Veblen emphasizes, inter alia, precisely the gradual *emancipation* of the *most* modern billionaires from the attitude expressed by the maxim “**honesty is the best policy,**” an attitude that had hitherto been characteristic of the capitalism of the modern era. In my essays in the *Archiv* and in the one in the *Christliche Welt* that Rachfahl has ignored, I have explored the origins of this maxim and will return to it later.

14) I am completely at a loss to recall anything in Rachfahl’s writings that might be described as a “debate” with me regarding the relationship between irrational “drive” [*Trieb*] and rational “spirit” (col. 779, footnote). I refer the reader to my rebuttal and advise Rachfahl to set himself somewhat higher standards.

15) Rachfahl is unhappy about the fact that I take exception to the malicious and petty way he keeps harping on about that example concerning the businessman

and the oysters—which, be it noted, I only mentioned in *a few lines* in a footnote. The reader may recall that I quoted the example of a highly successful businessman who, even when they were prescribed by his doctor, retained his antipathy for certain gourmet delights (oysters), because he had that “ascetic” conviction (which I believe to be highly characteristic of whole generations) that pleasure and luxury *as such* was a “wrong” use of wealth (as capital) which should properly be employed in the interests of the calling. Rachfahl wishes to convey the impression that such examples constitute a vitally important part of my “*proof*.” I notice that *despite* my remarks in response, this example plays the same part in his reply, indeed that Rachfahl *has the effrontery* to address his readers with the words: “at least it was not I (Rachfahl) who started evaluating the modalities of the consumption of oysters as an indication of . . . .” This is despite the fact that he knows that I was describing, in as comprehensive a fashion as possible and with as many examples as the occasion permitted, the attitude *as a whole* within which, *besides* numerous others, this small example also belongs. All this is indeed most “impressive.”

16) For Rachfahl it is now the sixteenth, now the eighteenth century—as it happens to suit him—that is “significant.” Since not only the specifically ascetic direction taken by Calvinism, but also the transformation of the Baptist movement (hitherto discredited by the Münster riots) into the Anabaptist, General Baptist, and Particular Baptist denominations, as well as the rise of Quakerism and Pietism (I myself have described Methodism as a latecomer and “revival”), all took place solely in the seventeenth century and the years immediately before and after it, as did the first large-scale and systematic development of modern and consciously *bourgeois* [*bürgerlich*] capitalist state policy *and literature*, Rachfahl’s opinionated determination to stick to that dating reveals itself to be a product of the quite understandable embarrassment of clinging *à tout prix* to an erroneous position, adopted for polemical reasons.

17) In truth, this last attribution would correspond rather to the view that Rachfahl himself takes in his “critique”—if one can talk about “taking a view” at all where it is really just a case of faultfinding for its own sake. According to R. (vol. 3, col. 1329), it is Calvinism (“of all things” precisely *that*) which *inter alia* also has the tendency to “serve” (sic) (besides the “capitalists”) not only the “middle and lower merchants and craftsmen” but especially also the clerical staff

(sic) and the “workers” (sic). It almost defies belief that such a mindless notion could ever have seen the light of day. In just how totally unthinking a fashion R. can react when he feels he is “being challenged” can be illustrated by a case about which he himself utters such a shout of triumph that one really wishes that, just this once, he could be proved right (after so often having revealed his ignorance in ways that do him little credit)—unfortunately, however, his argument fails to stand up to even the most superficial examination. He assures his readers that it must be extremely “unpleasant” for me to be “nailed down” to admitting that—as he claimed in his critique—with reference to New England, I had cited the craft professions as evidence for the *capitalist spirit*. If his readers would care to look at the passage where I was “nailed down,” they would find there the following words: “The existence of *metallurgical works* (1643), *weaving for the market* (1659), and the full flowering of the craft professions in New England in the first generation after the founding of the colony are, from a purely economic point of view, anachronisms, and contrast most strikingly with conditions in the south. . . .” I would certainly not wish to change one word of this remark, nor of the way in which I would justify it, namely, by portraying these phenomena of a strong autonomous small business culture (which were capitalist and yet occurred, remarkably, in a colonial territory still largely at a stage of development based on barter—as Rachfahl discovered from my writings and then put forward as his own idea) as being determined, at least in part, by the immigrants’ style of life, a style that was pervaded at every point by religion. And I might add that the Americans had previously expressed similar views. Quite apart from the answer (which can scarcely be in doubt) to the question of precisely who and what has been “nailed down” in this particular case, I should simply like to “nail down” the general question of the kind of intellect that can produce a “critique” that regards its business *throughout* as nothing more than the attempt to “nail down” the “criticized” author to individual *words* and individual *sentences* (and, moreover, does it with a consistent lack of success). Rachfahl’s “critique” does nothing else from start to finish.

18) The maxim “He who will not work shall not eat” is directed toward a certain kind of parasitic missionary activity which has existed in all periods and which is exemplified today in classical form by the divine “call,” delightfully depicted by Booker Washington, that tends to come to the Negro when he finds that he prefers the life of the saint to that of the worker. The other passages are either found in parables or are eschatological in character. The idea of work seen as something *positive* is found much more commonly in the philosophy of the

Cynics and in certain pagan Hellenistic petit bourgeois epitaphs than in primitive Christianity. In view of everything I have said in my essays about the influence of the Old Testament spirit on the Puritan ethic of the calling, it is somewhat grotesque that R. now holds these same things against me, when *all* he knows about them comes from these same essays, as the contents of his casual vacuous remark shows. Moreover, I also reminded the reader of the manner in which this renaissance of the Old Testament was connected with the specific qualities of Puritan religiosity that I was analyzing. Rachfahl has forgotten this.

19) This is not intended to deny the possible educational value of confession in general. But if we take a look at the instructions for confession or inform ourselves from other sources about what exactly was asked in the confession, we find that it was concerned with quite different matters from those that concern us here.

A nice example of how the Catholic doctrine related to economic life in *practice* is provided by the history of the ban on usury. It is a well-known fact that even today it has not been lifted; nor could it be “lifted,” according to the established principles of Catholic Church law [*Kirchenregiment*], since it is clearly enunciated in the papal decrees, although it is based on a complete mistranslation arising from a mistaken reading of the Greek (ὑμῶν instead of ὑμῶν ἀππλπιξοντες<sup>13</sup> in the Vulgate (an inspired text!). In practice, however, it has been annulled, although only definitively so for less than a hundred years, by instruction of the Congregation of the Holy Office. The Holy Congregation has ruled that from now on father confessors should no longer inquire about *usuraria pravitas* arising from the practice of lending at interest, provided that it can be guaranteed that the penitent *would* obey, *if* the Church should find it opportune to insist on enforcement of the ban. (In a similar way, the opinion has been publicly expressed in French Catholic circles, and I believe has not been censored by the Church, that father confessors should no longer inquire about “onanism matrimonialis,” the form of contraception encouraged by the two-child system—in spite of the biblical curse on “coitus interruptus.”)

This manner of proceeding is characteristic of the Catholic Church. As in the Middle Ages, it *tolerates* (while *in no way* positively *approving*), *temporum ratione habita* the factual existence of capitalist activity, but reserves the right to punish certain forms employed by capitalism, and thus *also* the use of these



forms. By contrast, Protestant asceticism has created for capitalism the positive ethic, or “soul,” required by that activity in order that “spirit” and “form” might become united.

20) I once compared the creditworthiness so gained to that of a member of a German fraternity [*Verbindungsstudent*] (in my day one could live almost “free of charge” when one had “received one’s colors”—the creditors would pay a freshman’s matriculation fees). It could also be compared to the creditworthiness of the clergy in the Middle Ages (because the threat of excommunication hovered over him), or the often rather dubious creditworthiness of the modern young army officer, who is subject to the threat of dismissal. However, the sociologically very important difference lies in the fact that in all these cases it is not, as it is with the sect, that creditworthiness as a *subjective* quality of the *personality* (through selection for membership following appropriate training) is demanded, but only (and this is something that was, incidentally, true of the sects as well) that the *objective* guarantee for the creditors is increased.

The Methodist institution of youth “**training**” has fallen into disuse, but was once highly significant. Equally characteristic of the Methodists was the custom of coming together in small groups for the purpose of regular mutual examination of the state of one’s soul, a kind of relatively public confession. Of course, since this was addressed to a majority of one’s personal equals, unlike Catholic confession, which took place behind a barred window, it represented a quite different psychological *situation*.

21) An emphasis on modern subjects [“Realien”] is an old principle of Pietist education, which, as I have indicated, has a strong religious foundation; the same principle applied among the Quakers and the Baptists from the start; in the Reformed Church it is not infrequently evident even today, for example, in the denominational distribution across *Realschulen* and other school types, and in the choice of profession.

These points are undoubtedly very important for an understanding of the connections between these forms of religiosity and the development of modern

capitalism. Similarly, the well-known achievements of the Reformation *in general* in the area of the elementary school are certainly important. But these latter quite general connections had their limits: the achievements of the Prussian state in the area of the elementary school *were absent* in the country with the most advanced capitalist development, England. The “good elementary school” *as such* and capitalist development did *not* proceed in parallel.

Incidentally, the idea expressed by R. (vol. 3, col. 1331) that there was no concern about expanding popular education, is also a serious exaggeration, especially in relation to our solidly Protestant East Elbians. In my essay I indicated the connection between a certain level of denominationally determined choice of school type and the attitude toward “fides implicita.”

22) As recently as thirty years ago, in the denominationally mixed Westphalian territories, there was constant banter among confirmation candidates between the Lutherans, who “dragged the Savior through the gutter” (that is, the intestinal tract—because of the words: hoc “est” corpus meum) and the Reformed “holy hypocrites” [*heuchlerische Werkheiligen*].

23) The Missouri Lutheran Church has retained its special character, in marked distinction to the other denominations.

24) This is typical of R. On the one hand, he makes the greatest efforts to “discredit” this expression (for *this* is all his kind of so-called critique amounts to), and not only this expression but also, as he himself insists, the *substantial* thesis corresponding to it, namely, the inner affinity with rational monastic asceticism. On the other hand, though, he informs me that, in the opinion of respected Church historians, those specifics of ascetic Protestant religiosity signify an “as yet incomplete” break with Catholicism. The words “as yet,” however, conceal a developmental *construction* based on a *value judgment* (subjectively quite unassailable, of course) which, for example, regards Lutheranism, which rejects all “justification by works” [*Werkheiligkeit* ], as quite simply the “highest” form of Protestantism, and then constructs a series of steps leading up to it. *Historically*, however, the development of innerworldly

asceticism is a product of the *post-Reformation* period, in other words, more a *revival* of religious motives that Catholicism *also* cultivated, but in a quite different manner and with different effects.

25) I have already indicated elsewhere, as far as circumstances permitted (“Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum” *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 3rd ed.), that certain quite definite *objective* conditions favored the rise of “homo oeconomicus.” (Incidentally, the culture of the Middle Ages contrasted unfavorably with that of antiquity in respect to geographic, political, social, and other conditions.) The extent to which modern science should be numbered among these causal “conditions” has been closely examined by Sombart.

25a) Compare, for example, the letter from John Keats to his brother Thomas (July 3, 1818): “These Kirkmen” have “formed Scotland into Phalanges of savers and gainers” (in contrast to Ireland, from where he is writing).

26) But not, of course, by the political upper strata, the majority of whom were Arminians, or simply indifferent (as I mentioned in my essay). The same phenomenon can be found elsewhere, and in Holland too it is mostly these upper strata who, through the “ennobling” of their wealth (purchase of manors, as in England), sought to *move out of* capitalist activity (at least partially). The fact that R., despite my explicit comment on Arminianism in my essay, chose to allege that these well-known matters were unknown to me, and even now, after I have reminded him of what I said, finds it appropriate to repeat the allegation to his readers, simply confirms everything that I feel about him but have no wish to keep on repeating.

27) To avoid any misunderstanding: this stagnation certainly had very significant political causes (external and internal). This is not to say, of course, that the breakdown of ascetic characteristics was completely without influence. I myself cannot pretend to be able to answer this question definitively at the moment—and I suspect that others cannot either.

28) It gives me considerable satisfaction, in the interests of the subject, that my efforts have been, in principle, *not* unkindly or indifferently received by a number of respected theological colleagues. I fully understand that this attempt to relate certain sets of religious motives to their consequences for bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] life must appear to fail to do justice to the ultimate value of the forms of religiosity with which we are concerned. These motives are (in terms of their religious *value*) the rough and external aspect of the actual religious content, and for persons with inner religious convictions, they are on the margins of this content. This is indeed true. But this merely “sociological” work (and Troeltsch himself is the theologian who chiefly undertakes this work) must *also* be done. Naturally, it is best left to the specialists themselves. All we outsiders can do is perhaps to suggest to them, irrespective of whether their attitude is supportive or critical, alternative *problematics* (*Fragstellungen*) based on our perspectives. *This* is what I had hoped to do, and from *those* quarters, though not from meddling faultfinders like R., I expect fruitful and instructive criticism.

29) This would require closer interpretation, of course, which I am not able to give at this juncture. From an objective point of view, an entrepreneurial risk, however daring, does not necessarily represent an “adventure,” if it is part of a *rationally* calculated business enterprise and is required by the “matter in hand.”

30) If one compares his earlier pronouncements with his present ones, one is bound to suspect that the latter are more a kind of “punishment” for my admittedly very disrespectful attitude than anything else.

#### *EDITORS' NOTES*

[1](#) “Antikritisches Schlusswort zum ‘Geist des Kapitalismus,’ ” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 31 (1910), pp. 554-99.

[2](#) The abbreviation of Rachfahl’s name to the letter “R.,” here, and in what follows, is Weber’s usage.

[3](#) The subtitles in square brackets have been inserted by the editors to assist the reader. They are not found in the German original.

[4](#) See Weber’s note 5 of his second rejoinder to Fischer, this volume, p. 241-42.

[5](#) The Greek expression means (roughly) “par excellence.”

[6](#) Occasionally in this essay, Weber resorts to vernacular English. To make this clear to the reader, we have placed English words and phrases in bold type.

[7](#) The abbreviation of Rachfahl's name to the letter "R.," here, and in what follows, is Weber's usage.

[8](#) 1 Corinthians 11.9 (Authorized Version).

[9](#) On Kuyper and the "schism," see Editors' note 9, in the first of Weber's replies to Rachfahl, p. 278 above.

[10](#) Ecclesiastical court.

[11](#) See Georg Simmel, "Philosophie des Abenteuers," *Der Tag*, Berlin, 7, 8 June 1910. Also "Das Abenteuer" in *Philosophische Kultur: Gesammelte Essays* (Leipzig: W. Klinkhardt, 1911), pp. 11-28.

[12](#) The term "actors" is used not, of course, in the sense of stage actors, but in the sense of being actively involved.

[13](#) "Miden" means "nothing," whereas "midena" means "no one." In the majority of ancient manuscripts, the form "miden apelpitsontes" appears in Luke 6.35 as "lend, expecting nothing in return" (Revised Standard Version). Such a meaning is, however, grammatically impossible, and the spelling of "miden" is probably due to a scribe's error. It actually translates as "lend, causing nothing to despair," which makes no sense. On the other hand, the other reading, which exists in a minority of ancient manuscripts, is grammatically correct and means "lend, causing no one to despair." The difference is important for Weber's argument. Whereas the first reading implies a total ban on lending at interest, the second only forbids excessive interest that would drive the debtor to ruin. Weber has a footnote on this in the revised edition of *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*, "Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie," 2nd ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922), p. 59. (The editors are grateful to Dr. Hans Schleiff for additional elucidation of this point.)

## APPENDIX I: REJOINDERS TO WERNER SOMBART AND LUJO BRENTANO

In the summer of 1919, Weber revised *The Protestant Ethic*, taking into account the criticisms that Werner Sombart and Lujo Brentano had made of the essay's

first version (1905). The new edition of *The Protestant Ethic* was published in 1920 in volume 1 of Weber's *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion*. Below, we present the most relevant passages of Weber's responses to Sombart and Brentano that appeared in the 1920 version so that readers of this Penguin Classic edition of *The Protestant Ethic* can have an overview of the career of the debate from 1907 (the joust with H. Karl Fischer) until Weber's death in 1920.

Werner Sombart (1863-1941) was educated at Pisa, Berlin, and Rome, studying law, economics, history, and philosophy. Although appointments at the Universities of Freiburg, Heidelberg, and Karlsruhe were vetoed by the Grand Duke of Baden on the grounds of his left-wing leanings, Sombart was eventually appointed professor of economics at the *Handelshochschule* in Berlin in 1906, and then in 1917 he accepted a professorial position at the University of Berlin.

In common with Marx, whom he regarded as the greatest social philosopher of the nineteenth century, Sombart saw capitalism as giving way to socialism, but believed that this would occur through evolution rather than revolution. His attitude toward Marx, as expressed in his book *Sozialismus und soziale Bewegung im 19. Jahrhundert I (Socialism and the Social Movement in the Nineteenth Century*, 1st ed., 1896), was one of critical solidarity. The twenty-four editions of this widely read work, however, chart the author's gradual progression from *Kathedersozialist* (moderate academic socialist) to outspoken antagonist of Marxism. The tenth edition, entitled *Der proletarische Sozialismus (Proletarian Socialism; 1924)*, together with the later *Deutscher Sozialismus (German Socialism; 1934)* contributed to the ideological climate of National Socialism. Despite this, however, the regime viewed him with suspicion, and students were warned against attending his lectures. Sombart later distanced himself from National Socialist thinking in *Der Mensch (Man; 1938)*.

In the work for which he is best remembered, *Der moderne Kapitalismus (Modern Capitalism; 2 vols., 1902)*, which brilliantly combines historical research with economic theory, Sombart propounds his evolutionary view of capitalism, which he sees as passing through the three stages of early, high, and late capitalism.

Sombart was actively involved in both the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie* (of which he was a cofounder) and the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, until their demise in 1933 and 1936, respectively.

Other works by Sombart include *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben (The Jews and Economic Life; 1911)* and *Der Bourgeois (1913)*, both of which, as well as *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, Weber addresses in the footnotes that we

translate below.

Lujo Brentano (1844-1931) was a prominent figure in the German reformist school of socialism (*Kathedersozialismus*) and a member of the Younger Historical School of economics. He gained his doctorate in 1867 at the University of Göttingen. Including his years as emeritus, he was professor of political science from 1871 until his death in 1931 at the Universities of Berlin, Breslau, Strasbourg, Vienna, Leipzig, and Munich. When Brentano retired from the University of Munich in 1919, Weber replaced him.

In 1868, Brentano commenced a study of trade unionism in England which resulted in his *Die Arbeitergilden der Gegenwart (The Workers' Guilds of Today)*; 2 vols., 1871-72). In it he argued that modern trades unions were the successors of the medieval guilds; it soon became an authoritative source on modern associations of workmen. Brentano was also engaged in a polemic with Marx, prompted initially by Brentano's claim that Marx had misquoted, indeed deliberately falsified, part of a budget speech delivered by Gladstone on April 16, 1863, when Gladstone was chancellor of the Exchequer. (The dispute led to Engels's defense of Marx, first in the preface to the fourth edition of *Capital*, volume 1, and, following a rejoinder by Brentano in 1890, in a pamphlet that was published a year later.) Brentano wrote, among many other works, *Eine Geschichte der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Englands (A History of Economic Development in England)*; 3 vols., 1927-29).

Lujo Brentano ardently opposed the rise of German militarism and was for many years an outspoken pacifist. He belonged to a distinguished family line, which included the Romantic poet Clemens Brentano and Adenauer's foreign minister in the 1950s, Heinrich Brentano.

a)

[*Editors' note:* In this opening footnote to the 1920 edition of *The Protestant Ethic*, Weber comments that Brentano was apparently unaware of his (Weber's) controversy with Rachfahl, as he (Brentano) makes no reference to it. He then continues . . .] I have not included in this edition anything from the inevitably rather fruitless polemic against Rachfahl, who—although he is a scholar whom I otherwise respect—had ventured on to a field with which he was not really familiar. I have merely added the (very few) supplementary quotations from my rebuttal [*Antikritik*] and attempted to rule out all possible misunderstandings for the future by inserting sentences or comments. I should also like to mention: *Werner Sombart's Der Bourgeois* (Munich and Leipzig, 1913), to which I shall

return in footnotes below. Finally: *Lujo Brentano* in the second article in the appendix to his Munich speech (Academy of Sciences, 1913) on: *The Beginnings of Modern Capitalism* (Munich, 1916, in a separate edition comprising additional material). I shall refer to this criticism too in special footnotes at the appropriate juncture.

If anyone should be sufficiently interested to do so (an unlikely eventuality), they are welcome to compare the two editions of these essays and satisfy themselves that *not one single sentence* that contains any materially essential statement has been cut, reinterpreted, or moderated. Nor have any materially *differing* statements been added. There was no occasion whatever to do so, and as the exposition proceeds, any doubts remaining cannot fail to be dispelled.

The two last-named scholars are even more seriously at odds with each other than they are with me. Brentano's criticism of Werner Sombart's work *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* I regard as justified in many factual aspects, and yet as frequently very unfair, quite apart from the fact that even Brentano seems not to be aware of the crucial factors regarding the Jewish problem [*Judenproblem*] (of which more later). I myself have not dealt with it in these essays.

Theologians have offered numerous valuable suggestions in response to this work, and reception has been on the whole favorable, and most impartial, even where opinions differed in individual cases. This is especially welcome as I should not have been surprised if there had been a certain antipathy toward the manner in which I treated these matters (which could not be ignored). That which is most *valued* by the theologian whose religion is dear to him cannot, in the nature of things, be given due weight here. In terms of religious *value*, we are often dealing with quite external and crude aspects of the religious life, but the fact remains that these aspects did exist *too*, and often, simply because they *were* crude and external, had the strongest external effects.

At this point I should like briefly to mention, rather than quoting it frequently in relation to every individual point, Ernst Troeltsch's great book *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen* (Tübingen, 1912), which, from his own and a very broad range of other viewpoints, deals with the universal history of the ethic of Western Christianity. As well as the richness of its remaining subject matter, it is highly relevant to our problem, and both complements and confirms



our findings. The author is concerned more with religious *doctrine*, whereas I am more concerned with the practical *effect* of religion.

b) [Weber added this passage to note 15 (p. 46 of this volume)].

. . . Later, in what I believe to be by far the weakest of his major works (*Der Bourgeois*, Munich, 1913)—at least in these sections—Sombart unfortunately, under the influence of a work by *F. Keller* (*Unternehmung und Mehrwert*, Publications of the Görres-Gesellschaft, vol. 12), which also, in spite of many good (though in *this* respect not new) passages, remained *below* the standard of other modern works of Catholic apology, defended a completely mistaken “thesis,” to which we shall have to return at a suitable opportunity. [Refer to section h) below.]

c) [This footnote further accentuates the difference between Fugger and Franklin. See p. 11 of this volume for the context.]

Which of course does not mean that Jakob Fugger was an amoral or irreligious man, nor that these sentences comprise the *entirety* of Benjamin Franklin’s ethic. There was really no need of the quotations from Brentano (*Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus*, Munich, 1916, pp. 150ff.) to protect this well-known philanthropist from the sort of misunderstanding that Brentano seems to think me capable of. The problem is rather the opposite one: How could such a philanthropist utter *these particular sentences* (the characteristic form of which Brentano has omitted to reproduce) in the tone of a *moralist*?

d) [See p. 12 of this volume for the context of the following footnote.]

Brentano (pp. 125-127, note 1) responds to this observation by criticizing the later exposition regarding the “rationalization and discipline” to which man has been subjected by innerworldly asceticism. For him this is a “rationalization” leading to an “irrational conduct of life.” This is indeed so. Nothing is ever “irrational” in itself, but only from a particular “rational” *point of view*. For the irreligious man every religious conduct of life is “irrational,” and for the hedonist every ascetic conduct of life is “irrational,” even if it should be a “rationalization” when measured by *its* ultimate value. If it helps to achieve anything at all, I should like this essay to help to reveal the multifaceted nature of the seemingly unambiguous concept of the “rational.”

e) [Editors’ note 19 on p. 13 indicates the position of this footnote.] Against Brentano’s (op. cit., p. 150f.) comprehensive but somewhat imprecise defense of

Franklin, whose ethical qualities I am supposed to have misunderstood, I should just like to point to this passage, which in my opinion ought to have sufficed to render that defense unnecessary. [See pp. 9-11 of this volume.]

f) [Editors' note 20 on p. 14 indicates the position of this footnote.] I should like to take this opportunity to interpose a few remarks by way of response to criticism.

Sombart is unjustified in claiming (in *Der Bourgeois*, Munich and Leipzig, 1913) that this "ethic" of Franklin is a "literal" repetition of the words of the great universal genius of the Renaissance, Leon Battista Alberti, who, alongside theoretical writings on mathematics, sculpture, painting, architecture (his chief interest), and love (he himself was a misogynist), also wrote a four-volume work on housekeeping (*Della Famiglia*). At the time of writing, I unfortunately do not have the Mancini edition, but only the older one by Bonucci.

The passage from Franklin is printed verbatim above, but where do we find the passages from Alberti's works which correspond to this, especially the maxim "time is *money*," with which he begins, and the exhortations that follow? To the best of my knowledge, the only passage which bears even the faintest resemblance to it is that which comes toward the end of the first book of *Della Famiglia* (Bonucci edition, vol. 2, p. 353), which talks in quite general terms of money as the *nervus rerum* of housekeeping, which must therefore be managed [*gewirtschaftet*] particularly well—just as Cato said in "De Re Rustica."

The portrayal of Alberti is totally false. This man who is keen to stress that he is descended from one of the most distinguished noble families in Florence ("nobilissimi cavalieri": *Della Famiglia*, pp. 213, 228, 247 in Bonucci's edition) is portrayed as a man with an "adulterated bloodline," a bourgeois [*Bürgerlicher*] filled with resentment against the noble families, because—on account of his extramarital parentage (which did not affect his social position in any way)—he was excluded from the families of the *signori*. What is characteristic of Alberti is his advocacy of *large-scale* business dealings, which are the only ones worthy of a *nobile e onesta famiglia* and of a *libero e nobile animo* (ibid., p. 209) and require less work (compare *Del Governo Della Famiglia*, vol. 4, p. 55, in the edition for the Pandolfini, p. 116; for this reason the best business to be in was the wool and silk trade!). He also advocates an ordered and rigorous system of housekeeping, that is, expenses should be

matched to income.

Thus the “*santa masserizia*,” for which Gianozzo is the spokesman, is primarily a principle of *housekeeping*, but not of *acquisition* (as Sombart of all people should have been able to recognize)—just as in the discussion of the nature of money (op. cit), it is primarily a question of the investment of *wealth* (whether money or *possessioni*), not of the utilization of *capital*. What is advocated—as protection against the uncertainties of “Fortuna”—is to accustom oneself as early as possible to regular activity in *cose magnifiche e ample* (p. 192), such activity being the sole means of preserving lasting health (*Della Famiglia*, pp. 73-74), and to avoid idleness, which is always a danger to the preservation of one’s position. It was therefore also important to make provision for the future and protect oneself against the vicissitudes of life by learning a profession [*Metier*] worthy of one’s social position [*standesgemäß*] (but: no *opera mercenaria* is [*unstandesgemäß*] worthy: *Della Famiglia* 1.1 *ibid*, p. 209).

His ideal of “*tranquillità dell’anima*” and his strong penchant for the epicurean “*λαθε βιωσας*” (*vivere a sè stesso*; *ibid.*, p. 262), especially his aversion to any office (*ibid.*, p. 258) as a source of trouble, enmity, and involvement in dirty business, the ideal of life in the country villa, his boosting of his self-esteem by thoughts of his ancestors, and finally his view of the *honor of the family* (which ought to hold on to its wealth, in the Florentine manner, rather than share it) as the vital principle and aim: in the eyes of any Puritan all this would have been sinful “*idolatry*,” and to Benjamin Franklin it would have seemed so much aristocratic rhetoric, totally foreign to him. We should note the high value placed upon the *litterati*. It should be noted that “*industria*” relates principally to literary and scholarly work; it is the truly humane work. It is essentially only the illiterate Gianozzo who is allowed to express the view that *masserizia*—in the sense of “*rational housekeeping*” as a means of living independently of others, and not falling into poverty—is of equal value. The origin of the concept [*industria*], which derives from the monastic ethic (see below) is thus traced back to an old priest (p. 249).

We should place all this beside the ethic and conduct of life of Benjamin Franklin and, especially, of his Puritan ancestors. If we place the Renaissance writings addressed to the humanist patricians alongside the writings of Franklin, which are addressed to the masses of the bourgeois [*bürgerlich*] middle class—and in particular the *commis*<sup>1</sup>—and alongside the tracts and sermons of the

Puritans, we can measure the immensity of the difference. The economic rationalism of Alberti, supported throughout by quotations from ancient writers, comes closest to the treatment of economic phenomena in the writings of Xenophon (whom he did not know), of Cato, Varro, and Columella (whom he quotes)—except that in the case of Cato and Varro in particular, *acquisition* as such takes a far more prominent place than it does for Alberti. Moreover, Alberti's (admittedly only very occasional) mentions of the use of *fattori*, their division of labor and discipline, of the unreliability of the peasants, etc., appear very much like the transposition of Cato's practical astuteness from an economy based on slavery [*Sklavenvronhof*] to that of free labor in domestic industry and a system of sharecropping.

When Sombart (whose reference to the ethic of the Stoics is quite mistaken) finds economic rationalism to have been developed "to its logical conclusion" as early as Cato, this is, properly speaking, not exactly incorrect. It is possible to view the "*diligens pater familias*" of the Romans as belonging in the same category as Alberti's ideal of "*massajo*." What is characteristic for Cato is above all that the estate [*Landgut*] is valued and measured as the object of a wealth *investment*. However, the concept of "*industria*" has a different nuance as a result of the Christian influence. And herein lies the difference. In the conception of "*industria*," which originates from monastic asceticism and was developed by monastic writers, lies the germ of an "ethos" which was fully developed in the exclusively *innerworldly* Protestant "asceticism" (of which more later!). From *this*, as we shall have to emphasize repeatedly, came the relationship between the two, although the link is *less close* to the official Church doctrine of Thomism than to the ethics of the Florentine and Sieneese mendicants. In Cato and in Alberti's own writings, this ethos is lacking. Both are more concerned with practical astuteness than with ethics. Franklin is also concerned with utilitarianism. But the ethical tone of the sermon addressed to the young merchants is quite unmistakable and—this is the point—it is a characteristic feature. Carelessness with money is for him equivalent to the "murder" of embryonic capital, and is therefore an *ethical* shortcoming.

An inner relationship between Alberti and Franklin is only present to the extent that in neither case are religious concepts linked with the advocacy of economic prudence [*Wirtschaftlichkeit*]*—in the case of Alberti, not yet, and in that of Franklin, no longer.* Sombart calls Alberti "pious." In truth, however, although he took holy orders and was granted a benefice from Rome, he scarcely *ever*

(apart from two completely insignificant passages) refers to religious motives as points of orientation for the conduct of life that he advocates. Utilitarianism is the watchword in this area, at least formally, in the case of both men. In that of Alberti, with his advocacy of the wool and silk trade, it is also mercantilist social utilitarianism (the idea that “many people must be put to work,” op. cit., p. 292). Alberti’s remarks on this subject are a very apposite paradigm of the kind of—so to speak—immanent economic “rationalism” that, as a “reflection” of economic conditions, can be found everywhere and in all periods among writers interested purely in “the facts themselves,” in Chinese classicism and in antiquity no less than in the Renaissance and in the Enlightenment.

Certainly, just as in antiquity by Cato, Varro, and Columella, economic *ratio* is here extensively developed by Alberti and his like, especially in the doctrine of *industria*. But how could anyone believe that an intellectual *theory* [*Literatenlehre*] could develop a life-transforming power in the manner that a religious faith that places premiums on *salvation* [*Heilsprämien*] in return for a certain conduct of life [*Lebensführung*] (in this case a methodical rational one) could do? On the other hand, the nature of a *religiously* oriented “rationalization” of the conduct of life (and thus possibly also of economic behavior) is evidenced not only by the Puritans of all denominations, but in a whole variety of mutually quite distinct ways by the Jains, the Jews, certain medieval ascetic sects, Wycliffe, the Bohemian Brethren (a remnant of the Hussite movement), the Skoptsy and the Stundists in Russia, and numerous monastic orders. To anticipate: the crucial difference is that a religiously based ethic offers quite definite and, as long as the religious faith remains alive, extremely effective *psychological premiums* [*Prämien*] (*not* economic in character) for the conduct which it demands, which are simply *not* offered by a mere set of teachings on life skills such as that of Alberti. Only to the extent that these premiums achieve their effect and—most importantly—only in the *direction* of their effect (a direction which, significantly, often diverges widely from the theological *doctrine*—which is, after all, only a “doctrine”) does this ethic exert its influence (one which follows its own laws) [*eigengesetzlich*]<sup>2</sup> on the conduct of life and thereby on the economy. This (and I must make this clear) is the point of this whole essay, and I should not have expected it to be so completely missed.

I shall examine elsewhere the relatively “capital friendly” theological moralists of the late Middle Ages (Antoninus of Florence and Bernardine of Siena in

particular), who were also very badly misunderstood by Sombart. At any rate, Leon Baptista Alberti definitely did not belong to this group. At most, he derived the concept of “*industria*” from this monastic thinking, albeit indirectly. Alberti, Pandolfini, and their like share an attitude of mind [*Gesinnung*] which, despite remaining loyal to the prevailing Christian ethic, is largely oriented toward the “paganism” of the ancient world. While remaining officially in obedience to the traditional church, these men are inwardly emancipated from it. Brentano claims that I have “ignored” the significance of this attitude for the development of modern economic doctrines (as well as for modern economic policy). The fact that I am not dealing with *this* causal series *here* is indeed quite correct: it simply has no place in a treatise on the “*Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism.*” Very far from denying its significance, however—as I hope to show on another occasion—I was of the opinion (and remain so), for good reasons, that its sphere of influence and the direction in which its influence operated were quite *different* from those of the Protestant ethic (the antecedents of which were the sects and the Wycliffe-Hussite ethic—themselves by no means without practical importance). Its influence was *not* on the *conduct of life* (of the rising bourgeoisie [*Bürgertum*]) but on the policy of statesmen and princes. We should make a clear distinction between these two causal series, which partially, but by no means at all points, converge. As far as Benjamin Franklin is concerned, his economic tracts in *this* area, which were at one time used as reading matter in American schools, are firmly in the category of those which are influential for *practical* life, unlike Alberti’s substantial work, which is scarcely known outside academic circles. Here, however, I have specifically quoted Franklin as a man who stood as much apart from the Puritan regulation of life (which had by this time grown weaker) as did the English “Enlightenment” in general, whose links with Puritanism have frequently been described.

g) [Editors’ note 22 on p. 15 of this volume indicates the position of this footnote.]

Unfortunately, Brentano too (op. cit.) has lumped together every kind of striving for acquisition (whether aggressive or peaceful), and then postulated solely the orientation toward *money* (rather than land) as the specific feature of the “capitalist” (as opposed, for example, to the feudal) striving for acquisition. He has then not only refused to make any further distinction—although such distinction would have been vital to formulate clear concepts—but has also (p. 131) (and I fail to understand why) asserted that the concept “ ‘spirit’ of (modern!) capitalism” (which I had coined for the purposes of this investigation)

presupposes what it is supposed to prove.

h) [Editors' note 26 on p. 25 indicates the position of this footnote.] This might be an appropriate juncture to explore briefly the observations in the work of F. Keller (volume 12 of the publications of the Görres-Gesellschaft) and Sombart's observations following from it (in *Der Bourgeois*), as far as they are relevant. [See extract b) above.]

It is a bit too much to stomach when an author criticizes a work in which the canonical ban on interest (except in *one* incidental remark which has *no* connection with the main argument) is *not mentioned at all*, on the grounds that this ban on interest—which is paralleled in almost all religious ethics in the world!—is held up as the distinguishing mark between the Catholic and the Reformed ethic. Surely one should only criticize works that one has actually read, or whose arguments one has not forgotten, if one has indeed read them.

The struggle against *usuraria pravitas* runs through the history of the Huguenots as well as through the Church history of the Netherlands in the sixteenth century. “Lombards,” that is, bankers, were often excluded from the Holy Communion (see p. 23, note 2 [*Protestant Ethic*, note 10, p. 45 in this volume]). Calvin's more liberal view (which, by the way, did not prevent regulations regarding usury being planned for the first draft of the ordinances) only prevailed thanks to Salmasius.<sup>3</sup> So the antithesis did not lie *here*—on the contrary.

Even worse, however, are the author's own arguments, which, compared with the writings of Funck (which he quotes but which I, for one, do not consider worth quoting) and other Catholic scholars, and compared with the studies of Endemann (which though today outdated in parts remain basic works), strike us as being embarrassingly superficial. Keller has indeed remained free of excesses such as those of which Sombart was guilty when he remarked (op. cit., p. 321) that it was quite obvious how the “pious men” (he has in mind particularly Bernardine of Sienna and Antoninus of Florence) “wished to promote the spirit of enterprise by every possible means”—by doing much the same as people all over the world have done in the face of bans on interest, namely, by interpreting the ban on usury in such a way that the (in our terminology) “productive” capital investment remained untouched.

(Incidentally, on the one hand, Sombart regards the Romans as a “nation of

heroes,” while, on the other hand, despite the fact that he normally regards the two things as irreconcilably opposed, he maintains that economic rationalism was already developed “to its logical conclusion” as early as Cato (p. 267). I simply mention this as symptomatic of the fact that this is a book with a definite “thesis,” in the bad sense of the word.

But he has also completely misrepresented the significance of the ban on interest. The significance of this ban cannot be examined in detail here. It often used to be overestimated, then it was greatly underestimated, and now, in an era when there are even Catholic multimillionaires, it has been practically reversed—for apologetic purposes. It is well known that it was only in the last century that the Congregation of the Holy Office issued the instruction for the ban to be annulled—despite biblical support for this—and then only *temporum ratione habita* and *indirectly*, namely, by prohibiting father confessors from causing anxiety to those making their confession by inquiring after *usuraria pravitatis*, provided always that the priest could be confident of their obedience *if the ban should be reintroduced*. The doctrine gave rise to endless controversies, for example, about whether or not the purchase of bonds, discounting of bills of exchange, and all kinds of other contracts were permissible. Consequently (and especially in view of the fact that the above-mentioned decree of the Congregation of the Holy Office was occasioned by a *municipal* loan), no one who has studied in any detail the extremely complex history of the Church’s doctrine of usury can possibly maintain (p. 24) that the ban on taking interest on loans referred solely to emergency credit, or that it pursued the aim of “capital maintenance,” let alone that it was “conducive to capitalist enterprise” (p. 25).

The truth is that it was only at a rather late stage that the Church again focused its attention on the ban on interest, and that, when it did so, the forms of capital investment customary for business were *not* fixed-interest loans, but *foenus nauticum*, *commenda*, *societas maris*, and *dare ad proficuum de mari* (loans in which—*inevitably*, given the nature of the entrepreneur’s loan interest—the investor shared profit or loss in proportion to the class of risk). None of these was affected (except in a few cases where canon law was particularly rigorously applied). Then, however, when fixed-interest capital investments as well as discounting became possible and customary, major difficulties were experienced (and continued to be experienced) as a result of the ban on interest. These difficulties led the merchant guilds to apply all kinds of stringent disciplinary measures (blacklists!). However, the canon lawyers normally treated the interest



ban in a *purely* legal and formal way, and certainly without the slightest tendency to “protect capital,” as suggested by Keller. Finally, *to the extent that* attitudes toward capitalism as such were expressed, these were predominantly of a rather vague, traditionalist distaste for the increasing power of capital, which because of its *impersonal* character was largely impervious to ethical influences. (Such attitudes were exemplified by what Luther said about the Fuggers and financial transactions.) At the same time, the need for accommodation was recognized. However, these matters are not relevant here, for, as we have said: the interest ban and what happened to it has no more than symptomatic significance, and even this only to a limited degree.

The economic ethic of the Scotists and in particular of certain fifteenth-century mendicant theologians, especially Bernardine of Siena and Antoninus of Florence, specifically rationally and *ascetically* directed monastic authors, undoubtedly merits special attention and cannot be dealt with in the context of this essay. I should be obliged to respond to my critics by anticipating what I have to say about the Catholic economic ethic and its *positive* relationship to capitalism. These writers endeavor to show—and in this they prefigure some of the Jesuits—that profit for the *merchant* is ethically *justifiable* as recompense for his “*industria*” (even Keller cannot claim more, of course).

The concept of “*industria*” and the value attached to it is, of course, *ultimately* derived from monastic asceticism, and probably, as stated by himself through the mouth of Gianozzo, from the concept of *mazzeria*, which Alberti took over from the language of the clerics. Later we shall be looking more closely at monastic asceticism as a precursor of the innerworldly ascetic denominations of Protestantism. (The beginnings of similar conceptions can also be found in antiquity among the Cynics, on late Hellenistic tomb inscriptions, and—in quite different circumstances—in Egypt.) What is *completely lacking* (just as it is in the case of Alberti) is precisely what is decisive for us. That is, as we shall see later, the characteristic feature of ascetic Protestantism, namely, the conception of *the proof* of one’s own salvation, the *certitudo salutis*, to be found in the calling, in other words, the psychological *premiums* that this religiosity offered for “*industria*” and that Catholicism inevitably lacked, since its means of salvation were simply different.

In effect, these authors are concerned with ethical *doctrine*, not with practical individual impulses that derive from an interest in gaining salvation. They are also concerned with *accommodation* (as we can very easily see), and not, as in

the case of innerworldly asceticism, with arguments arising out of central religious convictions. (Incidentally, far better commentaries exist on Antoninus and Bernardine than those provided by F. Keller.) And even these proposed accommodations have remained controversial right up to the present. Nevertheless, the significance of these monastic ethical conceptions is by no means negligible when seen as *symptomatic*. The true “beginnings” of a religious ethic leading to the *modern* concept of the *calling*, however, lay with the sects and with heterodoxy, especially with Wycliffe, although his importance has been greatly exaggerated by Brodnitz (*Englische Wirtschaftsgeschichte*), who thought that his influence had such a powerful effect that there was nothing left for Puritanism to do. We cannot (and must not) deal with any of this in any greater detail here. For we cannot explore here, alongside our main thesis, the extent to which the medieval Christian ethic *actually* contributed to the creation of the preconditions for the capitalist spirit.

#### *EDITORS' NOTES*

[1](#) The term refers to clerks or bookkeepers.

[2](#) *Eigengesetzlichkeit* is one of the key concepts of Weber's sociology of modern culture. It denotes the manner in which the various life spheres or life orders (sexuality, politics, science, commerce, art, religion, ethics) take on an inherent, separate logic of their own, no longer subordinated to one religious cosmology or worldview, and each claiming that its own axioms are fundamental, irreducible, and compelling. See “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions” in Hans. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge, 1970), pp. 323-59. For a superb analysis of Weber's argument, see Lawrence A. Scaff, *Fleeing the Iron Cage: Culture, Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 93-120.

[3](#) Salmasius was a sixteenth-century French Calvinist scholar.

## APPENDIX II: PREFATORY REMARKS TO COLLECTED ESSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION<sup>1</sup>

The child of modern European civilization [*Kulturwelt*] will inevitably and justifiably approach problems of universal history from the standpoint of the following problematic [*Fragestellung*]: What chain of circumstances led to the appearance in the West, and only in the West, of cultural phenomena which—or so at least we like to think—came to have *universal* significance and validity?

Only in the West<sup>2</sup> do we find “*science*” at the stage of development that we today recognize as “valid.” Other parts of the world have known empirical knowledge, reflection on the problems of the world and of life, philosophical wisdom, even theological wisdom of the profoundest kind—although a fully developed systematic theology is peculiar to Christianity, with its Hellenist influences (only in Islam and in a few Indian sects can the beginnings of it be found). Knowledge and observation of extraordinary refinement have existed in India, China, Babylon, and Egypt, and in other regions. However, Babylonian astronomy, and that found elsewhere, lacked the mathematical foundation that only the Greeks were able to give it, which only makes the development of astronomy in Babylon, in particular, all the more astonishing. Indian geometry lacked rational “proof,” which was again a product of the Hellenist spirit, and this in turn also first created mechanics and physics. Indian natural science, which was well developed in the field of observation, lacked rational experimentation, which was essentially a product of the Renaissance, though there were classical precedents; it lacked also the modern laboratory, which explains why the empirically and technically highly developed medicine of India was built on a biological and especially biochemical foundation. A rational science of chemistry is absent from all cultural regions apart from the West.

The highly developed Chinese historiography lacks the Thucydidean pragmatism. Machiavelli has precursors in India, but all Asiatic political science lacks a systematic approach like that of Aristotle, and lacks rational concepts entirely. Regarding the law, there are embryonic forms in India (Mimamsa

School), there is extensive codification, especially in the Near East, and there are plenty of books of laws in India and elsewhere, but outside the West there is an absence of the strictly juridical *schemata* and forms of thought needed for rational jurisprudence found in the Roman law, and in the Western law that grew out of it. Moreover, only the West has a structure like canon law.

It is similar with art. Other peoples apparently had a more finely developed musical sensibility than we do today, or at least no less finely developed. Polyphony of various kinds was known throughout the world, ensemble playing of a number of instruments and descant can be found elsewhere. All our rational tonal intervals were calculated and known elsewhere also. But only in the West could one find rational harmonic music, consisting of both counterpoint and chordal harmony; tonal material formed on the basis of the three triads with the harmonic third; chromatics and enharmonics (harmonically interpreted since the Renaissance, not on the basis of distance, but in rational form); the orchestra with the string quartet at its heart and with the wind section organized as an ensemble; the basso continuo; the notation, which alone makes possible the composition and practice of modern musical works, indeed their whole permanent existence; our sonatas, symphonies, and operas (program music, tone painting, tonal change, and chromaticism have admittedly always existed as a means of expression in various other musical traditions). Finally, as a means to achieve this, we have all our basic instruments: organ, piano, violin. All this could only be found in the West.

There have been Gothic arches as decorative features elsewhere, in the ancient world and in Asia; apparently even Gothic cross-vaulting was not unknown in the East. But what is lacking elsewhere is the rational use of the Gothic vault as a means of distribution of thrust, as a means of roofing differently shaped spaces, and, especially, as a construction principle of great monumental buildings. It also serves as the basis of a *style* embracing sculpture and painting, like that created in the Middle Ages. Also, although the technical foundations were derived from the East, only the West has solved the problem of the dome, and achieved the kind of “classical” rationalization of the whole of art that the Renaissance created here. In painting this was attained through the rational use of linear and aerial perspective. Products of the art of printing existed in China. But a printed literature, which was designed for printing *alone* and which could only live by this means, the “press” and “periodicals” especially, came into being only in the West. Institutions of higher education of every possible kind,

including some that were outwardly similar to our universities, or at least to our academies, could be found elsewhere (China, Islamic countries). But only in the West could there be found the rational and systematic pursuit of science by trained *specialists* in any sense approaching the culturally dominant position it enjoys today. Especially the specialist *official*, the cornerstone of the modern state and of the modern economy of the West. Only the first signs of this type can be found, and these never in any sense became a constitutive part of the social order as they did in the West. Of course, the “official,” even the official who specializes in one particular branch of work, has existed from ancient times in the most varied cultures. But apart from the modern West, no country and no period has quite known the absolutely inescapable confinement<sup>3</sup> [*Gebanntheit*] of the fundamental political, technical, and economic conditions of our life and of our whole existence in the shell [*Gehäuse*] of an *organization* of specially trained officials, nor the technical, commercial, and especially the *legally* trained state official as the bearer of the most important everyday functions of social life.

The organization of political and social associations on the basis of *estates* has been widespread. But the polity of estates [*Ständestaat*],<sup>4</sup> the “rex et regnum,” in the Western sense, was known only to the West. And even more important, only the West has produced parliaments consisting of periodically elected “representatives of the people,” demagogues and the rule [*Herrschaft*] of party leaders as “ministers” responsible to parliament—although, of course, all over the world there have been “parties” in the sense of organizations for gaining political power and exercising political influence. The “state” in general, in the sense of a political *institution*, with a vital combination of essential characteristics comprising a rational “constitution,” rationally constituted law, and an administration carried out by *specialist* officials according to rational constitutional rules (that is, “laws”), is known only in the West; however, many embryonic forms of it may exist elsewhere.

So it is too with the most fateful force of our modern life, *capitalism*.

—

In itself, the “acquisitive drive” [*Erwerbstrieb*], “striving for profit,” for monetary gain, indeed for the greatest possible monetary gain, has nothing to do

with capitalism in itself. This striving has been found at all times and in every country in the world among waiters, doctors, coachmen, artists, courtesans, corrupt officials, soldiers, robbers, crusaders, those who frequent gambling dens, and beggars—we may say, among “all sorts and conditions of men,”<sup>5</sup> wherever it has been objectively possible to pursue it. It should be one of the first principles of cultural history that we abandon this naive conceptual definition once and for all. Totally unrestrained greed for acquisition cannot in the least be equated with capitalism, less still with its “spirit.” Capitalism *can* be virtually identical to the *taming*, or at least with the rational tempering, of this irrational instinct. Capitalism is, however, identical to the striving for *profit*, in the course of continuous, rational, capitalist enterprise, for *more and more* profits, and for “*profitability*.” It must be. When the entire economy is organized on capitalist principles, an individual capitalist business that did not aim to achieve profitability would be doomed.

Let us *define* our terms a little more precisely than is usual. A “capitalist” act we take to mean firstly one that rests upon the expectation of profit through the exploitation of opportunities for *exchange*, that is, on (formally) *peaceful* opportunities for acquisition. Acquisition by force (formal and actual) follows its own particular laws, and it is not helpful (although no one can be prevented from doing so) to place it in the same category as actions that are (ultimately) oriented toward opportunities for profit through exchange. [1]

Where capitalist acquisition is rationally pursued, the corresponding action [*Handeln*] is oriented toward the *calculation* of capital. In other words, such action takes place within a planned utilization of material or personal output (used as a means of acquisition) in such a way that in the final calculation the ultimate yield of the individual enterprise, calculated in terms of the *balance* (or, in the case of a continuously operated enterprise, the estimated money value of the property, periodically calculated in terms of the balance), *exceeds* the “capital,” that is, the money value of the property, or the estimated *balance* value of the material means of acquisition employed for acquisition through exchange. This means that in the case of a permanent enterprise, the balance value should *constantly* exceed the capital.

It may be a question of payment in kind given to a traveling merchant *in commenda*,<sup>6</sup> the final yield of which may again consist of other goods in kind obtained by trade. Or it may consist of a factory, the component parts of which

consist of buildings, machines, supplies of money, raw materials, semifinished and finished products, and credit, while on the other hand there may be liabilities. Whatever it may be, the decisive point is that a capital *calculation* in terms of money is made, whether this be in a modern form of bookkeeping or in some primitive and superficial form.

At the outset of the enterprise, there must be a starting balance sheet. Before each individual action, there must be calculation. At the stage of applying controls and checks on appropriateness of procedure, there must be postcalculation, and at the conclusion, when the “profit” is assessed, there must be a final balance sheet. For example, the starting balance sheet for a *commenda* is based on the establishment of the monetary value (to be agreed on between the parties) of the goods handed over—unless they are already in the form of money. The final balance is that of the assessment which underlies the distribution of profit or loss at the conclusion. Where rationality prevails, calculation is the foundation for every single action of those partners. In every kind of capitalist enterprise, to this very day, wherever the circumstances do not require precise calculation, it can be the case that there is no precise calculation and assessment, and that one proceeds on the basis of estimates, or simply in a traditional and conventional manner. But these are points that only affect the degree of *rationality* of the capitalist enterprise.

What is crucial for the concept is simply this: that economic action is decisively determined by the *actual* comparison of the assessment of financial success with the assessed financial input, in however primitive a form. In this sense, “capitalism” and “capitalist” enterprises, even some with a degree of rationalization of capital calculation, have existed in *every* civilized country [*Kulturländer*], for as far back as economic documentation extends: in China, India, Babylon, Egypt, and the ancient world of the Mediterranean, as much in the Middle Ages as in modern times. This applies not only to quite isolated individual enterprises, but also to economies that were entirely based upon constantly changing individual capitalist enterprises, as well as to continuously operating “businesses.” For a long time, of course, trade did not have the character of our permanent businesses, but essentially that of a series of individual enterprises, and it was only gradually that an internal cohesion (based on different “branches”) began to typify the behavior of, in particular, the *wholesale* traders. At any rate, both the capitalist entrepreneur, and not only the casual but also the permanent entrepreneur, are ancient phenomena and were

absolutely universal.

The West, however, has acquired a degree of importance and (something which explains the importance) has produced varieties, forms, and kinds of capitalism that have never existed elsewhere. Throughout the world there have been traders: wholesale and retail traders, local and long-distance, there have been moneylending businesses of all kinds, there have been banks with highly varied functions, but functions which at least in essence resembled our sixteenth-century banks; loans for voyages, *commenda*, businesses, and associations of the limited-liability type, have been widespread, including those run on a businesslike basis. Wherever public corporations required *money* to finance their undertakings, the financial backers were there, in Babylon, Hellas, India, China, or Rome. They were required for the financing of, especially, wars and piracy, for sending supplies, and for buildings of all kinds. In overseas policy they appeared as colonial entrepreneurs, plantation purchasers and managers, employers of slave labor, or of directly or indirectly press-ganged workers. They were involved in farming out estates, offices and (especially) taxation, in the financing of party bosses for election purposes, and of *condottieri* for the purpose of civil wars. Finally, they were active as “speculators” in moneymaking opportunities of all kinds.

These kinds of entrepreneur figures, capitalist *adventurers*, have existed all over the world. Except where they were engaged in trade or in credit and banking business, their opportunities for profit were essentially either purely irrational and speculative or they were centered upon the acquisition of booty by force, whether in the course of waging war or exacted over time by fiscal means (plundering of subject peoples).



Capitalism of various kinds, whether for industrial expansion or large-scale speculation, whether colonial or modern finance capitalism in peace time, but most of all capitalism which is specifically oriented toward *warfare*, has these characteristics even today in the West. A few (and only a few) sections of international wholesale trade have much in common with it today, as they always have done.



But in *the modern period* there has appeared in the West alongside this a quite different kind of capitalism, one that has not developed anywhere else on earth, namely, the rational, capitalist organization of (formally) *free labor*. Only preliminary stages of this can be found elsewhere. Even the organization of *unfree* labor only attained a certain level of rationality in the plantations and, to a very limited degree, in the workshops [*Ergasterien*] of ancient times. It attained a rather lower level in feudal service [*Fronhöfen*] and estate factories, or the domestic industries of the landed estates with their serfs or bonded laborers in the early modern period. As regards free labor, outside the West there is only here and there definite evidence even of “domestic industries.” The employment of day laborers, which of course could be found everywhere, did not lead to manufactories, and not even to the rational organization of craft apprenticeships of the type that existed in the Middle Ages in the West. There were very few and very particular exceptions (for example, state monopolies), most of which differ greatly from modern forms of business organization.

However, rational business organization, based on the opportunities of the *market for goods*, and not on speculation that is irrational or based on power politics, is not the sole unique feature of Western capitalism. The modern rational organization of capitalist business would not have been possible without two further important developmental elements: the *separation of household and business* [*Betrieb* ], which absolutely dominates the business life of today, and, closely connected with this, rational *bookkeeping*. Physical separation of places of work or sale from residence can also be found elsewhere (in the oriental bazaar and in the workshops [*Ergasterien*] of other cultural regions). The creation of capitalist associations with separate accounting can also be found in East Asia as well as in the East and in ancient times. But compared with the modern autonomy of commercial businesses, these are no more than first steps. This is particularly because the *inner* means of this autonomy, both our rational business *bookkeeping* and our *legal* separation of business assets and personal assets, are completely absent or are only in the early stages of development. [2] Everywhere else there has been a tendency for commercial businesses to be part of the greater *household* (the “oikos”) of a ruler or landowner: something which Rodbertus recognized as extremely divergent from, indeed precisely opposed to, the modern organization, however great might be the apparent affinity.

However, all these peculiarities of Western capitalism ultimately derive their present significance from the connection with capitalist labor organization. Even

what is usually known as “commercialization,” that is, the development of securities and the rationalization of speculation in the form of the stock exchange, may be seen in this connection. For without rational capitalist organization of labor, all this, including the development toward “commercialization,” assuming it would be possible at all, would not be remotely comparable in scope, especially for the social structure and all specifically modern Western problems connected with it. Exact calculation—the foundation for everything else—is only possible on the basis of free labor. And just as (and just because) the world outside the modern West has known no rational organization of labor, so (in consequence) it has known no rational *socialism* either.

True, along with city economies, municipal food policies, mercantilism and welfare policies imposed by rulers, rationing, a regulated economy, protectionism, and laissez-faire theories (in China), the world has also known communist and socialist economies of many varieties: communism based on family, or the military, state socialist organizations (in Egypt), organizations based on monopoly cartels, and consumer organizations of all kinds. But just as—although municipal market privileges, guilds, and the most varied kinds of legal distinctions between town and country existed in all places at some time—the concept of the “citizen” [*Bürger*] was lacking everywhere except in the West, and the concept of the “bourgeoisie”<sup>7</sup> was lacking everywhere except in the modern West, so the “proletariat” as a *class* was inevitably lacking, simply because the rational organization of *free labor as a business* [*als Betrieb*] was lacking.

“Class struggles” between the strata of creditors and debtors, between landowners and the landless, serfs or leaseholders, between traders and consumers or landowners—all these have existed for a long time in various constellations. But even the Western medieval struggles between putters-out and domestic workers can be found elsewhere only in embryonic form. And the modern antithesis between large-scale industrial entrepreneur and free waged laborer is entirely absent. For this reason, the matrix of the problematic confronting modern socialism could not exist either.

In a universal history of culture, then, the central purely economic problem for us is ultimately *not* the development of capitalist activity as such (which varies in form only), whether such activity be of the adventurer type or of the trading

type, or that which is oriented toward war, politics, or administration, with their opportunities for profit. It is rather the rise of *bourgeois business* capitalism with its rational organization of *free labor*. Or, seen from the viewpoint of cultural history, the rise of the Western *bourgeoisie* [*Bürgertum*] and its distinctive character, which admittedly is closely related to the rise of the capitalist organization of labor, but is not, of course, simply identical to it. After all, the “citizen” [*Bürger*] in the estate sense existed before the development of specifically Western capitalism—but *only* in the West.

Now modern Western capitalism is obviously very largely determined by, among other things, developments in the field of *technical* possibilities. Its rationality is today essentially dependent upon the *calculability* of technically decisive factors, which are the bases of exact calculation. This means, in reality, that it is dependent upon the character of Western science, in particular the mathematically and experimentally exact and rationally based natural sciences. On the other hand, the development of these sciences, and of the technology founded upon them, received, and continues to receive, in turn, a vital impetus from the capitalist interests [*Chancen*] that attach premiums [*Prämien*] to the economic exploitation of these sciences. True, the rise of Western science has not been determined by such interests [*Chancen*]. Decimal calculation and algebra were practiced by the Indians, the inventors of the numerical series system, which, however, was first employed in the *service* of the developing capitalism of the West, and created no modern system of calculation and accounting in India. Neither was the rise of mathematics and mechanics due to capitalist interests. However, the *technical application* of scientific knowledge—and this was vitally important for the conditions of life<sup>8</sup> of the masses—was stimulated by the economic premiums that in the West were explicitly attached to it. These premiums, however, emanated from the distinctive character [*Eigenart*] of the *social* order of the West. The question that must be asked, then, is “From *which* constituent parts did they emanate?” as they cannot all have been equally important.

Among those parts whose importance is beyond doubt is the rational structure of the *law* and the administration. Modern rational business capitalism requires both calculable technical tools as well as calculable law and administration conducted according to formal rules, without which no rational private economic business with standing capital and reliable *calculation* is possible, although adventure capitalism and speculative trading capitalism and all kinds of

politically determined capitalism may be perfectly possible. Law and administration of this kind could *only* be provided for the economy with *this* degree of precise legal and formal perfection by the West. The question must then be asked: “Whence does the West derive this law?” Among other factors, capitalist interests *also* undoubtedly smoothed the path for the legal profession [*Juristenstandes*], with its specialist training in rational law, to dominate the administration of justice and other forms of administration. Every investigation shows this. But it was by no means only or even predominantly these interests that did this. Neither was it they which *created* that law from within themselves. Certain quite different forces were active in this development. And why did capitalist interests not do the same in China or India? Why was it that in those countries neither science, nor art, nor the state, nor the economy, developed along the paths of *rationalization* peculiar to the West?

In all the above-quoted cases of this particular character [*Eigenart*], we are evidently talking about a specific type of “rationalism” peculiar to Western civilization [*Kultur*]. Now a great many different things can be understood by this word—as we propose to make abundantly clear in what follows. There are, for example, “rationalizations” of mystical contemplation, that is, of a form of behavior which, seen from the viewpoint of other spheres of life [*Lebensgebieten*], is specifically “irrational.” And there can equally well be rationalizations of the economy, technology, scientific work, education, war, the administration of justice, and of other forms of administration. Furthermore, each one of these spheres can be “rationalized” from extremely varied ultimate perspectives and aims, and what may be “rational” when viewed from one may be “irrational” when seen from another. There have thus been rationalizations in many different spheres of life [*Lebenssphären*] in extremely varied forms in all cultures. The difference between them in terms of cultural history, however, lies in the different spheres in which they occurred and in the direction taken by the rationalization. The first problem is therefore once again to recognize the *distinctive characteristics* [*Eigenart*] of Western rationalism, and, within this, of modern Western rationalism, and to explain how it came into being. In light of the fundamental significance of the economy, each such attempt at explanation must above all give due consideration to the economic conditions. But equally the reverse side of the causal connection must not be forgotten. For just as economic rationalism is dependent on rational technology and rational law, so also it is dependent on the ability and disposition of people [*Menschen*] in favor of certain kinds of practical, rational *conduct of life* [*Lebensführung*]. Where this

was thwarted by mental inhibitions, the development of an economically rational conduct of life also ran up against serious inner resistance. Among the most important formative elements of the conduct of life in the past were always magical and religious powers, and the ethical ideas of duty rooted in the belief in them. We shall be dealing with *these* in the collected and extended essays that follow.

Two older essays have been included at the beginning.<sup>9</sup> These attempt to approach, through *one* important individual point, the aspect of the problem which is usually most difficult to grasp: the extent to which the emergence of an “economic disposition,” the “ethos” of an economic form, was determined by certain religious beliefs. This will be demonstrated by reference to the example of the links between the modern economic ethos and the rational ethic of ascetic Protestantism. Here we shall only pursue *one* side of the causal relationship. The later essays on the “Economic Ethic of the World Religions” attempt, in an overview of the relationships of the most important religions of civilization [*Kulturreligionen*] to the economy and social stratification of their environment, to pursue *both* causal relationships as far as it is necessary to find points of *comparison* with the development in the West, which we shall be exploring further. Only thus is it possible to set about *identifying* more or less unambiguously the causal elements of the Western religious economic ethic that, as distinct from others, are peculiar to it. These essays lay no claim to being comprehensive cultural analyses—or anything like them. Rather, they quite explicitly stress whatever *contrasted and still contrasts* with Western cultural development in each cultural region. They have been chosen for their relevance to what seems important in an exposition of the development of the West from *this* point of view. No other procedure seemed feasible given the stated purpose. We must, however, expressly point out the limitations of this purpose, in order to avoid misunderstandings. And in another sense, the uninformed reader should be warned against overestimating the significance of these essays. Scholars in the fields of Sinology, Indology, Semitic studies, and Egyptology will certainly find nothing in them that is substantially new to them. It is merely to be hoped that at least they will find nothing *essential* that they would have to judge to be *untrue* to the facts. The author cannot tell to what extent he has succeeded in at least approaching this ideal as closely as a layman is able. It is perfectly clear that anyone who is dependent on the use of translations, and must learn to use and assess monumental inscriptions, and documentary and literary sources, in order to find his way about the often highly controversial specialist literature, the value

of which he himself is unable to judge independently, has every reason to be very modest about the value of his achievement. This is particularly true when one considers that the amount of available translations of genuine “sources” (that is, of inscriptions and documents) is, in some areas (particularly China), still very small in relation to what exists and what is important.

From all this it is clear that these essays can only be *provisional* in character, especially those parts which relate to Asia. [3] A final judgment must be left to the experts. And it is only because, for understandable reasons, expert works of scholarship with this particular aim, and from these particular points of view, have not so far been forthcoming, that my essays have been written at all. To an incomparably greater degree and in a very special sense, they are destined to become rapidly “outdated,” even more so than is the fate of all scientific work. In this kind of work, involving comparison with other specialist areas, it is simply unavoidable that such overlap should occur, however regrettable this may be; but one just has to resign oneself to the consequences in terms of a much lower expectation of success. Nowadays, fashion or the yearnings of the literati encourage the belief that the specialist can be dispensed with or reduced to the level of subordinate provider for the “viewer.” Almost all the sciences owe something to the dilettante; they often owe him very valuable insights. But dilettantism as a principle of science would mean the end of science. Those who desire a “show” should go to the cinema. (The same principle underlies a vast amount of literary material that is also currently on offer in the same area.) [4] Nothing could be further from the thoroughly sober contents of these studies, which are designed to be rigorously empirical, than this disposition. I should like to add that those who are looking for a “sermon” should go to a chapel.

Not one word is devoted to the *value* relationship that exists between the cultures here treated comparatively. It is true that the whole course of human destiny swirls like a turbulent sea around the one who seeks to view a portion of it. But he will be well advised to keep his little personal comments to himself, as one does when faced with the sight of the ocean and the mountain ranges—unless he knows that he has a vocation for artistic expression or prophetic utterance and is endowed with the necessary gifts. In most other cases all the talk of “intuition” serves merely to conceal a lack of distance from the object of contemplation, and this should be judged in the same way as a similar attitude toward a person.

In view of the present status of ethnography, some explanation is required as to

why it is that in pursuit of the present aims we have not drawn on *ethnographic* research to anything like the extent that would have been essential for any really searching analysis, particularly of Asian religiosity. The reason for this is not simply that the human capacity for work has its limitations. The reason why such an omission seemed permissible was primarily that we were here concerned precisely with the context of the religiously determined ethic of those strata that were the “bearers of culture” [*Kulturträger*] in the relevant area. We are concerned with the influences that the conduct of life of *these* people has exercised. It is perfectly true that the particular character of even these influences can only be fully grasped when it is seen against the ethnographic background. It must be freely admitted and stressed that there is a gap here that the ethnographer has every right to complain about. I hope to be able to do something about filling it by undertaking a systematic treatment of the sociology of religion. Such an enterprise would, however, have exceeded the bounds of the present essays, with their limited aims. These essays have had to content themselves with revealing as far as possible the points of *comparison* with the religions of our Western civilization.

Finally, we should give some thought to the *anthropological*<sup>10</sup> aspect of the problem. If we find again and again—even in (apparently) unconnected areas of the conduct of life—in the West, and *only* there, certain *kinds* of rationalization developing, it seems a reasonable assumption that *hereditary* qualities have been key factors here. The author confesses that he personally and subjectively is inclined to rate the significance of biological heredity very highly. However, despite the significant achievements of anthropologists, I can at the moment see no way to even hazard a guess at what part it plays in the development under investigation *here*, let alone comprehend it adequately. It will have to be one of the tasks of sociological and historical work to first do what it can to expose all those influences and causal chains that can be satisfactorily explained by reference to reactions to fate and one’s environment. Only then, and when moreover the study of the comparative neurology and psychology of race have progressed beyond their present (and in some cases highly promising) early stages, shall we *perhaps* be able to hope for satisfactory results relevant to our problem. [5] At present, these conditions do not yet seem to be fulfilled, and reference to “heredity” would represent a premature abandonment from the level of knowledge that may be possible *today*, and a shifting of the problem to factors that are as yet unknown.

## WEBER'S NOTES

1) Here, as in certain other points, I differ from the view of our revered master Lujó Brentano (as expressed in the work from which we shall later quote). The difference is, in the first instance, terminological. It does, however, also extend to matters of substance. It does not seem to me helpful to include in the same category such heterogeneous things as the acquisition of booty and acquisition of a factory by the management. Still less should we designate as the “spirit” of capitalism—in contradistinction to other forms of acquisition—every kind of striving for the acquisition of *money*. My reason is that in the first case we lose the opportunity, in particular, of focusing on what is specific about Western capitalism as compared with other forms, and in the second we lose all conceptual precision. In *The Philosophy of Money* by G. Simmel, “money economy” and “capitalism” are far too closely identified, to the detriment of the substance of the argument. In the writings of W. Sombart, especially in the most recent edition of his principal work, *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, an excellent book, what is *specific* about the West, namely, the rational organization of labor, is very much downplayed in favor of developmental factors that were present throughout the world. That at least is how I see it from the perspective of my problem.

2) Of course, the antithesis should not be taken as absolute. In Mediterranean and Oriental antiquity, and probably in China and India too, rational *permanent* businesses have grown out of politically oriented capitalism (especially that which derived its income from taxation). The accountancy of these businesses—and records have only been preserved in meager fragments—could well have been “rational” in character. Furthermore, in the history of the origin of the modern *banks* (including the Bank of England), most of which evolved from *political* businesses motivated by the needs of war, politically oriented “adventure” capitalism and rational business capitalism are extremely closely linked. An illustration of this is the antithesis between the individuality of, for example, Paterson<sup>11</sup>—a typical “promoter”<sup>12</sup>—and those members of the board who were responsible for the stance of that institution and were very soon characterized as “The Puritan usurers of Grocers’ Hall.”<sup>13</sup> Another is the blunder committed by this most “solid” bank at the time of the founding of the South Sea Company. Thus the antithesis is, of course, quite fluid. But it is *there*. Neither



the great promoters and financiers nor—speaking generally and allowing for individual exceptions—the typical bearers of financial and political capitalism, the Jews, created methods of *rational* labor organization. That was done by a quite different type (!) of people.

3) The remnants of my knowledge of Hebrew are completely inadequate too.

4) I scarcely need to say that I do not include essays such as those by K. Jaspers (in his book *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, 1919), or, on the other hand, studies like those of Klage (in *Charakterologie*), which differ from what I am attempting in the nature of their starting point. It would not be appropriate to discuss these matters at this point.

5) A most distinguished psychiatrist expressed this view to me a number of years ago.

#### *EDITORS' NOTES*

[1](#) “Vorbemerkung” in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion)*, vol. 1 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1920), pp. 1-16. Weber’s *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion* (3 vols.) was largely devoted to a cross-cultural analysis of the economic ethic of the world religions. For more information on this project, see Introduction, footnotes 101 and 108.

[2](#) To avoid any misunderstanding, it should be emphasized that here, and throughout the essay, Weber is concerned with identifying institutions and practices—among them science, law, bureaucracy, bourgeois business capitalism, and their distinctive modes of rationality—that arose *originally* in the West. He was not saying that such institutions and practices could never have emerged in Asia. Nor was he saying that other civilizations could never have adopted them. On the contrary, it was obvious to Weber that the reverse was the case: that Occidental phenomena were becoming increasingly “universal,” that is, disseminated throughout, and incorporated adaptively within, all of the world’s major civilizations.

[3](#) *Gebanntheit* is literally the condition of being spellbound or transfixed.

[4](#) For a lucid description of the *Ständestaat*, see Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* (London: Hutchinson, 1978), pp. 36-59.

[5](#) Weber uses the English phrase.

[6](#) *Commenda* was a form of trust in use in the Middle Ages in which goods were delivered to another agent for a particular enterprise (as for marketing abroad).

[7](#) In this case the German word is *Bourgeoisie* (not *Bürgertum*). See *The Protestant Ethic and the "Spirit" of Capitalism*, Editors' note 4, on p. 37 of this volume, for a comment on these terms.

[8](#) The word Weber uses is *Lebensordnungen* (life orders or life spheres). According to Weber's theory of modern social development, the various "life orders" (sexuality, family, economy, politics) become increasingly detached from one another and subject to their own immanent logic.

[9](#) Weber is referring to "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" and "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism." Strictly speaking, these are both *revisions* of "older essays": respectively, "The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism" (1905) and " 'Churches' and 'Sects' in North America" (1906), both of which appear in this Penguin Classic on pp. 1-202 and pp. 203-20, respectively.

[10](#) Anthropology is today usually regarded as a discipline that examines cultural diversity. In contrast, Weber used the term in its original sense, defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* (2nd ed., 1989) as "the science of man, embracing human physiology and psychology and their mutual bearing."

[11](#) William Paterson was one of the founders of the Bank of England.

[12](#) This word is in English in the original.

[13](#) This phrase is in English in the original.

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